USA > Maine > Maine; a history, Volume II > Part 18
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The reasons given by the Jeffersonian for the change in the candidate for Vice-President were the chief causes of the defeat of Mr. Hamlin, but personal feeling and political management played a considerable part. Mr. Hamlin was under the great disadvantage of having his own section against him. Of the seventy votes from New England, he received but twenty-six. He obtained the solid vote of Maine, half of that of New Hampshire, and led the poll of Rhode Island, whose votes were badly scattered. But John- son carried Vermont, Connecticut voted solidly for him, and, worst of all,
"Jeffersonian, June 14, 1864.
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for Connecticut though a New England State often followed the lead of New York, Massachusetts gave seventeen of her votes to Dickinson and scattered the rest, Hamlin obtaining three. The failure of New England to support Hamlin had a very bad effect, and was made great use of in winning delegates from the West for other candidates. Nor was Massa- chusetts satisfied with merely voting against Hamlin; many of her delegates labored successfully to induce the representatives of Maryland, Delaware and Ohio to vote for other candidates. Ohio was the more easily won, as there was a chance that one of her leading citizens, ex-Governor Tod, might carry off the prize himself as a compromise candidate.
The action of Massachusetts had also a great effect on New York. The night before the nomination, the New York delegates caucussed. It was unanimously agreed to support the renomination of Lincoln, and a majority voted in favor of that of Hamlin. The caucus then adjourned, but met again the next morning. Meanwhile it had been learned author- itatively that Massachusetts would not support Hamlin under any circum- stances; this produced a great impression. Some delegates thought that there must be a strong personal reason for her action. It is to be feared that this was indeed the case, but the personal reason was not to be found in any act or omission of Mr. Hamlin's, but in the extreme views and resentment of opposition of Charles Sumner. He had on various occasions been worsted in discussions in the Senate by William Pitt Fessenden, who was the ablest debater in that body, though Sumner was the more brilliant rhetorician. Both men were able and patriotic, but of different types of character, and there was some ill feeling between them. Mr. Sumner never had any doubt that he was entirely right and his opponents totally wrong, and accordingly he set to work to get Mr. Fessenden out of the Senate. His term would expire on March 4, 1865. Should Mr. Hamlin fail of the Vice-Presidency, he would probably contest Mr. Fessenden's re-election, and, as he was very popular in Maine and a most skillful politician, he would have a good chance of success. Mr. Sumner therefore set earnestly to work to turn the Massachusetts delegation away from Hamlin, and so great was his influence that notwithstanding the opposition of his colleague, Senator Wilson, and of Governor Andrew, only three delegates from Massa- chusetts voted for the New England candidate.
Some of the New York supporters of Hamlin, including Preston King, who had taken an active part in securing his nomination in 1860, abandoned him to save Seward. New York had a prominent War Democrat, Daniel S. Dickinson, and the radical wing of the Republicans of the State pressed him earnestly for the Vice-Presidency, but the conservative or Weed- Seward faction feared that it would give offence should New York have both the Vice-President and the Secretary of State, and that, if Dickinson were Vice-President, Seward would be obliged to resign. Accordingly they worked hard for Johnson as the one man who could beat Dickinson, and this argument won over some of the Hamlin conservatives.
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The most interesting of all the questions connected with Mr. Hamlin's failure to obtain a renomination, and perhaps the hardest to solve is, What was the attitude of President Lincoln? There is no doubt that publicly it was one of strict neutrality. The President's private secretary went to the convention not as a member or delegate, but merely as an interested spec- tator. He found B. C. Cook, the head of the Illinois delegation, puzzled and worried. It had been supposed that the old ticket would be renom- inated, but some of the Illinois delegates personally desired Lincoln's defeat, and Leonard Swett of Illinois, a very intimate friend of the President, had telegraphed the delegation urging it to support Holt of Kentucky for Vice- President. This seemed suspicious. Yet if Holt were really Lincoln's choice for Vice-President, the delegation was ready to meet his wishes in this as in other matters. Accordingly, Nicolay wrote to his fellow secretary, John Hay: "Cook wants to know confidentially whether Swett is all right ; whether in urging Holt for Vice-President he reflects the President's wishes ; whether the President has any preference, either personally or on the score of policy, or whether he wishes not even to interfere by a confidential indi- cation." The President himself endorsed the letter: "Swett is unques- tionably all right. Mr. Holt is a good man, but I had not heard or thought of him for V.P. Wish not to interfere about V.P. Cannot interfere about platform. Convention must judge for itself." This would seem to show that Lincoln remained firm in his policy of neutrality, but in after years statements were made that he did not.
