USA > Texas > Tarrant County > Fort Worth > History of Texas : Fort Worth and the Texas northwest edition, Volume I > Part 45
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No reply to this communication was received, nor were commis- sioners sent in 1840. The suggestion aroused some interest in Texas, however, and the secretary of war recommended the construction of a military road to Santa Fé. Congress refused to make appropriation for a commission, but in the spring of 1841 President Lamar deter- mined, nevertheless, that one should be sent, and on his own authority ordered the treasurer and comptroller to honor drafts presented for outfitting the expedition. As finally organized, the expedition con- sisted of three commissioners-William G. Cooke, R. F. Brenham, and J. A. Navarro-fifty merchants, and a military escort, for protection from the Indians, of 270 men, commanded by Gen. Hugh McLeod. The whole party organized near Austin and set out toward the end of June. The commissioners bore an eloquent address from Lamar to the "inhabitants of Santa Fe and other portions of Mexico east of the Rio Grande" inviting them to cover themselves with the protection of the Texan flag. The commissioners were instructed to try to secure the adhesion of the people to Texas, but not to use force ; and if the Texan proffer were declined, to devote their efforts to establish- ing a commercial convention. The expedition reached New Mexico in the last stages of exhaustion from starvation and thirst and surren- dered to Governor Armijo, who refused to believe that the Texans came on an innocent mission.
The prisoners were marched to Mexico and sent thence to various prisons. Those who were citizens of the United States or of Euro- pean countries were soon released through the efforts of their govern- ments ; and Daniel Webster, as secretary of state of the United States. interceded with the Mexican government for the humane treatment of the Texans. On June 13, 1842, Santa Anna celebrated his birthday by releasing the remaining prisoners, except Navarro, who did not make his escape until 1845.
In the meantime Mexico had again taken the aggressive and had inade a brief invasion of Texas. On January 9. 1842, Gen. Mariano Arista issued from Monterey an address to the inhabitants of the "Department of Texas" pointing out the hopelessness of their struggle for independence and promising amnesty and protection to all who refrained from taking up arms during his contemplated invasion. At the same time he warned them that while his country held out "the
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olive branch of peace and concord with one hand, she would direct with the other the sword of justice against the obstinate." Early in March Goliad, Refugio, San Antonio, and Victoria were occupied for a few days by Mexican forces. The Texans were entirely unprepared, and at first great alarm was felt. Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston wrote General Hamilton on March 11,
"The war, after great preparation on the part of the enemy, is upon us without the slightest effort having been made by us. Our people are, however, turning out well and hastening west- ward, for the purpose of concentrating to meet the enemy, and notwithstanding every advantage has been given, we rely upon the energy and courage of our people to achieve most brilliant results."
On the 10th President Houston issued a proclamation ordering the militia to be ready for a call, and the next day he wrote the Texan consul at New Orleans telling him the conditions upon which the gov- ernment would receive emigrants from the United States : each should bring with him "a good rifle or musket, with a cartouch box, or shot pouch and powder horn, with at least 100 rounds of ammunition, a good knapsack and six months' clothing. and enter service for six months subject to the laws of Texas. They must be landed for the present at some point west of the Brazos, with eight days' provision. No number less than fifty-six in companies well organized will be received, and on landing each commandant will report to the secretary of war for orders." By March 15 the Texan forces began to collect at San Antonio, but the Mexicans had retired on the 9th, and were already thought to be west of the Rio Grande. Many of the volun- teers were anxious to invade Mexico, and General Burleson, who was in command at San Antonio, thought the invasion practicable. Presi- dent Houston, however, wisely forbade such a movement before July 20, which was the earliest date at which he thought the necessary preparations could be made.
