Rhode Island : three centuries of democracy, Vol. I, Part 76

Author: Carroll, Charles, author
Publication date: 1932
Publisher: New York : Lewis historical Pub. Co.
Number of Pages: 716

USA > Rhode Island > Rhode Island : three centuries of democracy, Vol. I > Part 76

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The "Peggy," sloop, packet between Newport and New York, was stopped off Newport harbor, July 31, 1795, and searched by the "Africa," British ship of the line, Captain Home.

OLIVER HAZARD PERRY Monument on Right of South Approach to State House

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The "Africa" had been hovering off the entrance to Narragansett Bay, and Captain Home sought M. Franchett, late French Minister, who, warned that the "Africa" was near, left the packet at Stonington. Captain Home then sent an insulting letter to Governor Fenner, demanding that Rhode Island officers assist him in capturing British deserters and permit him to purchase provisions, and threatening to treat Newport as violating neutrality should there be an interference with or impediment placed in the way of him or his officers. President Washington, to whom Governor Fenner sent Captain Home's letter, promptly revoked the exequatur of the British Vice Consul at Newport, through whom the letter had been delivered to the Governor. The "Africa," after following to sea the "Medusa," French frigate, which had been at Newport, returned, and on August 24, 1795, searched the "Ann," ship, Captain Tillinghast, of Providence, and impressed three sailors. All were British by birth, but two were alleged to have been naturalized. Thus what had been a vexatious interference with commerce on the ocean was brought closer home. As a general rule, the British government, on satisfactory proof that impressed sailors were actually American citizens, ordered release, but diplomacy was even slower than correspondence in a period in which communication over- seas was by sailing vessels. Doubtful cases furnished reasons for disagreement. American merchants, feeling immediately the losses involved in interference with commerce and in seizures, became restless. Seventeen Rhode Island seamen were reported in Rhode Island newspapers in 1805 as held for failure to prove by documentary evidence their American citizenship. Later in the year, on December II, a meeting of Providence merchants appointed a committee to draft and send to James Madison, as Secretary of State, a list of Providence vessels that had been captured, detained, condemned or plundered at sea. In June, 1813, a committee of the General Assembly reported the names of nineteen Rhode Island seamen impressed and held in service by foreign powers.

THREATS OF WAR AND MINOR WARS-Rhode Island had little part in the earliest wars of the new nation ; the struggle to clear Ohio of hostile Indians, and the border conflict with Creeks and Cherokees were far away from Narragansett Bay. The army raised to suppress the Whiskey insurrection consisted principally of militia from Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia. Cannon were mounted at Fort Washington, guarding Newport harbor, in 1792, and Rhode Island hired a gunner. Rhode Island proclaimed neutrality in the war between France and England, 1793, following President Washington's proclamation. America was friendly to France while memories of the Revolution were fresh. Refugees from the French West Indies came to Rhode Island, and the General Assembly made liberal provision for supporting those without resources who had fled from Santo Domingo. England's interfer- ence with American commerce was exasperating. The "Nautilus" affair at Newport reflected the American attitude. War with England seemed almost inevitable if national honor and respect were to be maintained. The General Assembly ordered a day of fasting in April, 1794, with prayers for delivery of citizens from captivity and the nation from war. Impress- ment and neglect of the rights of neutral trade had become intolerable. Congress ordered the raising of an army of 80,000 soldiers for national defence, and the General Assembly directed enlistment of 1697 militiamen as Rhode Island's quota. When war seemed certain, Jay's treaty was negotiated and ratified in spite of vigorous opposition. To offset popular disap- proval of the treaty, the Rhode Island General Assembly adopted resolutions sustaining President Washington for the same "distinterested devotion . . .. as our chief magistrate . . . . which characterized George Washington as commander-in-chief of the army." As further evidence of undivided loyalty, the General Assembly rejected Virginia's proposal to amend the Constitution, holding it inexpedient to make changes without further experience.

