USA > Washington > Spokane County > Spokane > History of the city of Spokane and Spokane County, Washington : from its earliest settlement to the present time, Volume I > Part 29
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"This portion of the country is wooded about half way from the divide of the Cascade mountains to the Columbia itself, but you pass up the main Yakima seventy miles before you reach the building pine, although cottonwood is found on its banks sufficient for camping purposes ; but when you reach the Pisqnouse or Wenatshapam, you come to a wooded region which extends to the main Columbia. The forest growth of the upper waters of the Clearwater and of the main Columbia from above the mouth of the Wenatshapam, furnishes inexhaustible supplies, which. after being rafted down the streams- that is, the Snake and Columbia rivers-will furnish set- tlements in the vicinity of those rivers with firewood and lumber at moderate rates."
Worthy of observation, said the governor, was the discovery, by his explorations of 1853, that gold existed "throughout the whole region between the Cascades and the main Columbia to north of the boundary, and paying localities have since been found at several points, particularly on the southern tributary of the Wenatshapam (the Wenatchee). Gold quartz also is found on the Natchess river. The gold-bear- ing zone, crossing the Columbia and stretching eastward along Clark's fork and the Kootenay river, unquestionably extends to the Rocky mountains."
In sharp contrast to Stevens' optimism, Captain George B. MeClellan, reporting from his camp at Ketetas, on Yakima river, September 18, 1853, thus describes the Yakima country: "The last forty-five miles of the trail have been over barren sage plains, mostly without grass, always without timber, and very stony: in some of the valleys pretty good bunch-grass is found. The soil of the valleys of the Yakima and its branches, though very limited in extent, is good enough to make tolerable farms, if irrigated."
This of the orchard soil that has since become world famous. MeClellan usu- ally took a pessimistic view, and his discouraging reports were eagerly seized by Jefferson Davis, then secretary of war, to discredit Stevens' enthusiastic laudation of the northern routes. Southern slave-holding interests and sympathizers were then active and adroit in their political manipulations to prevent settlement of northern territories, and at the same time foster the extension of slavery in the vast unsettled areas of the southwest. In this momentous political struggle they had, of
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course, the able support of Secretary Davis, who exerted his official influence in sup- port of an extreme southern route that would have for its Pacifie terminus the harbor of San Pedro, near Los Angeles, or that of San Diego, still nearer the Mexican boundary. In his report to congress, Secretary Davis quotes MeClellan, approvingly, as follows: "I am of the opinion that the Yakima pass is barely practicable, and that only at a high cost of time, labor and money." "The depth of snow upon the summit of this pass has been much discussed." says Davis's report. "Captain Mcclellan, who made the reconnaissance, says that he and his party spared no pains in inquiring of the Indians during the summer, fall and winter, as to the quantity and nature of the snow in the mountains during the winter. . . . All the infor- mation obtained was consistent ; and the resulting conclusions, that in ordinary win- ters there could not be less than from twenty to twenty-five feet of snow in the passes."
Subsequent railroad construction and operation have shown the wildness of these superficial guesses. Governor Stevens, who well understood the unreliability of Indian testimony on this point, as they were opposed, from interest, to the building of railroads in their country, felt, from the beginning, that MeClellan's estimates were unreliable, and emphatically urged that officer to make a more thorough exam- ination of the Cascade passes in the winter of 1853-54: but MeClellan raised one difficulty after another, failed altogether to grasp Stevens' argument that winter was just the time to examine the passes and gather definite, reliable data, and when another officer, Lieutenant Tinkham, aeting under the governor's directions, aeeom- plished the very achievement which Mcclellan had pronounced impracticable, and at the same time proved the untrustworthiness of MeClellan's conclusions, the officer who was later to command the Union armies on the Potomae resented the governor's resolute action, and a coldness grew up between them.
Returning to MeClellan's report on the Yakima valley, we find him asserting that while the Indians raised excellent potatoes, "the cold nights (the thermometer frequently standing below thirty-two degrees at sunrise), and the shortness of the season. would be great obstacles in the way of cultivation. The Yakima val- ley below this is wide, often destitute of grass, no timber of any consequence, and a limited extent of soil that by irrigation could be made moderately productive. On the trail to The Dalles the country is everywhere stony, barren and worthless. The valley of the Columbia, near the month of the Yakima, is a vast sage desert."
