History of the siege of Boston, and of the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Also an account of the Bunker Hill Monument. With illustrative documents, Part 16

Author: Frothingham, Richard, 1812-1880
Publication date: 1849
Publisher: Boston, C.C. Little & J. Brown
Number of Pages: 459


USA > Massachusetts > Middlesex County > Concord > History of the siege of Boston, and of the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Also an account of the Bunker Hill Monument. With illustrative documents > Part 16
USA > Massachusetts > Suffolk County > Boston > History of the siege of Boston, and of the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Also an account of the Bunker Hill Monument. With illustrative documents > Part 16
USA > Massachusetts > Middlesex County > Lexington > History of the siege of Boston, and of the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Also an account of the Bunker Hill Monument. With illustrative documents > Part 16


Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).


Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40


155


OBJECT OF THE BATTLE.


theme of the poet and the orator;1 and as time rolled on, its connection with the great movement of the age appeared in its true light. Hence the battle of Bunker Hill now stands out as the grand opening scene in the drama of the American Revolution.


It has been remarked, that in a military point of view it would be difficult to assign a just motive to either party for this conflict. It was not very important for the American army to hem in the British army in Boston, by a force posted so near as Bunker Hill, when that object could be accom- plished by a force a little further in the rear. While, on the other hand, if the British officers had nothing else in view but to dislodge the occupants of Breed's Hill, it was perfectly competent for them, as they commanded the Mystic and the Charles Rivers, to cut off all communication, and to reduce Prescott and his men to famine. The truth is, both parties were ready and anxious and determined to try the strength of their arms.2 The Americans were elated - perhaps too much elated-by their success on the nineteenth of April, and at Noddle's Island, and in the skirmishes in the harbor. They felt confident in their ability at least to prevent another excursion into the country, and would be satisfied with noth- ing short,of an expulsion of the British troops from Boston.3 So bold had they become in bidding defiance to Great Britain ! On the other hand, British pride was touched by this exulta- tion and daring, and by the reflection that predictions as to the courage of the Americans and the invincibility of the


1 Governor Johnstone, in a speech in the House of Commons, October 30, 1775, said : "To a mind who loves to contemplate the glorious spirit of free- dom, no spectacle can be more affecting than the action at Bunker's Hill. To see an irregular peasantry, commanded by a physician, inferior in number, opposed by every circumstance of cannon and bombs that could terrify timid minds, calmly wait the attack of the gallant Howe, leading on the best troops in the world, with an excellent train of artillery, and twice repulsing those very troops, who had often chased the chosen battalions of France, and at last retiring for want of ammunition, but in so respectable a manner that they were not even pursued, - who can reflect on such scenes, and not adore the constitution of government which could breed such men ! "


2 Address of Hon. Daniel Webster, 1843. 3 See Letter of the Committee of Safety, p. 104.


156


BUNKER HILL BATTLE.


regulars had been so completely falsified. Two regiments, -it had been written, - were sufficient to beat the whole strength of the province;' and a force of five thousand was sufficient to overrun the whole of the colonies. Never had high-sound- ing manifesto been followed by such mortifying results. The veterans of this triumphal march were so closely blockaded, by the force that was pronounced so impotent and was so despised, that their luxurious fare was suddenly changed into salt provision. Thus their daily food stimulated their desire for retaliation. Besides, the army was sent over to bring the Americans to a sense of their duty, and it longed to give them one good drubbing as a necessary step towards it.2 When, therefore, the British officers saw the redoubt, and saw it filled with its daring band, they could not submit that it should " stand in their very face, and defy them to their teeth." Without calculating the cost, or without caring for it, their object was to destroy the works at once, by the power of the royal army, and to take vengeance, as well as to attain security.3


The reason for issuing the order to fortify Bunker Hill has been stated. The council of war had decided not to occupy so exposed a post until the army was better prepared to defend it. But when it was certainly known that the enemy had determined to move into the country, the committee of safety, with that disregard of consequences that characterizes so remarkably the early stage of the revolutionary struggle, advised that this movement should be anticipated. The decision has been pronounced rash. It was followed by desolation and carnage. Much precious blood was shed. Even the " beauty of Israel fell upon his high places." This daring decision, however, was productive of consequences of the highest importance, and which a less terrible ordeal would scarcely have produced. They extended throughout the


1 Letter on page 44. 2 Harris writes, June 12, 1775, -" Affairs at pres- ent wear a serious aspect. I wish the Americans may be brought to a sense of their duty. One good drubbing, which I long to give them by way of retaliation, might have a good effect towards it. * * At present, we are completely blockaded, and subsisting almost on salt provision," &c. - Life of Lord Harris, p. 52. 3 Webster's Address, 1843.


