USA > New York > History of the state of New York, political and governmental, Vol. II 1822-1864 > Part 14
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ture immediately ordered the Bank Commissioners to assume the payment of their notes.
Two days later, on May 10, the banks of New York City suspended specie payments, and within three days their example was followed all over the country. That precipitated a crisis everywhere, but it was of special interest in New York. The Safety Fund law provided that if any bank suspended specie payments it should be placed in the hands of a receiver, its issue of notes be stopped, and eventually its charter be forfeited. Obviously, if that law had been enforced most of the banks in New York State would have been closed and would have gone out of existence. The Legislature was about to adjourn, but it halted long enough to pass an act suspending for one year the operation of that part of the Safety Fund law. The vote was nearly unanimous-30 to 2 in the Senate and 95 to 19 in the Assembly. A bill was then introduced to suspend for one year the law forbidding the circulation of bank- notes of less than five dollars value, but it was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 13 to 15. Then on May 16 the Legislature adjourned without day.
This refusal of the Senate to suspend the prohibition of small notes was one of the most fecund sources of popular inconvenience and distress, and one of the chief factors that made for the political revolution that speedily followed. The merchants of the city begged the Governor to recall the Legislature promptly in order that it might reconsider and pass the bill which the Senate had rejected, but he refused on the ground that it would not be proper to ask the Legislature to
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do something that it had just decided not to do. In this he made probably the greatest mistake, at least from the point of view of political tactics, of all his career. From that moment popular resentment and wrath against him and against the Democratic party increased with ominous rapidity.
The charter election in New York City was held in April. The Democrats nominated for Mayor J. J. Morgan, a man of high standing and unimpeachable character and record. Against him the Whigs nomi- nated Aaron Clark, who had been Clerk of the Assem- bly from 1814 to 1820. The Loco Foco faction put for- ward David R. Jacques. Although at this time the business troubles had not reached their height, specie payments had not been suspended, and the Legislature had not refused to permit small bills to be issued, the Whigs elected Mr. Clark by a majority of about three thousand and secured an overwhelming majority of both the Board of Aldermen and Common Council. The Loco Foco candidate received four thousand votes. In Albany, too, the Whigs elected their local ticket.
Although the President had refused the request of the New York merchants for a special session of Con- gress, he reconsidered the matter a few days later and on May 15 issued a call for such a session. It met on September 4 and listened to the reading of a mes- sage discussing the financial condition of the country and outlining the course that he thought should be pursued. Philip Hone on May 8 had refused to pre- side at a great civic meeting unless the resolutions to be presented for adoption were amended by the elimi-
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nation of a passage that charged the President with hav- ing made statements "unfounded in fact." But on Sep- tember 6 he wrote of Van Buren's message that it was the most mischievous in its tendency that had ever been presented to the American people, that it contained "many gross misrepresentations," and that one of its salient declarations was a "falsehood."
Van Buren's argument was briefly this: The banks chartered by the States had been tried and found want- ing as depositaries of public funds, and a National bank could not be chartered-he would veto a bill for chartering one. Therefore the United States treasury should keep charge of its own funds and have nothing whatever to do with the banking system or the busi- ness system of the country. This was interpreted by the Whigs and by a multitude of Democrats as a direct attack upon the banks and the credit system of bank- notes. It would restrain the country to a purely me- tallic currency, which alone would be legal tender, and that would be in volume entirely inadequate to the needs of a commercial community like New York, if not, indeed, to those of the whole country, rural as well as urban.
