The Wisconsin blue book 1893, Part 7

Author: Wisconsin. Office of the Secretary of State. Legislative manual of the State of Wisconsin; Wisconsin. Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics. Blue book of the State of Wisconsin; Industrial Commission of Wisconsin; Wisconsin. State Printing Board; Wisconsin. Legislature. Legislative Reference Library; Wisconsin. Legislature. Legislative Reference Bureau; Wisconsin. Blue book of the State of Wisconsin
Publication date: 1893
Publisher: Madison
Number of Pages: 804


USA > Wisconsin > The Wisconsin blue book 1893 > Part 7


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SECTION 5. The Governor shall receive during his continuance in office, an annual com- pensation of five thousand dollars, which shall be in full for all traveling or other expenses incident to his duties.


SECTION 9. The Lieutenant Governor shall receive during his continuance in office, an annual compensation of one thousand dollars.


ARTICLE VI.


[Section 4, as amended by a vote of the people at the General Election, November 7, 1882.]


SECTION 4. Sheriffs, coroners, registers of deeds, district attorneys, and all other county officers, except judicial officers, shall be chosen by thé electors of the respective counties, once in every two years. Sheriffs shall hold no other office, and be ineligible for two years next succeeding the termination of their offices; they may be required by law to renew their security from time to time, and in default of giving such new security their office shall be deemed vacant, but the county shall never be made responsible for the acts of the sheriff. The Governor may remove any officer in this section mentioned, giving to such a copy of the charges against him and an opportunity of being heard in his defense. All vacancies shall be filled by appointment, and the person appointed to fill a vacancy shall hold only for the unexpired portion of the term to which he shall be appointed and until his successor shall be elected and qualified.


ARTICLE VII.


[Section 4, as amended by a vote of the people at the General Election, November 6, 1877.]


SECTION 4. The supreme court shall consist of one chief justice and four associate jus- tices, to be elected by the qualified electors of the State. The Legislature shall, at its first session after the adoption of this amendment, provide by law for the election of two asso- ciate justices of said court, to hold their offices for terms ending two and four years respectively, after the end of the term of the justice of the said court then last to expire. Anl thereafter the chief justice and associate justices of the said court shall be elected and hold their offices respectively for the term of ten years.


[Section 12, as amended by a vote of the people at the General Election, November 7, 1882.]


SECTION 12. There shall be a derk of the circuit court chosen in each county organized for judicial purposes by the qualified electors thereof, who shall hold his office for two years, subject to removal as shall be provided by law; in case of a vacancy the judge of the circuit court shall have power to appoint a clerk until the vacancy shall be filled by an election ; the clerk thus elected or appointed shall give such security as the Legislature may require. The supreme court shall appoint its own clerk and a clerk of the circuit court may be appointed a clerk of the supreme court.


THE MILWAUKEE LITHO.&ENCR.Co.


COLLEGE OF LAW BUILDING, MADISON.


33


CONSTITUTION OF WISCONSIN.


ARTICLE VIII.


[Section 2, as amended by a vote of the people at the General Election, November 6. 1877. !


SECTION 2. No money shall be paid out of the treasury, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law. No appropriation shall be made for the payment of any claim against the State, except claims of the United States, and judgments, unless filed within six years after the claim accrued.


ARTICLE XI.


[Section 3, as amended by a vote of the people at the General Election, November 3, 1874. ] SECTION 3. It shall be the duty of the Legislature, and they are hereby empowered to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to prevent abuses in assessments and taxation, and in contracting debts by such municipal corporations. No county, city, town, village, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose, to any amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county taxes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness. Any county, city, town, village, school district, or other municipal corporation, incurring any indebtedness as afore- said, shall before or at the time of doing so, provide for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on said debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge. the principal thereof within twenty years from the time of contracting the same.


ARTICLE XIII.


[Section 1, as amended by a vote of the people at the General Election, November 7, 1882.]


