USA > New York > New York City > History of the New Netherlands, province of New York, and state of New York : to the adoption of the federal Constitution. Vol. II > Part 29
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Government he said must rest upon . " the good opinion of the people." He thought the inefficacy of the present confederation was owing to want of confidence in it, and that arising from declaimers who compared it to " a rope of sand;" these declaimers being fashionable and leading people. The ills the people felt, arising from their own extravagance, they attributed to the government. He closed his speech by a motion that the number of representa- tives be fixed at one for every 20,000 until they amounted to 300, and apportioned among the states by the number of inhabitants, and that " before the first enumeration, the several states shall be entitled to choose double the number of representatives for that purpose mentioned in the constitution."
The next speaker was Alexander Hamilton .* He defended
. * During the sitting of the convention, three of the members, Hamilton, Madi- sou and Jay, published in the papers of the United States that admirable work . afterwards collected and called the Federalist.
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Robert R. Livingston's first speech, and set himself in opposition to Lansing and Smith. He agreed with Livingston as to the weakness of New York, yet hoped we should not sacrifice our liberties : that we ought not to be actuated by unreasonable fear, but by a prudent regard for the public welfare. The radical vice of the old confederation is that the laws of the union only apply to states in their corporate capacity. Instead of obeying the law, the state examined it ; and by its own peculiar interests. Thus thirteen bodies judged congress, and each took its own course. If the requisition benefitted the individual state it was complied with, otherwise not. . This state bore unequal burthens owing to the delinquency of others. In time of war this state is exposed, and will ever be the theatre of war. In the last war New York suffered greatly, yet complied with the requisitions of congress, while New Hampshire, not suffering, was totally delinquent. North Carolina is delinquent. Many other states contributed but little. New York and Pennsylvania are the only states that perfectly dis- charged the Federal duty. The security of many states caused their non-compliance with the requisitions of congress. To force a compliance made civil war necessary, with all the horrours of disunion. The remedy is that the national laws shall operate upon individuals, as the state laws do. He insists on the want of con- fidence in a single assembly. The fundamental principle of the old confederation must be discarded ; a new system adopted.
He alludes to the Amphictyonick confederacy. The Dutch- the German-are noticed, because brought into view by others. Confederacies have hitherto been founded on false principles.
"During the war, common danger prevented the operation, in its full force, of the ruinous principle on which the old confederation was founded.
" The country is divided into navigating and non-navigating states. The northern are the first : the southern the second. The southern states wished to impose a restraint upon the northern, by requiring two thirds in congress to be necessary to pass an act in regulation of commerce. They feared that a navigation act would discourage foreigners, and throw navigation in the hands of the northern states, and thus enhance freight to the south. Again, the small states wished to retain their present advantages, and the large states thought Rhode Island and Delaware ought not to enjoy an equal suffrage with themselves-hence a contest-compromise was necessary. A committee was appointed, and they formed the arrangement as it stands. The convention could not establish, but only recom- mend a constitution. It is objected that three fifths of the negroes are taken into the representation. The south is unfortunate that a great part of the population as well as property is in blacks. With- out this indulgence by accommodation, no union could have been
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formed. But he insisted, that it was just to gratify the south. They possess certain staples-tobacco, rice, indigo-capital articles in treaties of commerce ; and the advantages they obtain in treaties, are felt by all the states. Again : representation should be com- pounded of persons and property. Slaves are not considered altogether as property. They are men, though degraded to the condition of slavery. They are persons known to the municipal laws of the states which they inhabit, as well as to the laws of na- , ture. It would not be just to compute these slaves in the assess- ment of taxes, and discard them from the apportionment of repre- sentatives. Besides that a great number of people in the state of New York who are not represented, will be included in the whole enumeration."
Mr. Hamilton proceeded to consider the objections to the num- ber of representatives. "There are no direct words prohibiting con- gress from reducing the number ; but the construction of the clause gives no such power. They may limit, but cannot diminish. One to every thirty thousand is fixed as the standard of increase, till by the increase it becomes necessary to limit the ratio. At present, it might considerably exceed sixty-five. In three years, it would exceed one hundred. To what point the representation ought to be increased, is matter of opinion. In Massachusetts, the assem- bly consists of three hundred ; in South Carolina, one hundred ; in New York, sixty-five. Congress is to consist at first of ninety- one members. New states may be created, which is another source of increase. If our number at present is three millions, one for thirty thousand gives one hundred representatives. In twenty-five years, we shall have two hundred."
He then considered the natural advantages of the state govern- ments-giving them an influence and ascendancy over the national government-precluding, as he said, the possibility of Federal encroachments.
