Outlines of the political history of Michigan, Part 17

Author: Campbell, James V. (James Valentine), 1823-1890
Publication date: 1876
Publisher: Detroit : Schober
Number of Pages: 638


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Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37


17


258


TECUMSEH AND THE PROPHET.


[CHAP. X.


The new representative of this unifying policy was Tecumseh, a chief of the Shawanoes, or Shaw- nees, a body of whom, after the Treaty of Green- ville, had established themselves by permission of the Potawatamies and Kickapoos on the Tippe- canoe River-a branch of the upper Wabash. This chief was a wise and statesmanlike charac- ter, and his ambitions were noble. He desired to advance the prosperity of the Indians by bring- ing them into unity and civilization. The Iroquois had once advanced far in that direction. The Wyandots, or Hurons, were intelligent and indus- trious. Some of the southern tribes, especially the Cherokees, had begun the work which still continues as a development of progress made under very great difficulties.


Tecumseh knew the danger of contact with the whites, and he also knew the advantages of Michigan and the adjacent country for Indian set- tlement. No country on the continent was better adapted for his confederacy. The annual subsi- dies of the British Government and the blandish- ments of the Malden agency had done much to retain the old influence, and the sagacious chief was not left in doubt concerning the approval of his scheme by his Canadian friends. The letters from all parts of the country very soon showed that he had come to a good understanding with them, and that he was working under their inspira- tion. In 1808 and 1809, the scheme became more apparent. His brother, the Prophet, from a


259


CHAP. X. | TECUMSEH AND THE PROPHET.


dreamer of dreams and seer of visions, became invested with the character of an inspired teacher, and so worked upon the superstition of the Indi- ans that he was looked upon by tribes near and remote with reverence and fear. Like other such characters, he no doubt became more or less de- ceived by his own fanaticism; and Tecumseh, from policy or superstition, or both, also assumed to be a believer, although he probably contrived to shape the inspirations very much as he chose. He was not so much of a fanatic as to lose his diplomatic craft, for he contrived for a time to persuade General Harrison (who was a very keen observer) that his schemes were all for the improvement of the Indians, and were not aimed against the whites; and no doubt such was his principal de- sign, if it could have been compatible with white settlements.


The purposes of Tecumseh became known to the Governor General of Canada, and he warned our government of them. It has generally been conceded that while Sir James Craig desired to dismember the union, he did not wish to turn loose the savages upon the American settlements. He prohibited the Malden agency from furnishing arms to the Indians. He expected rather to win over a part of the States by diplomacy. He sent John Henry into New England for that purpose, and had a notion that the Union was about to drop asunder. He, at least, may be acquitted of any complicity with Tecumseh, and it is quite


260


INTRIGUES. HOSTILITIES.


[CHAP. X.


probable that the Indian agents, while fomenting these troubles, and endeavoring to avenge some personal grievances, were acting independently, and in confidence that they would ultimately be re- warded. There is much mystery about the whole relations with Great Britain at this time. The British Minister at Washington professed ignor- ance of Henry's mission, and claimed that he had no official relations with the Governor General. The attack on the Chesapeake, made in 1807, was only apologized for in 1811, when the accumulation of other grievances had made war inevitable. Perhaps it is not entirely discreditable that Great Britain has been very forgiving to officers who have ex- ceeded instructions, in order to do what they thought she would be glad to see done. In those days it was certainly not deemed an unpardon- able sin to try experiments on the United States.


The time at last came when Tecumseh's plans could no longer be concealed. He failed in get- ting control of many of the Indians on the bor- der; and while some of them were friendly to him and to the English, the most of the Wyandots, Delawares, Senecas, and even the Shawanoes, re- mained friendly to the United States. In the au- tumn of 1811, General Harrison began a move- ment upon the hostile confederacy, and on the 7th of November he fought the celebrated battle of Tippecanoe, where the Prophet and his warriors were routed, and the peace of that region was secured till after Hull's delays had enabled the


261


HULL'S DEPARTURE.


CHAP. X.]