SECTION 1. The political year for the State of Wisconsin shall commence on the first Monday in January in each year, and the general elections shall be holden on the Tuesday next succeeding the first Monday in November. The first general election for all state and county officers, except judicial officers, after the adoption of this amendment, shall be holden in the year A. D. 1884, and thereafter the general election shall be held biennally. All state, county or other officers elected at the general election in the year 1881, and whose. term of office would otherwise expire on the first Monday of January in the year 1884, shall hold and continue in such office respectively, until the first Monday in January in the year 1885. 3


ARTICLE VII.


[Section 4, as amended by a vote of the people at an election April 2, 1892.]


SECTION 4. The chief justice and associate justices of the supreme court shall be sev- erally known as justices of said court with the same terms of office, respectively, as now provided. The supreme court shall consist of five justices (any three of whom shall be a quorum), to be elected as now provided. The justice having been longest a continuous member of the court (or in case of two or more of such senior justices having served for the same length of time, then the one whose commission first expires), shall be ex-officio the chief justice.


1420926


MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE.


BY THOMAS JEFFERSON.


TABLE OF CONTENTS.


SEC. 1. Rules, Importance of.


2. Legislature.


3. Privilege.


4. Elections.


5. Qualifications.


6. Quorum.


7. Call of the House.


8. Absence.


9. Speaker.


10. Address.


11. Committees.


12. Committee of Whole.


13. Examination before Committees, etc.


14. Arrangement of business.


15. Order.


16. Order respecting papers.


17. Order in debate.


18. Orders of the House.


19. Petitions.


20. Motions.


21. Resolutions.


22. Bills, Reading.


23. Leave to bring in.


24. First reading.


25. Second reading.


26. Commitment.


27. Report of Committee.


SEC. 28. Bills. Recommitment.


29. Report taken up.


30. Quasi Committee.


31. Second reading in the House.


32. Reading papers.


33. Privileged questions.


34. Previous question. Amendments. 35.


36. Division of question


37. Co-existing questions. Equivalent question.


39. The question.


40. Third reading.


41. Division of the House.


42.


Title.


43. Reconsideration.


44. Bills sent to the other House. 45. Amendments between the Houses.


46. Conferences.


47. Messages.


48. Assent.


49. Journals.


50. Adjournment.


51. Session.


52. Treaties.


53. Impeachment.


38.


MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE.


NOTE -The rules and practices peculiar to the SENATE are printed between brackets, [ ]. Those of PARLIAMENT are not so distinguished.


IMPORTANCE OF RULES.


SECTION I.


IMPORTANCE OF ADHERING TO RULES.


Mr. ONSLOW, the ablest among the Speakers of the House of Commons, used to say: "It was a maxim he had often heard when he was a young man, from old and experienced Members, that nothing tended more to throw power into the hands of the administration, and those who acted with a majority of the House of Commons, than a neglect of, or de- parture from, the rules of proceeding; that these forms, as instituted by our ancestors, op- erated as a check and control on the actions of the majority, and that they were in many instances, a shelter and protection to the minority, against the attempts of power." So far the maxim is certainly true, and it is founded in good sense, that as it is always in the power of the majority, by their numbers, to stop any improper measures proposed on the part of their opponents, the only weapons by which the minority can defend themselves against similar attempts from those in power, are the forms and rules of proceeding which have been adopted as they were found necessary, from time to time, and are become the law of the House: by a strict adherence to which, the weaker party can only be protected from those irregularities and abuses which these forms were intended to check, and which the wantonness of power is but too often apt to suggest to large and successful majorities. 2 Hats., 171, 172.


And whether these forms be in all cases the most rational or not, is really not of so great importance. It is much more material that there should be a rule to go by, than what that rule is; that there may be a uniformity of proceeding in business, not subject to the ca- price of the Speaker, or captiousness of the Members. It is very material that order, de- cency and regularity be preserved in a dignified public body. 2 Hats., 149.


SECTION II.


LEGISLATIVE.


[All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives - Constitution of the United States, Art. 1, Sec. 1.]


[The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. Constitution of the United States, Art. 1, Sec. 6.]


[For the powers of Congress, see the following Articles and Sections of the Constitution of the United States. I, 4, 7, 8, 9. II, 1, 2. III, 3. IV, 1, 3, 5, and all the amendments.]