Fearing that Austin would be attacked, the president had trans- ferred the government to Houston, and thither he called a special ses- sion of congress to meet on July 27. In his message he expressed the belief that Mexico could never conquer Texas, but he was con- vinced that it would continue to harass the frontier, and he advised a counter-invasion to bring the enemy to their senses. "We could at least impress them with the calamities which have thus far been inci- dent to us alone, and create in them a desire for that peace which would be mutually advantageous to both parties." As usual, how- ever, Houston refrained from pushing his views strongly on congress, merely urging that a decision be reached quickly, so that additional emigrant-volunteers could be prevented from coming to the country if they were not needed. Congress voted for a declaration of war, and appropriated 10,000,000 acres of land to meet the expense, but this Houston considered totally inadequate and vetoed the bill, thereby abandoning for his own part the plan of an aggressive campaign.
The Mexicans had retired without doing any considerable damage, and it seems that the chief purpose of the invasion was to counteract
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the argument of annexationists in the United States, who contended that since Mexico had never made an official entrance into Texas since 1836, no attention need be paid by the United States to its claims. In September, 1842, another expedition penetrated to San Antonio under the command of Gen. Adrian Woll. This time some resistance was offered and the Mexicans lost a few men before the Texans, fifty-three in number, surrendered. The district court was in session at the time, and Judge Hutchinson and other officials were among those captured. As soon as the news spread Texan forces began to march to the relief of San Antonio, and a band of volunteers from Gonzales under Col. Matthew Caldwell succeeded in decoying a portion of Woll's division into an ambush on the Salado and inflicting considerable loss upon it. At the same time, however, a company from La Grange and Fayette county, coming to the relief of Caldwell, was surrounded by the Mexi- cans and cut to pieces. Woll occupied San Antonio September 11-20, and then retired, being pursued for several days by Colonel Caldwell.
Again the militia was called out, and volunteers began to collect at San Antonio, eager for an invasion of Mexico. About the middle of November some 750 men, commanded by Gen. Alexander Somervell, started for Laredo. They took the town on December 8, and part of the force then disbanded and returned home. The remainder con- tinued the march down the Rio Grande, but on December 19 Somer- vell ordered them to retreat to Gonzales. Some 300 of the men refused to obey his orders, elected Col. W. C. Fisher to lead them, and marched to Mier, where they fought a desperate battle with Gen- eral Ampudia on December 25-26. The odds were hopelessly against them, and on the 26th they surrendered. Gen. Thomas Jefferson Green in his "Journal of the Texan Expedition Against Mier" says that they were promised the treatment of prisoners of war though the official capitulation says merely that the Texans will be treated "with the consideration which is in accordance with the magnanimous Mexi- can nation." Green tells us that there were 261 Texans engaged in the battle of Mier, nearly forty having been left in camp to guard the baggage. Ten were killed, and twenty-three badly wounded, while the loss of the Mexicans was thought to be more than 700. General Ampudia was ordered to send the prisoners to the capital. On the way they made a break for liberty, killed some of the guards, and escaped, but were later recaptured in the mountains and a tenth of their number shot. The survivors were eventually imprisoned in Castle Perote.
While the Mier prisoners were marching toward the south another Texan expedition, commanded by Col. Jacob Snively, was moving toward the northern boundary of Texas to capture a train of merchan- dise which it was known would be carried during the summer of 1843 from St. Louis to Santa Fé. The expedition had been authorized by the Texan government in February, but the force was composed of volunteers who went at their own expense and who expected to repay themselves by the spoils of the caravan. They encamped on the Arkansas River to await the train, but before it arrived the party divided and Snively was left with only a few more than 100 men.
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When the caravan arrived it was guarded by United States soldiers, who disarmed all but ten of Snively's men and ordered them home. The Texan government claimed damages from the United States for this act and was paid for the arms taken, but the expedition failed.
