USA > Massachusetts > Middlesex County > Concord > History of the siege of Boston, and of the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Also an account of the Bunker Hill Monument. With illustrative documents > Part 24
USA > Massachusetts > Suffolk County > Boston > History of the siege of Boston, and of the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Also an account of the Bunker Hill Monument. With illustrative documents > Part 24
USA > Massachusetts > Middlesex County > Lexington > History of the siege of Boston, and of the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Also an account of the Bunker Hill Monument. With illustrative documents > Part 24
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Washington was compelled by circumstances around him to pursue an inactive defensive policy. This, together with the condition of his army, more especially as to enlistments, weighed heavily on his mind. The Connecticut and Rhode Island troops were engaged only until the first of December, and those of Massachusetts only until the first of January ; and he was desirous, before this time, by "some decisive stroke," to drive the enemy from Boston, and thus to relieve the country from the expense of an army. On the Sth of September, he addressed a circular to his major and brigadier- generals, calling a council of war on the following Monday ; and he requested them to consider, preparatory to the meet- ing, whether it was expedient to make a simultaneous attack, by land and water, on Boston. This council was held on the 11th, consisting of the commander-in-chief, Major-generals Ward, Lee, and Putnam; and Brigadier-generals Thomas, Heath, Sullivan, Spencer, and Greene. It was unanimously agreed, "That it was not expedient to make the attempt at present, at least." On the 21st of September, Washington communicated this result to Congress, and stated that he had not wholly laid aside the project of an attack. He remarked, "Of this I hope the honorable Congress can need no assur- ance, that there is not a man in America who more earnestly wishes such a termination of the campaign as to make the army no longer necessary." His secretary, Joseph Reed, in a letter, September 29, expressed the views entertained on this point in the camp :- " Boston must, I fear, be given up for the common safety. The army and navy here must, at all events, be destroyed this winter. Should it be reinforced, the consequences to America will be dreadful. I preach this doc- trine with all my might, and hope the committee of Congress, who are expected here this week, will confirm it. The gen- eral is anxious to strike some decisive stroke, and would have done it before this, if matters had not been misrepresented to ยท him." In an elaborate letter (September 21) Washington forcibly describes his situation : - " My situation is inexpress-
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APPLICATIONS FOR DETACHMENTS.
ibly distressing-to see the winter fast approaching upon a naked army, the time of their service within a few weeks of expiring, and no provision yet made for such important events. Added to these, the military chest is totally exhausted; the paymaster has not a single dollar in hand. The commissary- general assures me he has strained his credit for the subsist- ence of the army to the utmost. The quartermaster-gen- eral is precisely in the same situation; and the greater part of the troops are in a state not far from mutiny, upon the deduc- tion from their stated allowance."
Washington, at this period, received many applications for detachments from the main army, to defend the towns along the coast from the pillage parties of the enemy; and among them, formal requests from the legislature of Massachusetts, and the governor of Connecticut. It was a delicate task to refuse them, for it might create serious disaffection among the people ; it was a dangerous policy to grant them, for it would have so seriously weakened the army as to have exposed it to a successful attack. Washington, taking council of the stern- est dictates of public duty, declined to comply with these requisitions. In reply to a letter of the patriotic Governor Trumbull, September 21, he said: "I wish I could extend protection to all; but the numerous detachments, necessary to remedy the evil, would amount to a dissolution of the army, or make the most important operations of the campaign depend upon the piratical expeditions of two or three men-of-war and transports." The policy of leaving isolated points to the protection of the local militia was acted upon through the war.
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THE SIEGE OF BOSTON.
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CHAPTER X.
Recall of General Gage. Proclamations of General Howe. New Organi- zation of the American Army. Armed Vessels.
GENERAL GAGE saw reason to alter his opinion of the colo- nists after a short experience, and in a despatch of June 25, 1775, told Lord Dartmouth much wholesome though unwel- come truth. After regretting his loss of the 17th, he wrote: " The trials we have had show the rebels are not the despica- ble rabble too many have supposed them to be; and I find it owing to a military spirit, encouraged among them for a few years past, joined with an uncommon degree of zeal and enthusiasm, that they are otherwise." He informed his supe- rior that the conquest of the country was not an easy work. It could only be effected by time and perseverance, and by strong armies attacking it in various quarters. He remarked of the colonists, that "In all their wars against the French, they never showed so much conduct, attention, and persever- ance, as they do now." The general here was in error. The colonists manifested the same spirit in conquering Louisburg, and in saving the remnant of Braddock's army. His percep- tive powers had been blinded by contempt. When he repre- sented that, in conquering a square mile of territory, a detach- ment made up of the flower of his army had one half of its number killed and wounded, and that after a complete victory, the whole of his army was closely besieged, it became neces- sary, in accounting for such facts, to admit the presence of something besides cowardice.
