USA > Rhode Island > Rhode Island : three centuries of democracy, Vol. I > Part 54
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when Washington sent Generals Arnold and Spencer to Rhode Island. The former was sub- sequently attached to the northern army and fought valorously in the Saratoga campaign; General Spencer remained in Rhode Island until relieved by General Sullivan in April, 1778.
Washington and Greene disapproved the raising of the fifteen months' regiments in Rhode Island for the reason that both believed that the raising of these troops for a particular state's defence would impede the raising of the two battalions ordered by Congress for service with the Continental army. Both the great commanders seemed to have penetrated Clinton's want of purpose in the movement in Rhode Island, and doubted that New England was actually in serious danger, while for strategic purposes on a large scale embracing all military movements in the United States, advantage lay with the continental forces while the British were content to isolate several thousand soldiers in Newport. Both Washington and Greene withdrew objections when it was explained that the brigade being raised in Rhode Island was enlisted for service in or out of the state, and that release for enlistment in the Continental line was encouraged. Meanwhile vigorous efforts were made to obtain recruits for the Con- tinental battalions, and Rhode Island offered large bounties for enlistments. The state was beset with difficulties in maintaining an effective military organization. The New England council of war, meeting in Providence late in December, 1776, had agreed to recommend the maintenance of an effective, active New England army of 6000 men. Governor Cooke wrote to Washington on March 18, 1777: "We have already given every encouragement in our power to men to enlist with the continental battalions; and I am sorry to inform you that there are but 400 enlisted. Nor, in the present state of affairs, do I see any prospect of our being able to complete them. To oppose the enemy at Rhode Island the states of New Eng- land agreed to keep up an army of 6000 men; of which we were to furnish 1800. The other states having always fallen short of their quotas, from 1800 to 2500, we have been obliged to keep up between 2500 and 3000. At present the enemy consist of six Hessian and two British regiments, making near 4000 men ; and we have not in the state but 551 effective men, besides our own troops. Your excellency is sensible that near a quarter of the state is in possession of the enemy. Besides those enlisted into the continental battalions, the brigade for fifteen months consists of about 500; and one-third of all the remaining fencible men are upon monthly duty by rotation. I need not add, that this situation creates insuperable difficulties. . Methods are taking by General Varnum to have the two Continental battalions raising by this state inoculated as early as possible. But I cannot think, while so large a body of the enemy are upon Rhode Island, and we left so defenceless, that your excellency will order them away."
Washington answered in April, announcing the arrival of arms at Philadelphia and Ports- mouth in quantity sufficient to relieve him of uneasiness and the sending of 1176 stands to Rhode Island for arming the Continental battalions. He condemned the granting of extrava- gant bounties, and again referred to the raising of the Rhode Island fifteen months' brigade, adding : "You certainly overrate the number of men upon Rhode Island, if they consist of only six Hessian and two British regiments. The Hessian regiments, when they came out complete, did not exceed 600 men each, and the British 250 each. Now, if they have decreased by casualties in proportion to the other troops in the British army, they are scarcely more than 3000; a number too small to make any attempt upon the main. I am convinced, from 'every appearance, that they intend to leave Rhode Island, where they have wintered comfortably, and kept up a considerable diversion, and join their main body in this state (New Jersey). How am I to oppose them, God knows; for excepting a few hundred from Jersey, Pennsyl- vania and Virginia, I have not yet received a man from the continental levies. So far, there- fore, from being able to consent that your continental battalions should remain at home, sup- posing the enemy should continue upon the island, I am obliged, in the most positive terms, to order every man who has had the smallpox to come immediately forward, and those who
GENERAL NATHANAEL GREENE : PAINTING IN STATE HOUSE, PROVIDENCE
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have not, so soon as they are recovered. I have written General Varnum to the same effect. As it is my duty to afford equal protection to every part of the continent, you may be assured, if I thought there was any real danger to be apprehended from the enemy at Rhode Island, that, instead of drawing the continental troops from that quarter, I would add to their num- bers. . As the safety of the whole confederacy depends upon each state's furnishing the quota of men allotted to it, I must call upon you in the most pressing manner to endeavor to complete your allotment by the usual methods; but, if your men will not turn out volun- tarily, notwithstanding the great encouragement given by the state, I beg you will, if your powers are adequate, insist upon each district's furnishing a certain number." The latter measure was resorted to, quotas being allotted to towns. Eventually a draft was ordered in May. The final effort to complete the battalions, under the direction of Major Simeon Thayer, won him praise by the General Assembly and the gift of a silver-hilted sword. The officers appointed for the Continental battalions were: Israel Angell and Christopher Greene as Colonels, Jeremiah Olney as Lieutenant Colonel, Samuel Ward and Simeon Thayer as Majors.