France was no better pleased with the Jay treaty than might be expected ; from the French point of view it constituted another grievance to be nursed with those arising from Washing-

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ton's insistence upon neutrality. France discontinued diplomatic relations and was discour- teous to the American Minister; French war vessels interfered with American commerce, and French privateers plundered American ships. Again the war spirit was aroused in the United States. The frigates "Constitution," "Constellation," and "United States" were completed, launched, armed, equipped, manned and sent to sea. Congress ordered the raising of an army of 80,000 soldiers, and the General Assembly directed the enlistment of 1626 men, in October, 1797, as the state's quota. March 23, 1798, was observed as a day of fasting and prayer in anticipation of war with France. The General Assembly, in May, commended President Adams for his effort to avert war through diplomacy. The Governor was directed to write to the Secretary of War concerning the defenceless condition of Rhode Island, while meas- ures were taken to provide cannon for the artillery companies in Bristol and Providence, and a committee was appointed to prepare measures for defence of the seacoast. The militia was called out for inspection on July 4. The Governor was directed to ask the Secretary of War for 1000 muskets, eight brass fieldpieces, ammunition, and one or more vessels to patrol the coast. Committees were appointed to collect and remount Revolutionary cannon and to buy 500 muskets and six brass fieldpieces. Late in the year the Governor was directed to ask that two brass fieldpieces be sent from Springfield to Newport. Again the war cloud passed without conflict on land, although the new navy achieved an enviable reputation. The "Con- stellation," still used in the twentieth century as a training ship at Newport, captured "L'In- surgent," and fought a drawn battle with "La Vengeance." The United States government purchased Rose Island in 1799, and dedicated Fort Adams, for many years thereafter the principal defence of Narragansett Bay, and one of the largest fortifications in the United States. In the ten years from ratification of the Constitution to the end of the eighteenth century the military spirit had been maintained in Rhode Island; independent military com- panies, membership in which was voluntary, had been chartered in large numbers, including Bristol Train of Artillery, Bristol Grenadiers, Ready Volunteers of Bristol, Charlestown Independent Company, Coventry Rangers, Cranston Blues, Cumberland Light Infantry, Washington Independent Company of Exeter, Foster Safeguards, Glocester Grenadiers, Glocester Light Infantry, Johnston Rangers, Kentish Guards, Kentish Light Infantry, Ken- tish Troop of Horse, Kingstown Reds, Newport Artillery Company, Newport Guards, North Kingstown Rangers, United Company of the Train of Artillery, Providence Independent Dragoons, Pawtuxet Rangers, Smithfield Grenadiers, Scituate Hunters, Tiverton and Little Compton Dragoons, West Greenwich and Coventry Light Infantry, Captain General Cav- aliers, Governor's Company of Light Infantry, Washington Troop of Horse, Washington Cavalry, Governor's Company of Independent Volunteers, Federal Blues of Warren, Ports- mouth Light Infantry.

THE "CHESAPEAKE" AND THE "LEOPARD"-The peace that seemed to be assured by Jay's treaty with England and the resumption of diplomatic relations with France was shortlived. France and England were soon engaged in a desperate struggle for supremacy, and England, particularly, watched enviously the growth of American commerce and the American mer- chant marine. The impressment issue had not been settled, and English captains, wanting sailors, resorted to ruthless methods to obtain them. English war vessels enforced rigorously their asserted right to take alleged deserters from American ships; there were many desert- ers, anxious to escape rigid naval discipline, and lured by the good wages paid seamen on American vessels participating in the thriving American carrying trade, become unusually prosperous as Europe was distracted by war. Rhode Island and the United States would have entered war against England in 1807 enthusiastically, fired as the entire nation was with indig- nation because of the wanton attack of the "Leopard," British ship-of-war, upon the "Chesa-

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peake," American frigate. Sailing from Virginia for the Mediterranean, the "Chesapeake" was intercepted by the "Leopard," which signaled that she had dispatches. The British officer who boarded the "Chesapeake" presented a demand that British deserters, alleged to be on board, be surrendered. Captain Barron, of the "Chesapeake," who had taken unusual care in recruiting his crew to exclude British subjects, replied that none were on the "Chesapeake," and the British officer withdrew. The "Leopard," which had moved closer to the "Chesa- peake" during the parley, fired a shot across the "Chesapeake's" bow, and followed it with a broadside immediately. The "Chesapeake" was wholly unprepared, and fired only one shot before Captain Barron hauled down his colors to save his crew from slaughter; three had been killed and eighteen wounded in less than fifteen minutes. The "Leopard" took from the "Chesapeake" four men, three Americans who had previously been impressed by British ships, and had deserted, and one a native British deserter, who had enlisted on the "Chesa- peake" under an assumed name. Of the four, the Briton was hanged, one American died, and the other two eventually were restored. The attack had occurred almost within the territorial waters of the United States, and the nation seethed with fury. Two meetings were held in Rhode Island to voice the indignation of the people. At Newport the largest meeting in years denounced the "late insult on our National Flag" and advocated preparation for war without delay. The people of Providence pledged lives and fortunes to revenge "a flagrant insult upon our national honor." The "Providence Phenix," of July 18, 1807, carried an editorial article headed "The Spirit of Seventy-six," in which it declared "No neutrality can now be tolerated. Those who are not for us are against us."