Against such a policy a large part of the Democratic party revolted. A bill was introduced into the House of Representatives for carrying out the President's de- signs. It was vigorously debated and at last, on the motion of John C. Clark, a Representative from Che- nango county, New York, was laid on the table by the votes of the Whigs and conservative Democrats. A bill was enacted, however, authorizing the issue of a
WILLIAM L. MARCY
William L. Marcy, 13th governor (1833-38) ; born in South- bridge, Mass., December 12, 1786; lawyer; served in the war of 1812; recorder of city of Troy, 1816; editor of Troy Budget; adjutant general, New York, 1821; state comptroller, 1823; associate justice state supreme court, 1829; elected United States senator and served from March 4, 1831, until his resignation, July, 1832 to become candidate for governor; governor, 1833-38 ; commissioner on Mexican claims, 1839-42; secretary of war, March 5, 1845 to March 3, 1849; U. S. secretary of state, March 7, 1853 to March 4, 1857; died at Balston Spa, N. Y., July 4, 1857.
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certain amount of treasury notes, and then Congress adjourned. It had done nothing to abate the popular distress, while the President through his message and its Independent Treasury scheme had done much to increase the popular dissatisfaction, distrust, and con- demnation with which his administration, only six months old, was regarded.
The banks of New York worried along as best they could, but their service to the business public was sadly inadequate. The great want was that of a currency of denominations less than five dollars. The banks could not, under the law, issue small notes, and they would not pay out gold or silver. Indeed, it would have been folly to do so, for specie was at a premium-or paper was at a discount-of from ten to twelve per cent., and specie if issued would have been hoarded or sold at a premium. A million or two in small bills from other States got into circulation, and among them were vast quantities of notes of insolvent and defunct banks, and also of outright counterfeits. These dubious bills were popularly called "shinplasters," a name that had been given the depreciated notes of the Continental Congress during and after the Revolution, and later was applied to the fractional currency of Civil War and reconstruction times. While all the nation suffered severely from the financial troubles of 1837 New York fared worst, partly because a flood of worthless paper currency was poured into it as the business metropolis, and partly because it was hampered by the refusal of the Legislature to give the banks power to afford such relief as might have been within their power. Of
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course much odium, as is usual in such cases, fell upon the party in power, with little thought as to whether it was or was not responsible for the ills from which the State was suffering.
In such circumstances the fall election of 1837 was held. It was not only the annual election for mem- bers of the Legislature, but the triennial election for Sheriffs and County Clerks throughout the State. The result was what in later years we have learned to call a "landslide." Almost every county in the State was carried by the Whigs. They elected six out of the eight Senators, 101 out of the 128 Assemblymen, and a great majority of the Sheriffs and Clerks. "New York," wrote Philip Hone, "has broken her chains and stands erect, regenerated. The moral and politi- cal effect of this victory will be prodigious. The meas- ures of the administration stand condemned before the nation, and Mr. Van Buren must alter his course or sink to rise no more."
CHAPTER XIV
"SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY"
A STONISHMENT and uncertainty prevailed in the politics of the State at the opening of the new year. The revolution of 1837 had been so tremendous that neither party knew just how to regard it-whether to look upon it as indicating a lasting change in the control of the State, or merely a tempo- rary fluctuation. It was thus in a spirit of expectancy, awaiting what next might happen, that the Sixty-first Legislature met at Albany on January 2, 1838. There was no change in the organization of the Senate, in which the Democrats still retained a majority. Gulian C. Verplanck, of New York, took his seat in that body for the first time, and Daniel S. Dickinson, who had entered it a year before from the Sixth district, began to rise toward that prominence which he later attained. In the Assembly appeared two men who were destined to make important marks in the history of the State. These were Benjamin D. Silliman, of Brooklyn, and James S. T. Stranahan, of Oneida county, who later removed to Brooklyn and had a distinguished career in that city. The Whig majority transformed the organization of the Assembly, electing Luther Bradish, of Franklin county, a man of exceptionally fine accom- plishments, Speaker, and Jarvis N. Lake to be Clerk.