- June 21st, Mr. Jonathan Williams, elected from Washington and Clinton counties, addressed the chair. He would attribute the distress of the country to habits of luxury, and the intro- duction of foreign commodities. The article of tea will amount in two years to all our foreign debt. All our present difficul- ties are not to be attributed to the defects in the confederation. He thinks the question before them momentous. The constitution must not swallow up the state governments. He thinks the num- ber of representatives too small to resist corruption. He objects to biennial elections. Annual elections are more democratick. He would not establish a bad government for fear of anarchy.
Melancthon Smith rose in opposition to Mr. Hamilton. He admits with him that the powers of the general government ought to act upon individuals to a certain degree. He will confine him-
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self to the subject under consideration. He will not reply to the arguments to justify the rule of apportionment, though confident they might be refuted. He is persuaded that we must yield this point to accommodate the south. He does not see that the clause fixes the representation. He sees that the representatives cannot exceed one for thirty thousand, and that whatever larger number of inhabitants may be taken for the rule of apportionment, each state shall be entitled to send one representative. If there is any other limitation, it is certainly implied. He thinks each member's share of power will decrease by an increase of representatives ; and that the senate and president will in like manner feel their power dimi- nished. He argues for a great number of representatives, and thinks the increased expense nothing. He hints at the state legis- latures becoming insignificant. He details the qualifications of a rep- resentative of the people, that he knew them, their interests, wishes, etc. For this reason the number should be large enough to take in the middling classes. He thinks the federal government is so con- stituted as to be confined to the first class or natural aristocracy of the country. It is true we have no legal distinction of this kind ; but birth, education, talents, and wealth create such distinctions. When the number is small, men of the middling classes will not be anxious, even if qualified, to become representatives, as the style of the richer representatives will deter them. Beside, the influence of the great will enable them to carry elections. A substantial yeoman will hardly ever be chosen. He thinks the substantial yeomen of the country, from necessary mode of life and self-denial, more temperate and of better morals than the great. The rich do not feel for the poor, because they do not know their difficulties.
Mr. Smith compared the feelings of the great in this country, to those of a hereditary nobility. The pride of family, wealth, ta- lents, command an influence over the people. Congress in 1775, have stated this in their address to the inhabitants of Quebec, and that good laws were opposed to such influence. He would have the first class or great, admitted into congress ; but a sufficient number of the middling class to control them. A representative body composed of yeomanry, is however, the last. He dreads the progress of anti-republican and anti-democratick principals, which he says, are already prevalent, even among those, who risked all for republicanism a few years ago. The men who now ask for an energetick government, will want something beyond the system now composed, in a few years. It is time to erect a barrier against such men.
Hamilton was the next speaker. He had pointed out the prin- ciple of accommodation, on which the constitution was framed. He contends that sixty-five and twenty-five representatives, in two bodies, afford security to liberty. The interest of the large states
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will be to increase the representation. The sense of the people will guide their delegates, as they know they must return to the people. He adduced other arguments against the proposed amendment.
He asserted that a pure democracy must be a bad government. The whole people assembled were a mob. The confidence of the people will be gained by a good administration, though in few hands. Massachusetts is represented by three hundred, New York by sixty-five. The people of the latter have as much confidence in the government as the former. Publick confidence is secured by prosperous events. Large bodies are less competent to govern than small ones. The requisite information for well governing, is not augmented by the increase of the governing.
The proper mode of holding elections, is to divide the state into districts. This state at present should have six. The sena- tors of this state are not more deficient in knowledge, than mem- bers of assembly. They have the confidence of the people as much. Yet they are elected in four districts. They are the fewer, but possess the confidence of the people as much as the more numerous house.
" Who are the aristocracy among us?" None are elevated to perpetual rank. There are rich and poor-wise and unwise. Every distinguished man is an aristocrat. The intended govern- ment does not render a rich man more eligible to govern than a poor one. It is bottomed on the same principle as the state consti- tution. [The absence of those laws of primogeniture, of which perpetual wealth is a security, are omitted here.]
As riches accumulate in a few lands, the tendency will be to depart from "the republican standard." It is the common mis- fortune attendant upon all states.
An advantage which large districts have over small, is the greater difficulty to bribe.
Men do not grow wicked in proportion as they enlighten their minds : there is as much virtue in one class of men as in another. The kind of vices incident to rich and poor is different, and the advantage lies with the rich. Their vices are more favourable [less detrimental] to a state, and partake less of moral depravity. But the people must choose whom they please to govern-that is the true principle. Where the legislative, executive and judicial branches are distinct ; where the legislature is divided into sepa- rate houses ; and where the vigilance and weight of the state go- vernments check the general government, it is absurd to talk of a subversion of liberty.