0


157


CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE.


war.1 This is not, however, the place to dwell on them. One of the more immediate of its results-the great political service of the battle-was to establish a state of general hos- tility. This already existed in Massachusetts, where war, and nothing short of war, had been fully resolved upon ; but it did not exist in some of the other colonies, where the spirit raised by the Lexington alarm had softened into a desire of reconciliation. How different, for instance, was the state of things in New York, where the same military companies were directed by the Provincial Congress to escort, on the same day, General Washington to the seat of war, and Governor Tryon to the seat of power ! But after it had been demon- strated that the New England militia had stood the attack of the British regulars, and had twice repulsed them,2 after War-


1 General Wilkinson's Review of the Battle, though clouded by prejudice, and incorrect in some of its details, contains the following discriminating and just remarks on its influence : - " The resolution displayed by the provin- cials on this memorable day produced effects auspicious to the American cause, and coextensive with the war ; for, although compelled by superior numbers to yield the ground, the obstinacy of their resistance put an end to that confidence with which they had been first attacked, and produced meas- ures of caution, bordering on timidity. There can be no doubt that we were indebted to these causes for the unmolested occupancy of our position before Boston." * * " To the cool courage and obstinacy displayed on the occasion, and the moral influence of the bloody lesson which Sir William Howe received on that day, we must ascribe the military phenomenon of a motley band of undisciplined American yeomanry, scarcely superior in num- ber, holding an army of British veterans in close siege for nine months ; and hence it might fairly be inferred that our independence was essentially pro- moted by the consequence of this single battle."


General Lee, also a soldier of the revolution, regards the severe admo- nition Sir William Howe received on this day as the most probable explana- tion of his subsequent timid line of policy. He says : "The sad and impressive experience of this murderous day sunk deep into the mind of Sir William Howe; and it seems to have had its influence on all its subsequent operations, with decisive control."


2 Hon. Daniel Webster, in his address of 1843, states, that it rested on indisputable authority, that, when Washington heard of the battle of Bunker's Hill, and was told that for want of ammunition and other causes the militia yielded the ground to the British troops, he asked if the militia of New England stood the fire of the British regular troops ; and being told they did, and reserved their own until the enemy were within eight rods, and then


158


BUNKER HILL BATTLE.


ren had fallen, and Charlestown had been destroyed, affairs changed their aspect. New confidence was felt in the Ameri- can arms. There were new justifying causes for open war. The other colonies became arrayed in hostility, side by side, with Massachusetts. And it was certain that peace could never be established between the two countries, except on the basis of an acknowledgment of American independence ! 1


The commanding officers, felt that the army was not pre- pared for such a conflict. The want of subordination and discipline rendered efficient military command impossible, and hence the proceedings throughout the day were characterized by great confusion. The evidence on this point, early and late, is uniform and decisive, and it relates both to transac- tions at Cambridge and at Charlestown. During the battle the influence of Colonel Prescott over his men2 preserved order at his position, but in other parts of the field the troops fought rather in platoons, or individually, - companies entirely losing their order, - than under regular commands; and in some instances, where superior officers attempted to exercise authority, their orders were openly disregarded. Even the orders of General Ward were but feebly carried into effect. Much of this delinquency must be placed at the door of ineffi- ciency on the part of some of the officers; but much of it also


discharged it with fearful effect, he then exclaimed, " The liberties of the country are safe ! " Washington, on the 10th of February, 1776, wrote to Joseph Reed : " With respect to myself, I have never entertained an idea of an accommodation, since I heard of the measures which were adopted in consequence of the Bunker's Hill fight. The king's speech has confirmed the sentiments I entertained upon the news of that affair ; and if every man was of my mind, the ministers of Great Britain should know, in a few words, upon what issue the cause should be put." This issue was a determination to shake off all connection with Great Britain. " This I would tell them, not under cover, but in words as clear as the sun in its meridian brightness."


