A history of Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania : from its first beginnings to the present time, including chapters of newly-discovered early Wyoming Valley history, together with many biographical sketches and much genealogical material. Volume II, Part 77

Author: Harvey, Oscar Jewell, 1851-1922; Smith, Ernest Gray
Publication date: 1909
Publisher: Wilkes-Barre : Raeder Press
Number of Pages: 680

USA > Pennsylvania > Luzerne County > Wilkes-Barre > A history of Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania : from its first beginnings to the present time, including chapters of newly-discovered early Wyoming Valley history, together with many biographical sketches and much genealogical material. Volume II > Part 77

Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).

* Under the resolution of Congress providing for the raising of this company, and for its duties, it was directed that the company should be subject to the orders of the commanding officer of the 24th Regiment.

1005

dence extant there were " between 300 and 400 men "-probably 375- assembled in the fort, and as many, or more, women and children. At Fort Wilkes-Barre Capt. William Hooker Smith and Ensign Elisha Blackman, Sr., of the 2d Alarm List Company, with a handful of their men, served as a garrison ; while James Bidlack, Sr., of Plymouth, Captain of the 1st Alarm List Company, in command of a very small number of his men, performned a similar duty at Shawnee Fort in Plymouth. Lieut. Lebbeus Tubbs and Ensign John Comstock of the 1st Company (being residents of Kingston), and Lieut. Flavius Waterman of the 2d Com- pany (residing in upper Wilkes-Barré), had repaired to Forty Fort.

At the desire of Colonel Denison and Lieutenant Colonel Dorrance, seconded by the unanimous wish of all the other officers present, Lieut. Col. Zebulon Butler again, as on the 1st of July, assumed temporary command of the military force at Forty Fort. Immediately thereafter a conference of all the officers in the fort was held, at which the situa- tion was fully discussed, resulting in a unanimous decision not to sur- render the fort, but to hold it at all hazards. About that time Lieut. Timothy Peirce, of Captain Spalding's Westmoreland Independent Coni- pany, appeared on the scene, having been hurried forward by Captain Spalding with the information that his company was en route to the Valley and would probably arrive about Sunday, July 5th. Soon after Lieutenant Peirce's arrival Colonel Butler despatched Adjutant Isaac Baldwin from Forty Fort to the Board of War (at Philadelphia, where the seat of Government had been re-established), with a report concern- ing the critical condition of affairs in Wyoming.

For the purpose of securing, by delays in negotiations, sufficient time to admit of the arrival of Captain Franklin and his company from Huntington and Salem, Captain Spalding's company, and possibly Cap- tain Clingman's, a messenger with a flag of truce was sent to Major Butler to ask for a conference with him upon the subject of his demands made in the morning. At the same time scouts were sent out to learn, if possible, the situation as well as the strength of the enemy. In fact, such scouts had been sent out during all the morning, but they were unable to form a satisfactory estimate as to the number of the invaders. Later in the day it was realized that, unfortunately, they had greatly underestimated the number. The messenger with the flag had not pro- ceeded half way to Wintermute's Fort when he was fired upon by prowl- ing Indians, and compelled to return. After consultation another flag was sent out, and its bearer, being also fired upon, returned to Forty Fort.

Shortly afterwards it was learned from incoming scouts (states Col. John Franklin in his article on this subject, previously referred to) " that the enemy were burning all the settlements above, and collecting all the cattle within their reach; but from appearances it was apprehend- ed that they would not risk an attack upon Kingston, but would burn, plunder, and destroy all the upper settlements, and would probably cross the river to Lackawanna [Pittston], take possession of that fort, destroy the settlement, and probably massacre the people or make them prison- ers, and return back with their booty from whence they came. To pre- vent which it was proposed by some of the officers to go and attack them on their own ground, which was finally agreed to, thoughi reluc- tantly by some. Colonel Denison informed ine that he said as much against it as he could say, without being called a coward. It was his

1006

wish to wait for more strength-for the arrival of my company, which he expected would be on the following morning; and further, for the arrival of Captain Spalding's company. But, fearing that it would then be too late-that the enemy would draw off with their booty before any further assistance could be had-it was determined to attack them."