It is a false supposition that the old confederacy was inefficacious because it was decried-no government can be rendered unpopu- lar, whose operations are wise and vigorous. The confederation VOL. II. 34
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was framed amidst tumult-the materials were unsound, and com- bined in haste. The pressure of war prevented amendment, or the appreciation of the faults of the government. That pressure re- moved, the cause of sufferings past, and the certainty of those to come, were seen. The spirit of republicanism has not diminished. Some men who have speculative doubts on the subject of govern- ment have expressed them ; but the principles of republican- ism are too firm to be shaken by sceptical reasons. He con- cluded, by hoping that the constitution would remedy all the evils dreaded.
Mr. Melancthon Smith spoke in reply, and insisted upon the ne- cessity of increasing the intended representation, and limitting the powers of the new government. As to the states being checks up- on the general government, he could see no possibility of check- ing a government of independent powers, which extended to all objects and resources without limitation. As to aristocracy, he did not consider the men who were exalted above others, as des- titute of virtue or morality : he only insisted that they could not sympathize with the wants of the people.
Mr. Lansing was an advocate for larger representation as well as Mr. Smith. We ought now to increase the members, and not leave it to future circumstances. It was not prudent to trust af- fairs to a body of which forty-six would be competent to pass laws ; and twenty-four of these a majority. There were eight times the number in the commons of Great Britain, and yet, that house was frequently corrupted. How much more easily so small a body as congress.
Governour Clinton professed a wish to obtain information on the important subject. Gentlemen appear to have omitted some con- siderations. He thought, however, the representation in congress, ought to be more full. The 'smallness of each state, renders it easy for members in its house of representative, to be informed of all that is requisite, but this is very different in respect to the United States. The generality of the representatives will be unacquainted with the local wants and wishes. A few men must be depended upon for this information. Is not this a reason for enlarging the number of representatives ? The legislators in a state, are known to their fellow citizens. Not so in the great council of the nation.
A law calculated for Georgia, might act cruelly upon New York, and the gradual encroachments made by one part, would not be seen in time by another.
Mr. Hamilton professed to answer the member from Ulster, (Gov. Clinton) but would first reply to the gentlemen from Albany and Duchess, (Lansing and Smith.) As to the danger of corrup- tion : the chances of corruption are less under the new than the old
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constitution. Under the old, nine states could declare peace or war. A great question required twenty-four members to decide in the new : in the old eighteen. It will ever be the interest of the several states to maintain an ample representation under the new constitu- tion : " for as every member has a vote, the relative influence and authority of each state, will be in proportion to the representatives she has in congress." Under the old confederation, as every and each state has but one vote, it is indifferent, whether the state has two or six representatives. As to corruption in the old con- gress-if nine states can pass the most important resolves, a foreign enemy by gaining a single member, and thus silencing a state, may frustrate an essential resolution. Butin the new scheme, a majority of all the members must be gained. Comparisons be- tween our government and that of England are false: many towns in England possess a seat in parliament, and are in the possession or gift of the king. These are called rotten boroughs. But the knights of the shire are generally found incorruptible-parliament has impaired the overgrown perogative, and limited the monarchy. Mr. Melancthon Smith has observed, that members from New York, for example, can know little of the circumstances of Georgia or South Carolina ; and therefore, the many must rely upon the few for information. A particular knowledge of local circumstances is not necessary to the Federal representative. His object is the ge- neral interest. The state government must take care of local af- fairs. One man can know and represent the interest of a state as well as twenty. The representative in congress must obtain his knowledge of local affairs in other states, from the members repre- senting those states. In congress, the members of a state adhiere too pertinaciously to the interests of the state from which they come. This causes party spirit, and embarrasses the publick affairs. As to internal taxation, the national legislature will not resort to it, ex- cept in very extraordinary cases, and then they must consult the customs adopted by individual states. The state legislatures will be sentinels on the encroachments of congress. The argument that . goes to prove that the habits of the several states and their interests
. are essentially different, and therefore, no government can suit them, is opposed to all union. But the spirit of accommodation, which produced the present constitution under consideration, will by degrees assimilate all the states.
Governour Clinton denied being adverse to a union. He wished for a Federal government, though Mr. Hamilton might wish for a consolidated one. Mr. Hamilton explained.
Monday, June 23d .- Mr. Harrison said, gentlemen agreed that the old government was incompetent: feeble requisitions, that may, or may not be attended to, are not sufficient. It is likewise agreed, that a close union is necessary. It is agreed, that however desira-
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ble such union, liberty must not be sacrificed to it. He advocated the number agreed to, in the new constitution, and thought six members from New York can be at all times found to represent the feelings and interests of the people, and the present arrange- ment is temporary, and remedies itself. The constitution declares, that the representation shall be determined by the population, and every state shall have at least one. Congress cannot reduce the present number. As the United States increase, the representa- tives at the present rate would become a mob : therefore, congress have a discretionary power to form another ratio. He supports the article in debate. In three years an increase will take place in the number, and he has confidence that corruption will not be felt before that time, in the present limited number.
