The westward movement : the colonies and the republic west of the Alleghanies, 1763-1798 with full cartographical illustrations from contemporary sources, Part 14

Author: Winsor, Justin, 1831-1897. cn
Publication date: 1897
Publisher: Boston ; New York : Houghton, Mifflin and Co.
Number of Pages: 622


USA > Mississippi > The westward movement : the colonies and the republic west of the Alleghanies, 1763-1798 with full cartographical illustrations from contemporary sources > Part 14


Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).


Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51


151


FLORIDA BLANCA.


d'Aranda. They got some encouragement in the promise that American privateers should have equal protection in the French and Spanish ports. Vergennes, however, had lost some of his boldness, or was veiling it, when, a few weeks later (February, 1777) Grimaldi was succeeded at Madrid by the Count Florida Blanca.


This man, who thus became the Spanish king's prime minis- ter, was forty-six years old ; he had risen from an inconspicnons station, and by force of character had well crowded with action his mature life. He disliked England, was jealous of France, and hated revolutions. He certainly was not quite ready to make good all the promises which Grimaldi had made. He had his eye on Portugal, and he wished rather to have French aid in securing that little kingdom, than to join in the struggle in British America. He thought, also, that France and Spain could work together better in Brazil, a Portuguese dependency, than in North America. Vergennes felt otherwise, and this lack of accord, as well as the bad news from Washington's army, seemed at present to be fatal to an agreement.


To offset the ill effects of the military miscarriages near New York, Congress was quite prepared (December, 1776) to prom- ise its assistance in capturing Pensacola from the British and share its advantages as a port, as well as the navigation of the Mississippi, with Spain ; but this willingness was not known till April, when Franklin opened the question with Aranda. A few weeks before (March 4, 1777), Arthur Lee had met Gri- maldi at Burgos, but he could get no promise of aetive assist- ance. He further learned that Florida Blanca was apologizing to England and playing shy with Vergennes. Nevertheless, it was intimated that the Americans would find powder and other supplies at New Orleans, which they could take, if they liked, on credit.


In France there was an active public opinion, asking for ac- tion, largely induced by the influence of Franklin. But Ver- gennes repelled the request of the American commissioners for guns and ships, and made a show of preventing Lafayette and De Kalb embarking for America. By April 20, however, La- fayette, who had fled to Spanish territory, put to sea, though ostensibly for the West Indies.


This exodus, or some other incident, had aroused Stormont,


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THE SINISTER PURPOSES OF FRANCE.


the British ambassador in Paris, to a belief that an expedition to aid the rebels was arranged by a French general officer, and he suspected that he could get more particular information if he could pay fifteen hundred guineas for it. His government was not quite as credulous, and directed him not to pay the money. Before long the French cabinet was assuring the London states- inen of their determined neutrality. This led the British min- istry in July to propose a treaty, in which both England and France should guarantee their respective possessions in America. Vergennes was not to be caught, and before many days had passed, he and the king were pretty well agreed that the ex- pected crisis for determinate action had come. There was some difficulty in making the king see wisdom in abetting a rebellion against a royal brother ; but Vergennes had little sympathy with any such sentiments, when the purpose to punish England was in the balance. It had come to be simply a question of the opportune moment for a public declaration. Franklin, in Sep- tember, was assuring Congress that the commissioners were much too far from accomplishing their object. The final fruition of all his hopes was nearer than Franklin could have judged. The autumn had brought mingled elation and regret in the colonies. Washington had failed at Brandywine and German- town ; but Burgoyne had capitulated at Saratoga. An army worsted was no offset to an army captured, and Jonathan Aus- tin Loring, when he sailed, on October 30, as the messenger of good tidings to the American commissioners in Paris, carried also conviction to the hesitating cabinet of France.


Early in December, 1777, and not many hours apart, the startling news reached Lord North in London, just as he had returned at midnight from a debate in Parliament, and it was broken to Franklin at Passy by the Boston messenger. It was soon heard by Vergennes. "There must be no time lost," he said. He let the king, who was wondering what Spain would do, understand that an advantage was likely to accrue to whom- ever first welcomed the Americans to the company of nations.


