USA > Texas > Tarrant County > Fort Worth > History of Texas : Fort Worth and the Texas northwest edition, Volume I > Part 40
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While lying at San Patricio we had been joined by Daniel J. Toler. a partner of Colonel Grant, who. when the state Congress adjourned. went to Parras for the purpose of looking after their estate and informed us that, on his way to Texas, he saw Santa Anna and his army at Sal- tillo, which he estimated at some 8,000 or 10,000 men of all arms. This information was immediately communicated to Colonel Fannin.
On our return march, Colonel Grant, learning that there were a number of horses and mules at no great distance below the road, sug- gested the propriety of securing them. In this he was seconded by Major Morris. Colonel Johnson was opposed to it, and urged as rea- sons : first, that the enemy were advised of our neighborhood ; secondly,
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that we had a sufficient number of horses. However, as the command was pretty equally divided it was agreed that Grant and Morris, with about one-half the force-some seventy men-should secure the animals. Johnson, and the other part of the force, returned to San Patricio, there to await Grant and Morris.
On the night of the second day after our arrival at San Patricio, we were surprised and attacked by Urrea's advance. After a short struggle, all were put to the sword, except Colonel Johnson, David J. Toler, John H. Love, of Georgia, and Miller, of South Carolina. At the time we were rooming together, and had been joined by a Frenchman, a mer- chant of Matamoras. The house was soon surrounded, and an order given to open the door; there being no light in the house, the officer ordered a light to be made. Toler, who spoke the Castilian well, kept the officer in conversation while he pretended to be complying with the order. While thus engaged, fortunately for the inmates of the house, a fire was opened on the street in front, whether at a squad of their own men or at Texans is not known. This drew those in the rear of the house to the front. Apprised of this, Colonel Johnson gave the order to open the rear door, and to pass out, and escape if we could. The order was promptly obeyed; and the party escaped in safety to Goliad after some suffering and fatigue. The first night we stopped near Refugio, where we were joined by one of our companions-Beck, and by one or two at Goliad, who, like ourselves, had escaped from San Patricio.
After this affair, Grant and his command, near Agua Dulce, some twenty-five miles west of San Patricio, was attacked and after a des- perate resistance overcome and put to the sword, only one-R. R. Brown, of Georgia, being made a prisoner. Two escaped, Skurlock, of Eastern Texas, and Placido Benavides, a Mexican, who gave us the first infor- mation of the bloody tragedy. Brown was taken to Matamoras, but subsequently escaped.
The truth of history, as well as justice to many patriots, most of whom sacrificed their lives in the war of Texas independence, makes it necessary to correct certain portions of Kennedy's and Yoakum's his- tory.
Kennedy says :
"On the first of January, 200 of the volunteers stationed at Bexar had marched for Goliad, on their way to San Patricio, under the command of Colonel (Doctor) Grant. On the preceding day, a meeting of part of the garrison had been held, at which resolutions were passed, approving of Lieutenant-Colonel Neill as commandant. in the absence of Colonel Johnson and declaring it 'highly essential that the existing army should remain in Bexar.' This declaration was in condemnation of the movement against Matamoras, which stripped Bexar of two-thirds of its defenders, with the greater por - tion of the winter supply of ammunition, clothing, and provisions." To this, it is only necessary to say that there was no supply of cloth- ing, and that provisions were obtained from the surrounding country.
Again, he says :
"All the Bexar volunteers under Grant, with the exception of about fifty, left him, having heard that his object was plunder, and
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joined the force at Goliad, while Grant himself, who was subse- quently joined by some twenty men under Johnson, proceeded on a forage for horses and cattle in the direction of Matamoras."
That a part of the force under Grant joined the troops under Gen- eral Houston at Goliad and Refugio, is true, but not for the reason stated ; and, as to Johnson and twenty men joining him, that is equally untrue. Johnson joined with but a single individual, Adjutant Brister.
It is due the historian to say, that these errors arose from the want of correct information, and not from any desire to do injustice to any one.