Two days after Mr. Hamlin's death, the Philadelphia Times contained an editorial stating that the writer had been invited to a conference with Lincoln just before the meeting of the Baltimore convention, that Lincoln urged the nomination of Johnson because of the advantage of having a Southern Democrat on the ticket and that he (McClure) returned to Balti- more to work and vote for Johnson's nomination. John G. Nicolay. who had been Lincoln's private secretary from his nomination in 1860 to his death, at once telegraphed Mrs. Hamlin that the editorial was entirely erroneous. The telegram was widely published in the newspapers, and there followed a bitter personal controversy on the matter between the editor of the Philadelphia Times, Mr. A. K. McClure, and Mr. Nicolay.
The evidence adduced by each may be briefly summarized as follows : In favor of the theory that Lincoln worked for Johnson's nomination there is, first, some direct testimony that he wished for the nomination of a War Democrat. General Benjamin F. Butler stated repeatedly that Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania came to him from Lincoln to propose that he should be a candidate for the Vice-Presidency, with Lincoln's support, but that he preferred to remain in the army. Cameron at various times gave interviews confirming this statement. On the question directly at issue, McClure stated that Lincoln asked him to support Johnson. Lamon, an intimate friend of Lincoln, corroborated him. Another close friend of the
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President, Leonard Swett, wished the Illinois delegation to vote for a War Democrat, Joseph Holt of Kentucky, for Vice-President. Henry J. Ray- mond, the editor of the New York Times, was the Lincoln leader in the convention. He died before the McClure-Nicolay controversy, but George Jones, the principal owner of the paper, said that he had frequently dis- cussed Johnson's nomination with Raymond, and that McClure was abso- lutely right. Benjamin C. Truman, Johnson's secretary, declared that he knew that Lincoln favored Johnson's nomination. Judge Pettis of Indiana told Mr. Hamlin in 1889 that Lincoln said to him in response to a question, whom did he favor for Vice-President, "Governor Johnson of Tennessee," and Mr. Hamlin believed him.
On the other side, there is Lincoln's endorsement on Nicolay's letter concerning Cook's doubts. Moreover, Nicolay says that Lincoln told him that as the leading candidates were all his friends, he thought that it would be unbecoming in him to advocate the nomination of any of them, but that privately and personally he would prefer that the old ticket should be renominated. Cook, not satisfied with the President's endorsement on Nic- olay's letter, saw Lincoln and became certain that he desired the nomina- tion of Hamlin. There is some evidence that Lincoln personally disliked Johnson, partly because of his habits. Finally, it is said on excellent authority, that Lincoln showed no pleasure, but rather anxiety, when he first learned of Johnson's nomination.
In endeavoring to estimate the value of these very contradictory pieces of evidence, it must be remembered that recollections given years after the event are untrustworthy, that in the passage of years imagination often takes the place of memory, and that in reminiscences, as in nature, "great oaks from little acorns grow." Let us first consider the evidence for Lincoln's favoring Johnson. McClure's stories are not always consistent with each other, and he had a very high estimate of his own importance. When he was about to publish a book, some one remarked that it would be another volume in his series of "How I Saved the Union." Butler and Cameron were unscrupulous politicians, and their statements must be re- ceived with caution. Nevertheless, Lincoln's anxiety to attract the War Democrats was such that the story of the offer to Butler is by no means improbable. McClure states that Cameron was lukewarm in the support of Hamlin and readily came over to Johnson. Just after the convention Cameron wrote to Senator Fessenden :
"MY DEAR SIR: I strove hard to renominate Hamlin, as well for his own sake as for yours, but failed only because New England, especially Massachusetts, did not adhere to him. Johnson will be a strong candidate for the people, but in the contingency of death, I should greatly prefer a man reared and educated in the North. I hope you will come this way going home. Truly yours, "SIMON CAMERON."