British to become aggressive, and to use the In- dians effectively. Tecumseh betook himself to Malden, and thereafter his attachments were un- concealed. He was well received and much fa- vored, and obtained a high rank in the army.


The Michigan settlements could make no head- way under such circumstances, and the local affairs of the Territory remained in the same state of discord.


Governor Hull left for Washington before he heard of the battle of Tippecanoe. While in that city he made some useful suggestions concerning the possession of the lakes by American vessels. His earlier advice on this subject had been ju- dicious, and at this time, on the strength of his Revolutionary merits, he was well thought of as a military officer. He had never commanded any large force, nor performed any striking de- tached service on a large scale. While some of the more distinguished and successful soldiers who afterwards had reason to complain of him became suspicious of his fitness in the earliest days of his command, he left Washington for the. west in good general repute.


His civil administration practically terminated when he left for the seat of government. But there was one last civil function performed. in the sad interval between his return from Canada and the surrender which followed it, indicating a dangerous omission in the previous legislation of the Territory. On the 13th of August, 1812,


262


OLD LAWS ABOLISHED.


[CHAP. X.


a bill was passed forbidding the sale of intoxi- cating liquor to the Indians.


There are not many peculiar features in the laws of the first Territorial period, but some fur- ther reference is necessary to a few of them.


The want of a press, and, the difficulty which was found in determining the legal condition of the country, led in 1810 to a very wise measure, whereby all the French laws and customs, and all English and Canadian statutes, as well as those of the Northwest Territory and Indiana, were abolished. This left the people subject only to the laws of the United States, the Territorial statutes, and the general rules of the common law.


No counties were laid out during the time of General Hull. The districts were the only di- visions, and the district judges acted as local ad- ministrators. Although there were highway com- missioners, there were few roads, and those either in Detroit or up and down the Detroit River. There was no access to the interior except by streams or Indian trails.


The money then in circulation was mostly Spanish dollars, halves, quarters, pistareens, and pieces of twelve and a half, and six and a quarter cents. In the absence of small coin the larger coins were cut into quarters and eighths. Accounts were kept in York currency, of two dollars and a half to the pound, or twelve and a half cents to the shilling.


263


LEGAL AFFAIRS.


CHAP. X.]


Several of the early tax laws were never printed, and are lost, and there is no index to their contents. It seems, however, that revenue was raised almost entirely from capitation taxes of one dollar on each male over sixteen years, specific taxes on dogs, horses, asses and mules, and upon vehicles, and taxes and license fees on various occupations. The tax on dogs was ingeniously devised. It assessed fifty cents on a dog it only one was owned, one dollar for the second, and a dollar and a half for each beyond two. The license law for liquor selling punished with se- verity every dealer who allowed drunkenness or noise on his premises, in-doors or without. It seems that the deputy marshal, who was jailor, had been charged a full tavern license; as a law was passed requiring him to pay but one dol- lar, instead of the greater sum, for the privilege of entertaining his involuntary guests.


The district courts were abolished in 1810, and there appears a hiatus for some years in the published laws, as to compulsory jurisdiction over the cases they had dealt with. Probably they were remitted to the Supreme Court. Par- ties in the district courts could waive a jury. On the other hand, cases tried there by jury could be appealed for a new jury trial in the Supreme Court-a practice which afterwards, under a some- what modified system, was found oppressive. Tes- timony in equity cases could be taken in open court, if desired. This was allowed in the United States courts by the early judiciary act.


264


BURR'S CONSPIRACY.


[CHAP. X.


On the 19th day of January, 1811, Judge Wood- ward appeared in the legislative board clad in a suit of American cloth, (as the record carefully recites), and introduced resolutions in favor of American industry. This was no doubt meant for the audience. It is not reported what effect it produced, at home or abroad.


In the early part of 1807, on the 23d day of January, a law was passed which seems to have been in some way connected with Burr's conspir- acy, but which is not explained. It is a very elaborate and carefully framed statute to prevent and punish acts hostile to the peace of the United States, reaching all attempts and incipient preparations by land or water, authorizing the sei- zure of persons, arms, supplies and boats or ves- sels, and giving unusual powers to call out forces, and punishing with great severity military officers neglecting or refusing to respond.