Such was the attitude of people and the press generally throughout the United States, except in Boston, where President Jefferson's political opponents first delayed and temporized, next yielded reluctantly to public clamor, and exerted restraint upon the resolutions that were adopted in the public meeting that became inevitable, and eventually, through the Federalist press, sought to sublimate the popular impulse and to divert it from its immediate purpose. Congress authorized the President to call out 100,000 militia, and the Rhode Island General Assembly, in October, 1807, directed the enlistment or drafting of 1814 men as Rhode Island's quota. The Secretary of War was requested to make suitable provision for housing the can- non furnished by the United States for the defence of Bristol and Newport. Discretion, per- haps, rather than valor, guided President Jefferson, who, with reference to the "Chesapeake"- "Leopard" affair followed his lifelong and consistent advocacy of peace by recourse to diplo- macy. Instead of sending a war message to Congress, he advocated an embargo as an effective measure for enforcing demands made on England. and on December 22 signed an act of Con- gress forbidding the sailing of American vessels from American ports on foreign voyages. The embargo, and other measures taken subsequently to make it effective, brought to an abrupt termination the prosperous carrying trade, and became unpopular with commercial states, although the farming states eventually realized the effect of the embargo in a failing market and lower prices for their produce.

THE EMBARGO-In Rhode Island the embargo affected almost the entire population. The losses to merchants and others engaged in commercial occupations was indicated by a decrease of exports from $1,600,000 in 1807 to $240,000 in the following year in Rhode Island alone. It was estimated that $100,000,000 worth of produce was held in the United States by the embargo, and deteriorated or became a total loss. On the other hand, foreign goods were no longer available, and some manufacturing enterprises profited from the home markets now exclusively their own. Of Rhode Island farming during the embargo it was written in 1808: "There is but little market for the productions of our labor. Our crops of hay will but little more than pay for making. What last year brought twenty dollars will thus bring but ten

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dollars. Pork, at the last market of it, was worth ten cents; now it will command but little more than five." The outrage on the "Chesapeake" faded into the background of memory as the public mind focussed on the grievance of the immediate present, and the administration became unpopular because of its policy, undertaken to avoid a war for which the country was almost wholly unprepared, had accomplished economic distress, although it may be questioned seriously if the privations by reason of loss of commerce equalled the economic burden of financing a war. The Rhode Island General Assembly, in 1809, adopted resolutions remon- strating against continuance of the embargo and enforcement act, urging (I) that the latter infringed inalienable rights and privileges of the good people of the United States; and (2) that it was unjust, oppressive, tyrannical and unconstitutional. The resolutions were emphatic, but they were voted in face of vigorous opposition, the vote being seven to four in the Senate, and thirty-five to twenty-seven in the House of Representatives. In the same resolutions the Assembly asserted its own duty to be vigilant in safeguarding the rights of citizens and the state not delegated to regulation by Congress, and, with reference to the alleged usurpation of power by the latter, declared that a "dissolution of the union may be more surely, and as speedily, effected by the systematic oppression of the government as by the inconsiderate dis- obedience of the people." The tone of the resolutions contrasted distinctly with that of the Rhode Island resolutions rejecting the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1799; it was prophetic of the antipathy toward the federal administration which led to the Hartford Con- vention in 1814. The embargo was repealed in 1809, being superseded by the non-intercourse law. Impressment and interference with trade continued, and a party favoring war carried the national congressional election of 1810, seventy new members being chosen. The South and West wanted war with England; New England distrusted the policy of attacking the most vigorous opponent of imperialism in Europe. Jefferson recognized the failure of the embargo policy in the declaration "we must fight it out or break the union."