Beaumarchais, when he was trying to induce the French king to advance the Americans a million, told him that " to sacrifice one million to make England spend a hundred is but advancing a million to obtain nine and ninety." The present news was a stronger plea than any argument of his could be,


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BURGOYNE'S SURRENDER.


and having received it from London, he had hopes of being the first to break it in Paris. He was hurrying to that capital as fast as his horses could gallop, when his carriage over- turned, and he was put to bed in agony in a neighboring house. It was December 6, and he sent a message ahead, dictated from a couch of pain. It was too late. The king was already en- gaged in inviting propositions from Franklin. Two days later (December 8), the American commissioners, in language that had probably been arranged with Vergennes, made their re- sponse in a document which was at once dispatched to Spain. It had no immediate effect. Spain's Mexican and Brazilian fleets, with their treasure, were still awaited, and it was not pru- dent to incite England to their capture. Beside, Spain's rup- ture with Portugal was still unhealed. At least, such were the professions.


Vergennes, meanwhile, was having conference with the American commissioners, and on December 17 they were in- formed that France was ready for an alliance and would make an acknowledgment of their independence. Ten days later (December 27), Vergennes was sending word to Madrid that Spain was losing the opportunity of centuries to cripple the power of England, and recover Gibraltar, Minorca, and Florida. France had already pledged her power to the extent, in one way and another, of about three million livres, as Vergennes and Franklin both knew.


The new year (1778) opened in France with the American commissioners greatly satisfied with the outlook. "Ever since Burgoyne's fate was known," wrote William Lee, "we are smiled at and caressed everywhere." Louis XVI., following up the arguments of his minister, was sending word to his Bour- bon brother of Spain that he had come to an understanding with the American commissioners, "to prevent the reunion of America with England." Every obstacle removed, on Febrn- ary 6, 1778, the treaty was signed. Stormont, the English ambassador in Paris, divined what was in progress, and a cer- tain " Mr. Edwards " was probing the secrets for him, - per- haps, under a new guise, the same Dr. Edward Bancroft who had been dogging the steps of Deane. Stormont was paying well for what information he secured, and was naturally im- mersed in the misery of not knowing just how much to believe


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THE SINISTER PURPOSES OF FRANCE.


of all that was betrayed to him, while, as the negotiations pro- ceeded, Manrepas, in his intercourse with him, was blandness itself in his denials. Within two days, it was confidently be- lieved in London that the French king had at last succumbed, and had banished his qualms of conscience in recognizing rebels. It was supposed that the allied parties had agreed to give Canada and the West Indies to France, if the fortunes of war threw those regions into their hands.


On March 10, 1778, Vergennes instructed Noailles in London to break the news to Lord Weymouth, and on the 13th it was done. The respective ambassadors of the two countries were withdrawn, and when Stormont reached London on the 27th, he found bank stocks at 69, a drop to less than a moiety of the value of two and a half years before.


This condition to a mercantile people was very alarming. Grenville Sharp and others were already outspoken for an accommodation with America on the basis of her independence. It would prevent, they claimed, a rupture with France and Spain. North had inclined to the same view ; but it was not a grateful one to the king and the rest of the cabinet. They so far felt the pressure, however, as to introduce into Parlia- ment (February 17) acts of conciliation with America on the ground of continued allegiance. They were passed, and reached America by the middle of April.


France, fearful of their effect, was soon reassured by a prompt rejection of them by Congress. The movement of the English ministry encouraged Florida Blanca to offer mediation for the purpose of curbing the ambition both of the colonies and of England, and of assuring some territorial aggrandizement to Spain. It was Spain's proposition to confine the revolted colo- nies to the Alleghany slope, while she guaranteed to England the valley of the St. Lawrence and the region north of the Ohio, taking to herself all south of the Ohio between the mountains and the Mississippi. England was not so much in straits that she could come to such an agreement, and the arbitration was refused.


Spain got nothing for her pains, and France was content, both with the failure of Lord North, and with the disappoint- ment of Florida Blanca. It all looked well in the mind of Ver- gennes for securing deeper revenge upon England. Vergennes


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ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE.


cared nothing for America, if only her exhaustion was increased so that France could the better become the arbiter of her future. His simple purpose was to degrade England first, and America next.