It is known that Mr. Jefferson received infor- mation in October, 1806, which excited his sus- picions against Burr, and that he notified some of the western governors to be on their guard. In November, Colonel Daviess was foiled in an at- tempt to have Burr held to bail in Kentucky ; but the Ohio Legislature, before the middle of December, passed an act from which ours was copied. Whether there were any suspicious movements in this region, or whether the act was passed merely from abundant caution, is now un-


CHAP. X.1


WAR. 265


known. The news of Burr's arrest could not have reached Detroit for some time after its passage.


The war of 1812 and its consequences made a sorrowful ending to a period of no political progress, and which was not an auspicious open- ing to our public career.


CHAPTER XI.


GOVERNOR HULL'S MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.


THE discussion of the events of the War of 1812 in a purely military point of view, is not within the purpose of this sketch, and not within the writer's skill. But they were events of such great political and social importance to Michigan that an outline of them is necessary. This involves unavoidably a reference to the surrender of Detroit. Upon this, whatever may have been the laudable desire of personal friends and affectionate relatives to remove obloquy from an officer of very kind heart and many good qualities, there has been a substantial agreement among military men, and no appreciable difference of opinion among the citizens and officers who had most reason to understand and observe the circumstances. The details of the war, and of this most disgraceful and lamentable occurrence in it, have been made familiar by many historians, and given in the Field Book of the War of 1812, with much fullness as well as with general accuracy, by Mr. Lossing, who has done so much with pen and pencil to perpetuate our military history. No attempt will be made to go into these particulars at length.


267


CHAP. XI.]


DELAYS AND MISTAKES.


.


The conduct of the War Department of the United States in delaying important preparations, and in not using greater diligence in sending out knowledge of the declaration of war, was very reprehensible. And so far as it really interfered with any military successes, the excuse should be, and has been, allowed to all officers and others who did their best. But it is also no more than just and reasonable to discard from allowance any difficulties or dangers, which, although they might have been possible, either had no effect upon results or were not in fact existing; and when existing, were not of such a character that at the time any one should have acted, or did rationally act upon them. The delays and difficulties were not confined to American movements and prepara- tions ; and the antecedent fears of some wise men and good officers at a distance, concerning the precise nature of perils on the frontier, would not all have been entertained had they been on the spot, and known the condition of affairs on both sides of the line.


There was opposition to the declaration of war, and of course it was among the possibilities that it would not be made. It appears from various sources, and especially. from those brought to light in General Hull's behalf, that he was opposed to declaring it at that time, and especially opposed to it so early, as endangering his civil jurisdiction and the people living under it. He claims also to have been opposed to the invasion of Canada


268


HULL'S VIEWS.


[CHAP. XI


(although his previous letter may bear a different construction) on similar grounds, and for the reason that he regarded it as too strong to be overcome by the American forces, and as likely to be dangerously aggressive in return. He was re- luctant to accept a military command, not because of any doubt of his own ability, but as it now appears for the reason, among others, that it might involve an expectation on the part of the Government that he would attempt to invade Canada; while he saw fit to think it his paramount duty not only to look chiefly to the interests of the Michigan settlements, but to put his private judgment on this policy against all other consider- ations, and carry it out at all events. No one can read his own defence, or the undisputed facts of history, without seeing that he claims credit for having been constantly moved by this sentiment. He was acquitted on the charges of treason. It was not believed he meant to deliberately injure or betray his country. But while free from that design, which would have made his memory as black as Arnold's, he was not, if we accept his own vindication of himself, free from that fault, which, though not so disgraceful morally, is not much less dangerous, and which has been the destruction of many promising reputations, of imagining that military officers have a right to determine the policy of their government, and are only bound to carry out such measures as they deem expedient. An officer who prophesied failure


269


HULL'S QUALITIES


CHAP. XI.]