SECTION III. PRIVILEGE.


The privileges of Members of Parliament, from small and obscure beginnings, have been advancing for centuries with a firm and never yielding pace. Claims seem to have been brought forward from time to time, and repeated, till some example of their admission enabled them to build law on that example. We can only, therefore, state the points of progression at which they now are. It is now acknowledged, 1st. That they are at all times exempted from question elsewhere for anything said in their own House; that during the time of privilege, 2d. Neither a Member himself, his* wife, nor his servants (familaries


*Order of House of Commons 1663, July 16.


38


WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK.


sui), for any matter of their own, may be* arrested on mesne process, in any civil suit: 3d. Nor be detained under execution, though levied before time of privilege: 4th. Nor im- pleaded, cited or subpoenaed in any court: 5th. Nor summoned as a witness or juror: 6th. Nor may their lands or goods be distrained: 7th. Nor their persons assaulted, or characters traduced. And the period of time covered by privilege, before and after the session, with the practice of short prorogations under the connivance of the Crown, amounts in fact to a perpetual protection against the course of justice. In one instance, indeed, it has been re- laxed by the 10 G. 3, c. 50, which permits judiciary proceedings to go on against them. That these privileges must be continually progressive, seems to result from their rejecting all definition of them; the doctrine being that "their dignity and independence are pre- served by keeping their privileges indefinite; 'and that the maxims upon which they pro- ceed, together with the method of proceeding, rest entirely in their own breast, and are not defined and ascertained by any particular stated laws.'" 1 Blackst., 163, 164.


[It was probably from this view of the encroaching character of privilege that the framers of our constitution, in their care to provide that the law shall bind equally on all, and especially that those who make them shall not exempt themselves from their opera- tion, have only privileged "Senators and Representatives " themselves from the single act of " arrest in all cases except treason, felony and breach of the peace, during their attend- ance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same, and from being questioned in any other place for any speech or debate, in either House." Const. U. S., Art. 1, Sec. 6. Under the general authority "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers given them," Const. U. S., Art. 2, Sec. 8, they may provide by law the details which may be necessary for giving full effect to the enjoy- ment of this privilege. No such law being yet made. it seems to stand at present on the following grounds: 1. The act of arrest is void, ab initio + 2. The member arrested may be discharged on motion, 1 Bl., 166; 3 Stra., 990; or by habeas corpus under the Federal or State authority as the case may be; or by a writ of privilege out of the Chancery, 2 Stra., 989, in those States which have adopted that part of the laws of England. Orders of the House of Commons, 1550, February 20. 3. The arrest being unlawful, is a trespass for which the officer and others concerned are liable to action and indictment in the ordinary courts of justice, as in other cases of unauthorized arrest. 4. The court before which the process is returnable is bound to act as in other cases of unauthorized proceeding, and liable also, as in other similar cases, to have their proceedings stayed or corrected by the superior courts.]


[The time necessary for going to, and returning from, Congress, not being defined, it will, of course, be judged of in every particular case by those who will have to decide the case.] While privilege was understood in England to extend, as it does here, only to exemption from arrest, eundo, moranda, et redeundo, the House of Commons themselves decided that " a convenient time was to be understood." (1580,) 1 Hats .; 99, 100. Nor is the law so strict in point of time as to require the party to set out immediately on his return, but allows him time to settle his private affairs, and to prepare for his journey ; and does not even scan his road very nicely, nor forfeit his protection for a little deviation from that which is most direct; some necessity perhaps constraining him to it. 2 Stra., 986, 987.


This privilege from arrest, privileges of course against all process, the disobedience to which is punishable by an attachment of the person; as a subpoena ad respondendum, or, testificandum, or a summons on a jury; and with reason, because a member has superior duty to perform in another place. [When a representative is withdrawn from his seat by summons, the 40,000 people whom he represents, lose their voice in debate and vote, as they do on his voluntary absence; when a Senator is withdrawn by summons, his State loses half its voice in debate and vote, as it does on his voluntary absence. The enormous dis- parity of evil admits no comparison.]