Therefore, about two o'clock in the afternoon of July 3d, the entire armed* force collected in Forty Fort (with the exception of a handful of men, detailed to garrison the fort under the command of Ensign John Jenkins, Jr.) marched forth in column formation, headed by Colonels Denison and Butler, mounted. Closely following these officers was a stalwart color-bearer, carrying the new national flag-the "Stars and Stripes "-adopted and established less than a year previously .; To the tune of "St. Patrick's Day in the Morning," played by the fifers and drummers of the several companies, the column marched in a north- easterly direction-approximately along the course of the present Wyo- ming Avenue-upwards of a mile to Abraham's Creek, at the point where the "stone-arched bridge " (mentioned on page 53, Vol. I) now spans that stream. This was less than fifty rods from the home of Colonel Denison .¿ Here a halt was made, and the little army was arranged in proper form to resist an attack from the enemy. At the same time another messenger with a flag of truce was despatched in the direction of Wintermute's Fort with a request for a conference with Major Butler, and scouts were sent out in different directions.

Soon after the departure of the Westmorelanders from Forty Fort three horsemen were seen galloping up the road towards the fort, their steeds covered with foam, and sweat dripping from their sides. When the men drew up at the gate of the fort and dismounted it was discovered that they were Capt. Robert Durkee, Lieut. Phineas Peirce (of Spalding's company) and Gershom Prince§ (a negro servant of Captain Durkee's), who, having procured horses at a settlement a few miles north of the Wind Gap early on the previous day, had left Spalding's company- slowly, but with earnestness, pursuing its toilsome march toward Wyo- ming-and hastened along the rough and narrow way to the Valley (a distance of some forty miles) to apprize the people of the coming re-en- forcements, and to encourage and assist them to repel the invading enemy. These three men had ridden nearly all the preceding night, and were

* Excepting a small number of men who had rifles, the rank and file of the Americans were armed with "nothing but bad muskets without bayonets." (See "Journals of the Sullivan Expedition," page 251.)

¡ See note, page 448, Vol. I. # See picture facing page 786.

§ GERSHOM PRINCE was born about the year 1733 in either Rhode Island or Connecticut (accord- ing to Pearce's "Annals of Luzerne County"). If it was in the year mentioned, then he was the same age as Captain Durkee. He is said to have been a servant of Durkee's, but it is more than probable that he was his slave. He accompanied Robert Durkee on some, or all, of his campaigns as a commissioned officer during the French and In- dian War, and it is quite likely that he was one of the "hands" Captain Durkee wrote Colonel Butler in January, 1774, he intended to bring to Wilkes- Barré. (See page 893.) When, in September, 1776, Captain Durkee again entered the military service, Prince accompanied him; and with the Captain he fought on Abraham's Plains and yielded up his life in defense of the people of Wyoming, July 3, 1778.

At Crown Point, in the Summer of 1761, Gershom Prince made himself a powder-horn, which thereafter he wore when he had occasion to carry or make use of a gun. This horn was taken from his lifeless body on the battle-field of Wyo- ming, and ultimately passed into the possession of The Wyoming Historical and Geological Society. A photo-reproduction of it is herewith given. Various designs are rudely carved upon the horn, together with the following inscriptions: "GARSHOM PRINCE his horn made At Crownpoint Septm. ye 3rd day 1761," and "PRINCE + NEGRO HIS HORNM."

1007

almost exhausted through hunger and overexertion; but, as soon as they had learned from the inmates of the fort the situation of affairs, they exclaimed : "Give us a morsel of food, and we will follow on !" Hav- ing eaten hastily they hurried up to Abraham's Creek, where they found their compatriots still arrayed along the right bank of the creek, await- ing the return of the scouts and the messenger with the white flag. These soon returned and reported that the flag had been fired on, and that the enemy were in commotion, but what their design was-whether to move forward to battle or to retire from the Valley-could not be told. "All was doubt and uncertainty," declares Steuben Jenkins .* " Speculations and discussion now began to arise as to the intent of the enemy. The march upon Forty Fort, which had been threatened by Major Butler in the morning, unless a surrender was made, had not taken place. What did it mean? Had the threat any meaning, or was it mere braggadocio? It was suggested that the invading force had been overestimated by the timid ; that if Major Butler had the overwhelming force pretended, he would, long ere this, have put his threat in execu- tion, instead of breaking camp and leaving the Valley, as now appeared most probable. What did it mean ? Was it a mere threat to frighten, and thus evade pursuit ? Such were the queries the situation gave rise to, and in consequence of no satisfactory answer being at hand, the dis- cussion grew warm. The cool and more judicious of the officers, on whom the responsibilities rested, thought prudence the better part of valor, and decided that their present position, being tenable against a superior force, and, serving to protect the lower and main parts of the Valley from the encroachments of the enemy, would answer the purpose of protection to that part of it, until the expected re-enforcements should arrive.