The defeat of Florida Blanca's plot with England was felt by Vergennes to open the way to secure the alliance of Spain, and it was well known what Spain wanted. "The Court of Spain," wrote Lee to Congress, March 19, 1778, " will make some difficulties about settling the dividing line between their possessions and those of the United States. They wish to have the cession of Pensacola." Ten days later (March 29), Ver- gennes wrote to Gérard at Philadelphia that Spain would probably require a promise of Florida before she would accede to the alliance, and Gerard was instructed to prepare Congress for yielding that point. To insure the continuance of the alli- ance with France, Gérard was reminded that the United States should be made to understand that Canada must remain to England, France renouncing any purpose of regaining that province.


When Congress, on May 4, 1778, had ratified the treaty, at- tention had already been directed to the Spanish problem on the Gulf. Patrick Henry, as governor of Virginia, had as early as October, 1777, been urging upon the Spanish authorities at New Orleans the opening of trade with the States by the Missis- sippi, and now again in January, 1778, he was making a dis- tinct proposition to Galvez to accept produce sent down from Kentucky in return for munitions and cash. In the following June, Colonel David Rogers started from Fort Pitt, in two boats built by General Hand's orders, to make a beginning of the trade. Reaching New Orleans in October, he found that Galvez was so ignorant of the geography of the valley that he had sent the goods intended for Virginia to St. Louis. Thither Rogers was obliged to return for them. The passage of the Mississippi to and fro was made with little danger, as ever since April, the river above New Orleans had been freed of the Eng- lish flag ; but later, while ascending the Ohio, and near the mouth of the Licking, the little flotilla was waylaid, as we have seen, by Hamilton's Indians, and its commander killed.


Meanwhile, a more active career awaited Captain James


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THE SINISTER PURPOSES OF FRANCE.


Willing of Philadelphia. This officer had departed from Pitts- burg, bearing a commission from Congress. He had less than fifty men ; but as his business was mainly to plunder, he picked up recruits as he went. One of his aims was to placate or in- timidate the Tory settlement about Natchez, where a body of loyalists had bought of the Choctaws, in 1777, a stretch along the river from 31° to the month of the Yazoo, a distance of something over one hundred miles. During January, Willing had carried a rather ruthless hand among the upper settlements of the river. In February, he was at Natchez, devastating the cstates of such as had fled across the river. He seized one of the Tory leaders, Colonel Anthony Hutchins, and took him to New Orleans, where he was put on parole. The plunder which Willing also took away was estimated by those who suffered at a million and a half dollars in value. The agents of France in New Orleans were not altogether pleased at this kind of domination for the American flag, inasmuch as too much suc- eess might give the Republic such territorial claims on the river as it was not French policy to encourage. Rochehlave, who commanded the British post in the Illinois, when he heard of the fall of Philadelphia, and that it was reported that some of the chief rebels were "flying by way of Fort Pitt," imagined that Willing's exploits were simply preparing the lower Missis- sippi as a refuge for disheartened patriots.


In April, 1778, Pollock complained to Congress that a British , sloop-of-war was still capturing vessels at the river's mouth, but he had at least ground for rejoicing in the new commission from Congress, which Willing had delivered to him, and in that offi- cer's destruction of the Tory nest at Natchez, which had been supplying provisions to Pensacola and Jamaica.


Pollock now dispatched one Reuben Harrison to Natchez to preserve the neutrality which Willing had instituted ; but Hutchins, breaking his parole, reached that post ahead, and, gathering his old associates, Harrison's boat was lured to the banks and captured. This for a while ended the neutrality. To keep the river open for the passage of supplies to the Ohio looked now hopeless, for the " Hound," a vessel sent from Pen- sacola, was likely before long to reach a station at Manchac, near Baton Rouge, where her boats could patrol the river. Pollock's plan was for American boats coming down from above to avoid capture by being put under the Spanish flag.


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POLLOCK AT NEW ORLEANS.


Willing was now raising men in New Orleans, and was in- tending to risk passing up the river with a flotilla in time to reach the falls of the Ohio in October, which, with his lading of supplies for Fort Pitt, he could best pass at that season.


