USA > Texas > Tarrant County > Fort Worth > History of Texas : Fort Worth and the Texas northwest edition, Volume I > Part 41
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1. That the Texans should be received and treated as prisoners of war, according to the usages of the most civilized nations. 2. That private property should be reputed and restored ; but that the side-arms of the officers should be given up. 3. That the men should be sent to Copano, and thence, in eight days, to the United States, or so soon there- after as vessels could be procured to take them. 4. That the officers should be paroled, and should return to the United States in like manner. General Urrea immediately sent Colonel Holzinger and other officers to consummate the agreement. It was reduced to writing in both the Eng- lish and Spanish languages, read over two or three times, signed, and the writings exchanged in the most formal and solemn manner .*
The Texans immediately piled their arms, and such of them as were able to march were hurried off to Goliad where they arrived at sunset the same day (the 20th). The wounded, among whom was Colonel Fannin, did not reach the place till the 22nd. At Goliad the prisoners were crowded into the old church, with no other food than a scanty pit- tance of beef, without bread or salt. Colonel Fannin was placed under the care of Colonel Holzinger, a German engineer in the Mexican serv- ice. So soon as Fannin learned how badly his men were treated, he wrote to General Urrea, stating the facts, and reminding him of the terms of capitulation.
On the 23d Colonel Fannin and Colonel Holzinger proceeded to Copano, to ascertain if a vessel could be procured to convey the Texans to the United States; but the vessel they expected to obtain had already left that port. They did not return till the 26th. On the 23d Major Miller, with eighty Texan volunteers, who had just landed at Copano,
*Notwithstanding this positive assertion that the Texans surrendered as prison- ers of war, a Spanish copy of the capitulation found in the archives of the Mexican war department in Mexico City, signed by Chadwick, Wallace, and Fannin, seems to show that they surrendered "as prisoners of war, subject to the disposition of the supreme government." Technically this was equivalent, no doubt, to a surrender at discretion.
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were taken prisoners and brought into Goliad. On the 25th, Colonel Ward and his men, captured by Urrea, as has already been stated, were brought in.
The evening of the 26th passed off pleasantly enough. Colonel Fan- nin was entertaining his friends with the prospect of returning to the United States; and some of the young inen, who could perform well on the flute, were playing "Home, Sweet Home." How happy we are that the veil of the future is suspended before us! At 7 o'clock that night, an order, brought by an extraordinary courier from Santa Anna, re- quired the prisoners to be shot! Detailed regulations were sent as to the mode of executing this cold-blooded and atrocious order. Colonel Portilla, the commandant of the place, did not long hesitate in its execu- tion. He had 445 prisoners under his charge. Eighty of these, brought from Copano, having just landed, and who as yet had done no fighting, were considered as not within the scope of the order, and for the time were excused. The services of four of the Texan physicians-that is Drs. Joseph H. Bernard, Field, Hall, and Shackelford-being needed to take care of the Mexican wounded, their lives were spared. So likewise were four others, who were assistants in the hospital (Messrs. Bills, Griffiin, Smith, and Sherlock).
At dawn of day, on Palm Sunday, March 27th, the Texans were awakened by a Mexican officer, who said he wished them to form a line, that they might be counted. The men were marched out in separate divisions, under different pretexts. Some were told that they were .to be taken to Copano, in order to be sent home; others that they were going out to slaughter beeves ; and others, again, that they were being removed to make room in the fort for Santa Anna. Doctor Shackel- ford. who had been invited by Colonel Guerra to his tent, about 100 vards southwestwardly from the fort, says: In about half an hour we heard the report of a volley of small arms, toward the river, and to the east of the fort. I immediately inquired the cause of the firing, and was assured by the officer that "he did not know, but supposed it was the guard firing off their guns." In about fifteen or twenty minutes thereafter, another such volley was fired, directly south of us, and in front. At the same time I could distinguish the heads of some of the men through the boughs of some peach-trees, and could hear their screams. It was then, for the first time, the awful conviction seized unon our minds that treachery and murder had begun their work! Shortly afterward Colonel Guerra appeared at the mouth of the tent. I asked him if it could be possible they were murdering our men. He replied that "it was so but that he had not given the order, neither had he executed it."