" It was contended that the enemy by that time could prowl through the Valley, rob and burn their homes, kill or take captive the women and children, drive off their horses and cattle, and destroy their harvests; while they, like base and cowardly poltroons, were standing by with arms in their hands. Besides, were they to remain where they were, or go back to the fort and shut themselves up in it, to await deliverance, they had not collected and in store sufficient provisions to hold out a long siege, or endure long delay. The discussion became heated and personal. Charges of cowardice were made by Capt. Lazarus Stewartt (then a private in Captain McKerachan's Hanover company) against all who opposed advancing, particularly against Lieutenant Colonel Butler, who was against an advance, and he (Stewart) threatened to report him as such [sic] to headquarters. Stewart was ordered under arrest by Colonel Denison. The Hanover company became mutinous. Captain McKerachan resigned, and the company immediately elected Stewart in his place. They now threatened a revolt, unless a march should be immediately made against the enemy.

" Colonel Denison, a cool and quiet man, who had taken little or no part in the discussion, as yet, urged the propriety of careful and con- siderate action, and the impropriety and danger of hasty and inconsider- ate action. * * These suggestions did not meet the feelings and views of the men generally. They had become warmed up by the fiery words of Captain Stewart, and declared that it would be a disgrace never

* In an "Historical Address" delivered at the Wyoming Monument, July 3, 1878, and subse- quently published. * See page 640.

1008

to be forgotten or forgiven should they remain there, or lie cooped up in the fort, while the enemy should devastate the Valley. * When * * it was decided to advance and attack the enemy, Colonel Butler dis- charged Captain Stewart from arrest, saying: 'We will march and meet the enemy, if he is to be found, and I will show the men that I dare lead where they dare follow !' "

Relative to the alleged happenings thus described by Mr. Jenkins, we have the following statement made by the Rev. George Peck, * D. D. :

"Captain Lazarus Stewart and William McKerachan headed the party which were for marching out of the fort at once and meeting the foe. A warni debate upon the ques- tion followed, which closed with high words. The belligerant Captains, perceiving that the majority was on their side, intimated that it was cowardice which influenced the views of the Colonels, and that if they should decline the command they (the Captains ) would lead on the brave men who would volunteer to go out and flog Butler and his Indians. These insulting insinuations roused the spirit of Colonels Butler and Denison, and they resolved to hazard all upon the chances of a battle. Colonel Butler said: ‘We go into imminent danger; but, my boys, I can go as far as any of you.' Those who were fierce for fight seemed to be under the impression that the enemy was about to retreat, or that they would run as soon as they saw danger. They were anxious to meet and pun- ish the Indians while they were within reach, and to chase them out of the country. This, as they might have known, and as the event proved, was all erroneous. In this case, as in many others, hot-headed and reckless men prevailed against sober counsels. * *

"Captain Stewart threatened to withdraw his company if the commanding officers

* refused to go out and meet the enemy. *

** Stewart and his party were confident of success. They had 110 idea of the odds they would have to contend with, but were pliren- sied with the idea of shooting down a few scattered bands of Indians and Tories. Many of the people in the fort were not at all sensible of the awful hazards of the movement. * * Upon issuing from the fort they moved toward a high bank or rise of ground

above Shoemaker's [at Abraham's Creek], where Colonel Butler proposed to halt and form the army to better advantage for giving the enemy battle; thinking it a good posi- tion for them to take and, if possible, maintain. But Captain Stewart opposed the plan, declaring that if Butler did not move on and take a stand further up, lie would report him at headquarters as a coward. Butler replied that he did not fear to go, but that it was throwing away an advantageous position, and they would have cause to repent it."

The foregoing statements of Dr. Peck concerning Lazarus Stewart were based on information derived from three or four aged ladies, who, at the time of the battle of Wyoming, were young women, and were among the occupants of Forty Fort. Whence Mr. Jenkins drew his information for his detailed account of the preliminaries to the battle of Wyoming I know not. Some writers of Wyoming history following him have told the same story, and have stated that "Lazarus Stewart was undoubtedly responsible for the battle and massacre of Wyoming "; but I have been unable to find a statement similar to Mr. Jenkins' in the publications of any responsible writer (excepting the Rev. Dr. Peck) who preceded him. The nearest approach to the story of the latter is con- tained in a statement made by Jonathan Terry (a brother of Parshall Terry, Jr., previously mentioned), a young man who was in Forty Fort prior and subsequently to the battle of July 3d. Years after the event Mr. Terry saidt:

