Rhode Island : three centuries of democracy, Vol. I, Part 56

Author: Carroll, Charles, author
Publication date: 1932
Publisher: New York : Lewis historical Pub. Co.
Number of Pages: 716

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Both French and British fleets had been badly disabled in the hurricane; yet both com- manders were still ready for battle had physical conditions favored. The "Renown" and "Preston," British ships, attacked the "Languedoc" and "Tennant," both dismasted, and were held off until other French vessels came to the rescue and drove them away. The French fleet anchored for temporary repairs, and returned to Newport on August 20. Howe, also badly buffeted by storm, hovered about until August 22, and then sailed for New York. D'Estaing's strategy in following Howe to sea on August 10, thus abandoning the advantage of position previously gained on the eve of what had been planned to be a decisive effort to destroy or capture a British army, has been severely criticised and even ridiculed, usually with the assumptions that Pigot was in such straits that his surrender could be forced speedily by sharp action, and that Howe's fleet actually was inferior to D'Estaing's. Neither assumption has been sustained ; Pigot was far from being ready to surrender ; British officers of the period had too little respect for the soldierly qualities of "rebels" to fear even superior numbers, and Sullivan did not have superior numbers under his immediate command. Moreover, there was still hope that reinforcements might be sent from New York, justified by the appearance of Howe on August 9. So far as the fleets were concerned D'Estaing would be at disadvantage if attacked by Howe while in Newport harbor, because of shore batteries; indeed, as he sailed out to meet Howe he was heavily bombarded by British shore batteries and returned the fire. Howe had a strong fleet, reinforced after reaching New York from the Delaware; with little additional reinforcement, it could easily bottle D'Estaing in Narragansett Bay and make the Count the laughing stock of America and Europe.

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BATTLE OF RHODE ISLAND-On land an artillery battle was opened by the Americans on August 17, to cover an advance to more advantageous positions; Pigot meanwhile consoli- dated his army and strengthened new defences. He was still firmly entrenched when a fleet was seen entering Narragansett Bay on August 20, and watched anxiously until it was identi- fied as French. The fleet sailed away again on August 21, D'Estaing insisting, after making necessary immediate repairs, to follow literally his instructions to refit at Boston. News had reached America, and was imparted to D'Estaing by Lafayette, than an English fleet had sailed from Plymouth for America shortly after D'Estaing left Toulon. Were Howe reinforced by this fleet of thirteen warships, D'Estaing, unless completely refitted, could not venture to haz- ard meeting him in battle. D'Estaing refused to delay departure for Boston even for a day, although urged by American officers, particularly by Greene and Lafayette, to remain long enough to support with troops and cannon an attack in force upon the British. D'Estaing's fleet captains sustained him unanimously in his decision to sail at once; Lafayette declined to sign a protest drawn up by the American officers against the departure. Then followed in the American lines an acute shortage of provisions, because much had been destroyed by the hurri- cane, and supplies had been reduced on the mainland. The situation was far from satisfactory. Sullivan had not the strength to hazard a frontal attack; Greene proposed a flank movement in boats and a surprise attack on Pigot's right and rear from Sachusett Beach, but Sullivan had been warned by Washington against imprudence that might hazard loss of his army. Should Howe return to Newport, Sullivan's flank and rear would be threatened. The Ameri- can army had begun to dwindle by desertion and withdrawal. The New Hampshire contin- gent, all volunteers, departed. Three thousand militia, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, insisted on going home because they believed the campaign would be inactive until the French fleet returned. Sullivan had only 5400 effective men on August 27, and was actually in danger, should Pigot discover his weakness and launch a general attack.