Of course, it is possible that Cameron was lying. Lamon is not a very
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reliable witness. Swett's support of Holt is strange, but it is said that after seeing Cook, who had seen Lincoln, he worked for Hamlin. Jones's state- ment of his conversations with Raymond is very important, but there is to be set against this the testimony of Noah Brooks that Raymond said to him on the day before the convention, "Do you know who is Lincoln's choice for Vice-President ? I cannot find out." It is possible, however, that Brooks did not quote Raymond correctly, or that Raymond wished to pump him. The value of Truman's testimony is weakened by the circumstance that two of his statements do not square. Pettis' statement is extremely important, and so is its acceptance by Mr. Hamlin, but the latter afterward came to the belief that Pettis was mistaken.
In regard to the testimony on the other side, it may be said that Lincoln's endorsement on Nicolay's letter is less conclusive than has been claimed. He says that he cannot interfere about the platform but only that he does not wish to interfere about the Vice-Presidency. Undoubtedly he did not wish to. Nicolay's recollection that Lincoln's personal wishes were in favor of Hamlin, and Cook's full belief that this was the case, are of weight. Still it must be remembered that Lincoln's policy was to avoid committing himself, and to speak well of all the candidates, and that atti- tude might easily be misunderstood. The testimony that Lincoln appeared disappointed and anxious on learning of Johnson's nomination, is one of the strongest arguments against McClure's story.
Historians disagree on the question. Rhodes accepts the offer to Butler, but says nothing about the McClure-Nicolay controversy. Stanwood also makes no reference to the matter. Dr. Brummer, in his "History of New York During the Civil War," appears to disbelieve McClure's assertions. Alexander, in his "Political History of the State of New York," says that "The reason for Raymond's ardent support of Johnson will probably never be certainly known. In his long and bitter controversy with Nicolay, how- ever, McClure furnished testimony indicating that Lincoln whispered his choice and that Raymond understood it."
The Democratic National Convention nominated General Mcclellan, the candidate of that wing of the party which would fight rather than give up the Union but which would make almost any concession to induce the rebels to come back. The platform was written by Clement L. Vallandig- ham, the leader of the peace Democrats, and demanded that "after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war," there be a cessation of hostilities with a view to an ultimate convention of the States and restoration of the Union. It was a most unfortunate sentence. The Republicans declared that their opponents had proclaimed the war a failure, and made great use of the phrase. It is said that its incorporation in the platform was indirectly due to the courtesy of one of the Maine delegates. Each State chose a member of the platform committee, and it had been planned that ex-Judge Rice of Augusta should represent Maine, but ex-
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Governor Dana desired to be on the committee, and Mr. Rice withdrew in his favor. The "failure" resolution passed the committee by a single vote, Governor Dana supporting it. Mr. Rice would have opposed it, and had he been the Maine committee man it would have been defeated.
The Argus had been warmly in favor of Mcclellan, and received the news of his nomination with joy. But the thorough-going copperheads were ill pleased. General McClellan after some delay accepted the nomination. The Bangor Democrat said that his letter of acceptance "was very far from what peace men had a right to expect ; and there was danger, ten days ago, of serious disruption. But that danger, we believe, is now past. General McClellan cannot hesitate to pledge himself to the 'cessation of hostilities,
and negotiations for peace,' of the Chicago platform. Let Democrats, then, not be disturbed by any reports of dissensions in our ranks. The Democ-
racy are determined to go into this contest united. They are determined to elect their candidate to the Presidency and they are determined that, after he is elected, he shall obey their behests, and make a speedy peace."
The Democrats of Maine followed in the footsteps of their national assembly, the State convention giving the platform to the peace wing and the candidate to the war faction. The convention declared :
"That the only ground of hope for the preservation of the Union under the Constitution and of maintaining the rights of the people, and of the States, and of securing an honorable peace, is by expelling from power the present corrupt, imbecile and revolutionary Administration, and substitut- ing in its place an Administration which will conduct the Government ac- cording to the requirements of the Constitution, and protect all parties in the full enjoyment of their constitutional rights, privileges and immunities ;
"Resolved, That the Administration by its corruption and imbecility has shown itself incapable of a successful prosecution of the War, and from its levity, tergiversation and bad faith is manifestly incapable of negotiating an honorable peace ;
"Resolved, That we stand where the Democracy has ever stood in favor of the Constitution and of the Rights of the States and of the People, and of the entire Union in all its integrity, and of an honorable peace at the earliest practicable moment."21
It will be noticed that the convention did not say what it would do if the South resolutely refused all terms but independence.