CHAPTER XXIV
CONFEDERATED INDIAN WAR OF 1858
WAR FLAMES KINDLED OVER A WIDE AREA-CAUSES LEADING UP TO TIIE OUTBREAK OF TRIBES NORTH OF SNAKE RIVER-YAKIMAS REPUDIATE TREATY AND MURDER THEIR AGENT-STEVENS BITTERLY ASSAILS COMMANDER AT FORT VANCOUVER-STEPTOE'S ILL-FATED EXPEDITION-HIS CANDID REPORT OF THE DISASTROUS REPULSE.
How sleep the brave who sink to rest
By all their country's wishes blest. When spring, with dewy fingers eold. Returns to deek their hallowed mould, She there shall dress a sweeter sod Than fancy's feet have ever trod.
By fairy hands their knell is rung, By forms unseen their dirge is sung; There Honor comes, a pilgrim gray, To bless the turf that wraps their clay : And Freedom shall awhile repair, To dwell a weeping hermit there. -William Collins.
T IS a fitting eoincidence that the United States government has established the military reservation of Fort George Wright on the very scene where that able soldier, four and fifty years ago, dealt his final crushing blow to the confed- erated hostile Indians in the war of 1858. By that victory a lasting peace was won. and this fair wild land made ready for awaiting pioneers. So eondign was that defeat. so stern the treaty language of the stout soldier Wright that the spirit of angry insolence was forever driven From the red warrior's breast. and the Spokanes and Coeur d'Alenes have ever remained our enduring friends. I
If the reader. bent on historie search, will follow downward for two miles the west bank of the Spokane from its confluence with Hangman creek, his eye will fall on the scene where Wright and his gallant command struek the river after their memorable running fight of fifteen miles. Retracing his steps a mile, he will dis- eover, at a point one mile down stream from Hangman ercek, the spot that was made their night eneampment after that strenuous autumn day.
If the reader eare to continue his stroll on historie ground, and will seek out a
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point on the south bank of the Spokane two miles above the main falls, his foot will press the treaty grounds where the broken and terrified Spokanes, responding to Wright's imperious summons, gathered in penitence and besought his mercy.
Wright's campaign in the autumn of 1858 followed fast upon the disastrous re- pulse of Colonel Steptoe at a point near the present flourishing town of Rosalia in northern Whitman county. So charged with stirring interest arc these events, so fraught with lasting consequences, that they constitute an essential episode in Spo- kane's history and that of the whole Inland Empire. It is therefore the author's purpose to devote to them a somewhat extended recital.
The period passing between 1853 and 1858 was signalized by many savage In- dian uprisings throughout the Pacific northwest. At times within that period the skies were red with war flames from the Rogue river region of southern Oregon northward to Puget Sound, and from the western waters to the Rocky mountains. Some tribes of the interior had, in fact, maintained a constant attitude of haughty insolence since the Cayuse uprising in 1847 and the massacre, at Whitman mission near Walla Walla, of Dr. Marcus Whitman, Mrs. Narcissa Whitman and other mem- bers of their household.
Dissatisfaction existed in the minds of some of the interior tribes against cer- tain treaties which had been negotiated in 1855 by Isaac I. Stevens, who bore from the president of the United States a dual appointment as first governor of Washing- ton territory and commissioner empowered to treat with all the Indian tribes of the vast interior from the Missouri to the Pacific. A number of chiefs protested that Stevens had failed to negotiate with the men who were authorized to bind their people by treaty obligations, and angry protests were made against some of the conditions of these treaties.