Meanwhile, as a precautionary measure, hills to the north, in Portsmouth, had been forti- fied, and on the night of August 28 a retreat was undertaken quietly and in good order. Men, stores, cannon and arms were withdrawn without loss. Lafayette rode to Boston, seventy miles, in seven hours, on a mission to persuade D'Estaing to return and renew the movement. Lafayette returned, seventy miles, in six and one-half hours, too late for the battle of Rhode Island, which was fought on August 29, with D'Estaing's promise to march troops overland with reinforcements. D'Estaing was not called upon to fullfil this promise. Pigot discovered the American retreat at daylight August 29, and at once moved in pursuit, sending two columns northward along the east and west main roads. The American army had reached and rested on Butt's Hill, with flanks extended to cross the east and west roads, and pickets and cover- ing parties guarding the flanks. The British established contact with the American pickets as seven o'clock, skirmishing continuing steadily as the pickets, as ordered, retired in good order, drawing the British on toward the field and the line selected by Sullivan for fighting a rear guard action should it become necessary. Early in the morning the British Twenty- second Regiment, Colonel Campbell, marched into an American ambuscade prepared by Silas Talbot, and lost one-fourth of its members. The Americans, posted behind stone walls, were not discovered until they rose and poured a volley almost into the faces of the British; a second volley followed before the latter, in their bewilderment, could rally, and the British column wilted. Two Hessian regiments charged to retrieve the disaster, but the Americans had retreated, still in good order. By nine o'clock the armies were engaged along the entire line, with artillery in action on both sides and frequent skirmishing. Then that happened which justified the retreat, had there been no other reasons; British warships appeared in the open water west of the American lines, and took positions for shelling the American right flank. Had the retreat been delayed even a day, Sullivan would have been trapped, with the British fleet commanding his right flank and rear, and able to land troops in his rear for a

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circling movement. He was still in danger on August 29, and must fight to protect his line of retreat to the mainland.

GENERAL SULLIVAN'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE-Sullivan's report to Congress contained a résumé of the general movement in Rhode Island :

Upon the Count D'Estaing's finding himself under a necessity of going to Boston to repair the loss he sustained in the late gale of wind, I thought it best to carry on my approaches with as much vigor as possible against Newport, that no time might be lost in making the attack upon the return of his fleet, or any part of it. to cooperate with us. I had sent expresses to the Count to hasten his return, which, I had no doubt, would at least bring part of his fleet to us in a few days. Our batteries played upon the enemy's works for several days, with apparently good success, as the enemy's fire from the outworks visibly grew weaker, and they began to abandon some of those next us; and, on the 27th, we found they had removed their cannon from all the outworks except one. . . . The town of Newport is defended by two lines. . . . The first of these extends from a large pond, called Easton Pond, near to Tonomy Hill, and then turns off to the water. . . . The second line is more than a quarter of a mile within this, and extends from the sea to the north side of the island, terminating at the north battery. . . . There are a number of small works interspersed between the lines, which render an attack extremely hazardous on the land side without a naval force to cooperate with it. I, however, should have attempted carrying the works by storm, as soon as I found they had with- drawn their cannon from their outworks, had I not found, to my great surprise, that the volunteers, which composed a great part of my army, had returned, and reduced my numbers to little more than that of the enemy. Between 2000 and 3000 returned in the course of twenty-four hours, and others were still going off, upon a supposition that nothing could be done before the return of the fleet. Under these circumstances, and the apprehension of the arrival of the English fleet, with a reinforcement to relieve the garrison, I sent away, to the main, all the heavy articles that could be spared from the army; also a large party was detached to get the works in repair on the north end of the island, to throw up some additional ones, and put in good repair the batteries at Tiverton and Bristol, to secure a retreat in case of necessity. On the 28th a council of war was called, in which it was unanimously determined to remove to the north end of the island, fortify our camp, secure our communication with the main, and hold our ground on the island till we could know whether the French fleet would soon return to our assistance.