MAINTAINING SUPPLIES-As the war progressed the difficulties of supplying troops with necessary clothing increased. Cloth of all kinds was scarce, and supplies as they were dis- closed were purchased, and ordered made into clothing. Bounties on the production of salt and steel were offered. An embargo on the export of rum, sugar, molasses, cottonwool, cof- fee, tanned leather, sheep wool, and sheep, the latter unless shorn, was laid and enforced rigidly. Twice during 1777 and once in 1778 quotas of knit stockings to be furnished for soldiers were assigned to towns, and once each town was ordered to raise a quota of blankets. The distillation of grain into alcoholic beverages was forbidden. The withdrawal of so many men, more than one-third, sometimes as many as one-half, and on the occasion of general alarm all able-bodied men from their regular occupations, tended to interfere seriously with the production of commodities and particularly with farming economy. In certain instances of the production of essential articles relief from military service was permitted; thus John Wells and Waterman Williams were exempted from the draft order that they might continue at work in a paper mill, which had been established to manufacture paper for cartridges. George Tefft and Jeremiah Sheffield, making guns, also were exempted. The women and chil- dren of Rhode Island replaced their husbands, brothers and fathers so far as was possible in economic occupations, including farming. Cattle and other food animals were withdrawn from places close to the shore and convenient for raiding by the British; and many of the inhabitants abandoned their homes in exposed places, withdrawing inland, and facing serious privations in view of the unsettled industrial organization. Soldiers were everywhere ; camped in strategic positions, or marching from place to place as directed; or billeted in homes, if not barracked in houses abandoned by inhabitants who had fled for safety. Other soldiers passed along the streets and highways, on their way to mustering for active service, or on the way home after a tour of duty. Small wonder that some social activities, including schools, were for the time being abandoned. Two of the schoolhouses in Providence were military laboratories. Rhode Island College had closed its doors, as professors and students went to the war; University Hall, the only college building at the period, was used as barracks for troops, and afterward as a hospital. While General Malmedy was in Rhode Island he inspected the fortifications erected in 1776, and advised the strengthening of some, the aban- donment of others, and the fortifying of places that he considered of greater strategic impor- tance. Most of the points along the shores of Narragansett Bay were fortified in some way, if only with trenches and breastworks to protect sharpshooters. Under General Spencer's direction a fort was laid out on Prospect Hill in Providence as a defence for the town.
SPENCER'S RHODE ISLAND EXPEDITION-The military operations involving actual conflict in arms in Rhode Island in 1777 were minor in significance, and not so numerous as might be
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expected in view of the proximity of the opposing forces. The reasons for this were the inertia of Clinton, Percy and Prescott, successively commanding on the island, and the failure to assemble on the mainland for concerted action at any time a force sufficiently large to hazard an invasion of the island. Greene, whose appraisal of the British strategy was most accurate at all times and whose keen estimates of the probable action of his opponents served him well in most of his campaigning, advised urgently against a general attack upon the Brit- ish on Rhode Island in 1777; so long as the latter remained at Newport they could help neither Burgoyne in the northern campaign nor Howe in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The General Assembly, in March, "being under great concern that no attempt hath, as yet, been made against the enemy upon Rhode Island, which they consider as a great disgrace to New England in general and to this state in particular," resolved to recommend to General Spencer "(if it be any way consistent with prudence) to make an attack upon the enemy at Rhode Island." Volunteers were asked to assemble on March 12, and assistance was requested from Rehoboth, Taunton, Attleboro, Wrentham, Norton, Bellingham, Dighton, Swansea, Free- town, Dartmouth and Middleboro. Spencer did not hazard an attack with the forces that assembled, and the expedition was abandoned.