In about an hour or more, the wounded were dragged out and butchered. Colonel Fannin was the last to suffer. When informed of his fate. he met it like a soldier. He handed his watch to the officer whose business it was to murder him and requested him to have him shot in the breast and not in the head. and likewise to see that his re- mains should be decently buried. These natural and proper require- ments the officers promised should be fulfilled. but. with that perfidv which is so prominent and characteristic of the Mexican race. he failed
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to do either! Fannin seated himself in a chair, tied the handkerchief over his eyes, and bared his bosom to receive the fire of the soldiers.
As the different divisions were brought to the execution they were ordered to sit down with their backs to the guard. In an instant young Fenner rose to his feet, and exclaimed, "Boys, they are going to kill us -die with your faces to them, like men!" At the same time, two other young men, flourishing their caps over their heads, shouted at the top of their voices, "Hurrah for Texas !"
Many attempted to escape, but the most of those who survived the first fire were cut down by the pursuing cavalry, or afterward shot. It is believed that, in all, twenty-seven of those who were marched out to be slaughtered made their escape, leaving 330 who suffered death on that Sunday morning.
The dead were then stripped and their naked bodies thrown into piles. A few brush were placed over them, and an attempt made to burn them up, but with such poor success that their hands and feet, and much of their flesh, were left a prey to dogs and vultures! Texas has erected no monument to perpetuate the memory of those heroic victims of a cruel barbarism; yet they have a memorial in the hearts of their countrymen more durable than brass or marble.
Colonel Fannin doubtless erred in postponing for four days the obedience to the order of the commander-in-chief to retreat with all pos- sible dispatch to Victoria on the Guadalupe; and also in sending out Lieutenant Colonel Ward in search of Captain King. But these errors sprang from the noblest feelings of humanity : first, in an attempt to save from the approaching enemy some Texan settlers at the mission of Refugio ; again, in an endeavor to rescue King and his men at the same place ; and, finally, to save Ward and his command-until all was lost but honor. Yoakum says :
"The public vengeance of the Mexican tyrant, however, was sat- isfied. Deliberately and in cold blood he had caused 330 of the sternest friends of Texas-her friends while living and dying-to tread the wine press for her redemption. He chose the Lord's day for this sacrifice. It was accepted; and God waited His own good time for retribution-a retribution which brought Santa Anna a trembling coward to the feet of the Texan victors, whose mag- nanimity prolonged his miserable life to waste the land of his birth with anarchy and civil war."
CHAPTER XXI SAN JACINTO CAMPAIGN
Sunday, March 6, when Santa Anna had just concluded the storm- ing of the Alamo, General Houston, as we have seen, made a farewell speech to the convention and began his journey to Gonzales. Having been informed of the alarming situation of the garrison in Bexar through Travis's letter of the 3d to the convention, he formed, as he went, a plan for its relief. Fannin, at Goliad, was to advance with the bulk of his division to the west bank of the Cibolo and await there the arrival of the commander-in-chief, who would join him with all the forces from Gonzales and march to Travis's rescue. On reaching Gonzales, however (March 11), Houston was met by a rumor that the Alamo had been captured, and, privately confiding in its truth, though pretending in the hope of avoiding a panic to disbelieve it, he dis- patched an express to Fannin, countermanding his previous order and instructing him, "as soon as practicable," to fall back to Victoria.
At Gonzales Houston found "three hundred and seventy-four effective men, without two days' provisions, many without arms, and others without any ammunition"; and, although a few had served under Austin and Burleson the preceding year, the most of them were entirely innocent of any knowledge of military discipline. While wait- ing for confirmation of the fall of the Alamo, he seized the opportunity to organize his force. A regiment was formed with Edward Burleson for colonel, and Sidney Sherman and Alexander Somervell lieutenant- colonel and major respectively. Houston regretted, however, that he had not time to teach the men "the first principles of the drill."