1
General Gage, though in favor of occupying New York, regarded the evacuation of Boston as a measure of too much danger, and difficulty, and importance, to be taken without having the sanction of government. He accordingly deter- mined to winter his army in its present position, and the last of September he commenced preparations to quarter it in the
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GENERAL GAGE RECALLED.
houses of the inhabitants. In consequence of this determina- tion, it was necessary to remove the furniture from the build- ings that would be required; and on the 1st of October, Crean Brush received a commission authorizing him to receive for safe keeping such goods as the people might voluntarily intrust to him. On the 2d General Gage issued a proclama- tion requiring a return of the names of every inhabitant, the army and navy excepted, and their places of abode, unto the town major, at his office, in Long-lane, on or before the 5th of October. On the 7th he issued a proclamation appointing "Joshua Loring, Jr., Esq., to be sole vendue master and auctioneer, in and for the town of Boston," and strictly pro- hibiting any other person from doing such business.
This was one of the last official acts of General Gage in Boston. Just before the reception, in England, of intelligence of the battle of Bunker Hill, a despatch had been made out for him, in which a sketch of future operations was drawn, and important questions were proposed for his consideration. But when this intelligence arrived, a separate letter was writ- ten, bearing the same date with the other,-August 2,-and closing in the following terms: "From the tenor of your letters, and from the state of affairs after the action of the 17th, the king is led to conclude that you have little expectation of effecting anything further this campaign, and has therefore commanded me to signify to you his majesty's pleasure, that you do, as soon as conveniently may be after you receive this letter, return to England, in order to give his majesty exact information of everything that it may be necessary to prepare, as early as possible, for the operations of next year, and to suggest to his majesty such matters in relation thereto as your knowledge and experience of the service enable you to furnish." He was directed to leave the other despatch, when he came away, with General Howe, who would succeed him in the command. These letters were received in Boston, by the Cerberus, on the 26th of Septem- ber. General Gage replied in full to the letter of Lord Dart- mouth, in a communication dated October 1, which certainly bears the marks of ability, good sense, and sound judgment. Subsequent events show, that if the ministry rejected the
21*
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THE SIEGE OF BOSTON.
general, they accepted his advice. He recommended the occupancy of New York, and stated the difficulty of making New England the seat of the war. "I am of opinion," he wrote, "that no offensive operations can be carried on to advantage from Boston. On the supposition of a certainty of driving the rebels from their intrenchments, no advantage would be gained but reputation ; victory could not be im- proved, through the want of every necessary to march into the country. The loss of men would probably be great, and the rebels be as numerous in a few days as before their defeat; besides, the country is remarkably strong, and adapted to their way of fighting."
General Gage immediately prepared for his departure. On this occasion he received several testimonials from his friends. On the 6th his council, and the leading loyalists, presented separate addresses to him, drawn up in a similar loyal tone, and expressing gratitude for his civil and military services. Both of them are highly eulogistic of his personal character. That of the inhabitants is reserved in its endorsement of his proceedings ; that of the council is fulsome in its flattery. It not only expressed "profound respect" for his "prudence, benevolence, and candor," in civil affairs, but for the "steadi- ness, vigilance, and humanity," of his military career. They presented their "loyalty to the best of kings" as their title " to the care and protection" of Gage's successors ; and they requested him to assure their "gracious sovereign" that they were " unalienably attached to his sacred person and govern- ment." 1 Gage, in one of his replies, lamented the miseries brought upon this once happy country, through the deep designs and dark contrivances of ambitious men, to raise themselves from obscurity to power and emoluments. He could not reflect "without pain upon the infatuation of the
) The council, in their address, said : " We have seen with pleasure the many efforts you have made to avert this unhappy rebellion. We lament that the success has not been equal to your endeavors. But the undisturbed constancy and firmness with which you have pursued this principle, opposed to every abuse which wickedness, delusion, or enthusiasm could devise, has been as much the object of admiration to the loyal, as the subject of disap- pointment to the disaffected, people of this province."