In the meantime President Houston had been trying to bring pres- sure on Mexico through the mediation of the strong foreign powers. The United States, as we have seen, recognized the independence of Texas in March, 1837, by accrediting to the republic a chargé d'affaires. France recognized it by concluding a treaty of commerce and friend- ship on September 25, 1839, which was ratified on February 14, 1840. British recognition was obtained in a series of treaties concluded in November, 1840, but these were not ratified until June 28, 1842. One of these British treaties was an agreement on the part of England to urge upon Mexico the recognition of Texas, and Lord Aberdeen on July 1, 1842, instructed the British chargé at Mexico to make the necessary representation to the Mexican government. This was done. but the overture was rejected. Immediately following the ratification of the British treaties an effort was made to get France, England, and the United States to make a joint demand on Mexico for recognition, but England refused to become a party to this tripartite action. At the same time, however, Lord Aberdeen suggested that the three gov- ernments might make identical representations on the subject to the Mex- ican government. Appropriate instructions were accordingly issued to the diplomatic agents of England and France for making such a repre- sentation, but these agents, knowing the uselessness of such action, did nothing.
On October 15, 1841, just after the retreat of General Woll from San Antonio, President Houston again appealed to the powers to use their influence to compel Mexico either to recognize the independence of Texas "or to make war upon her according to the rules established and universally recognized by civilized nations." "It has now been nearly seven years since the declaration and the establishment of the independ- ence of this republic. During the whole of this time Mexico, although uniformly asserting the ability and determination to re-subjugate the country, has never made a formidable effort to do so. Her principal war has consisted of silly taunts and idle threats, of braggadocio bulle- tins and gasconading proclamations. All her boasted threats of in- vasion have resulted in nothing more than fitting out and sending into the most exposed portions of our territory petty marauding parties, for the purpose of pillaging and harassing the weak and isolated settlements on our western border." Mexico's object, he said, was merely to keep alive its claim to Texas and to retard the development of the country by threats that it had neither the intention nor the means to carry out.
Daniel Webster was secretary of state at this time in the United States, and on November 12, 1842, he instructed Waddy Thompson, the American chargé at Mexico, to urge recognition. The United States saw with pain the preparations for war, and while it disclaimed any right to interfere, it could not be indifferent to a renewal of hostilities. He urged Mexico to accept the mediation of his government, and at the
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same time asked Texas to suspend any invasion it might be contemplat- ing until the result of this overture could be learned.
Nothing came of this proposal, but on January 9, 1843, James W. Robinson, who had been lieutenant-governor of Texas under the pro- visional government in 1835-1836, and had been captured at San An- tonio by General Woll in September, 1842, and was now in Perote, made a proposal to Santa Anna which led to negotiations. Robinson, who was anxious above all things to get out of prison, suggested that the people of Texas were tired of war and confusion and would be willing to be reunited with Mexico. He thought that if an armistice could be arranged, peace could probably be brought about by discussion. After a conference with him Santa Anna appointed Robinson a commissioner to go to Texas and open negotiations. Reunion with Mexico must be the sine qua non of any arrangement, but after acknowledging the sover- eignty of Mexico, Texas might conduct its local affairs through its own officers pretty much as it pleased. Mexican troops would never be sent to the province.
President Houston had no intention of acknowledging the sover- eignty of Mexico on any terms, but he was willing to play for time. A correspondence was continued through the British diplomatic agents at Mexico and at Houston, and it was finally agreed that commissioners should meet and arrange the terms of an armistice for the negotiation of a permanent settlement. Houston proclaimed a truce on June 15, 1843. and commissioners were appointed in the fall by both Texas and Mex- ico. They met at Salinas on the Rio Grande, and February 15, 1844, signed the armistice. Before following this phase of the subject further it will be necessary to return and trace briefly the movement for the annexation of Texas to the United States.
When Texas declared independence on March 2, 1836, the Texan commissioners, Austin, Archer, and William H. Wharton, were in the United States, and Austin was of the opinion that they could have ob- tained from congress the recognition of the new republic, if the ad interim government had sent them an official report of the battle of San Jacinto. Austin may have been mistaken, but both houses certainly sympathized deeply with the Texans, and before adjournment the senate commit- tee on foreign relations reported that Texas ought to be recognized as soon as it had in operation a de facto government "capable of perform- ing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power." On May 30th President Burnet appointed James Collinsworth and P. W. Grayson to visit Washington and ask the mediation of the United States in securing from Mexico recognition of Texan independence. At the same time they were to sound the government on the subject of annexing Texas to the United States. They reached Washington after the ad- journment of congress and had several conferences with Forsyth, Presi- dent Jackson's secretary of state, but received no satisfaction. In the fall the Texans, as we have seen, voted (3,277 to 91) in favor of an- nexation to the United States, and one of President Houston's first acts was to send William H. Wharton to Washington to further this measure.