1 Hon. Daniel Webster's Address, 1843.


2 Perfectly understanding his countrymen, remarks Colonel Swett, they were entirely under his control. - p. 22. The depositions often describe his effi- ciency. Captain Bancroft, who was in the redoubt, thus speaks of Colonel Prescott : "He continued through the hottest of the fight to display admira- ble coolness, and a self-possession that would do honor to the greatest hero of any age. He gave his orders deliberately, and how effectually they were obeyed I need not tell." - Ms.


159


THE QUESTION OF COMMAND.


must be ascribed to an absence of the principle of subordina- tion, from the generals to the lower officers. The prompt action of Connecticut, relative to a commander-in-chief, shows that the evil was felt in its full force.


It is from this cause - the want of subordination, and the confusion - that it is a question whether there was a general authorized commander in the battle. Had the army been fully organized, and had the rank of the officers been estab- lished, such a question could not have arisen. It is not one of recent origin, for there was the same perplexity on this point, immediately after the battle, that exists now; and inquiries . in relation to it elicited equally unsatisfactory answers. The orderly book of General Ward not only is silent on it, but contains no orders for the conduct of the enterprise. Nor is this deficiency entirely supplied by any contemporary document. Yet it is from authorities of this character that a correct conclusion must be drawn. In the place of a labored argument on this delicate subject, I prefer to place, as fairly as I am able to do it, the evidence in rela- tion to it that has fallen in my way, state the conclusion it seems to warrant, and leave the subject to the candid reader.


The Massachusetts committee of safety appointed Reverend Messrs. Cooper, Gardner, and Thatcher, to prepare an account of the battle, in which it is stated that the "commander of the party " gave the order to retreat from the redoubt. This is dated June 25, 1775. It was written by Rev. Peter Thatcher, who subsequently stated : " What facts he did not see himself were communicated to him by Colonel Prescott, (who commanded the provincials,) and by other persons who were personally conversant in the scenes which the narrative describes."'


Gen. Ward, in a letter addressed to John Adams, dated Oct. 30, 1775, says : " There has been no one action with the enemy which has not been conducted by an officer of this colony, except that at Chelsea, which was conducted by Gen. Putnam."


Rev. John Martin, who was in the battle, related its inci- dents to President Stiles, who recorded them in his diary, June 30, 1775. He states that the Americans took possession of the hill, "under the command of Colonel Prescott," and


14


160


BUNKER HILL BATTLE.


that application to General Ward for aid "brought Colonel Putnam and a large reinforcement about noon."


Dr. James Thatcher's military journal contains a narrative of the battle, under the date of July, 1775, which purports to have been recorded at the time. He says : "On the Ameri- can side, Generals Putnam, Warren, Pomeroy, and Colonel Prescott, were emphatically the heroes of the day, and their unexampled efforts were crowned with glory. The incom- parable Colonel Prescott marched at the head of the detach- ment; and though several general officers were present, he retained the command during the action."


John Pitts, Esq., in a letter dated Watertown, July 20, 1775, addressed to Samuel Adams, then in Congress, says : "I find the letters, in general, from you, and the rest of our friends, complain of not having particular information relative to the late battle of Charlestown. I do assure you, the particulars, any further than what I have already wrote you, I have not been able to obtain from any one. To be plain, it appears to me there never was more confusion and less command. No one appeared to have any but Colonel Prescott, whose bravery can never be enough acknowledged and applauded. General Putnam was employed in collecting the men, but there were not officers enough to lead them on." 1


Colonel James Scammans printed in the New England Chronicle, February 29, 1776, a report of the court-martial that tried him for alleged misconduct on the day of the battle, with a sketch of the evidence. This report was inter- spersed with notes. In one of them it is remarked, that " there was no general officer who commanded on Bunker Hill." The notes were undoubtedly by Scammans. -


General Charles Lee, in his vindication, in 1778, has a cas- ual allusion to the battle, in adducing proofs of the courage and good qualities of the American soldier. He says : "The Americans were composed in part of raw lads and old men, half armed, with no practice or discipline, commanded with- out order, and God knows by whom."


Rev. William Gordon, 17SS, says : "Orders were issued on


1 This extract was first printed in the oration on the battle delivered by Rev. George E. Ellis.


$


161


THE QUESTION OF COMMAND.


the 16th of June, that a detachment of a thousand men, under Colonel Prescott, do march at evening, and intrench upon the hill." "General Warren joins the Massachusetts forces in one place, and General Pomeroy in another. General Putnam is busily engaged in aiding and encouraging here and there, as the case requires."