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GENERAL WILLIAM HOWE.
multitude," " who enjoyed perfect liberty, who felt no oppres- sion, but, deceived and betrayed, had flown to arms to avert evils that existed only in imagination ;" and "in lieu of lib- erty had madly erected a tyranny upon the most free, happy, and lenient government." The country loyalists in Boston presented (the 7th) another address to Gage, which vied with that of the council in its fulsome flattery. Their regrets at his departure were relieved by the hopes of his speedy return ; their lamentations at the few who dared to stem the torrent of rebellion and sedition were softened by the anticipation of the establishment of the rightful supremacy of Parliament over America. Gage, in his reply, gave them the welcome assurance that, during his absence, his successors in civil and military command would afford them every favor and protec- tion. This language indicated that he expected to resume his command in America, after he had given the "exact informa- tion" which the British cabinet demanded and needed. He sailed October 10 for England, and soon found that his serv- ices would be dispensed with. He did not return to America. On this day General Howe took the command.'
General Howe was superior in ability to his predecessor, inferior to him in education, but no better informed of the temper of the people he was ordered to conquer. He had learned, however, to respect their courage, and was as averse as his predecessor had been to offensive operations about Bos- ton. His reasoning, of the inductive cast, was conclusive. If the works of a single night, unfinished as they were, ill- supplied with ammunition and cannon as they were, cost so much blood to carry, what would be the sacrifice in storming lines made formidable by the labor of months, and frowning with heavy artillery ? And if successful, no other end would be gained than to drive the Americans from one stronghold to
1 Boston, Oct. 10, 1775. - The king having ordered the commander-in- chief to repair to Britain, and that, during his absence, Major-general Carle- ton should command his majesty's forces in Canada, and upon the frontiers, with the full powers of commander-in-chief ; and that Major-general Howe should have the like command within the colonies on the Atlantic Ocean, from Nova Scotia to West Florida inclusive, - orders are hereby given to the troops to obey the said major-general accordingly. - Howe's Orderly Book.
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THE SIEGE OF BOSTON.
1
another. In his letter in reply to the important despatch of August 2, which was dated October 9, he frankly stated to Lord Dartmouth, "That the opening of the campaign from this quarter would be attended with great hazard, as well from the strength of the country, as from the intrenched posi- tion the rebels had taken." He recommended an entire evac- uation of Boston. Further south the army might possibly penetrate into the country, but here it could only defend this post, and send out plundering expeditions, without having the power of reducing the inhabitants. In the beginning of the letter he assured Lord Dartmouth that Boston, "without the most unforeseen accident, would be in no danger from the enemy during the winter ;" at the close of the letter he earn- estly solicited the arrival of the destined reinforcement early in the spring. In the mean time he proposed to keep quiet, and to attempt nothing material. The British veterans in Boston would "shortly have full employment in preparing quarters for the winter ;" while the reinforcement of five bat- talions of two thousand, expected from Ireland, would enable him "to distress the rebels by incursions along the coast." He "hoped Portsmouth, in New Hampshire, would feel the weight of his majesty's arms." Such was the policy prescribed by the ministry 1 to bring the freemen of America to the feet of the British throne. It was carried out to the letter by the king's generals, in their wanton sacrifice of life and property. Its mission was to widen the breach between England and her colonies, to break the charm of loyalty that so long had bound them together, and thus to pave the way for political independence and national unity ..
The cliange of commanders was popular with the army. They thought General Gage lacked enterprise and nerve. They thought he had been too lenient to the people of Boston,
1 This savage policy was expressly authorized by the British government, although it affected to be displeased at the destruction of Falmouth. It ought to have the full odium of it. Thus Lord Dartmouth, in a despatch dated October 22, 1775, authorized Howe to employ the troops in "attacking and doing their utmost to destroy any towns in which the people should assemble in arms, hold meetings of committees or congresses, or prevent the king's courts of justice from assembling."