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It was apparent, however, that recognition of Texan independence must precede any negotiation for annexation and at first President Jack- son showed himself unexpectedly cautious. He had sent Henry M. Morfit to Texas in the summer of 1836 to report on the ability of the new government to maintain itself. Morfit wrote ten letters from Texas, filled with information that make them a most valuable source for the history of this time. On the whole his opinion of Texas was very favorable, but Bravo's invasion was expected during the winter and he advised that the United States withhold recognition until the result of the invasion was seen. President Jackson accepted the advice. and in a special message of December 21, 1836, recommended that con- gress await the outcome of the contemplated Mexican expedition. He closed the message by saying, however, that if congress held a different opinion, he would be glad to co-operate in extending recognition without further delay. For reasons that we have already seen Bravo did not reach Texas during the winter, and thus strengthened the friends of Texas in congress. On March 1, 1837, the senate voted for recognition, and the house made appropriation to pay the salary of a diplomatic representative to Texas whenever the president thought it desirable to send one. Jackson considered this equivalent to recognition, and March 3, 1837, appointed Alcée La Branche of Louisiana chargé d'affaires to Texas.
This opened the way for the advancement of the annexation ques- tion, and on August 4 Hunt, the Texan representative, formally offered Texas to the United States. He argued that the revolution had been justified by the treatment which Texas had received from Mexico and by the hopeless political anarchy that had existed in Mexico since 1821 : that Texas was now independent and free to dispose of itself without hindrance from any power; and that annexation would be mutually beneficial to the United States and to Texas. President Van Buren was opposed to annexation, however, and flatly declined the Texan offer. The question of slavery was becoming acute in the United States, and annexation was opposed by the anti-slavery party chiefly because it would extend slave territory. At the same time it was pretty evident that annexation would lead to war with Mexico. President Houston withdrew the offer of annexation in October, 1838, and there the mat- ter rested for nearly five years.
During those five years the government of Texas became more and more involved in debt, but the country itself developed rapidly and its commerce became an object of some consideration. When this was perceived in the United States the annexation question ceased to be a purely sectional issue, and it became possible to consider the subject to some extent on its merits. Aside from the awakened economic inter- est, a general uneasiness spread over the country lest England gain ascendency in Texas. England was known to desire a source of cot- ton supply outside the United States and to be interested in universal abolition of slavery. Texas offered a tempting field for British activity. Recent investigations have disclosed little evidence of a desire on the part of England to incorporate Texas in the British empire, but they
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have clearly proved its wish to establish a controlling influence and to prevent annexation by the United States.
On October 16th, 1843, President Tyler opened negotiations for the annexation of Texas by treaty. He was a slave owner, and was doubt- less not averse to an extension of the slave territory of the United States, but he sincerely believed that Great Britain was on the point of gaining a foothold in Texas, which would be harmful to the United States. He may also have been influenced to some extent by the am- bition to have his administration identified with a great measure like annexation, but it is now in a fair way to be conceded by students that his idea was statesmanlike and his motive patriotic. The truce between Texas and Mexico had just been arranged, and President Houston was in a position to feign indifference, if he did not feel it. He would not entertain Tyler's proposal until he was assured of two things: (1) That the treaty would command the two-thirds majority necessary for its ratification in the senate; and (2) that the United States would use its army and navy to protect Texas during the pendency of the negotia- tions, in case Mexico renewed its attempts at invasion. When he was satisfied on these points the treaty was signed at Washington, April 12, 1844. The senate rejected it on June 8. The motives for this were varied, but most of the senators were moved by the desire to postpone the issue until after the presidential election which would take place the following November. Tyler immediately submitted the question to the house and proposed annexation by joint resolution, which would require merely a simple majority vote, but congress adjourned the mid- dle of June without action.