The unrest was further intensified by a long delay by the senate in its work of treaty ratification and by a conflict of official opinion regarding the ultimate fate of the treaties at Washington. Army officers in the field were positive that ratifica- tion and an attempt by the government to enforce the treaties would precipitate a general uprising. Colonel E. J. Steptoe, then commanding at Fort Walla Walla, entered vigorous protest, declaring in a letter to the assistant adjutant-general at San Francisco:
"It is my duty to inform the general that Mr. J. Ross Brown, acting, as I believe, as an agent of the Indian Bureau. did, in a recent conversation with "Lawyer" the Nez Perees chief, assert that Governor Stevens' treaty of Walla Walla would cer- tainly be ratified and enforced. Considering that this statement is in direct opposi- tion to what the Indians have been told by us, and to what, as I believe, nearly all of them desire, it seems to me in very bad taste, to say the least of it. Mr. Brown could not possibly have known that the treaty will be ratified, and even if he had, the proper time to enlighten the Indians on the subject is obviously after it shall have become a law of the land. He had no right to unsettle the Indian's minds on a point respecting which his convictions arc probably no stronger than the opposite belief of many others in daily intercourse with them.
"I will simply add that in my opinion any attempt to enforce that treaty will be followed by immediate hostilities with most of the tribes in this part of the country ; for which reason it does appear to me greatly desirable that a new commission be appointed, and a new treaty made. thoroughly digested and accepted by both sides."
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Obviously it did not occur to Steptoe that if Brown erred in telling the Indians that the treaty would be ratified and enforced. himself and other army officers were alike at fault when they told the red men that it would not be ratified or enforced. Brown's rights as a prophet were at least equal to those of Steptoe and Clarke, commanding the department of the Columbia.
Ringleaders in this sorry business of repudiating treaties were the Yakimas. They had met Governor Stevens in the summer of 1855, entered into treaty relations and accepted agency rule, only, a few months later. to go on the warpath and mur- der their agent, A. J. Bolon, and a number of other white men in their country. These atrocities they followed up by defeating a detachment of United States troops under Major Haller, and declared their determination to exterminate all the whites in the country.
As we have seen, news of the Yakima war reached Governor Stevens on October 29, 1855, when returning from a council with the Blackfoot nation in Montana. Ile was two days' march from old Fort Benton, head of navigation on the Missouri, when this alarming intelligence reached him by an express from Acting Governor Mason at Olympia, and his position became one of imminent peril. "At this time," to quote from his report to Jefferson Davis, then secretary of war, but within a few years to be making greater history as president of the southern Confederacy, "my party of twenty-five men were in this condition: our animals were poor and jaded from the constant express service in which they had been employed in the operations preliminary to the Blackfoot council; for our expresses had ranged from Saskatche- wan on the north, to the Yellowstone on the south ; they possessed but few arms and little ammunition, as we had, in coming np, found no use for them, passing through the territory of friendly Indians."
Stevens, however, as we have seen in a preceding chapter, met the situation with his customary courage and vigor.
The governor complained bitterly to the war department against the refusal of General Wool, commanding at Fort Vancouver. to dispatch regulars to his relief when it became apparent that he had been cut off from the settlements and his party was in imminent danger of destruction. "We had reached a place of safety unaided, excepting by the fortunate movements of the Oregon troops. Not a single man had been pushed forward to meet us, although it was well known we should cross the mountains about a certain time, and arrive at Walla Walla at the time we did."
"Mr. Secretary," continues the indignant governor, "Major-General Wool, com- manding the Pacific division, neglected and refused to send a force to the relief of myself and party, when known to be in imminent danger, and believed by those who are best capable of judging, to be eoming on to certain death; and this when he had at his command an efficient force of regular troops. It was reserved for the Oregon troops to rescue us. There has been a breach of faith somewhere. I ask for an investigation into the whole matter."
From Walla Walla the governor hastened to Olympia, to deal with the warlike Indians in the Puget Sound country. He found time, however, to map out a winter campaign against the warring savages of the interior, and went to Vancouver to lay it before General Wool, but missed that officer by a few hours, Wool having sailed from Portland for San Francisco. The limitations of this history forbid the presen- tation here of Stevens' plan in detail, but it may be said in passing that he advanced
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there a doctrine of successful Indian warfare which ultimately was applied some twenty years later in Indian wars on the great plains cast of the Rocky mountains, after repeated failure had demonstrated that the old plan of spring and summer campaigns was powerless to strike effective blows. Stevens' advice was founded on the well known fact that when young grass comes in springtime, the Indian finds maintenance everywhere, and if menaeed by an invading enemy, has only to disperse his people in all directions to batlle and defeat pursuit. But in winter his people can not rove at will or pleasure. They are required by the rigors of climate to concen- trate in sheltered places, around their winter stores of provisions, while an invading foree of regulars can transport supplies by wagon and keep its horses in good con- dition by feeding grain.