Congress, on April 16, recommended that Rhode Island, Connecticut and Massachusetts concentrate soldiers "to attack and destroy the enemy on the Island of Rhode Island," and that Washington appoint general officers to direct the movement; the purpose stated in the resolution adopted by Congress was "to cause a diversion" of the British forces in New Jer- sey. Spencer undertook preparations for the attack; nevertheless a fleet carried reinforce- ments from Newport to Howe's army in May. Spencer was accused by his contemporaries of dilatoriness and indecision; he was embarrassed in 1777 by the slow assembling of the army being prepared for the invasion. Spring and summer both had passed before all was ready, and the concentration of troops behind the heights along the east bank of the Seaconnet River was delayed until October. Rhode Island had called out half the men of the state capable of bearing arms, and had organized them into a brigade of six regiments under the immediate command of General Cornell. In addition, the fifteen months' brigade was pre- pared for action, and other militia guarded the shores of Narragansett Bay. Massachusetts had gathered 3000 infantry, besides artillery ; and Connecticut sent 1500 soldiers. Spencer's army, when assembled, was estimated variously at 8000 to 10,000 men. On the island were probably 4000 British and Hessians, having the advantage of strongly fortified defensive positions chosen by professional soldiers. Boats had been assembled, and preparations had been made by Spencer to move his army across the Seaconnet River secretly, under cover of darkness, thus to avoid the fire of British batteries commanding the river. On the night selected for the advance the wind blew a heavy gale, and the Seaconnet River was impassable in the flatboats that had been constructed for ferrying a large number of men simultaneously across its always turbulent, now tempestuous, waters. The attack was postponed for three days, while the storm still raged, and postponed again and the base changed because the British had concentrated troops at the place selected for landing. Meanwhile Spencer's forces dwindled rapidly as troops were withdrawn because their officers had become dissatisfied. The British by this time had made ample preparations to meet the attack that they anticipated as the purpose of the activity noted along the east shore of the river. Spencer, on Ocober 26, had less than 5000 men; he abandoned the expedition when news reached Rhode Island of Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga.
Spencer was criticised severely for alleged failure, which was attributed by many to his inability to move promptly, and unofficial requests for his removal from the command in Rhode Island were addressed to Washington and to Congress. He asked for an investiga- tion, and was acquitted by two military courts of inquiry. Perhaps his conduct may be explained in terms of the major strategy of the American campaign of 1777. Neither Wash-
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ington nor Greene wished the British elsewhere than at Newport in 1777; it is conceivable that Spencer had been instructed to conduct his campaign in such manner as to keep the British army in Rhode Island for the time being. Burgoyne's instructions to Baum, who met disaster at Bennington, were to march across country to Springfield, where he would meet his majesty's forces from Rhode Island! If Spencer actually aimed to prevent the sending of reinforcements from Newport to Burgoyne's army and to upset the plan for an invasion of central New England, culminating in junction of the British forces in western Massachusetts, he had been eminently successful; and Rhode Island, in enduring the discomfort of British occupation was suffering vicariously for the nation.
MINOR ENGAGEMENTS-Skirmishes along the extended lines held by the opposing forces occurred occasionally, but not so frequently as might be expected had they not been separated by open waters. The "Cerberus," British frigate, was driven from the Seaconnet River, near the Fogland Ferry, by troops stationed in Little Compton in January, who damaged her hull with artillery fire. The British thereupon fortified high ground on the island west of the ferry, and also Butt's Hill. They sent a raiding party to Prudence Island on January 14 and burned the houses that Wallace had overlooked or spared. A British armed schooner grounded in shoal water between Prudence and Patience Islands one month later; her crew abandoned the schooner, exploded the magazine and set the vessel on fire, lest it be captured by the "Providence," sloop, which was approaching. An American raid, planned to carry hay off Rhode Island, was covered by the "Spitfire," row galley, which exchanged cannon shots with a British battery on shore. At Bristol, on April 2, the "Washington," row galley, exploded, and eight of the complement lost their lives; the vessel was repaired, rigged as a schooner, and placed in commission in August.