The convention unanimously nominated ex-Judge Howard for Gov- ernor. According to the Jeffersonian, however, there was a sharp struggle behind the scenes. It said "General Gorham L. Boynton, the 'Dean Rich- mond"ª of the Maine Democracy, the brains of his party, almost the only man in the party who has not at one time or another acted with the Aboli- tionists, was the choice of a vast majority of the party, assembled in 'the Tent';ª but he was ruled out in deference to that contemptible minority of
"Argus, Aug. 18, 1864.
"A very influential New York politician.
"The convention was held in a great tent. The Jeffersonian had announced that it would be pitched on the lot "where the balloons are inflated and go up."
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the party who just now act upon the maxim, 'assume a virtue if you have it not.' They are at heart Peace-at-any-price and submission to the rebellion, but they want to 'catch gudgeons.' They affect to believe that they can by sailing under false colors beguile back into their ranks the 'renegade Demo- crats.' The struggle between Howard and Boynton was at times quite hot, in the committee rooms and private parlors. . . At length Dean Rich- mond succumbed to this small minority, and swallowed another pill as bitter as that he gulped down last year labelled 'Bion.'" But though George B. succumbed to Howard, he triumphed on the question of "Peace." If the latter should ascend the throne of State, the former will surely be the con- trolling "power behind the throne."24
The Union convention was held at Augusta on June 29. The Union State Committee had invited to participate in the choice of delegates, "The qualified voters of Maine who desire the unconditional maintenance of the Union, and the supremacy of the Constitution, and the complete suppression of the existing rebellion, with the cause thereof, by vigorous war and all apt and efficient means." Representation was to be based on the number of votes cast for Governor Cony the preceding year. The convention renominated Governor Cony by acclamation, declared for an uncompromis- ing prosecution of the war, and endorsed the National Union platform.
From the first there was no serious doubt of the success of the Union party. The only question was the size of their majority. When the ballots were counted it was found that Cony had received 65,583 votes and Howard 46,403. Although a presidential year, there was a decrease of 7,000 in the total vote, the Democrats losing somewhat more than the Unionists.
The Argus said of the election, "Maine has thus reaffirmed her verdict in favor of the policy of the Administration and that the war should be continued for the purpose of giving freedom to the negroes. It is certainly to be hoped that those who sustain this policy will now come forward and volunteer for the war with as much zeal as they have manifested in carry- ing the election, and thus save the State from the necessity of a draft. They are in honor bound to do this." The Whig, for once agreeing with the Argus, also proclaimed that it was the duty of the Union men of Maine to follow up the blow they had struck by volunteering to complete the State's quota.
In November, Lincoln and Johnson carried the country. In the Elec- toral College the majority was overwhelming, but the popular majority, especially in some of the doubtful States, was not large. The Argus, in commenting on the national election, made one of those prophecies which read so strangely after the event. It said: "The re-election of Mr. Lincoln means financial ruin, utter and irretrievable, makes the permanent dissolu- tion of the Union inevitable, and will prolong the war indefinitely to end finally in a military despotism sustained by a permanent standing army."
"Jeffersonian, Aug. 23, 1864.
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It added, however, that Lincoln's comparatively small majority gave hope of a return to the principles of 1787."
In striking contrast to this lugubrious vaticination is an editorial in the Whig written at the end of the year: "We think that whoever lives to see the next generation will find the South all the more loyal to the govern- ment, by reason of its terrible experiment in rebellion. The war will, in the providence of God, relieve us of slavery, teach both sections to have a respect for each other's endurance and skill, and give us a national unity more compact and enduring than would otherwise have been possible."