"I will respectfully urge," advises Stevens in a detailed communication to Wool, "that you forward your preparations with all possible dispatch. Get all of your disposable force in the Walla Walla valley in January. Establish a large depot eamp here: ocenpy Fort Walla Walla and be ready early in February to take the field. February is generally a mild and open month. February and March are the favorable months for operating; all the Indians are destitute of food; the rivers are easy to cross; the mountain passes are closed. In April the Indians can retreat on the Pend d'Oreille route, eastward of the mountains. In May the Coeur d'Alene route is also open ; the streams are swollen and the salmon begin to run. In June roots are abundant and the streams difficult to cross. If operations be vigorously prosecuted in February and March, there is little probability of any of the tribes now peaccable, taking part in the war. This is the conclusion to which I was brought by the recent council held by me with the Indian tribes on the Spokane."
Had these recommendations been heeded, there is reason to believe that the inte- rior tribes would have been paeified by early spring of 1856, and history would not have recorded the disastrous repulse of Steptoe in the summer of 1858. Numer- ons atrocities would have been spared. and the task of subjugating the hostiles would have been far less difficult and expensive than it afterwards proved to be.
This view is ably sustained by Lieutenant John Mullan, an officer under Wright in 1858, and afterwards made famous as surveyor and builder of the historie Mullan trail. "The war feeling of 1855," says this authority. "was not ended in 1858. Many may join issue, but let them remember that at the end of the winter campaign of 1856 there was a mutual withdrawing of troops and Indians from the field. In 1857 no troops were sent into the field. The immigrant rontes were all blocked up in consequence of difficulties in the interior, and thus no passage of persons was had through the Indian country. The command under Colonel Steptoe then that entered the country in 1858 was the first military force that tried the field since the apparent cessation of hostilities."
It is true that Steptoe's little command entered the country with no hostile in- tent. On the contrary, as Mullan says, Steptoe had ever been a firm friend of the Indians, and the objects of his expedition were to "adjust amicably all the differ- ences that existed among the Indians and whites that then had place at Fort Col- ville; to punish those who had run off cattle from Walla Walla, and at the same time to produce a moral effect on the Indians by moving a military column through the country, and give his men at the same time a field experience."
Steptoe has been severely criticised for apparent over-confidence in the friendli-
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ness of the tribes north of the Snake, and the circumstance that his party came with an inadequate supply of ammunition has been cited in substantiation of that belief. But the truth is, Steptoe had given orders for an adequate supply before leaving Walla Walla, but lamentably, as a survivor of the expedition, who served as pack- master, frankly confessed to the author a few years ago, the greater part of the ammunition that had been brought out for packing was overlooked in the excitement of the hour, and the loss was not detected until the party had entered the Spokane country and found itself surrounded by a vastly superior number of furious, taunt- ing warriors.
Apparently no official explanation was made of the scant supply of ammunition, for General Winfield Scott, then commanding the army, commented in this terse manner on Steptoe's report: "This is a candid report of a disastrous affair. The small supply of ammunition is surprising and unaccounted for."
It is not clear, however, that the disaster would have been averted if ammunition had been carried in quantity, for Steptoe's force was vastly outnumbered by the enemy, a part of his soldiers carried old musketoons, an arm inferior to the rifles borne by some of the Indians, and a part of the command were recent recruits who had never been under fire and were inexperienced in field service. It seems probable that with a greater ammunition supply Steptoe would not have made his successful night retreat, and that with the return of day the Indians-who had surrounded his position-would have charged his camp and annihilated his command. Even if they had lacked the courage to close in, they would have renewed the battle and subjected the troops to a repetition of the galling attack as it slowly retreated toward the Snake. In that event it seems certain, too, that the enemy would have sent a sufficient force to the river to capture Steptoe's canoes and thus cut off his retreat to Walla Walla.