The marine committee was dissatisfied with the inactivity of Esek Hopkins, and, in Feb- ruary, ordered him to send four of his vessels to sea, but Hopkins could not obtain sailors ; he was suspended in March. To assist Captain John B. Hopkins of the "Warren," frigate, and Captain Abraham Whipple of the "Providence," frigate, to go to sea, the General Assem- bly authorized the impressment of transient seamen not citizens of Rhode Island or other states, but neither vessel was able to sail. Rhode Island ordered the purchase of two armed cruisers and three merchant vessels in June. Occasionally, taking advantage of darkness or storm, adventurous captains drove their vessels in or out of Narragansett Bay, past the British warships. Not all were successful; a privateer, sailing from Providence, was driven ashore at Seaconnet and burned. Congress ordered the purchase in Rhode Island of six vessels to be used as fireships, additional to the two purchased earlier in the year by the state. Colonel Elliott's Rhode Island artillery drove the "Renown," British ship, fifty guns, from her anchor- age near Dutch Island, on August 2, and cleared the way for a raid on Conanicut, then held by the British. The British retaliated, but their raiding party landing at Narragansett on August 5 was driven back by the Rhode Island militia. Across the bay, on August 5, Captain Dyer invaded the island of Rhode Island from Tiverton to punish British who had fired on fishing boats in the Seaconnet River; the British were driven back to the protection of their forts, and Captain Dyer, wounded, was carried off the field by his soldiers. Prisoners were taken in raids upon Prudence Island and Rhode Island early in September. The artillery at Point Judith captured the "Syren," ship, twenty-eight guns, which had run aground on November 6. A squadron of British warships from the Delaware reached Newport in Decem- ber, and army and navy settled down in winter quarters.
BARTON CAPTURES PRESCOTT-The most conspicuous, daring and successful exploit of the year in Rhode Island was the capture of Major General Prescott, commanding the British, by Colonel William Barton, of Rhode Island, on the night of July 9. In December, 1776, Major General Charles Lee was captured by British* and was held as a prisoner for exchange ;
*Chapter XII.
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there could be no exchange, however, unless and until Washington could offer a captured British officer of equal rank. Barton had been with the brigade on Rhode Island previous to British occupation, and, in December, 1776, had withdrawn to Tiverton, and built a fortified camp on the highlands overlooking and commanding the channel of the Seaconnet River. There he planned the capture of Prescott. From British deserters, Americans who evaded the British patrols and escaped from the island, and scouts in the American service, Barton learned that Prescott was quartered at Overing's house some distance away from the main body of troops under his command. To this extent the situation on Rhode Island resembled somewhat that attending the capture of Lee, who stopped to spend the night at a farmhouse miles from his army, and there was surrounded. There is reason to believe that Barton, in disguise, visited the island to confirm the reports concerning Prescott, and to plan the details of an expedition to capture him. Barton confided his design to Colonel Stanton; they called together with them five other officers, whom they persuaded to join in a secret expedition, the purpose of which was not disclosed, however. Five whaleboats were obtained, and then Bar- ton paraded his regiment and asked for forty volunteers to accompany him upon an expedition against the enemy. The entire regiment stepped forward as one man to volunteer. Barton's headquarters were to the east of the island of Rhode Island; the Overing house was in Ports- mouth one mile from the westerly shore of the island. It was desirable, therefore, to pass around the northern end of the island of Rhode Island; this involved the danger of discovery by patrols from the British war vessels anchored in Narragansett Bay.