In April, 1778, Galvez issued a proclamation permitting trade with the United States. Pollock, at the same time, was fitting out a captured letter of marque as an American cruiser. He was somewhat embarrassed for money, as he had not yet re- ceived from Philadelphia the $36,000 due him for the supplies which he had sent up the river.


Notwithstanding there had been no adhesion given as yet in Madrid to the American cause, it was apparent that the rep- resentatives of Spain and America were acting now in much harmony at New Orleans. The price of this informal connec- tion might put Spain, possessed ultimately of Florida, in a position to contest with the Republie the eastern bank of the Mississippi, as it turned ont she did.


As the summer (1778) came on, the British plans had worked out to their satisfaction. They controlled Natchez with a force of two hundred men. Another sloop-of-war, the "Sylph," with a erew of one hundred and fifty men, kept a body of sixty British rangers under cover at Manchae. Others were expected, for Clinton, in New York, had been aroused to the exigeney.


Pollock was accordingly obliged to bestir himself and send warnings up to the Arkansas to meet any boats descending the river. In July, two Scotch merchants in New Orleans, Ross and Campbell, were found to be sending tidings to Natchez of intended attempts to send supplies up the river. They were seized and sent to Pensacola. The reestablished Tories at Natchez had indeed rendered the blockade of the river so effec- tual that Willing hesitated to start with his supplies. In August, however, under the escort of an armed force, led by Lieutenant George, he hoped to ascend the river for other exploits, - the expense of the undertaking being met in part by a loan of $6,000 from Galvez ; but nothing came of the plan.


Pollock had been long anxious for some decisive stroke. In May, he had urged Congress to start an expedition from Fort Pitt to sweep the British from the river, and then to advance on Pensacola. He was confident there was not in that post, he- side Indians, more than eight hundred to a thousand men. He


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thought a thousand Americans could clear the Mississippi, and that three thousand could capture Pensacola. He had himself, he adds, secured a prize ship, the " Rebecca," and put a suitable armament on board with one hundred and fifty men, and in two months he hoped to cooperate in attacking the English ship at Manchae. But his plans miscarried. In the autumn, the British control of the river was so well maintained that he was obliged to send Willing and his men north by sea. In Decem- ber, he dispatched a vessel to Havana with merchandise to be exchanged for supplies, which were to be sent thence to the United States. He had gone on spending his own money and receiving no remittances from Congress, which was now over $40,000 in his debt. He was selling his own slaves to enable him to meet his outstanding obligations.


As the summer and autumn (1778) wore on, the purpose of France was developed. Franklin, as sole commissioner, was treating with Vergennes in Paris, and Gerard and Gouverneur Morris were conferring in Philadelphia. The object of Ver- gennes was unmistakable. He would, in confining the new Republie to the Atlantic slope, propitiate Spain, and in giving the region north of the Ohio, with Canada, to England, he would establish a constant menace between the colonies and the mother country, and cripple the future of the nascent Republic. So he talked with Franklin with as much bland concealment of his intention as he could, while he instructed Gérard to prepare Congress for submission to Spain's demand. France at this time had eighty ships of the line and sixty-seven thousand sailors, and for ten years she had been drilling ten thousand gunners for her navy. Nevertheless, she urged that England with her one hundred and fifty ships of the line (and two hun- dred and twenty-eight in all) was an overmatch, unless the sixty great ships of Spain could be added. D'Estaing, with his fleet, had not certainly, during the summer, justified in American waters the hopes which had been entertained. There- fore it was necessary for America, as Vergennes represented, to abate her territorial pretensions and secure the alliance of Spain for a common good. By October (1778), it seemed as if Vergennes had brought Florida Blanca to consent to join the alliance on certain conditions. These were that the war should


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GERARD IN PHILADELPHIA.


be continued till Gibraltar was gained for her, either by cap- ture, or by agreement at the peace ; and that America should agree to her having Florida and the trans-Alleghany region. Morris, in Philadelphia, was unfortunately showing how the Republic might yet give in to such demands. He was con- fessing to Gérard that yielding the Mississippi to Spain and Canada to England might the better restrain the western com- munities in any arrogant hope they felt of future independence. There was no such hesitation about Canada in Lafayette. He and D'Estaing had planned for an invasion north of the St. Lawrence, and had sent from Boston a proclamation to arouse the native French of Canada. This done, D'Estaing had in November sailed for the West Indies, while Lafayette, two months later (January, 1779), went to France to work out this aggressive movement for the coming season. Washington saw the dangers of it for the Republic, as a Frenchman like Lafay- ette could not. The fear of the American leader that France, reestablished in Canada, would help the schemes of Spain on the Mississippi, led very soon to the abandonment of the project.