Steptoe's official report of his repulse bears evidence of candor, truthfulness and moral courage. Writing, May 23, from Fort Walla Walla, to Major W. M. Mackall, assistant adjutant-general stationed at San Francisco, he said :
"Major: On the second instant I informed you of my intention to move north- ward with a part of my command. Accordingly on the 6th I left here with compa- nies C, E and H, First dragoons (the term then employed for mounted men) and E, Ninth infantry, in all, five company officers and 152 enlisted men. Hearing that the hostile Pelouses were near Al-pon-on-we, in the Nez Perces land, I moved to that point and was ferried across Snake river by Timothy, a Nez Perces chief. The enemy fled towards the north and I followed leisurely on the road to Colville. On Sunday morning, the 16th, when near the Te-hoto-nim-me (probably Pine creek ) in the Spokane country, we found ourselves suddenly in presence of ten or twelve hundred Indians of various tribes-Spokanes, Pelouses, Coeur d'Alenes, Yakimas and some others-all armed, painted and defiant. I moved slowly on until just about to enter a ravine that wound along the bases of several hills which were all crowned by the excited savages. Perceiving that it was their purpose to attack us in this dangerous place, I turned aside and encamped, the whole wild, frenzied mass moving parallel to us, and, by yells, taunts and menaces apparently trying to drive us to some initiatory act of violence.
"Towards night a number of chiefs rode up to talk with me, and inquired what" were our motives to this intrusion upon them. I answered that we were passing on Vol. 1-15
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to Colville, and had no hostile intentions towards the Spokanes, who had always been our friends, ner towards any other tribes who were friendly; that my chief aim in coming so far was to see the Indians and the white people at Colville, and by friendly discussion with both, endeavor to strengthen their good feelings for each other. They expressed themselves satisfied, but would not consent to let me have cances, without which it would be impossible to cross the Spokane river. I concluded, for this rea- son, to retrace my steps at once, and the next morning (17th) turned back towards this post.
"We had not marched three miles when the Indians, who had gathered on the hills adjoining the line of march, began an attack upon the rear guard, and immedi- ately the fight became general. We labored under the great disadvantage of having to defend the pack train while in motion and in a rolling country peculiarly favorable to the Indian mode of warfare. We had only a small quantity of ammunition, but in their excitement the soldiers could not be restrained from firing it in the wildest manner. They did, however, under the leading of their respective commanders, sus- tain well the reputation of the army for some hours, charging the enemy repeatedly with gallantry and success.
"The difficult and dangerous duty of flanking the column was assigned to Brevet Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Gaston, to both of whom it proved fatal. The latter fell about 12 o'clock, and the enemy soon after charging formally upon his com- pany, it fell back in confusion and could not be rallied.
"About a half hour after this Captain Taylor was brought in mortally wounded ; upon which I immediately took possession of a convenient height and halted. The fight continued here with unabated activity; the Indians occupying neighboring heights and working themselves along to pick off our men. The wounded increased in number continually. Twice the enemy gave unmistakable evidence of a design to carry our position by assault, and their number and desperate courage caused me to fear the most serious consequences to us from such an attempt on their part.
"It was manifest that the loss of their officers and comrades began to tell upon the spirit of the soldiers; that they were becoming discouraged, and not to be relied upon with confidence. Some of them were recruits but recently joined; two of the companies had musketoons, which were utterly worthless to us in our present condi- tion ; and. what was most alarming, only two or three rounds of cartridges remained to some of the men, and but few to any of them.
"It was plain that the enemy would give the troops no rest during the night, and they would be still further disqualified for stout resistance on the morrow, while the number of enemies would certainly be increased. I determined for these rea- sons, to make a forced march to Snake river, about eighty-five miles distant, and se- eure the canoes in advance of the Indians, who had already threatened to do the same in regard to us. After consulting with the officers, all of whom urged me to the step as the only means, in their opinion, of scouring the safety of the command, I concluded to abandon everything that might impede our march. Accordingly we set out about 10 o'clock in perfectly good order, leaving the disabled animals and such as were not in condition to travel so far and so fast, and, with deep pain I have to add. the two howitzers. The necessity for this last measure will give you, as well as many words, a conception of the strait to which we believed ourselves reduced. Not an officer of the command doubted that we would be overwhelmed with the first
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