Deaf Smith, Henry Karnes, and R. E. Handy, sent out on the morning of the 13th with instructions to approach near enough to San Antonio to learn the fate of the Alamo. met Mrs. Dickinson, the wife of a lieutenant killed in the Alamo, some twenty miles from Gon- zales, and learned that the worst had happened, and that a division of the enemy under General Ramirez y Sesma was already on the march eastward. They returned with her to camp, where they arrived about twilight, and her report threw both army and town into the greatest confusion and excitement. Thirty-two of Santa Anna's vic- tims had left their homes in Gonzales no longer than two weeks before, and the grief of their stricken families was intense. Others. with ears only for the news that the Mexicans were advancing. has- tened to flee for their lives, a few of the little army who had left their own families unprotected doubtless among them. Houston thought his position too advanced and his force too small to meet the enemy at Gonzales, and in the midst of the general excitement ordered his men to prepare for retreat. Some of his few baggage wagons being sur- rendered to the helpless citizens of the town, the soldiers were forced to destroy all clothing and stores, except what they could carry on their persons. and his only two pieces of cannon were thrown into the Guadalupe. Before midnight he was on the march, his plan. as
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reported by himself at the time, being to halt on the Colorado until strengthened sufficiently to meet any force that the Mexicans might send against him. And before morning Gonzales was burned to the ground, that it might not afford shelter and supplies to the approach- ing enemy.
At the Colorado, Houston would be near the most populous sec- tion of the state, where he could easily command its resources and receive quick reinforcement ; while, so long as he could hold that line, the Mexicans would be restricted to an uninhabited country, where they could do little damage to Texas, and whence, if held long enough in check, they might be compelled to withdraw merely through fail- ure of their own supplies.
After receiving several small reinforcements along the line, the army reached Burnham's Crossing on the Colorado in the afternoon of the 17th, when Houston reported his strength as six hundred men. Remaining here two days, Houston crossed the river and descended the east bank to Beason's Ford, near the present town of Columbus where he pitched camp for nearly a week.
Before leaving Burnham's, however, a scouting party, consisting of Deaf Smith, Henry Karnes, R. E. Handy, and three others, was sent back toward the Navidad to reconnoiter. They encountered a scouting party of the enemy at Rocky Creek and took one prisoner, from whom they learned that General Sesma was near with a consid- erable force. The latter, indeed, who had left Bexar on the 11th with orders from Santa Anna to proceed through San Felipe and Harris- burg to Anahuac, encamped the night of the 21st on the west bank of the Colorado, only two miles above the Texans. He had but 725 men, and, having already asked for reinforcements, and finding the river well defended, he made no attempt to cross.
In this position the two armies remained five days, Houston receiving reinforcements all the time until, by the 26th, he could have mustered from twelve to fourteen hundred men, though the two cannon for which he had sent William T. Austin to Velasco did not arrive. Several prisoners were taken from time to time, and almost the exact strength of the enemy being learned, the Texans became eager to fight. Houston, too, seemed to think it desirable to engage Sesma here; but suddenly changed his mind, and late in the after- noon of March 26 began to fall back towards the Brazos.
When, along with the news of Fannin's misfortune, it became known that the Texans were falling back from the Colorado, the wildest confusion seized upon all east of that river. Reinforcements on their way to join the army faced about, and fled with their families to put them in safety beyond the Sabine. And many of the volunteers already with Houston-either with or without permission-left him for the same purpose, so that when he reached the Brazos his force was reduced more than half.
Arriving at San Felipe on the 28th, the little army remained over night, and set out the next day for Groce's, fifteen or twenty miles up the river. Many thought that, since most of the settlements were down the river, the movement should be made in that direction, and
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Moseley Baker and Wily Martin refused to follow Houston further. The former, therefore, was ordered to guard San Felipe with his com- pany of 120 men; while the latter, with a hundred men, was sent to hold the crossing at Ford Bend. After encamping near Mill Creek on the night of the 29th and marching but a few miles the next day, the main force came to Groce's on the 31st and went into camp for nearly a fortnight.