We will notice the statement of Yoakum :
"A difference between the governor and council has already been intimated. The origin and progress of this difference, so painful and destructive in its consequences, require a special notice. Dr. James Grant, it will be remembered, originated the project of an expedition to Matamoras. His domicile was in Coahuila, where he had a splendid estate. He had never resided in Texas; it was not his home. His feelings, his interests, and his efforts, were all in favor of the old union of Coahuila and Texas. True, he was at the siege of San Antonio and fought gallantly there, and was severely wounded on the first day, but he fought against Cos, who had driven him from the legislative hall of Monclova, and not for the cause and right of Texas. He therefore had a motive in carrying the war to Matamoras, and thence into the interior of Mexico, that he might return to his princely domain at Parras. Among the volun- teers and adventurers at San Antonio he was incessantly painting in lively colors the rich spoils of Tamaulipas, New Leon, Coahuila, and San Luis Potosi, the facility of the descent, the cowardly nature of the inhabitants, and the charming beauties of the valleys of the San Juan, the Sabinas, and the Santander."
That Doctor Grant resided, or, rather had resided, in Parras, Coa- huila, had an estate there, and was a member of the Congress of the state of Coahuila and Texas, and was in favor of an expedition against Matamoras, is true; but, that he was actuated by anything but pure patriotism in advocating the Matamoras expedition, we deny. Doctor Grant was a scholar, gentleman, and soldier, and devoted to the best interests of Texas.
Major Morris, and most others engaged in the expedition, were actu- ated by the highest motives of patriotism, and had left their homes to aid and assist a people struggling for independence and liberty.
That Johnson and Grant and their companions asked or desired other or greater privileges than those authorized by law, is simply false.
The expedition, west of the Nueces, for horses and mules was not, as is insinuated, for their own emolument and profit. but to supply a want in the service-a cavalry force. So far from seizing and taking prop- erty by force, all was receipted for at a fair valuation or paid for. Yet, Mr. Yoakum, in his history, insinuates, if he does not charge in direct terms, that the parties thus engaged were guilty of offenses that, if true, would brand them with eternal disgrace. Why the historian should have singled out Johnson, Grant, Morris, and their followers as fit subjects
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to brand with disgrace and infamy is beyond our ken. So far as their motives and acts are concerned, they have been faithfully, if not ably, stated, and may well abide impartial public opinion.
On our arrival at Goliad, from San Patricio, Colonel Johnson in- formed Colonel Fannin of the advance of Urrea. Soon after, news was received of the defeat and slaughter of Grant and command. We were informed by Colonel Fannin that Colonel Travis was besieged, and had sent to him for aid, which he was not able to give for want of neces- sary transportation.
Before leaving Goliad, Johnson advised Fannin either to abandon Goliad and destroy the fort or to strengthen it by the addition of new works, and collect such supplies of provisions as he could procure, and await the advance of the enemy. He decided, after consultation with his officers, to maintain his position. He was, also, informed that due notice had been given the families at Refugio, and not to listen to any appeal for assistance, as most of the Irish families were suspected of being un- friendly to the Texans; that his safety and success in defending the place depended on his keeping his force united.
Hearing of the advance of the Mexicans upon Refugio, Colonel Fannin sent Captain King with twenty-eight men to remove some fam- ilies yet at the mission. King reached there on the 12th of March, but delayed his departure until the advance of Urrea's cavalry came up. He then took position with his small force, in the mission, and kept the enemy at bay until he could send a messenger to Fannin at Goliad. The messenger reached the latter place about midnight on the 12th and Fan- nin immediately dispatched Colonel Ward with 100 men to his relief. Ward arrived at the mission on the evening of the 13th. In the mean- time, Urrea, then on his march to Goliad, received news of the assist- ance made by King, and on the 13th dispatched a company of cavalry to keep the Texans engaged till he could come up with the main body. The latter reached the mission at daybreak on the 14th, but Ward had got into the mission.