"The leading officers in the fort were for delaying the attack until the expected reenforcements arrived, or perhaps keep the fort and defend themselves therein. Stewart was of a contrary opinion. A very warm altercation now in a special manner took place between Stewart and Colonel Denison as to the expediency of attacking the enemy under present circumstances. He would fight that very day, or else march his men back and never attempt to aid them any more, and finally charged Denison and those of his opinion with cowardice. Denison, well known to be a candid man, now became provoked; anger took place, and he said he would not hear that. If Stewart would go out and die (oaths passed ), he would venture himself in it."¿

* In his "Wyoming; its History, Stirring Incidents, and Romantic Adventures," pages 104, 157 and 205. ¡ See Craft's "History of Bradford County," page 489.

¿ It may be mentioned, in this connection, that there was a strong friendship subsisting between Colonel Denison and Captain Stewart. The former was the younger (by six years) of the two men, and he had named his eldest child-Lazarus Denison, five years old in 1778-for Captain Stewart.

1009

Isaac A. Chapinan, who resided in Wilkes-Barré and was person- ally acquainted with many of the survivors of the battle of Wyoming, makes in his "History of Wyoming " (written in 1818 and published at Wilkes-Barré in 1830) the following statement concerning some of the preliminaries of the battle of Wyoming.

"On the morning of the 3d of July the officers of the garrison at Forty Fort held a council, to determine on the propriety of marching from the fort and attacking the enemy wherever found. The debates in this council of war are said to have been conducted with much warmth and animation. The ultimate determination was one on which depended the lives of the garrison and the safety of the settlements. On one side it was contended that their enemies were daily increasing in numbers-that they would plunder the settlements of all kinds of property, and would accumulate the means of carrying on the war, while they themselves would become weaker; that the harvest would soon be ripe, and would be gathered or destroyed by their enemies, and all their means of sustenance during the succeeding Winter would fail; that probably all their messengers [sent to headquarters] were killed, and as there had been more than sufficient time, and no assistance had arrived, they would probably receive none, and consequently now was the proper time to make the attack. On the other side it was argued that probably some or all the messengers may have arrived at headquarters, but that the absence of tlie com- mander-in-chief may have produced delay; that one or two weeks more may bring the desired assistance, and that to attack the enemy-superior as they were in number-out of the limits of their own fort, would produce almost certain destruction to the settlement and themselves, and captivity and slavery-perhaps torture- to their wives and children."

The Hon. Stewart Pearce, who took special pains to inform himself relative to the life and deeds of Capt. Lazarus Stewart, printed in his "Annals of Luzerne County " (1860 and 1866) considerable authentic information concerning Captain Stewart. He states ("Annals," page 117):

"On the morning of the battle they [the Westmorelanders] were assembled in Forty Fort, when a council of officers was convened to decide on the propriety of march- ing out to meet the foe. Colonel Butler and others deemed it advisable to remain in the fort. Captain Stewart was prominent among those in opposition, who contended for a prompt and speedy conflict with the invaders in the open field. The debate became ani- mated, and was marked with warin words. Stewart contended that the enemy were increasing in numbers; that they would plunder the settlements of all their property; that they would burn the dwellings and destroy the crops and leave nothing for subsist- ence during the coming Winter; that there was now no hope of reenforcements on their own side, and that if the savages should carry the fort by storm, when they were wasted by fatigue and famine, they would all, together with their women and children, perish in an indiscriminate slaughter. A large majority were in favor of marching out to encounter the enemy. Who shall say that this was not the better policy?"

The Rev. James May of Wilkes-Barré, in an address delivered in Kingston Township July 3, 1832 (see Chapter XXVII), relative to the battle of Wyoming, said *:

" It was about three o'clock P. M. when the settlers reached the bank of Abraham's Creek. There, as they had understood, they were to meet the enemy; but none were in sight. Colonel Butler, apprehending an ambush, deemed it prudent to halt at this point and to make no further offensive movement. But his foresight was disregarded by others, and his remonstrances were ineffectual. * * At last, contrary to his own judgment, but finding the step necessary to preserve the confidence of some of the officers who had put themselves under his command, and who were more ardent than prudent, he gave orders for advancing."