MR. MADISON'S WAR-The policy of Rhode Island as war developed was forecasted in resolutions adopted in the Providence town meeting of August 7, 1812, after news of the declaration of war in 1812 had been received, which in part were as follows :

It is the duty of every citizen promptly to aid in repelling all invasions of enemies, made for the purpose either of plunder, bloodshed or devastation or with any view to infract the rights, usurp the privileges, or interrupt the political freedom of any person whatever. . . . We consider it most indispensably needful, at this time, to give all aid for suppressing all riots, tumults and mobs, believing that, however terrible war may be between nation and nation, his terrible features almost soften with mercy, when compared with the grim and bloody visage of civil commotion. . . . We will, at the hazard of all things, aid in the support and com- plete execution of the laws, knowing that safety cannot be found when law is trampled under foot, and believ- ing that neither life, liberty or property can be secure when once secret threats or open force have with impunity violated the freedom of speech, of the press, and of election. . . . We do all pledge ourselves, promptly, and on all occasions, to resist, and, if possible, repel, all hostile invasions from the enemy; that we will assist in quelling riots, tumults and mobs, and do all in our power to discourage and discountenance every- thing tending to those direful conflicts, hereby guaranteeing to all persons, so far as our influence and the effect of our exertions can extend, the perfect protection of the laws, so that they may, at all times, in all places and on all occasions, freely speak and publish their opinions, and nominate and elect their public officers, nor be answerable therefor to any man or collection of men, nor to any tribunal on earth but such only as are established by the laws of the land. . . . For obtaining the objects aforesaid we do recommend to all persons capable of bearing arms forthwith to furnish themselves with arms and ammunition, and be ready at a moment's warning to aid in defence of themselves, their families and their country.

Briefly the resolutions might be summarized as voicing patriotic sentiments strongly favorable to maintaining internal order and to resisting aggression amounting to invasion, but as carrying also an undisguised warning that Rhode Island was prepared to resist invasion of

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constitutional rights. Rhode Island would engage in defensive warfare; it was not committed to the plan for invading Canada, which was the favored project of the "War Hawks" led by Clay and Calhoun. The resolutions were cold and studied, and wanted enthusiasm and spon- taneity. Federalists were in control in Rhode Island ; the administration at Washington was Republican.

The declaration of war against England, expected within a few months, after the war Congress elected in 1810 had been organized in ISII, was issued in June, 1812. Congress had anticipated the declaration by some measures of preparation and had authorized the rais- ing of an army of 100,000 men. The General Assembly, in May, directed the enlisting or drafting of Rhode Island's initial quota of 500 soldiers. Although the Governor and the General Assembly complied with the early requests of the President and his secretaries, neither was enthusiastic. Even before the declaration of war, in resolutions drafted in May and addressed to Congress, the General Assembly expressly deprecated recourse to war and requested that Congress, with regard to the exposed and defenceless situation of Rhode Island, inaugurate proper measures to safeguard the state against attack and invasion. In view of repeated complaint that the federal government had left Rhode Island defenceless during the war, it should be mentioned that the following fortifications were in existence when war was declared : Fort Adams, then the largest fortress in the United States; Fort Walcott and Fort Hamilton, near Newport; Dumpling Fort at the entrance to Narragansett Bay; North Bat- tery and Tonomy Hill. The complaint, if at all justifiable, must be based upon the federal government's failure to increase garrisons. On the other hand, the Governor and General Assembly refused to detach Rhode Island militia, to be commanded by federal officers, even for garrison duty. At the July session, 1812, Governor Jones laid before the Assembly for consideration President Madison's war message, the declaration of war by Congress, and an order from Washington that the 500 Rhode Island soldiers previously requested and being enlisted should be placed under the command of Major General Dearborn. The Assembly directed the Governor to ask President Madison to send ordnance, muskets and ammunition to Rhode Island, and to ask General Dearborn to distribute to the Rhode Island militia mus- kets stored at Newport. A council of war, consisting of six members, was appointed to advise and assist the Governor. July 23 was designated as a day of prayer and fasting. The Governor was authorized to call out all or any part of the militia in the event of invasion. Three months later, at the October session, Governor Jones in a message to the General Assembly reported that General Dearborn had requested, additional to the 500 soldiers author- ized for enlistment as part of the national army, two companies each of artillery and infantry from the militia, to be posted for garrison duty, in the forts at Newport. The Governor had called the war council for advice because he doubted that the President or his subordinates had a right under the Constitution to call out the militia except "to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."* The council had advised that the militia could not be transferred to the command of federal officers except for one of the three reasons enumerated in the Constitution, and that responsibility rested with the Governor, as Captain General and the commander-in-chief of the militia, to determine whether or not any one of the causes for transferring the militia actually prevailed.