Meanwhile, General Houston, who had taken command of a small force at Gonzales, dispatched Captain De Sangue with an order to Colonel Fannin, dated the 11th of March, commanding him, as soon as practicable after the receipt of the order, to fall back upon Victoria, on the Guadalupe, taking with him such artillery as could be brought off with expedition, previously adopting measures to blow up the fort before leaving its vicinity. This order was received by Colonel Fannin on the morning of the 14th, and he immediately dispatched an express to Ward. stating the nature of Houston's order, and requesting him to return with all haste to Goliad. Fannin also sent out parties for teams and carts, and commenced dismounting and burying several of the guns. On the same day, he sent a note to Col. A. C. Horton, at Matagorda, request- ing him to join him as early as possible with the 200 men under his com- mand. This note fell into the hands of General Urrea; but Horton joined Fannin on the 16th with twenty-seven mounted men.
To return to the mission of Refugio: Colonel Ward gave orders to set out on the march to rejoin Fannin on the following morning (the 14th) at daybreak. When the morning dawned, however, it was be-
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lieved from the report of one of the sentinels that the Mexicans were in large force in the neighborhood. To satisfy themselves on this point, Captain King was sent out with thirteen men to ascertain the fact. Shortly afterward a firing was heard in the direction King had taken. Ward with his command advanced rapidly till they found themselves in front of 600 or 800 of the enemy. Ward again retreated to the mis- sion. The church was an old stone building, in ruins, but strong. Three sides of it were, however, exposed to an assault. The fourth side was formed by a stone wall, 150 feet in length, used as a place of burial, and containing many tombs; from the end of this wall the ground descended. Captain Bullock's company of thirty-five men was placed in the church- yard to protect the mission from an assault in that direction. The re- mainder of Ward's command barricaded the church, made loopholes, and otherwise prepared for defense. General Urrea now ordered a charge, at the same time bringing up a four-pounder to batter down the door. The Texans waited till their rifles could take effect, when they opened such a fire that the enemy, after repeated charges, broke and fled. Dur- ing this affair, which lasted nearly all of the 14th of March, the Mex- icans lost about 200 in killed and wounded; the Texans' loss was only three severely wounded.
The enemy having retreated to their camp, some 500 or 600 yards distant, had posted sentinels around the mission. At night the Texans. finding their ammunition nearly exhausted, determined to retreat; but. as they could not remove their wounded, they resolved first to leave them a supply of water. Accordingly, after dark. the whole Texan command marched to the spring, about 400 yards distant, dispersed the enemy's guard stationed there-killing four of them-supplied themselves with water. filled the gourds of their wounded comrades, and bade them a last farewell.
Colonel Ward with his forces then set out on their retreat, and. marching through the woods and swamps, where the enemy's cavalry could not follow, they reached the San Antonio River on the third day. On the second day, however, a few of the men left the command in search of water, but did not again join it. The next morning, the 19th. Ward crossed the river and resumed the march in the direction of Vic- toria. That evening they heard the firing between Fannin and Urrea. apparently about ten miles distant. They endeavored to reach the com- batants, but, darkness coming on, they found themselves in the Guad- alupe swamp, where they passed the night. The next day. the 21 st. Ward set out again toward Victoria, where he and his command sur- rendered to the enemy as prisoners of war.
To return to Captain King. He had been sent out on the morning of the 14th to reconnoiter, but his return to the mission having been cut off, he attempted to reach Goliad. He lost his way, however, and found himself, after two days' march (on the morning of the 16th), only three miles from the mission on an open prairie, and his ammunition wet. Under these circumstances he was surrounded and obliged to sur- render, previous to which one of his men was mortally wounded. In six hours afterward Captain King and his command were shot, on the
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road to Goliad, about a mile from the mission, and being stripped of their clothing, were left a prey to wild beasts.
General Urrea took possession of the "Old Mission" on the morning of the 15th. He found there only the three wounded Texans, who were soon despatched and thrown out, to give place to his own wounded. Leaving these under the care of Colonel Vara and a small command, he sent the whole of his disposable cavalry in pursuit of Ward, and set out himself with the advance, consisting of 200 horses and foot, on the morning of the 16th, toward Goliad, sending a reconnoitering party still ahead of his advance.