Colonel Stone, in his " Poetry and History of Wyoming " (page 203), says :

"A council of war was held on the morning of the 3d of July, to determine upon the expediency of marching out and giving the enemy battle, or of awaiting his advance. There were some who preferred delay, in the hope that a reenforcement would arrive from the camp of General Washington. * * The result of the council was a determi- nation for an immediate attack. As soon as the proper dispositions could be inade, Col- onel Butler placed himself at the head of the undisciplined force, and led them forward." Miner, in his "History of Wyoming " (page 219), says :

" Colonel Butler called a council of war [in the fort], and opinions were freely expressed. Many, and among the rest Colonel Butler, Colonel Denison and Lieut. Col-

* See The Susquehanna Democrat (Wilkes-Barré), July 18, 1832.

1010

onel Dorrance, were of the opinion that a little delay would be best-that the alarm of the sudden irruption would subside-that the absent militia companies would arrive. * * To these wise and weighty considerations it was replied: That the enemy had now been three days in the town; that they were fast carrying on their work of conquest and murder. *

* Unless led to action, each man would fly to the protection of his own

family. * We must depend on God and ourselves. To attack and defeat the enemy was the only hope of salvation for the settlement. A large majority accorded with these sentiments, and the minority, though with reluctance, finally yielded their assent."

Mr. Miner further says (Appendix, page 20):

"Capt. William McKerachan was the first officer of the Hanover company. Evin- cing at once a spirit of singular modesty and patriotismn, he said to Captain Stewart on the morning of the battle : 'My pursuits in life have thus far been those of peace; you have been used to war and accustomed to command. On parade I can manœuvre my men, but in the field no unnecessary hazard should be run; a mistake might prove fatal. Take you the lead; I will fight under you with my men, as an aid, or a private in the ranks. Your presence at the head of the Hanover boys will impart confidence.'"

Col. H. B. Wright, in his "Historical Sketches of Plymouth" (published in 1873), follows Stone and Miner in telling the story of the events preceding the battle of Wyoming, and then says (page 183):

"The decision of the council of war to adopt immediate offensive action may possi- bly have been premature. From the limited knowledge, however, of the circumstances which is left to us at this remote period of time, we cannot help concluding that the decis- ion was right. The men who made it were not aware of the numerical strength of their enemy; and the sequel, as developed afterwards upon the field, is pretty conclusive that a hundred men more could not have saved the day."

When Mr. May (who was rector of St. Stephen's Protestant Epis- copal Church in Wilkes-Barré) wrote and delivered his address, afore- mentioned, there were a dozen or more hale and hearty, intelligent and sensible, old men living in Wyoming Valley who were survivors of the battle and massacre of Wyoming, and whose recollections of the circum- stances connected with those events were distinct and positive. From those men Mr. May derived his information concerning the matters which he described, and it is quite probable that, had there occurred on the 3d of July, 1778, such dissensions and acts of insubordination as have been described by Dr. Peck and Mr. Jenkins, those old survivors would have remembered and talked about them, and Mr. May would have referred to them in liis address. It is a noticeable fact, however, that by neither word nor implication does Chapman, May, Stone, Miner, Pearce or Wriglit connect Lazarus Stewart or any other American officer with any wrangle, mutiny or act of insubordination at Wyoming preced- ing the battle of July 3, 1778.

There is no doubt that Capt. Lazarus Stewart (although only forty- four years of age when he fell in that battle) possessed inore military knowledge and experience-particularly concerning Indian warfare- than any other officer, with the exception of Lieut. Col. Zebulon Butler, Capt. Robert Durkee and Capt. Samuel Ransom, who marched out of Forty Fort to meet the invading Tories and Indians on that disastrous 3d day of July. More than that, Lazarus Stewart knew the value of, and the absolute necessity for, martial discipline in the presence of such dangers as they there faced. And in this respect all the other officers and many of the men in the ranks of the Americans were like him. Not a few of them were old campaigners, as we have previously shown -some having taken part in the last colonial war, others having but recently participated in several battles of the War for Independence and undergone the hardships of Valley Forge, while still others had seen active military service in both colonial and revolutionary times. But, above all, the great majority of tlie inen assembled there were New

Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.

A history of Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania : from its first beginnings to the present time, including chapters of newly-discovered early Wyoming Valley history, together with many biographical sketches and much genealogical material. Volume II, Part 77

Author: Harvey, Oscar Jewell, 1851-1922; Smith, Ernest Gray Publication date: 1909 Publisher: Wilkes-Barre : Raeder Press Number of Pages: 680

Author: Harvey, Oscar Jewell, 1851-1922; Smith, Ernest Gray
Publication date: 1909
Publisher: Wilkes-Barre : Raeder Press
Number of Pages: 680