On the evening of the 28th we moved, with our stores and baggage, which had not been previously sent forward, and, about two in the morning, encamped on Butt's Hill, with our right extending to the west road, and left to the east road; the flanking and covering parties still farther toward the water, on right and left. One regiment was posted in a redoubt advanced off the right of the front line; Colonel Henry B. Livingston, with a light corps, consisting of Colonel Jackson's detachment and a detachment from the army, was stationed on the east road. Another light corps, under the command of Colonel Laurens, Colonel Fleury and Major Talbot, was posted on the west road. These corps were posted nearly three miles in front; in the rear of these was the picket of the army, commanded by Colonel Wade. The enemy having received intelligence of our movement, came out early in the morning with nearly their whole force in two columns, advanced in the two roads, and were supported for some time by the picket. I ordered a regiment to support Colonel Living- ston, another to support Colonel Laurens, and, at the same time, sent them orders to retire to the main army in the best order they could. We kept up a retreating fire upon the enemy, and retired in excellent order to the main army. The enemy advanced on our left very near, but were repulsed by General Glover. Then they retired to Quaker Hill. The Hessian column formed on a chain of hills running northward from Quaker Hill. Our army was drawn up, the first line in front of the works on Butt's Hill; the second in the rear of the hill; and the reserve near a creek and nearly half a mile in rear of the first line. The distance between those hills is about one mile. The ground between the hills is meadow land interspersed with trees and small copse of wood.

The enemy began a cannonade upon us about nine in the morning, which was returned with double force. Skirmishing continued between the advance parties until near ten o'clock, when the enemy's two ships of war and some small armed vessels having gained our right flank and begun a fire, the enemy bent their whole force that way, and endeavored to turn our right under cover of the ships' fire, and to take the advanced redoubt on the right. They were twice driven back in great confusion; but a third trial was made with greater numbers and with more resolution, which, had it not been for the timely aid sent forward, would

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have succeeded. A sharp contest of nearly an hour ensued, in which the cannon from both armies, placed on the hills, played briskly in support of their own party. The enemy were at length routed, and fled in great confusion to the hill where they first formed, and where they had artillery and some works to cover them, leaving their dead and wounded, in considerable numbers, behind them. It was impossible to ascertain the number of dead on the field, as it could not be approached by either party without being exposed to the cannon of the other army. Our party recovered about twenty of their wounded, and took nearly sixty pris- oners. . . . The number of their dead I have not been able to ascertain, but know them to be very consider- able. An officer informs me that in one place he counted sixty of their dead. . . . The firing of artillery continued through the day, the musketry with intermission of six hours. The heat of the action continued near an hour, which must have ended in the ruin of the British army, had not their redoubts on the hill covered them from further pursuit. We were about to attack them in their lines; but the men having had no rest the night before, and nothing to eat either that night or the day of the action, and having been in constant action through most of the day, it was not thought advisable, especially as their position was exceedingly strong, and their numbers fully equal, if not superior, to ours. Not more than 1500 of my troops had ever been in action before. I should before have taken possession of the hill they occupied, and fortified it; but it is no defence against an enemy coming from the south part of the island; though exceedingly good against one advancing from the north and toward the town, and had been fortified by the enemy for that purpose.

VALOR OF RHODE ISLAND TROOPS-General Nathanael Greene commanded the right wing of the American army, which bore the brunt of the British and Hessian attacks during the long summer day. Greene's division comprised Varnum's brigade of continental infantry, including the Rhode Island battalions ; Cornell's brigade of Rhode Island troops serving under a year's enlistment ; Glover's brigade of the continental line; and a brigade commanded by Colonel Christopher Greene of Rhode Island. John Hancock was not in the battle; he had returned to Boston to hasten refitting the French ships. With the Rhode Island continental troops was Colonel Greene's regiment of negroes, commanded for the day by Major Samuel Ward; this regiment repulsed three concerted assaults by Hessians with heavy losses. The fighting was most furious in front of the position assigned to Varnum's brigade. The Hes- sians formed three times on Anthony's Hill and charged across the valley between Anthony's Hill and Butt's Hill, until the fields were strewn with their dead bodies, and the right wing broke the last assault with a bayonet charge. Sullivan sent as reinforcements two continental battalions, and these joined in the charge that ended the concerted battle. A Rhode Island writer described this phase of the battle of Rhode Island: "Three times the Hessian charges broke with frightful losses in the valley between Anthony's Hill and Butt's Hill, until the fields were strewn with piles of bodies. Still the right wing held intact with steadfast courage. Concentrated and massed for a final charge upon the right wing, the Hessians advanced with fixed bayonets, on, on, almost to the American line, until, steel meeting steel in vigorous sortie and counter-attack, the Hessians faltered and then fell back, defeated.