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Governor Marcy's message contained no reference to the result of the election, but dealt at length with the varied interests of the State in his customary calm, self-possessed, and statesmanlike manner. There was perhaps a little higher touch of statesmanship than usual, as if some sub-conscious intimation had come to him that this was to be his valedictory. Had he indeed been conscious of that fact he could not have wished to make his last message a more worthy com- position than was this. He discussed the interests of the judiciary, the schools, the canal system, the prisons, etc., and then gave his chief attention to what was un- doubtedly the most important topic in the State, the fiscal system. He attributed the disastrous business panic and depression of the preceding year chiefly to extravagant speculation and to unsound banking and currency conditions ; and in view of the impending re- sumption of specie payments by the banks he recom- mended that they should be required to maintain a larger specie reserve than thitherto for the protection of their paper currency. In consequence of his recom- mendations the Legislature presently enacted measures permitting banks to be incorporated under a general act and without special legislation for each charter, re- quiring them to have at all times a specie reserve equal to twelve and a half per cent. of their paper circula- tion, and also permitting them to resume the issuance of notes for less than five dollars with the stipulation that they should redeem in specie all small bills on pre- sentation.
This was followed on April 12 and 13 with messages
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to the Aseembly and Senate, respectively, on the re- sumption of specie payments by the banks. He pointed out that the banks of New York would be alone in taking that step, and that there was thus danger that the banks of other States would drain out the specie from this State. He recommended legislative action if it should prove necessary to prevent such a result. He also recommended that, if the banks seemed to need such aid, the Legislature issue six or eight millions of State bonds for canal work, and loan them to the banks. Such an issue would, he pointed out, soon be necessary if the work of canal construction and improvement was to continue, and it would be good policy to issue them at once if thus the banks could be aided to re- store a normal status to the State's finances. As a mat- ter of fact, this aid was not needed, since millions of dollars in gold began to pour into New York from Europe.
On the same day that his annual message was de- livered, January 2, Governor Marcy sent in a special message on the foreign relations of the State, and especially on what was known as the "Caroline" affair. At that time there was an insurrection in Canada. There were in the United States, and particularly in New York, many sympathizers with the rebels, and much aid was given to the insurrection in flagrant vio- lation of the neutrality laws. Armed bodies were organized for the invasion of Canada in cooperation with the insurgents, and late in December, 1837, one of these seized Navy Island in the Niagara River, be- longing to Canada. In return for this flagrant out-
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rage the Canadian government sent a force thither which crossed the river to the American shore and there captured and destroyed the steamer "Caroline," which belonged either to the insurgents or to their Ameri- can aids. Governor Marcy, in the absence at the moment of complete information, regarded the Cana- dian action as an invasion and an outrage upon an American vessel. He assumed in his message that the Federal government would take appropriate proceed- ings and that the New York militia would prevent any further invasion of the State. In fact, President Van Buren promptly issued a very judicious proclamation warning New Yorkers and all Americans against any further violations of the neutrality laws and calling upon the New York militia to prevent them.
Later, on March 5, Governor Marcy addressed the Assembly concerning the breaking into and robbing of the State arsenals at Watertown, Elizabethtown, and Batavia by sympathizers with the Canadian rebels, who thus stole State arms and ammunition for use in the insurrection.
Samuel B. Ruggles, of New York City, as chairman of a committee of the Assembly, made a most telling report on the subject of internal improvements, in which he demonstrated the fiscal ability of the State to proceed with the completion of the Erie canal en- largements and other great public works. In conse- quence of his showing a bill was promptly passed, by an all but unanimous vote, appropriating four million dollars to be expended during that year in work on the Erie canal. The Legislature, after surprisingly
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little legislation of a partisan political character, ad- journed without day on April 18.
After so great a revolution as that of 1837 a certain reaction was inevitable, especially since by the spring of 1838 business conditions had radically changed and prosperity had been largely restored. It was not sur- prising, therefore, that the April elections throughout the State showed a considerable loss of Whig votes. This indicated, however, not any actual defection of Whigs but a return to their normal party affiliation of numerous Democrats who because of the hard times had temporarily revolted against the Jackson-Van Buren policies. In New York City the Whig Mayor, Aaron Clark, was reelected by a majority of only 99, against about three thousand at his former election, and a bare majority of one was all that the Whigs could secure in each of the branches of the City Council. There were similiar results throughout the State.