Santa Anna, in the meantime, had ordered General Gaona to diverge from his original route to Nacogdoches and advance from Bastrop upon San Felipe, and Urrea to march upon Brazoria. He then started five hundred men under Colonel Augustin Amat to rein- force Sesma, and leaving General Filisola at Gonzales, to take com- mand of these and superintend their passage of the Guadalupe, he pressed on to join Sesma himself. He overtook Sesma just after that General had crossed the Colorado at the Atascosita ford, and together they hastened after Houston to San Felipe. They reached the ruins of the town on April 7. Moseley Baker had burned it March 29, upon a report from his scouts that the enemy was approaching. Finding the crossing here in possession of Baker's company, Santa Anna made a reconnaissance for several miles up and down the swollen river in the hope of discovering a ford where he might cross and surprise Baker by a night attack. But, failing in this, he ordered the construc- tion of two large flat-boats, and then, too impatient to remain inactive while this was being done, for he desired to end the campaign before the rains rendered the country impassable, set out down the river with five hundred grenadiers and fifty cavalry, looking for more expedi- tious means of crossing. After three days he gained possession of the ferry at Fort Bend, and was joined on the 13th by Sesma, who had been awaiting in vain at San Felipe the arrival of Gaona and Filisola.
Here Santa Anna learned that the seat of government was at Har- risburg, only twelve leagues distant, and unprotected, and that by a rapid march he might succeed in capturing the president and all of his cabinet, among them his old enemy, Lorenzo de Zavala. Abandoning, therefore, what was perhaps his original plan of pursuing Houston and forcing a battle near Groce's, he left Sesma with a part of his division, and sealed instructions to Filisola, when he should come up, and with the rest of Sesma's force-seven hundred infantry, fifty cavalry, and a six pound cannon-hastened on towards Harrisburg. Reaching that place during the night of April 15th, he found it aban- doned. Three printers captured in the office of the Telegraph and Texas Register informed him that the officers of the government had departed that morning for Galveston Island, and that Houston was at Groce's with eight hundred men. A reconnoitering party sent out towards Lynchburg reported that settlers in that direction uniformly declared that Houston intended retreating to the Trinity by way of Lynch's Ferry, and Santa Anna, by his own account, formed the plan of intercepting him there. Ordering Filisola, who had now come up with Sesma, to reinforce him with five hundred picked infantry (infantes escogidos), he set fire to Harrisburg and pushed on to over-
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take his scouts at New Washington-having sent them there, it would seem, for plunder.
In marked contrast with the impetuosity of Santa Anna was Hous- ton's long delay in the bottom opposite Groce's. He sought to employ his leisure in the better organization of his forces ; a new regiment was formed, with Sidney Sherman as its colonel, and numerous promotions were made in consequence. A medical staff also was created, and specific duties assigned to each of the six or eight physicians with the army. But the volunteers did not take kindly to discipline. They had little respect for the fighting ability of the Mexicans, and chafed at their commander's delay. Many came to believe that Houston desired to avoid a conflict altogether, and that his only movement from the Brazos would be to continue the retreat eastward.
Despite the general dissatisfaction of the men, however, the army was gradually reinforced to almost its size on the Colorado. General Rusk, Secretary of War, arrived on April 4, and in consultation on the night of the 11th he and Houston decided to cross to the east side of the river. This operation-rendered very tedious on account of the absence of a ferry boat and the presence of several wagons with their ox teams and some two hundred horses-was completed by means of the steamboat Yellowstone on the 13th, before which time Houston was apprised of the passage of the river by the enemy at Fort Bend. Orders had already been issued to the scattered detach- ments at San Felipe, Fort Bend, and Washington to join the main army at Donoho's, a few miles east of Groce's, and thither Houston took his way in the afternoon of the 14th, the difficulties of his march being increased by the addition to his train on the 11th of the "Twin Sisters," two six-pound cannon presented to Texas by the people of Cincinnati.
The hypothesis that Houston's plan was to retreat to Nacogdoches, or perhaps to the Sabine, had little to support it beyond his apparent reluctance to face the enemy, and the known fact that there was a large body of United States troops at Fort Jessup, near Nacogdoches in Louisiana, whose protection from both Mexicans and Indians many relied upon, in case the worst came and Texas had to be temporarily abandoned. But subsequent knowledge of the sympathy of General Gaines, who commanded these troops, and of the attitude of President Jackson towards the Texas question has, it is sometimes contended, clearly proved that Houston's purpose throughout the campaign was to draw Santa Anna to the Sabine, where it was hoped that he might inadvertently offer General Gaines an excuse for taking up the war and establishing a protectorate of the United States over Texas.