Mr. Lansing, said, that when the subject of apportionment of representatives, came before the general convention, the large states insisted " that the equality of suffrage should be abolished." This the small states opposed-it would reduce them to a state of sub- ordination. The difficulty threatened a dissolution of the con- vention. A committee of states was agreed upon, and they reported a recommendation of that inequality in representation, which is now the subject of debate. The ratio was first determined at one for 40,000. At this period, " I left the convention." No ques- tion had been taken. "It is acknowleged, that if the people of the smaller states, shall amount to 50,000, this number may be taken as the ratio. What then is to control the general government ?" He contends that if the interest of the large states leads to increase, the interest of the small leads to a diminution of the number, and their equality in the senate will enable them to oppose the large states successfully. He thought the subject had been sufficiently discussed.
Mr. Lansing said, 40,000 was the number agreed upon, and he did not know, if that had been determined by accommodation, how the number came to be reduced to 30,000.
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Mr. Hamilton said, such (40,000)was agreed to, but after other parts were agreed to and the convention was about rising, his ex- cellency, the president, expressed a wish for reduction to 30,000, and it was agreed to without opposition.
Chancellor Livingston thought Mr. Melancthon Smith, had mis- apprehended his argument; he advocated the number fixed by the new constitution. As to the people, he would have their interests, not their feelings represented. The rich are objects of envy, and envy is a bar to promotion. 'The governour of the state was not elected for his riches, but this virtues. He would prove that the rich and great are not aristocrats. He would place Mr. Smith among the aristocrats for his merit. The people will confide in
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distinction of any meritorious kind. Power is no objection to the new government. All good government must have power, the purse and sword. He compliments Hamilton's idea, that the ratio of representation must be governed by the population of Delaware, as the lowest, and yet entitled to one. He thinks the sense of the people not in favour of a large representation.
Mr. Melancthon Smith rose again. He meant and expressed that the interests of the people, not their feelings, should be represented. Chancellor Livingston opposing him, distorts his ideas. His idea of aristocrats is not new.
Mr. John Jay for the first time addressed the chair. It seemed to be generally agreed that a strong Federal government is necessary to the United States. He called upon Mr. Smith to know if he understood him, that our country is too extensive for a complete representation ; and Mr. Smith answered that he thought a proper representation for a strong Federal government was unattainable under the proposed constitution. Mr. Jay went on-No Federal government is worth having, unless it provides for the interests of the United States. If the proposed constitution does so, it is what we want. He thinks the number provided for representation suffi- cient, under present circumstances. As to corruption, during the last war there were generally less than sixty-five men in congress, and Great Britain could not corrupt a majority. The old congress was more liable to corruption than the intended one, because a foreign power, by bribing one member, took off the vote of a state -- two members being necessary to a vote, and seldom more than two attending.
Mr. M. Smith said a few words in support of his amendment, and the convention adjourned.
June 24th-the 3d section of the 1st article being read, Mr. G. Livingston said, the senate would have powers co-extensive with the house of representatives, except as to originating revenue laws; they would have greater importance, as they were a smaller and firmer body, and continuing longer in office, gave them more dig- nity. He thought these powers made them dangerous. They had likewise powers in a judicial capacity, and in forming treaties ; they were likewise a council of appointment. He thought these powers too great, and subversive of liberty. Senators would associate with senators, forget the people, and become the aristocrats of the land. He would shorten the term of office, and lessen their powers. He moved that no person be eligible as senator more than six years in any twelve, and the state legislatures have power to recall their senators and elcct others.
Mr. Lansing said, he thought it was the intent of the framers of the constitution to make the power of representatives the organ of
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the people, and the senate that of the states : therefore the states ought to have a control over the senators. The idea of rotation he liked. He wished the power of recall to exist. Removing members would check party spirit, which had been known to pre- vail. He thought evils might result from the small number of senators.
Chancellor Livingston said, six years was not too long time for a senator to remain such, considering his duties and the knowledge required to perform them. Evil would result if the state could recall. He ridiculed the notion of corruption started by G. Liv- ingston, or of the senators rendering themselves perpetual.
Mr. Lansing said, the object of the amendment was to make senators more independent of the state legislatures. He thought senators would be elected who had knowledge of foreign states, and therefore need not be continued in office to gain that know- ledge. And if one third go out every two years, cannot those who come in obtain knowledge from those who remain? The power of recall existed in the old confederation, and although not used, might deter from corruption. The senate do not originate money bills, but it, by its power to declare war, makes them neces- sary. All publick bodies are liable to corruption.
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