The campaigning for the fall election for Governor began early. On the Democratic side it was straight campaigning for the reelection of Marcy and Tracy, whose renomination without opposition was a foregone conclusion. Such renomination was effected at the State convention at Herkimer, on September 12. And Marcy well deserved it. He was in his third term as Governor, and his administration throughout had been of a high order. It had been free from scandals and generally had been responsive to the will of the people. Although as Comptroller Marcy had strongly opposed the Chenango canal, as Governor he promoted that enterprise in accordance with the evident desire of the
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people. He was friendly to public works, but wisely insisted that they should not be undertaken beyond the ability of the State to pay at least the interest on the money borrowed for the purpose.
On three grounds he incurred disfavor, a part of which was greatly to his credit. That was in connec- tion with his action toward the Canadian rebellion and its New York abettors. There is no reason for suspecting him of toadying to England. He simply wanted and determined that the American neutrality laws should be enforced. But for that he suffered the resentment of a certain Anglophobe faction. He was also criticised and condemned for not calling a special session of the Legislature to repeal the law forbidding the issue of small banknotes. Most of all, perhaps, he was denounced for his friendliness to Van Buren's Sub-Treasury program. On that account he incurred the hostility of a faction of Democrats led by Nathaniel P. Tallmadge, United States Senator. This faction held a State convention at Syracuse, repudiated Marcy, and endorsed the Whig ticket.
The Whig campaign, on the other hand, was down to the State convention at Utica on September 12 a contest among aspirants for the nomination. The prospect of victory at the polls had brought a number of candidates into the field. Conspicuous among these were Francis Granger, who had already been twice a candidate; William H. Seward, who had run once before; and Luther Bradish, the Speaker of the Sixty-first Assembly and a man of immense personal popularity and real worth. Mr. Bradish had entered the Assembly in 1828,
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and was one of the founders of the Anti-Masonic party and also the Whig party. Among these three men per- sonally there was the kindliest of feeling and a desire that the one who was most favored by the people, and who would be the strongest candidate, should be chosen. Each of the three was, moreover, ready to work with might and main for either of the others in case he should be chosen. Among their followers there was less agreement, and at times there was positive dissen- sion. This resulted in some regrettably savage attacks on the candidates and in a sharp contest in the con- vention.
The deciding factor in making the nomination was Thurlow Weed, the editor of the Albany Evening Journal and the most astute political manager in the State. He was at first undecided in his choice, inclining somewhat toward Francis Granger, with whom he had been longer and more intimately associated than with either of the others. Indeed, Granger was probably the choice of a majority of the party leaders. But Weed soon came to realize that the future of the party lay with the young men of the State, and that if success was to be attained appeal must be made to them. On that ground he turned to Seward, and it was his doing so that secured Seward's nomination.
When the convention met the choice still wavered in the balance. On the first informal ballot Seward had 52 votes, Granger 39, Bradish 29, and Edwards, of New York City, 4. The supporters of Bradish were devoted to him and would have stood by him to the end, hoping for his success as a compromise candidate between
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Seward and Granger; but he himself, believing that either of the others would be a stronger candidate be- fore the people of the State, advised them to cast their votes for either Seward or Granger, as they preferred. Accordingly the second ballot showed 60 for Seward, 52 for Granger, only 10 for Bradish, and 3 for Ed- wards. A third was taken, and to Weed's alarm Seward fell to second place with only 59, while Granger's vote rose to 60 and Bradish's was 8.