On the night of July 4, 1777, Barton and his followers embarked and started to row across Mount Hope Bay from Tiverton to Bristol. A violent thunderstorm scattered the boats, and some were twenty-six hours in making the passage. When all had reached Bristol, they set forth again in the evening of July 5 for Hog Island, which lies between Poppasquash Point and Bristol Ferry. There Barton for the first time disclosed his project to his followers, laying upon them the pledge of secrecy. They then returned to Bristol, and on the night of July 6, crossed Narragansett Bay to Warwick Neck. A heavy storm delayed the departure from Warwick until the night of July 9. Embarking under cover of darkness, Barton and his men passed between Prudence and Patience Islands, in order to avoid observation from the ships of the enemy near Hope Island ; and thence down the westerly side of Prudence Island, placing Hope Island between themselves and the enemy fleet. Gaining the westerly shore of Rhode Island, the party marched in five divisions, three assigned one each to the three entrances to the house in which Prescott slept, the fourth to guard the road, and the fifth in reserve for emergencies. Rumor relates that Prescott and his companions slept unusually soundly on the night of July 9, assigning as a reason the fact that a prize cargo of wines and spirits had been brought into Newport the day before, some of the cargo no doubt finding its way to the officers' mess. The sentinel standing guard at the gate was taken by surprise and silenced before he could raise an alarm. The Barton party surrounded the house and burst in the door.
Barton in person captured Prescott before the latter could rise from his bed. "Colonel Barton went to his bed," wrote John Hunt, a member of the party, "and ordered him to sur- render." Hunt took Prescott's clothes, and Prescott was compelled to arise and accompany his captors without dressing. Only when the Barton party had travelled so far from the house as to assure themselves that they were reunited and not in immediate danger of pursuit, was Prescott permitted to exchange nightshirt for uniform. Then the party, including Prescott, his aide-de-camp with the rank of major, and the sentinel, a private, boarded the boats and rowed quietly back to Warwick. Prescott was taken to Providence, signed a parole there on July 14, and was sent to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut at Lebanon, there to await exchange or discharge. Barton and his companions received a reward of $1120 from Rhode Island, under an offer made earlier in the year to encourage captures of British. The General
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Assembly voted thanks to Barton and the other officers and soldiers for "their brave execu- tion" of the enterprise "in the most prudent and gallant manner" and commended Barton and the other commissioned officers of the party "to the notice of his excellency General Washing- ton for promotion according to their merit." Congress awarded Barton a sword, and he was appointed as an aide on General Greene's staff.
NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE-Rhode Island sent Stephen Hopkins, William Bradford and Paul Mumford to a conference of committees from the New England States and New York, which assembled at Springfield on July 30. Stephen Hopkins was chosen President of the conference. The subjects considered were paper money, regulation of prices, embargoes on transportation, and the raising of soldiers. The conference was unanimously of the opinion that the quantity of paper money emitted exceeded what was necessary for trade and support of the war, and tended to produce depreciation and attendant evils; and recommended the calling in of non-interest bearing notes, except fractional currency, and redemption by taxes, or treasury notes carrying interest, and that effort be made to support war expenditures so far as possible by taxation. The conference recommended the repeal of statutes to prevent monopolies as interfering with trade which sometimes was legitimate, and the substitution therefor of measures to assist soldiers and their families in obtaining necessities of life at reasonable prices, with heavy penalties for inflating prices of goods sold in small quantities by engrossing ; and that embargoes restricting free transportation of goods between states be resorted to only when absolutely necessary. The conference was of opinion that the situation facing New England and the necessity of procuring supplies of all kinds demanded as little interference with trade as was possible. For the defence of Rhode Island the conference recommended a New England army of approximately 4000 men under general officers, con- sisting of two battalions each from Rhode Island and Massachusetts, one battalion of 728 men from Connecticut, and 300 men from New Hampshire. The conference report was referred to Congress, which on November 22 resolved to request the states to raise $5,000,000 by taxes, Rhode Island's share being apportioned as $100,000; and to recommend that the states refrain from emitting bills of credit, call in paper currency emitted except fractional currency, and "for the future to provide for the exigencies of war and the support of government by taxes to be levied within the year, or such other expedient as may produce a competent supply."
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