[So far there will probably be no difference of opinion as to the privileges of the two Houses of Congress; but in the following cases it is otherwise. In December, 1795. the House of Representatives committed two persons of the name of Randall and Whitney, for attempting to corrupt the integrity of certain members, which they considered as a con- tempt and breach of the privileges of the House; and the facts being proved, Whitney was detained in confinement a fortnight, and Randall three weeks, and was reprimanded by the Speaker. In March, 1796, the House of Representatives voted a challenge given to a mem- ber of their House to be a breach of the privileges of the House; but satisfactory apologies and acknowledgments being made, no further proceeding was had. The editor of the Aurora having, in his paper of February 19, 1800, inserted some paragraphs defamatory of


·Xlsynge, 217; 1 Hats., 21; Gray's Deb., 133


+Stra., 989.


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MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE.


the Senate, and failed in his appearance, he was ordered to be committed. In debating the legality of this order, it was insisted, in support of it, that every man, by the law of nature, and every body of men, possesses the right of self-defense; that all public functionaries are essentially invested with the powers of self-preservation; that they have an inherent right to all acts necessary to keep themselves in a condition to discharge the trusts confided to them; that whenever authorities are given, the means of carrying them into execution are given by necessary implication; that thus we see the British Parliament exercise the right of punishing contempts; all the State Legislatures exercise the same power, and every court does the same; that, if we have it not, we sit at the mercy of every intruder who may enter our doors or gallery, and, by noise and tumult, render proceeding in business impracticable; that if our tranquillity is to be perpetually disturbed by newspaper defamation, it will not be possible to exercise our functions with the requisite coolness and deliberation; and that we must, therefore, have a power to punish these disturbers of our peace and proceedings. To this it was answered, that the Parliament and courts of England have cognizance of con- tempts by the express provisions of their law ; that the State Legislatures have equal author- ity, because their powers are plenary; they represent their constituents completely, and possess all their powers, except such as their Constitutions have expressly denied them; that the courts of the several States have the same powers by the laws of their States, and those of the Federal Government by the same State laws adopted in each State, by a law of Congress; that none of these bodies, therefore, derive those powers from natural or neces- sary right, but from express law; that Congress have no such natural or necessary power, nor any powers but such as are given them by the Constitution; that that has given them, directly, exemption from personal arrest, exemption from question elsewhere for what is said in their House, and power over their own members and proceedings; for these no fur- ther law is necessary, the Constitution being the law; that, moreover, by that article of the Constitution which authorizes them "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power vested by the Constitution in them," they may provide by law for an undisturbed exercise of their functions, e. g., for the punishment of contempt, of affrays or tumult in their presence, etc., but, till the law be made, it does not exist; and does not exist, from their own neglect; that in the mean time, however, they are not unprotected, the ordinary magistrates and courts of law being open and competent to punish all unjusti- fiable disturbances or defamations, and even their own sergeant, who may appoint deputies ad libitum to aid him, 3 Grey, 59, 147, 255, is equal to small disturbances; that in requiring a previous law, the Constitution had regard to the inviolability of the citizen, as well as of the member; as, should one House, in the regular form of a bill, aim at too broad privi- leges, it may be checked by the other, and both by the President; and also as, the law being promulgated, the citizen will know how to avoid offense. But if one branch may assume its own privileges without control; if it may do it on the spur of the occasion, conceal the law in its own breast, and after the fact committed, make its sentence both the law and the judgment on that fact, if the offense is to be kept undefined, and to be declared only ex re nata, and according to the passion of the moment, and there be no limitation either in the manner or measure of the punishment, the condition of the citizen will be perilous indeed. Which of these doctrines is to prevail, time will decide. Where there is no fixed law, the judgment on any particular case, is the law of that single case only, and dies with it. When a new and even similar case arises, the judgment which is to make and at the same time apply the law, is open to question and consideration, as are all new laws. Perhaps Congress, in the mean time, in their care for the safety of the citizen as well as that for their own protection, may declare by law what is necessary and proper to enable them to carry into execution the powers vested in them, and thereby hang up a rule for the inspec- tion of all, which may direct the conduct of the citizen, and at the same time test the judg- ments they shall themselves pronounce in their own case.]