General Heath (179S) says in his memoirs : "Perhaps there never was a better fought battle than this, all things consid- ered ; and too much praise can never be bestowed on the coll- duct of Colonel William Prescott, who, notwithstanding any- thing that may have been said, was the proper commanding officer, at the redoubt, and nobly acted his part as such, during the whole action." The italics are by General Heath.


General Lee, in his memoirs, (1812,) after stating that Gen- eral Howe found his enemy posted on Breed's Hill, "com- manded by Colonel Prescott," says : "The military annals of the world rarely furnish an achievement which equals the firmness and courage displayed on that proud day by the gal- lant band of Americans; and it certainly stands first in the brilliant events of our war. When future generations shall inquire where are the men who gained the highest prize of glory in the arduous contest which ushered in our nation's birth, upon Prescott and his companions will the eye of his- tory beam."


Hon. William Tudor, judge advocate in the trials of the delinquent officers, in a communication printed in the Colum- bian Sentinel and N. A. Review, 1818, states as follows : "Soon after the arrival of General Washington, as command- er-in-chief of the American forces, at Cambridge, in July, 1775, court-martials were ordered to be holden for the trials of different officers, who were supposed to have misbehaved in the important action on Breed's Hill, on the seventeenth of June; at all of which I acted as judge advocate. In the inquiry which these trials occasioned, I never heard any insinuation against the conduct of General Putnam, who appeared to have been there without any command ; for there was no authorized commander. Colonel Prescott appeared to have been the chief; and according to my best recollections, after forty-three years, the whole business appeared to have


162


BUNKER HILL BATTLE.


been conducted without order or regular command. Each man fought for himself, loaded and fired as he could, and took care to waste no powder, which was a scarce article at the time."


These statements were made by contemporaries, who, out of professional curiosity, or out of fidelity to history, endeav- ored to ascertain the facts in the case. They were made mostly before controversy had arisen on the subject, and there- fore are not warped by known prejudice or partiality. They are also chiefly independent testimonies, - some of them never having been printed before. Rev. Peter Thatcher, whose account is remarkably accurate, and Rev. John Martin, who was in the battle, are equally clear and positive.1 Gordon, a historian of established reputation for fidelity, was the first to state in print the positions of the commanding officers. He was in the neighborhood at the time, and wrote, probably, with the order before him ; and he uses careful and discrim- inating language. General Heath was one of the council of war that issued the order, and must have known to whom the command was intrusted. His language agrees with the oth- ers. General Ward's remark is decisive that a Massachusetts officer conducted the battle. Dr. James Thatcher, who acted as surgeon in Cambridge, and purports to write at the time, uses unequivocal language, and disposes of the difficulty as to general officers being present. The characteristic allu- sion of General Charles Lee, and the letter of John Pitts, indi- cate the early uncertainty on the subject. The statement made by Scammans, that no general officer commanded, elicited no contradiction at the time, and is confirmed by the words of Judge Advocate Tudor.


To these authorities must be added another, of such high character as to be, of itself, almost conclusive, -that of Judge William Prescott, the son of Colonel Prescott. He states in his memoir: " I have always understood and believe that the detachment was originally placed under the command


. ' The statement of Thatcher I found at the Antiquarian Hall, Worcester, in his own hand-writing. The relation of Martin is in Stiles' Journal, - copies of which were loaned to me by Hon. Geo. Bancroft and President Sparks.


163


THE QUESTION OF COMMAND.


of Colonel Prescott, with orders, in writing, from the command- er-in-chief; that they marched to Breed's Hill under his com- mand, and there threw up the works; and that neither Gen- eral Putnam, nor any other officer, ever exercised or claimed any authority or command over him, or the detachment, before or in the battle; that General Putnam was not in the redoubt during the action. All this I have often heard stated by my father, as well as other officers of the detachment."


The conclusion warranted by this evidence is, that the orig- inal detachment was placed under the orders of Colonel Pres- cott, and that no general officer was authorized to command over him during the battle.