before war was declared, unless his views were accepted, and whose anterior views, as to the means of preventing mishap, were not carried out by Congress or the War Department, was cer- tainly in danger of fulfilling his prophecies, and of convincing himself that the failure was inevitable. If Hull was really as frank in his prophecies to the War Department before his appointment, as he was ingenious in finding out afterwards rea- sons why he ought to have failed, there can be no doubt that his selection, reluctant or unre- luctant, was one of the worst faults that could have been charged against that office. But this is hardly credible. At any rate it was not known to the public, and is very doubtful in fact. The General had a reputation for bravery in the Revolution that was honestly earned. The miser- able squabbles at Detroit had not become so far known outside that any one had discovered his personal foibles and infirmity of purpose; and very good soldiers have had weak points, and been led into ridiculous positions by such annoyances, with- out losing their military qualities. The selection, so far as we can now see, was justified by exist- ing appearances. With the aid of subsequent events to suggest a full inquiry, we can now, with that ex post facto wisdom, which no one then could be expected to possess, easily see that the indecision and readiness to avoid trouble which led him into so much mischief, and his fussy attempts to per- suade others and himself that he had some energy,


270


HULL'S ANTECEDENTS.


[CHAP. XI


had not been of entirely new origin, although ad- vancing years had made it easier to yield to them and harder to resist them. He had never, during his Revolutionary career, held command of an army, or any command of any great responsibility, or one which called for much more than personal bravery and devotion, which he certainly had shown. He had been sent on two missions to Canada, one to General Haldimand, to seek the delivery of the posts, in 1784, and one to Governor Simcoe, during the pendency of Jay's negotiations, to ar- range for the access of commissioners to the western Indians in our Territory. In the former he accomplished nothing. In the latter he was certainly evaded and misled, by the address of Simcoe, and showed very little sagacity. In both he had talked with vigor and spirit, and in both he had been easily satisfied. The British gover- nors had resorted to much personal flattery and attention, which he greatly appreciated, and prob- ably produced some effect on his judgment by so doing. In the steps which led to the final sur- render, General Brock deliberately and understand- ingly calculated on the result, and worked on his fears with a confidence which would have utterly destroyed the British expedition, if any one else had succeeded to, or assumed command. It is not, indeed, to General Hull's discredit, that his char- acter was open enough to enable those who were dealing with him to discern his defects. And they were of that character which are very seldom recognized by their possessor.


2.1


DECLARATION OF WAR.


CHAP. XI.]


The war was declared on the 18th of June, 1812. News of it should have reached General Hull several days earlier than it did; and, as he received one communication of that date from Washington, written earlier in the day, by express on the 24th, it may be assumed that the same diligence should have informed him on that day, or the next, of the declaration. News reached Malden on the 30th of June. It reached Hull, near the River Raisin, on the end of July. As declarations of war are not made in a corner, and as the British would not have been foolish enough to have no means of immediate knowl- edge at Washington, there was no reason why the British post should not have been informed as early as any Americans near by. Malden was practically nearer Cleveland, where Hull's dispatch was sent from, than Hull himself was. But there was equally no reason why every exertion should not have been made to inform the Americans. The fall of Mackinaw was due directly to the fault of the War Department in failing to send news. The fall of Detroit may be palliated by it just so far as it was affected by it, which was very little, if at all, as this happened six weeks later.


Governor Hull spent the winter of 1811-12 in Washington, and knew all that was going on. It is possible that he entertained the idea that a British war would be avoided. He felt much more kindly to the British than most Americans did, except in a small part of the country; and on


272


HULL'S STRANGE VIEWS.


[CHAP. X1.


his journey down, he had been furnished with a passage across the lake by a British armed ves- sel detailed on purpose ; - a handsome courtesy recognized by our journals, and creditable to both parties. But he himself expected Indian hostili- ties, and he knew perfectly well that the adminis- tration expected war with Great Britain. He knew that the force under his command was raised with that anticipation, if not for that immediate service. He also knew that Congress had, by sufficient majorities, adopted legislation that would have been absurd except in that view. The infatuation that could make any reasonable man suppose war would not be declared, after all these prelimina- ries, was marvellous, and would be incredible, if we did not know there were sections of the coun- try, and other more able men than General Hull, among his old neighbors, that entertained that no- tion. That a general . sent out to the frontier with an army, did not at least feel bound to act in all his course as if war might be declared at any moment, and then one party or the other must do some fighting, was one of the fatalities of Hull's unfortunate career. No administration could have delayed it, and it is strange he should have thought so, it such was his notion.