As a matter of fact, some negotiations were made to enlist the sup- port of these forces ; but they were made by the civil government and the citizens of Nacogdoches, and it is doubtful whether Houston at the time knew anything about them. The following letter from the secretary of state, Sam P. Carson, gives the first suggestion of these overtures :
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"His Excellency David G. Burnet.
"12 o'clock. News-good news.
"I have just heard through a source in which Judge Hardin has confidence that a company or battalion of U. S. troops left Fort Jessup eight or ten days since, crossed the Sabine and were marching towards the Nesches. I believe it to be true. General Gaines is there and doubtless my letter by Parmer had the de- sired effect. Jackson will protect the neutral ground, and the beauty of it is, he claims to the Nesches as neutral ground. I should like his protection that far at present. If we are success- ful, we can hereafter negotiate and regulate boundaries. This news, just arrived, has infused new life into people here, and be assured I will keep the ball rolling.
"Carson."
The letter bears no date, but was certainly written in the earlier part of April, probably on the 4th.
By way, as he would perhaps have expressed it, of "keeping the ball rolling," Carson pushed on to Fort Jessup-officially, it is pre- sumed, since he was still secretary of state-and tried the efficacy of a personal appeal to General Gaines. His formal report to the presi- dent and cabinet gives the result of the interview, together with some other interesting information :
"Nachitoches, April 14, 1836.
"To his Excellency David G. Burnet and the Cabinet of the Re- public of Texas.
"Gentlemen : On my arrival here last night I met with Gen- eral Gaines and have had with him a full and satisfactory con- versation. His position at present is a delicate one, and requires at his hands the most cautious movements. The object of the concentration of forces at Jessup is to protect the frontier and neutral ground, also to keep the Indians in check and repress sav- age aggressions. This he is bound to do in fulfillment of treaty stipulations between the Government of the United States and Mexico. General Gaines issued an order to prepare thirteen companies to march this evening to the Sabine, with two field pieces with seventy-five rounds for each and thirty-five rounds for the infantry-also twelve days' provisions, etc.
"I herewith send you a copy of his requisition upon the gov- ernment to Louisiana to furnish a brigade of mounted volun- teers ; a similar request has been made to the governors of Ten- nessee, Mississippi, and Alabama, requiring, however, only a bat- talion of the latter in consequence of the Florida war. He will have in a few days (sav 20 or 30) from seven to eight thousand men with him. You will perceive that we cannot use Indian aux- iliaries unless in self defense. The treaty referred to requires the United States to put such conduct down.
"I cannot state positively what General Gaines may do, but one thing I think I may say, that should he be satisfied of the fact that the Mexicans have incited any Indians, who are under the control of the United States, to commit depredations on either
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side of the line, he will doubtless view it as a violation of the treaty referred to, and be assured that he will maintain the honor of his country and punish the aggressor, be he who he may. Now the fact is that the Mexicans have already with them a number of the Caddoes, some Cherokees, and Indians of other tribes which are under the protection and control of the United States. It is only necessary to satisfy General Gaines of the fact, in which case, be assured he will act with energy and efficiency. The proofs will, I have no doubt, be abundant, by the time he reaches the Sabine; in which case he will cross and move upon the aggressors.
"Yours,
"Sam P. Carson."
"P. S. I have written General Houston and requested him to forward the communication to you."
General Gaines did, indeed-upon information furnished him mainly, however, by the Committee of Safety and private citizens of Nacogdoches-advance to the Sabine with thirteen companies ; but, finding there that the Indians had killed but one man, and that not in such a manner as to indicate a "spirit of general hostility towards the inhabitants," he contented himself with halting on the left bank of the river and sending a warning message to the Cherokee chief. Bowles. That he was in eager sympathy with the Texans and wished to help them seems clear; but the simultaneous reports that Santa Anna had been defeated and captured at San Jacinto, and that "the Cherokee and other Indians in Texas from our side of the national boundary line are disposed to return to their villages, plant corn, and be peaceable," relieved him alike of the necessity and the pretext.
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