Three times the Hessian hosts assailed the lines in vain, And three times back the scarlet flood receded without gain ; The slopes of Anthony's and Butt's, the vale between them, too, Were strewn with Hessian dead, and still the British bugles blew ; For Pigot planned a final charge, massing his troops with skill, Filling the ranks with fresh reserves, sending them down the hill. Onward they march with steady tread across the vale and on, Their bayonets fixed, with blinding flash reflect the sinking sun, While patriots wait, withholding fire as thrice before that day, Onward the Hessian column treads, eager to end the fray. One crashing volley from the guns, the Hessians reel, but still Rally again, as patriots charge, rolling them down the hill. The Hessians break as steel meets steel, leaving their guns, and flee.

The British and Hessians abandoned the field, leaving their dead and wounded; Ameri- cans followed in pursuit, and captured a battery, abandoned in the haste of departure. Gen- eral Sullivan, in his letter to Congress, commended his troops and officers, thus: "I have the

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pleasure to inform Congress that no troops could possibly show more spirit than those of ours which were engaged. Colonel Livingston and all the officers of the light corps behaved with remarkable spirit. Colonels Laurens, Fleury and Major Talbot, with the officers of that corps, behaved with great gallantry. The brigades of the first line-Varnum's, Glover's, Cornell's and Greene's-behaved with great firmness. Major General Greene, who commanded the attack on the right, did himself the highest honor, by the judgment and bravery exhibited in action. One brigade only of the second line was brought into action, commanded by Brigadier General Lovell. He and his brigade of militia behaved with great resolution. Colonel Crane and the officers of the artillery deserve the highest praise. . . Our army retired to camp after the action ; the enemy employed themselves, through the night, in fortifying their camp."

RETREAT FROM RHODE ISLAND -- On August 30 the council of officers agreed unanimously to withdraw from the island. The retreat was described by Sullivan in his letter to Congress, thus: "In the morning of the 30th I received a letter from his excellency General Washing- ton, giving me notice that Lord Howe had sailed with the fleet; and receiving intelligence at the same time that a fleet was off Block Island, and also a letter from Boston, informing me that the Count D'Estaing could not come around so soon as I expected, a council was called, and as we could have no prospect of operating against Newport with success without the assistance of a fleet, it was unanimously agreed to quit the island until the return of the French squadron. To make a retreat in the face of an enemy, equal, if not superior, in numbers, and cross a river, without loss, I knew was an arduous task and seldom accomplished if attempted. As our sentries were within 200 yards of each other, I knew it would require the greatest care and attention. To cover my design from the enemy, I ordered a number of tents to be brought forward and pitched in sight of the enemy, and almost the whole army to employ themselves in fortifying the camp. The heavy baggage and stores were falling back and crossing through the day; at dark the tents were struck, and the light baggage and troops passed down; and before twelve o'clock the main army had crossed, with the stores and baggage. The Marquis de Lafayette arrived about eleven in the evening from Boston; where he had been, by request of the general officers, to solicit the speedy return of the fleet. He was sensibly mortified that he was out of action; and, that he might not be out of the way in case of action, he had ridden hence to Boston in seven hours, and returned in six and a half-the distance nearly seventy miles. He returned in time enough to bring off the pickets and other parties which covered the retreat of the army, which he did in excellent order; not a man was left behind, nor the smallest article lost. . .. . The event has proved how timely my retreat took place, as one hundred sail of the enemy's ships arrived in the harbor the morning after the retreat. I should do the highest injustice if I neglected to mention that Brigadier General Cornell's inde- fatigable industry in preparing for the expedition, and his good conduct through the whole, merit particular notice. Major Talbot, who assisted in preparing the boats, and afterward served in Colonel Laurens' corps, deserves great praise."