Nor, previous to the year 1790, is there in any document, written or printed, that is known to me, an assertion to the contrary, except where the command is assigned to General Warren.1 It was announced then that a general officer com- manded during the whole affair, from beginning to the end. This announcement was made under the following circum- stances. General David Humphries published an essay on the life of General Putnam, who was then alive, dated Mount Vernon, July 4, 17SS, in which, in a brief account of the battle, he says : "In this battle the presence and example of General Putnam, who arrived with the reinforcement, were not less conspicuous than useful." This language, it will be noticed, agrees remarkably with that of some of the earlier authorities, - especially with Martin, Dr. Thatcher, Pitts, and Gordon, - already quoted. General Putnam died May 29, 1790. Rev. Josiah Whitney preached his funeral sermon, which was published. In a note to this sermon, after remark-


1 Immediately after the battle it was reported in Boston that General War- ren had the command. Hence in all the early British accounts this honor is given to him. It is singular, also, that the same statement is made in some of the American accounts. A brief narrative of the battle appeared in "George's Cambridge Almanack, or the Essex Callender," for 1776, in which it is stated that he was " commander-in-chief on this occasion." And as late as 1813, in the Analectic Magazine, he is regarded as the commander ; and it is said General Putnam "directed the whole, on the fall of General Warren." Some of the soldiers also say that, though he went on as a vol- unteer, yet he was persuaded to take the command. It is, however, now generally admitted, that he served only as a volunteer.


14*


164


BUNKER HILL BATTLE.


ing that the language of Humphries' essay on the battle was not satisfactory to the friends of General Putnam, Mr. Whit- ney says : " The detachment was first put under the command of General Putnam. With it he took possession of the hill, and ordered the battle from beginning to end. These facts General Putnam gave me soon after the battle, and also repeated them to me after his life was printed." Colonel Swett also states that the general made the same declarations to his son.


I have met few contemporary allusions to General Putnam's agency in the battle, besides those which have been quoted. William Williams, in a letter dated Lebanon, Conn., June 20, 1775, 10 o'clock at night, and addressed to the Connecticut delegates in Congress, says : "I receive it that General Put- nam commanded our troops, perhaps not in chief." Captain Chester's letter gives the fact that he ordered the Connecticut troops to Charlestown after the British landed. In the report (1775) made to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, it is stated that on Bunker Hill he ordered Captain Callender, who was riding down the hill, " to stop and go back ; " and in the court-martial held on Colonel Scammans (1775) one of the witnesses stated that Colonel Scammans sent to General Put- nam to see whether his regiment was wanted, and on Bunker Hill that the general ordered this regiment forward. Major Jackson, in his journal, writes, (June 16, 1775,) "General Putnam, with the army, went to intrench on Bunker Hill." The same fact is stated in some of the newspapers. President Stiles, under the date of June 20, 1775, recorded in his diary various rumors from camp, and, among others, that General Putnam, with 300 men, took possession of Bunker Hill on the night of the 16th. On the 23d, however, he derived additional details from several who had visited the camp, been "with General Putnam in his tent on Prospect Hill," and heard him describe the battle. He then writes : "Putnam was not at Bunker's Hill at the beginning, but soon repaired hither, and was in the heat of the action till towards night, when he went away to fetch across this reinforcement which ought to have come before. Soon after, and before he could return, our men began to retreat." I have not seen any disparaging comments


----


165


THE QUESTION OF COMMAND.


on General Putnam's services on this day, previous to those in Wilkinson's Memoirs, printed in- 1816; nor any statement that the first detachment was put under his command previous to that of Whitney's sermon, delivered in 1790.


General Putnam, in a letter dated New York, May 22, 1776, makes an allusion to his services on this day, which has a bearing on the case. This letter was addressed to the Cam- bridge committee of safety, and remonstrated against the treat- ment that Mrs. Putnam had received from an agent of this committee. He says : "Pray did not I labor and toil night and day, through wet and cold, and venture my life in the high places of the field, for the safety of my country, and the town of Cambridge in particular ? For it was thought we could never hold Cambridge, and that we had better quit it, and go back and fortify on the heights of Brookline. I always told them we must hold Cambridge ; and pray did not I take possession of Prospect Hill the very night after the fight on Bunker Hill, without having any orders from any person ? And was not I the only general officer that tarried there ? The taking of said hill I never could obtain leave for before, which is allowed by the best judges was the salvation of Cam- bridge, if not of the country." 1




Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.