251
HOWE'S POPULARITY.
and too favorably disposed, out of family connections, towards the body of the colonists. They fancied General Howe to possess opposite qualities. One letter says, "he is in the high- est estimation and honor among his brave countrymen ;" another account says, "even the blunders of Bunker Hill were forgotten, so happy were most people at the change." He had proved himself brave and energetic in battle, and gen- erous and humane in sharing the fatigues and in ministering to the necessities of the troops. Measures more decisive and uncompromising were expected.1
General Howe first improved his defences, and provided quarters for his troops. The main works in progress at this time were, a fort on Bunker Hill, and additional fortifications at Boston Neck. The former was so far completed, October 26th, that a general order designated the manner in which the several regiments were to line it in case of an attack. This was a very strong work. In describing it, an account says : "I do not recollect whether you saw Charlestown-side in that forwardness to give you any idea of its present strength ; nor can I, with words, well describe the plan ; - suffice it to say, that we thought six hundred men, commanded by two field- officers, so fully sufficient to protect it against the whole rebel army, that the flushes are levelled, and the Neck left open for their approach." General Clinton took the command of this post September 29, on the promotion of General Howe.
1 In England the British commander was much blamed for his inactivity. A British journal, Sept. 23, says : " With a degree of apathy scarce recon- cilable to the honor of a great nation, we see our whole force penned up in America by a rabble of half-armed militia-men. Even on the element of our nation, the sea, we have been strangely inactive, if not negligent. Both by sea and by land our commanders have been, with reason, complained of ; and while we complain like women, we have not the spirit of men to remove them from places which they fill so awkwardly."
The British officers wrote various apologies to their friends in England for this inaction. A letter, dated August 19, says, that the Bunker's Hill busi- ness of the 17th of June has convinced the provincials so entirely of the irre- sistible intrepidity of our troops, that they have attempted nothing of any moment since. They have formed a line of contravallation from Mystic River, which runs by Bunker's Hill round to Dorchester, about eight miles in extent, and carry on the petit guerre of popping at sentries.
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THE SIEGE OF BOSTON.
Adjutant Waller's orderly book, kept on the heights, gives glimpses of camp scenes. The troops were enjoined to main- tain a high state of discipline. They were occasionally assembled for divine service, when they were directed to appear " clean," to be arrayed in order, and to be "as much as possible sheltered by a grove of trees." Sometimes rogues were barbarously flogged, and deserters were hung on Charles- town Neck. Views of the heights sent to England represent two clusters of tents, - one on Bunker Hill, and the other on Breed's Hill. These beautiful hills, at this time unincum- bered with scarcely a building, and in full view of the sur- rounding country, presented a fine appearance, as the British troops, in their brilliant uniforms, paraded on their summits.
The British general' was uncommonly busy in Boston. Many buildings near the hay-market, at the south end, were pulled down, and an opening was made from water to water. Here the troops were engaged in raising works. Six hundred men were employed on Boston Neck. The lines here also were made very strong. Other defences also were thrown up. "Our works," Carter writes, October 19, "are daily increas- ing ; we are now erecting redoubts on the eminences on Bos- ton common ; and a meeting-house, where sedition has been often preached, is clearing out, to be made a riding-house for the light dragoons."
Gencral Howe, on the 25th of October, issued three procla- mations, which created much indignation. In one he stated that several inhabitants had "lately absconded," to join, as he apprehended, "his majesty's enemies, assembled in open rebellion ; " and he threatened any who were detected in an attempt to leave the town, " without his order or permission given in writing," with "military execution." Any who escaped he should treat as traitors, " by seizure of their goods and effects." A second proclamation prohibited any person who had thus obtained permission to go out from taking more than five pounds in specie, and threatened offenders with the forfeit of the whole sum discovered, and with such fine and imprisonment as might be adjudged proper for the offence. To insure sharpness, he promised that one half of the moneys thus detected should go to the informer. A third proclama-
EVENTS OF OCTOBER. 253
tion recommended the inhabitants to associate themselves into companies, which were to be employed solely within the pre- cincts of the town, to preserve order and good government. They were to be armed, such as were able, and to be allowed fuel and provisions equal to the allowance of the troops. This proclamation was equivalent to a threat; for it said, in order " that no one might plead ignorance," the association, under the direction of Hon. Peter Oliver, Foster Hutchinson, and William Brown, Esquires, would continue in session four days in the Council Chamber. Up to this time the Tories in the country, and even the officers of the crown, if neutral, were generally unmolested. It could not, however, be ex- pected, that there could be burning of towns and seizure of private property on the one side, and forbearance on the other side. Washington (Nov. 12) recapitulated the substance of these harsh proclamations, and ordered Gen. Sullivan, about to repair to Portsmouth, N. H., to seize all officers of govern- ment there who had given proofs of their unfriendly disposi- tion to the patriot cause. On the same day he gave similar orders to Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut. He wrote (Nov. 15) also to Governor Cooke, of Rhode Island, as fol- lows : " Would it not be prudent to seize on those Tories who have been, are, and that we know will be, active against us ? Why should persons, who are preying on the vitals of the country, be suffered to stalk at large, whilst we know they will do us every mischief in their power ?"