Nor did a scheme of Vergennes and Charles III. of Spain, planned at the same time, result in any action. Gérard was instructed to sound Congress cautiously in the matter, but we know little more of it than as a proposition to the United States to accept a long truce with England instead of a peace, during which France and Spain would have time for arranging ulterior projects. England, however, was in no mood to come to terms of France's proposing after her own approaches to Congress had been repelled, and while France kept a fleet in the Ameri- can waters. It was apparent that both England and Spain preferred to gain time, rather than commit themselves to any definite arrangement.


Early in 1779, Congress had decided (January 14) to make no peace without the concurrence of France, and it was appar- ent at what price Spain would render her aid in the war, and that the United States were mainly to pay the cost. Gerard, instructed by Vergennes, was assiduously impressing upon Con- gress that the demands of Spain were proper and should be met ; that it was meet for America to renounce territorial am- bition and be content with thirteen States along the Atlantic


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slope, and that there was great danger of an Anglo-Spanish league, unless Pensacola and the free navigation of the Missis- sippi were assured to Spain.


Spain, meanwhile, was toying with Grantham at Madrid, professing a desire for alliance with England, and suggesting the benefits of the proposed long truce with her colonies as best to calm the internecine passions. At the same time she was shuffling with France, and waiting the results of Gerard's in- trigues at Philadelphia, buoyed up the while by the hope of regaining something of that imperial dominion in the New World which the bull of demarcation had assigned to her at the end of the fifteenth century. While Vergennes (February 12) was submitting to Spain a proposition to fight England unceas- ingly till America's independence was secured, leaving Spain's aspirations to be satisfied by wresting something from America in the future, Florida Blanca set no less a price on the adhe- sion of Spain than the old demand of Gibraltar. When their demands were known, Congress, on March 19, with considerable spirit, announced that while Spain might possess Florida, the American States had no intention of releasing claim to all that England gained below the Great Lakes by the treaty of 1763, and to the full navigation of the Mississippi. To make their intentions definite, Congress defined the bounds by a line from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, along the height of land between the Atlantic and the St. Lawrence to the north- west head of the Connecticut, and thence direct to the south end of Lake Nipissing, and on to the sources of the Mississippi, - of course in ignorance of just where those sources were. It was provided as an alternative that. if it became necessary, the line beyond Lake Nipissing might be run farther south, but not below 45°. On the south they claimed the left bank of the Mississippi above 31°, - the old southern bounds of the Caro- lina charter of 1663, which had indeed never been acknowledged by Spain. There was also a distinct demand on Spain for a port of entry on the river within Spanish Louisiana.


While this action was pending, and the British commander in New York was strengthening Pensacola with General Camp- bell's force of fifteen hundred men, Spain, fearing England less now that she had lately augmented her fleets, entered into a secret treaty with France on April 12, 1779, and thus joined


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SPAIN AND ENGLAND.


hands in the new triple-combination against Great Britain. The professed object of this clandestine alliance was to secure Gibraltar, and to distract England by an invasion of the British islands, and by attacks on Minorca, Pensacola, and Mobile. It is only of late years that the full text of this convention has become known, and Bancroft, in his earlier editions, had allowed larger pretensions for Spain than were given to her.


Six days after the treaty had been concluded, Spain made other perfidious propositions for alliance with England, and these being rejected, on May 3, 1779, she openly declared war. There was now no further doubt on England's part of what she was to encounter. In the early part of the summer the Euro- pean parties to the conflict were manœuvring for an advan- tage, while Congress was at the same time facing a serious complication in the evident purpose of France and Spain to insist on recognizing England's territorial pretensions in the Quebec act. France saw that this gave Spain a better chance of wresting the country north of the Ohio from England, - as indeed was attempted by Spanish troops in 1781, - than from the grasp which Virginia was preparing to make upon it, and did make in 1779.




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