A sharp, clear-cut distinction had been drawn between the 500 soldiers enlisted for the national army, who were detached and sent outside the state on requisition, and the four com- panies of militia requested by General Dearborn, and Governor Jones had taken the same position assumed by the Governor of Connecticut and the Governor of Massachusetts, each of whom refused to transfer organized state militia to the command of General Dearborn either

*Article I, section 8, paragraph 15.

R. I .- 29

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for field or for garrison duty, the latter to replace units of the regular army that had been withdrawn from New England. Technically justifiable because the United States actually had not been invaded, and because there was no outstanding issue of law enforcement and no insurrection, the course of the three southern New England states had deprived them of the organized defence possible had the almost 10,000 militia requested by General Dearborn been ordered into service and combined as a New England army. Besides, Rhode Island lost 500 Massachusetts militia requested by General Dearborn for garrison duty at Fort Adams. The three southern New England Governors, at the time, professed to fear that the state militia, if transferred to federal command, would be marched out of the territory, perhaps into Can- ada to support the invading army operating on the Great Lakes frontier. Governor Jones also reported to the General Assembly that 1000 muskets had been promised by the federal government and were to be sent to Rhode Island. The committee of the Assembly to which the Governor's message was referred reported that Congress, so long before as 1808, had made provision for the purchase, accumulation and distribution of arms, and had raised and expended public money for the purpose; but that none of the arms had been deposited in Rhode Island, all having been distributed in southern and western states. It characterized the correspondence received by the Governor from certain federal officers as evidence of imbe- cility. It condemned the withdrawal of regular army units from Rhode Island forts. It congratulated the people of Rhode Island that Governor Jones had had the courage to resist and deny the President's request for the militia, and that the war council had had the wisdom to sustain the Governor. Reverses on the northwestern front indicated late in 1812 that the invasion of Canada would not be a parade of triumph, and that, with the reinforcements required there, the defence of New England would be left principally to the New England states.

Governor Jones could be as energetic in practical measures as he was cautious in insist- ing upon adherence to a literal reading of the Constitution. In his message to the General Assembly at the opening of February, 1813, he announced that 1000 muskets had been received from the federal government, and deposited half at Newport and half at Providence; that cartridges had been made and flints procured in reasonable quantities for use immedi- ately ; that diligent search had been made but no record could be found of cannon formerly owned by the state, but that three pairs of brass fieldpieces had been obtained and placed, one pair each at Bristol, Newport and Warwick; and that he had asked for 1000 additional mus- kets, and for fieldpieces at Fort Walcott that were not in use; that, in the event of an attempted invasion by English troops, the militia was available for immediate service. The General Assembly approved the Governor's action, and ordered the Quartermaster General to have all muskets belonging to the state repaired and put in good condition, and deposited at convenient places with the commanders of the militia, with twenty-four rounds of ammu- nition and three flints for each musket. At the May session a memorial to the President was prepared to present to him the defenceless condition of the coast, and to urge that the United States ought to undertake the manning of the forts at Newport with regular troops. Atten- tion was also directed to the diversion of revenues from state to federal government with the ratification of the Constitution, and to the fact that Rhode Island alone paid of federal taxes more than each one of half of the other states. The transfer of revenue had assumed accept- ance by the federal government of the responsibility for the common defence. The argument was sound and based upon facts: Rhode Island by ratifying the Constitution had sacrificed a revenue derived from imposts and tonnage duties; Rhode Island then, as in the twentieth century, through taxation, contributed more than each of many states of much larger area to the support of the federal government. Resolving that the government of the United States had failed to defend the coast of Rhode Island, the Governor was directed to establish patrol

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Rhode Island : three centuries of democracy, Vol. I, Part 76

Author: Carroll, Charles, author Publication date: 1932 Publisher: New York : Lewis historical Pub. Co. Number of Pages: 716

Author: Carroll, Charles, author
Publication date: 1932
Publisher: New York : Lewis historical Pub. Co.
Number of Pages: 716