As Houston had foreseen would be the case, Mexico broke off the armistice as soon as it learned of the negotiations between the United States and Texas. As a matter of fact there had never been a chance of reaching an adjustment, because Texas had no intention of accept- ing less than recognition on condition of its assuming a portion of the Mexican debt, and Mexico insisted on reunion as a sine qua non. On June 16 General Woll notified President Houston that Mexico had re- sumed hostilities on the 11th of that month. Houston thereupon called on the United States to fulfill its promise of protection, and on Sep- tember 10 John C. Calhoun. who was now Tyler's secretary of state, notified Mexico that the president would regard the invasion of Texas as "highly offensive" to the United States. The Mexican minister of foreign relations replied that his country would not be intimidated by the president's threats to desist from the effort to regain what was its own, but the government soon found reason to change its policy in the hope that Texas might be induced thereby to suspend further annexa- tion negotiations.
During the summer of 1844 annexation was the most prominent question before the people of the United States. All the presidential candidates were required to define their positions with regard to it. Van Buren, the leading Democratic candidate, declared against immedi- ate annexation, and failed of nomination bv the national convention. which chose James K Polk. a "dark horse" from Tennessee who had frankly declared for immediate annexation. Henry Clay, the leading
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Whig candidate, was also opposed to immediate annexation, and this is believed to have been the chief reason for the victory of the Democrats in the November election. Undoubtedly the tariff and other questions played a part in Polk's election, but the country as a whole interpreted his victory as a demand for annexation.
Tyler did not wait for Polk's inauguration to carry out this im- portant measure. He placed the subject before congress in December, 1844, and a joint resolution was finally passed on February 28, 1845, defining the terms of annexation. Texas was to be admitted as a state and might, when qualified, be divided into as many as five states. Slavery was excluded from that portion of the territory claimed by Texas north of the parallel of 36° 30' north latitude; and boundary disputes with Mexico were to be adjusted by the United States. Texas was to retain its public lands as a means of paying the debt of the re- public.
England and France, as well as Mexico, were greatly opposed to the annexation of Texas by the United States, and on January 12, 1844, before the treaty was negotiated, Lord Aberdeen instructed the British minister at Paris to sound the French government and learn whether it would co-operate with England in "deprecating all interference on the part of the United States in the affairs of Texas, or the adoption of any measure leading to the destruction of the separate existence of that State ; at the same time, warning the Texan government to look to the preser- vation of their independence as the best security for their ultimate prosperity, both political and commercial." France was acquiescent, and on May 29 Aberdeen outlined to the Mexican minister at London a plan of operations which he proposed to submit to France: (1) Mexico must recognize the independence of Texas, and thereby remove, so far as Texas was concerned, one of the principal motives for desiring annex- ation ; (2) England would then oppose annexation, and it was believed that France would join England not only in guaranteeing the independ- ence of Texas, but also the boundaries of Mexico. Aberdeen said : "Provided that England and France were perfectly agreed, it would make little difference to England whether or not the American government consented to abandon the question ; that if it were necessary, England would be willing to go to the last extremities in supporting its opposi- tion to annexation." There were two important provisions here: Mex- ico must recognize Texan independence. and France must act with Eng- land. Before the reply of either France or Mexico was obtained Aber- deen received a long and able letter from the British minister at Wash- ington. In this Pakenham pointed out that although the Senate had rejected the treaty, the question was before the country as one of the principal issues in the presidential campaign. If Clav were elected by the Whigs annexation would be postponed; but if the Democrats were victorious it would be pushed vigorously. The American public was already very uneasy concerning British designs in Texas, and the surest way to effect the defeat of Clay, and thereby ensure annexation would be for England to interfere. This argument convinced Aberdeen, and he let the French government know at once that England thought it best to defer action for the time.
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