The failure of the Rhode Island campaign was discouraging, in spite of the brilliant vic- tory for the American army in the rear guard action fought at Butt's Hill, and the remarkable achievement of retreat of the entire army across a river without losses. Washington had entertained hopes that a success might end the war. He wrote: "If the garrison of that place, consisting of nearly 6000 men had been captured, as there was, in appearance at least, a hundred to one in favor of it, it would have given the finishing blow to the British preten- sions of sovereignty over this country; and would, I am persuaded, have hastened the depar- ture of the troops in New York as fast as their canvas wings could carry them away." Greene was no less disappointed, but expressed his admiration for Sullivan's conduct of operations, thus: "Our numbers at the time we left the enemy's lines were not much superior to the garrison. We knew they expected a reinforcement hourly. Had any considerable force

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arrived the night we retreated, landed and marched out with the old garrison, we should have met with a defeat .. . I have seen as much service almost as any man in the American army, and have been in as many or more actions than any one. I know the character of our general officers as well as any one; and if I am any judge the expedition has been prudently and well conducted, and I am confident there is not a general officer, from the commander-in- chief to the youngest in the field, that would have gone greater lengths to have given success to the expedition than General Sullivan. He is sensible, active, ambitious, brave and perse- vering in his temper; and the object was sufficiently important to make him despise every difficulty opposed to his success, as far as he was at liberty to consult his own reputation; but the public good is of higher importance than personal glory, and the one is not to be gratified at the risk and expense of the other."

There had been enough of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of relations between American and French officers in the Rhode Island expedition to produce disaffection had both not hastened to explain and to endeavor to reestablish a most complete entente cordiale. Lafa- yette had declined to sign the protest of the American officers against D'Estaing's sailing on August 21, and the French resented the protest ; it was explained later as intended to strengthen D'Estaing in his personal wish to remain at Newport, against the unanimous vote of his fleet captains to sail. D'Estaing was not a naval officer, and his captains resented his appointment as Admiral. Congress adopted resolutions as follows: "Resolved, that the retreat made by Major General Sullivan, with the troops under his command, from Rhode Island, was pru- dent, timely and well conducted, and that Congress highly approves of the same; that the thanks of Congress be given to Major General Sullivan, and to the officers and troops under his command, for their fortitude and bravery displayed in the action of August 29, in which they repelled the British forces and maintained the field; that Congress have a high sense of the patriotic exertions made by the four eastern states in the late expedition against Rhode Island; that his excellency Count D'Estaing hath behaved as a brave and wise officer; and that his excellency and the officers and men under his command have rendered every benefit to these states which the circumstances and nature of the service would admit of, and are fully entitled to the regard of the friends of America." Congress also assured the Count that "Con- gress entertains the highest sense of his zeal and attachment, manifested in repeated instances, and especially in his spirited offer to lead the troops under his command from Boston to coop- erate against Rhode Island." The simplest and most satisfying explanation of the failure of the campaign places the blame on "the weather."

The number of troops under Sullivan's command varied from time to time; estimates place the maximum number at any time as 10,835, and the number actually engaged in the battle at Butt's Hill as less than 6000. Estimates of losses vary; Sullivan reported 21I Americans killed, wounded and missing ; Pigot reported 260 British casualties. Sullivan esti- mated Pigot's loss as 1,023. The names of officers reported by Pigot as killed or wounded included American Tories, and a letter written by a Newport Tory relating events in Newport on the day of the battle indicates that Newport Tories were engaged in the attack on Butt's Hill, and that several were killed or wounded. Sullivan, on retiring to Tiverton, dismissed the militia still with him. The continental soldiers and the Rhode Island brigade were assigned to posts in Rhode Island on guard duty against the possibility of an attempt by the British to penetrate New England. Sullivan remained in supreme command, with Lafayette, command- ing the eastern shore, stationed at Bristol, with headquarters at Reynolds house; Nathanael Greene, the western shore, and General Glover, Providence and the north. Cornell's Rhode Island brigade remained at Tiverton. Other divisions of the army were assigned as follows : Varnum's brigade, at Warren and Bristol; Colonel Greene and a detachment, at East Green- wich; Lovell's and Titcomb's brigades at Pawtuxet; Glover's brigade and Jackson's regi- ment, at Providence.

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Rhode Island : three centuries of democracy, Vol. I, Part 56

Author: Carroll, Charles, author Publication date: 1932 Publisher: New York : Lewis historical Pub. Co. Number of Pages: 716

Author: Carroll, Charles, author
Publication date: 1932
Publisher: New York : Lewis historical Pub. Co.
Number of Pages: 716