Privilege from arrest takes place by force of the election; and before a return be made a member elected may be named of a committee, and is to every extent a member, except that he cannot vote until he is sworn. Memor., 107, 108. 'D'Ewes, 642, col. 2; 643, col. 1. Pet. Miscel. Parl., 119. Lex Parl., c. 23. 2 Hats., 22, 62.


Every man must, at his peril, take notice who are members of either House returned of record. Lex Parl .. 23; 4 Inst., 24.


On complaint of a breach of privilege the party may either be summoned or sent for in custody of the sergeant. Grey, 88, 95.


The privilege of a member is the privilege of the House. If the member waive it with- out leave, it is a ground for punishing him, but cannot in effect waive the privilege of the House. 3 Grey, 140, 222.


For any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.


40


WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK.


Const. U. S., I, 6, S. P., Protest of the Commons to James I., 1621; 2 Rapin, No. 54, pp. 211, 212. But this is restrained to things done in the House in a parliamentary course. 1 Rush., 663. For he is not to have privilege contra morem parliamentarum, to exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty. Com. p.


If an offense be committed by a member of the House, of which the House has cogni- zance, it is an infringement of their right for any person or court to take notice of it, till the House has punished the offender, or referred him to a due course. Lex Parl., 63.


Privilege is in the power of the House, and is a restraint to proceedings of inferior courts, but not of the House itself. 2 Nalson, 450; 2 Grey, 399. For whatever is spoken in the House is subject to the censure of the House; and offenses of this kind have been severely punished by calling the person to the bar to make submission, committing him to the tower, expelling the House, etc. Scob., 72; L. Parl., c. 22.


It is a breach of order for the speaker to refuse to put a question which is in order. 2 Hats., 175-6; 5 Grey, 133.


And even in cases of treason, felony, and breach of the peace, to which privilege does not extend as to substance, yet in Parliament a member is privileged as to the mode of pro- ceeding. The case is first to be laid before the House, that it may judge of the fact and of the grounds of the accusation, and how far forth the manner of the trial may concern their privilege; otherwise it would be in the power of the other branches of government, and even of every private man, under pretense of treason, etc., to take any man from his service in the House, and so as many, one after another, as would make the House what he pleaseth. Dec. of Com. on the King's declaring Sir John Hotham a traitor. 4 Rushw., 586. So when a member stood indicted for felony, it was adjudged that he ought to remain of the House till conviction; for it may be any man's case who is guiltless, to be accused and indicted of felony or the like crime. 23 El. 1580; D'Ewes, 283, col. 1; Lex Parl .. 133.


When it is found necessary for the public service to put a member under arrest, or when on any public inquiry, matter comes out which may lead to affect the person of a member, it is the practice immediately to acquaint the House, that they may know the reasons for such a proceeding, and take such steps as they think proper. 2 Hats., 259. Of which see many examples. Ib., 256, 257, 258. But the communication is subsequent to the arrest. 1 Blackst., 167.


It is highly expedient, says Hatsel, for the due preservation of the privileges of the sepa- rate branches of the Legislature, that neither should encroach on the other or interfere in any matter depending before them, so as to preclude or even influence that freedom of debate, which is essential to a free council. They are therefore not to take notice of any bills or other matters depending or of votes that have been given, or of speeches which have been held, by the members of either of the other branches of the Legislature, until the same have been communicated to them in the usual parliamentary manner. 2 Hats., 252. 4 Inst., 15. Seld. Jud., 53. Thus the King's taking notice of the bill for suppressing soldiers, depending before the House; his proposing a provisional clause for a bill before it was presented to him by the two Houses; his expressing displeasure against some persons for matters moved in parliament during the debate and preparation of a bill, were breaches of privilege; 2 Nalson, 347; and in 1783, December 17, it was declared a breach of funda- mental privileges, etc., to report any opinion or pretended opinion of the King on any bill or proceeding depending in either House of Parliament with a view to influence the votes of the members. 2 Hats .. 251, 6.




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