Colonel Fannin, receiving no news from his first express to Ward, sent a second, and then a third, who were perhaps taken by the enemy. It was only on the 18th that he first received any account of Ward. On the 17th Col. A. C. Horton, who had come in the day before from Matagorda, was ordered to reconnoiter the enemy. On his return he reported a large force of them a few miles from the fort, marching slowly and in good order. Colonel Fannin immediately had the cannon dug up and remounted, expecting an engagement that night or the next morning. During the night of the 17th the guard was doubled. The enemy were seen hovering about the place on the 18th and in some force on the left bank of the San Antonio River. near the old mission. Colonel Horton was sent over with such mounted force as he could collect and made a furious charge upon the party at the mission. The latter re- treated to the timber, and, being there supported by their infantry. Colonel Horton fell back in good order. Captain Shackelford volun- teered to go over with his company to the aid of Horton, but just as they were about to commence the attack, the guns from Fort Defiance caused the enemy to make a precipitate retreat.
Having determined on his retrograde movement the next morning. Fannin made his arrangements accordingly. Before day, Colonel Hor- ton and his twenty-eight horsemen were in the saddle, and proceeded on , the Victoria road. The way being reported clear of the foe, the fort was dismantled, the buildings burnt, and the Texan force, about 300 strong, set out early. It was 10 o'clock, however, before the rear guard had crossed the San Antonio River. Much time was consumed in get- ting the artillery up the banks; besides, a cart broke down, and its load had to be distributed among the other wagons. Still they advanced in good order and as briskly as the ox-teams and freight would permit. At length, after a march of six or eight miles toward the waters of the Coleto. Colonel Fannin ordered a halt, to graze and rest the oxen, and refresh the troops. Fannin had all along committed the error of enter- taining a too great contempt for the enemy. Captain Shackelford re- monstrated against the halt until they should reach the Coleto, then five miles distant, but he was overruled. "Colonel Fannin and many others," says the gallant captain, "could not be made to believe that the Mexicans would dare follow us."
After a halt of an hour the march was resumed. Colonel Horton with his cavalry was sent in advance, to examine the Coleto crossing. Shortly after resuming the march, two of the enemy appeared, as if coming out of the timber bordering on the Coleto, about a mile distant,
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and rather to the rear and right of the Texan army; then four men appeared, and finally 350 cavalry emerged from the same quarter and advanced rapidly with the view of cutting off the Texans from the skirt of timber about a mile or more in front. "Our artillery," says Captain Shackelford, "was ordered to open on them and cover our rear. About this time we discovered a large force of infantry emerging from the same skirt of woodland at which their cavalry had first been seen."
Fannin attempted to reach the timber in front, but the rapid approach of the enemy determined him to prepare immediately for battle. Fan- nin's forces were in an open prairie, the nearest timber being that in front. The breaking down of an ammunition wagon also hindered them from advancing to an eminence near by ; they were therefore compelled to form in a depression in the plain, six or seven feet below the sur- rounding surface. The Texans were compelled to form in an oblong square, the artillery being judiciously posted. The enemy's cavalry com- ing up within a quarter of a mile, dismounted, and fired a harmless volley with their scopets [escopetas]. Thus they continued to advance and fire. Colonel Fannin, with great coolness, repeated to his men the order "not to fire." By this time all the Texan infantry sat down, leaving the artillerists and Colonel Fannin alone standing. The Mexican cavalry having now come within 100 yards, the command was given, and the Texans opened a fire with their rifles, muskets, and artillery. About this time Colonel Fannin received a wound in the fleshy part of the thigh. While engaged with the enemy's cavalry on their right flank, the Texans found the . Mexican infantry, 1,000 or 1,200 strong, advancing in their rear and left flank. Coming within range, they fired a volley, and charged bayonets. They were received by a fire of artillery, Duval's riflemen, and some other troops, whose fire cut them down with great slaughter. This Mexican infantry was the celebrated Tampico regiment. They fell down in the grass. and occasionally raised up to shoot, but whenever they showed their heads, the Texan rifles generally took them down. A body of the enemy's cavalry then made an attempt upon the Texan rear, but. at a distance of sixty yards. they were so well received with double canister charged with musket-ball, and by the riflemen. that they fell by scores, and made a sudden retreat, choosing to return after- ward on foot.