During the year (1864) several changes were made in important national offices, in one of which Maine had a special interest. For some time there had been considerable friction between President Lincoln and his Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase; on June 29 Mr. Chase resigned and, perhaps somewhat to his surprise, his resignation was accepted. The vacant place was offered to ex-Governor Tod of Ohio, who declined it. The President then nominated Mr. Fessenden, the chairman of the Senate committee on finance, and the Senate instantly confirmed the nomination. Both nomination and confirmation had been made without Mr. Fessenden's knowledge. He was in feeble health, had no desire for executive office, and was most anxious to decline. But from all quarters came urgent requests that he should accept. He was told that his nomination would have the best effect, that his refusal would give a fearful blow to the public credit, and that it was his duty to take the office. Reluctantly he yieldec He wrote to a close friend and relative: "I felt much as Stanton said. You can no more refuse than 'your son could have refused to attack Monett's Bluff, and you cannot look him in the face if you do.' I told him it would kill me and he replied, 'Very well, you cannot die better than in trying to save your country." In taking the Treasury, Mr. Fessenden stipulated that he should be free to resign as soon as he could do so without injury to the public service.
Mr. Chase did not remain long unprovided for, but in the following November was made Chief Justice of the United States, succeeding Judge Taney, who had died on the 12th of October. The death of the writer of the Dred Scott decision tested the fairness of the partisan press. It was a severe trial, and the Maine papers did not come through with credit. The Jeffersonian referred to him as "that judicial monster the American Jeffries." The Argus went to the other extreme. It not only called him :1 great and good man, but quoted with apparent approval from an article in the Boston Post which said, "If we array beside him the long lists of the illustrious dead where beyond a Mansfield, a Lyndhurst or a Marshall, shall we find one worthy to be named in comparison ?"
25 Argus, Nov. II, 1864.
26Whig, Dec. 29, 1864.
"Fessenden, "Fessenden."
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It fell to the Legislature in the winter of 1865 to choose a Senator. On Mr. Fessenden's resignation, Governor Cony had appointed Nathan A. Farwell of Rockland, until the Legislature should act, and they chose him to fill the remainder of Mr. Fessenden's term, which expired the fourth of the ensuing March. For the full term Mr. Fessenden was himself a candidate, as was Vice-President Hamlin. There had been considerable doubt and discussion as to Mr. Fessenden's position, and he finally wrote a letter to his friend, John S. Tenney, in which he stated that he desired a re-election, that he had accepted the Treasury with the clear understand- ing that he should resign on the earliest suitable occasion, and that his health would not permit him to permanently remain in an office requiring such hard and continuous labor as did the Secretaryship of the Treasury. The letter showed that he earnestly desired a re-election and would be much hurt if it were refused. His supporters made great use of these arguments, and also said much of his ability and the need in the Senate of his leader- ship.
His opponents, ignoring the matter of his health, plausibly used his position as Secretary of the Treasury as an argument against returning him to the Senate. The Biddeford Journal said: "Those who urge the election of Mr. Fessenden can say nothing of his very distinguished quali- fications for any office in the nation that we will not fully admit, and, more than that, which we will not claim for him ourself. And because of those very qualifications we desire, in common with a singular unanimity among capitalists, that he should retain his present position. Under his adminis- tration our finances have become stronger and firmer, and our national credit has advanced. There was no other man in the country that could have filled the position of Secretary of the Treasury, at the time of his appointment, but Mr. Fessenden, and no one has appeared since that time. Does it appear to be wisdom to cause him to vacate that position that the Government may be a loser thereby? and is it an exercise of prudence to throw away a seat in the Cabinet which will give Maine a corresponding influence in the national councils, in order to defeat Mr. Hamlin ?"2ª
The discussion was not always so polite. One of the Fessenden papers charged Hamlin with being a demagogue, and the Jeffersonian replied by accusing them of flunkeyism and aristocratic notions. It also intimated that Mr. Fessenden had not been attentive and generous to the soldiers or active in party work, and that he had not been zealous in support of vigor- our measures against the rebellion and slavery. A Fessenden paper claimed that without a caucus Fessenden would certainly be elected, and urged the Fessenden men, if one were held and Hamlin nominated, to "show your- selves superior to such paltry machinery and vote him down." The Jeffer- sonian said of this advice to bolt, "Thus the copperhead vote is invoked to
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