No skirmish of importance occurred in October in the neigh- borhood of Boston, nor was a new position taken. Early in the month there was a sharp cannonade on Roxbury, but after this things for some days continued remarkably quiet. On the 19th, the Essex Gazette states that scarcely a gun had been fired for a fortnight. On the 4th, a small fleet, under Capt. Mowatt, sailed out of Boston. It consisted of a sixty- four, a twenty gun ship, two sloops of eighteen guns, two transports, and six hundred men. They took two mortars, four howitzers, and other artillery. This was the fleet that burnt Falmouth. About the 12th a naval skirmish took place at Beverly. One of the privateers fitted out at this place was driven in by the Nautilus man-of-war, when she got aground
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THE SIEGE OF BOSTON.
in a cove just out of the harbor. The people collected, stripped her, and carried her guns ashore. The ship also got aground, but was able to bring her broadside to bear on the privateer, when she began to fire upon it. The Salem and Beverly people soon returned the compliment from the shore, and the firing lasted for two or three hours. When the tide rose the ship got off. The privateer was but little damaged. On the night of the 17th the Americans saluted the British camp on Boston common. Carter writes : "They brought three floats (with a piece of cannon in each) out of Cam- bridge River, and fired a number of shot, - some of which went over, several fell short ; in fine, we had not even a tent- cord broke." The assailants did not fare so well. One of their cannon burst, damaging the battery, and wounding some of the men. Colonel Huntington writes, Oct. 19: "We had three fine floating batteries, -two in Cambridge, and one in Mystic River. Two of them remain good yet; and about twenty flat-bottom boats, that will carry near an hundred men each, besides a number of whale-boats."
Dr. Belknap (Oct. 20) visited the lines at Roxbury, and writes : "Nothing struck me with more horror than the pres- ent condition of Roxbury ; that once busy, crowded street is now occupied only by a picquet-guard. The houses are deserted, the windows taken out, and many shot-holes visible ; some have been burnt, and others pulled down, to make room for the fortifications. A wall of earth is carried across the street to Williams' old house, where there is a formidable fort mounted with cannon. The lower line is just below where the George tavern stood; a row of trees, root and branch, lies across the road there, and the breastwork extends to Lamb's Dam, which makes a part thereof. I went round the whole, and was so near the enemy as to see them (though it was foggy and rainy) relieve their sentries, which they do every hour. Their outmost sentries are posted at the chimneys of Brown's house." 1
Washington, during October, was occupied with making preparations for the winter, and in a new organization of the army. He was not in a condition to act offensively. This ' Life of Dr. Belknap, p. 92.
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WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER.
inactivity, however, grew more and more irksome to the com- mander, and more unsatisfactory to the country ; and it occa- sioned audible murmurs. It was believed that an assault on Boston was delayed out of a desire to spare its inhabitants, and to save. their property. Congress, either sharing this feeling or willing to hazard an engagement, suggested to the commander-in-chief, that if he thought a successful attempt against the British troops practicable, it would be advisable to make the "attack upon the first favorable occasion, and before the arrival of reinforcements." But Washington hardly needed this hint, for at no period of his command was he more solicitous to act on the offensive than during the siege of Boston. He stated his position, and the necessity of his continuing to act on the defensive, in a letter dated Octo- ber 5, 1775: " The enemy in Boston and on the heights of Charlestown are so strongly fortified, as to render it almost impossible to force their lines, thrown up at the head of each neck. Without great slaughter on our side, or cowardice on theirs, it is absolutely so. We therefore can do no more than keep them besieged, which they are to all intents and purposes, as closely as any troops upon earth can be, that have an opening to the sea. Our advanced works and theirs are within musket-shot. We daily undergo a cannonade, which has done no injury to our works, and very little hurt to our men. These insults we are compelled to submit to for want of powder, being obliged, except now and then giving them a shot, to reserve what we have for closer work than cannon distance." 1
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