The conflict by this time had become general. The Texans had no water to sponge their cannon, and they became so hot that they could not be used. so that the Texans were forced to relv wholly on their small arms. With these they continued the fight most manfully from 1 o'clock fintil sundown. At dusk. the Campeachy Indians ( who could not well understand the word of command at Mission Refugio) were placed in the high grass. about thirty yards from the Texan lines, from which they poured a destructive fire : but so soon as it was sufficiently dark for the Texans to see the flash of their guns. they seldom flashed twice from the same point. Among those wounded was Henry Riplev. a son of General Ripley, of Louisiana, a youth of eighteen years. He had his thigh broken. Mrs. Cash (who was with the Texan army) at his re- quest helped him into a cart and fixed a prop for him to lean on and a rest for his rifle. Thus he continued the fight until another shot broke
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his right arm. Such was the spirit of the Texans at the battle of the Coleto.
A little after dark General Urrea drew off his troops. The Texans lost during the day seven killed, several mortally and sixty badly wounded. The enemy's loss must have been five times as great. Urrea's force in the action was estimated at 1,200 infantry and 700 cavalry. The Texans, exclusive of Colonel Horton's mounted force, were about 275 in all. Horton having gone on in advance to examine the pass of the Coleto, had dismounted with his men. So soon as they heard the firing between the contending parties in their rear, the word "to horse" was given, when the party galloped back to the prairie. Here they had a full view of the engagement, and, seeing the Texans very nearly sur- rounded by so large a force of the enemy, Horton's lieutenant, Moore. objected to any attempt to reach their comrades by penetrating the Mexican lines, alleging that they would all be cut to pieces. Immedi- ately he dashed off in another direction, taking with him nearly all the party. Colonel Horton, being thus left with so few men, had no other alternative than to retire also. He therefore returned to Victoria.
The description of the battle of the Coleto, as it appeared first after one of those attempts to charge in the evening, is thus given by an eye- witness :
"The scene was now dreadful to behold. Killed and maimed men and horses were strewn over the plain ; the wounded were rend- ing the air with their distressing moans, while a great number of horses without riders were rushing to and fro back upon the enemy's lines, increasing the confusion among them; they thus became so entangled, the one with the other, that their retreat resembled the headlong flight of a herd of buffaloes, rather than the retreat of a well-drilled army, as they were."
The enemy took position for the night in the skirt of woods in front. The Texans were occupied in forming a breastwork of earth, carts, wagons, and packs. "It has been often asked," says Captain Shackel- ford. "as a matter of surprise, why we did not retreat in the night. A few reasons, I think, ought to satisfy every candid man on this point. During the engagement our teams had all been killed. wounded, or had strayed off. so that we had no possible way of taking off our wounded campanions. Those who could have deserted them under such circum- stances possess feelings which I shall never envy. I will mention another reason which may have more weight with some persons than the one already given. We had been contending for five hours, without inter- mission. with a force more than seven times larger than our own: had driven the enemy from the field with great slaughter : and calculated on a reinforcement from Victoria in the morning. when we expected to consummate our victory."
Captain Shackelford does not inform us why thev expected aid from Victoria : at all events, none came. On the other hand, the reinforce- ment sent to the enemy from Bexar consisting of 500 men under Colonel Morales. with three pieces of artillerv. and of which Urrea had received notice on the 18th. arrived in the Mexican camp at half past six on the morning of the 20th. Early on that morning Urrea displayed his whole
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force in the most imposing manner, together with his pack-mules and artillery. The fire of the latter commenced, but without effect. They kept out of the range of the Texan riflemen, who reserved their fire for close quarters. After the Mexicans had discharged a few rounds, they raised a white flag, but it was soon taken down. The Texan wounded had "suffered agonies for want of water." Their officers held a con- sultation, and it was the opinion of a majority that they could not save the wounded without a capitulation. The unexpected appearance of artillery in the ranks of the enemy likewise conduced to this conclusion, for the Texan breastwork was only, intended to resist small arms.
The Texans now raised a white flag, which was promptly answered by the enemy. Major Wallace and Captain Chadwick went out, and in a short time returned saying General Urrea would treat only with the commanding officer. Colonel Fannin, though lame, went out, assuring his men that he would make no other than an honorable capitulation. He returned in a short time, and communicated the terms of the agree- ment which he had made with Urrea. They were in substance as follows :
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