The invasion of Canada was very openly dis- cussed early in the winter. Before accepting com- mand, General Hull had, in writing, expressed his views on the subject, in which he plainly expressed his opinion in favor of putting at Detroit a force


273


CHAP. XI.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.


adequate to protect that place, as an alternative, and not as an appendage to a plan for getting control of the lakes ; and that, with Detroit pro- tected, the Indians could be kept from Malden, and the British, unable to hold Canada without them, would leave it, and the command of the lakes would be obtained without a fleet. Mr. Eustis did not corroborate his statements concern- ing his further representations, as being quite as positive as he asserted them from recollection to have been. Before the middle of January, the President had been not authorized but required to add to the regular army a force of more than 25,000 men. On the 6th of February he was authorized to accept 50,000 volunteers. On the 14th of March a loan of eleven millions was au- thorized. On the 4th of April an embargo was laid. And during all this time the necessary sup- plementary laws were passed, for supplies, ord- nance and ships, and for organizing the customary corps and appliances for the staff department.


It was during this period that the President called for 1,200 Ohio volunteers, and planned a movement to Detroit with an army including those and the 4th Regiment of United States Infantry, which had been engaged in the Battle of Tippe- canoe, and was commanded by Colonel Miller, who afterwards obtained distinction on the Niagara frontier, and was made famous by his modest "I'll try, sir." Hull, after declining command in the first instance, afterwards accepted it, and did so


18


274


QUALITY OF THE TROOPS.


[CHAP. X1.


unconditionally. The volunteering went on very rapidly, and much greater numbers came in than had been called for, but all were accepted. Three regiments of foot and a considerable force of cavalry were mustered in. Duncan McArthur, James Findlay, and Lewis Cass, were chosen colonels of the first, second and third regiments. Their other field officers were Majors James Denny and William A. Trimble of the first, Thomas Moore and Thomas B. Van Horne of the second, and Robert Morrison and J. R. Munson of the third. It is not known or reported that there was in the whole command an unworthy officer of any standing. Some of them were men of tried bravery and personal distinction. All the superior officers were already well known and trustworthy. Colonel Miller's command was one never surpassed in soldierly qualities, and Duncan McArthur was spoken of by Brock as "an officer of high repu- tation." All of them soon earned it.


Some stress has been laid by Hull's apologists upon the fact that the troops were chiefly militia men, and not under proper subordination. They were no part of the ordinary militia, in the proper sense of the term, and were the same kind of troops that in all our wars have been the chief reliance of the government. One of Hull's con- spicuous faults was his notion (drawn partly, per- haps, from his old experience with Steuben) that troops who were not trained and apparelled ac- cording to the army regulations were not to be


275


VOLUNTEERS.


CHAP. XI.|


implicitly trusted. He had before made trouble in Michigan by this finical disposition, and it may have been one of the causes of dislike which arose in the army quite early. No one doubts that it is advantageous to secure uniformity and system in little things as well as in great, when it can be done without too great delay and the sacri- fice of other things. But it is idle to expect vol- unteers to become martinets, and it is very ques- tionable how far it is best to go in that direction. In the wars of the west, there was a great deal of hard fighting in a very rough way, and those were generally found to be the best commanders who least annoyed their men. It is very certain that if there was insubordination it did not interfere very seriously with the proper work of the army, although there was some which arose from its being kept back from its work. This fault-finding with the volunteers is the less to be respected, if the court was justified in finding him guilty on the specific charge of neglecting the inspection, training and exercise of these troops, during the period between his arrival at Detroit and the surrender. The testimony covered the whole period after he took command; but the court very justly exonerated him from liability for such neglect on the march through the wilderness, but condemned him for the rest.




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