At that point by masterly strategy Weed succeeded in having a recess declared, during which he worked with consummate tact, first, to bring over to Seward a major- ity of the eight men who still held out for Bradish. It was in vain. The eight were immovable. They were willing to do anything else that Weed might ask, but they would not desert their candidate until some other was actually nominated, not if a hundred ballots were taken. Then Weed addressed himself to the men who had originally voted for Bradish but had gone over to Granger, and with them he was more successful. The recess ended and the fourth informal ballot was taken. Seward had 67, Granger 48, and Bradish 8. The next morning the leaders of the Granger forces moved to make Seward's nomination unanimous, and then Bradish was nominated for Lieutenant-Governor by acclamation, no other person being so much as sug- gested.
The cordial feelings among the three candidates were notably manifested. Bradish's advice to his supporters has already been referred to, and he followed it up by unhesitatingly accepting the second place on the ticket.
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Granger had told his delegates in advance that if either Seward or Bradish won he wished them to move for a unanimous nomination and then to work for the success of the nominee as zealously as though he himself had been chosen. As for Seward, who remained at home in Auburn, premature word reached him during the recess after the ominous third ballot that Granger had won; whereupon he instantly summoned his friends to organ- ize a popular ratification mass-meeting and himself drafted resolutions to be adopted in cordial support of the supposedly successful candidate.
If thus Thurlow Weed was the Deus ex machina that secured the nomination of Seward, it was left for an- other young man and journalist to secure his election. Four years before, that then obscure young man had started his weekly paper, the New-Yorker, in New York City. It was not a political journal, though it did pay some attention to politics along with all other topics of public interest, and it was strongly committed to Whig doctrines. Indeed, it may be believed that many former Democrats and independents had been con- verted to the Whig party through its influence. More- over-and this was what perhaps most strongly ap- pealed to Weed,-it was scholarly, cultivated, and dig- nified in tone. While it could be severe in its criticisms it never descended to lampoonery or billingsgate.
Weed had been a reader of the New-Yorker from the beginning and quickly discerned the surpassing genius of Greeley as a political writer and controversialist, al- though he did not know him personally. When the electoral revolution of 1837 presaged Whig victory in
.
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1838, Weed conceived the fortunate design of publish- ing a campaign paper at Albany and of getting the young editor of the New-Yorker to come up and con- duct it. Accordingly he went to the metropolis and called on Greeley in his humble office. That first meet- ing of the two men, in an Ann Street cellar, was historic for its results in relation to the future of New York and of America. It meant the conjunction and cooperation of the ablest political diplomat and manager and the ablest political preacher and propagandist of the time. Instinctively drawn to each other by the kinship of genius, the joint influence that they exercised was im- mense and far-reaching, although their agreement and association were not to prove permanent.
Greeley was much gratified at Weed's proposal and readily accepted it when he found that it would not in- terfere with the continued publication of the New- Yorker. It was arranged that the new paper should be printed in the office of the Albany Evening Journal and that Greeley, doing most of his work in New York, should go to Albany for two days in each week to make up the forms. Weed left the choice of the name to Greeley, who selected that of The Jeffersonian. That in itself was consummately shrewd because of the ap- peal to many Democrats who were devoted to the prin- ciples of Jefferson but were not pleased with Jackson's and Van Buren's departure therefrom. It was Greeley's wise purpose to show them that Jefferson's real prin- ciples were cherished and practiced by the Whigs more than by the Democrats.
Publication of the paper was begun at Albany in
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February, 1838, and from the first it was highly success- ful in attracting popular attention and influencing vot- ers to affiliate themselves with the Whig party. It was almost unique among campaign sheets in its temperate, reasonable tone. It made no appeal to passion. It in- dulged in no invective or denunciation. It neither "pointed with pride" nor "viewed with alarm." Its appeal was entirely to reason and judgment, and all its discussion of men and measures was such as gentlemen might have engaged in by word of mouth, face to face with their political opponents, without discourtesy or offense. Very different were its articles from the vio- lent and often ruffianly campaign diatribes which other newspapers had been in the habit of emitting, and in- deed very different from the impassioned invectives of Greeley's own later years. Its work was tremendously effective, and to it more than to any other factor may be attributed the result of the election.
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