USA > Michigan > Outlines of the political history of Michigan > Part 20
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Under the charges of neglect of duty, he was acquitted of some very serious charges. Among those not before mentioned, and not found sus- tained, were neglect in sending up the vessels from Maumee, when he had reason to believe there was war, or likelihood of it; and neglect in put- ting the post in proper order, and in using dili- gence to expedite his artillery preparations. That there was carelessness in regard to the vessels can hardly be questioned, but it was not criminal carelessness of such a degree as to require severe judgment. Upon the other matters, it appears the fort was not out of repair to any serious extent, and that he had been reasonably diligent in giving orders for the artillery preparations.
Upon the other points there was really no conflict of fact, unless it may be supposed to have arisen upon the question of his state of mind.
310
HULL'S DEFENCE.
[CHAP. XI.
He never seriously asserted that he had done the acts which he was charged with omitting. He claimed that some of them were not feasible, or that he had reason to fear either that they could not be done at all, or could not be done without incurring risks which he felt bound to avoid. And he also relied to some extent upon the ground that, as matters had been left to his discretion, he was not subject to censure or responsibility for following it.
If the defence of General Hull against the verdict of public opinion merely involved himself, no one would desire to dwell upon the unfortunate occurrences, beyond such reference as could not be avoided. That the surrender was unnecessary, and that Hull could not only have saved Detroit but taken Malden, no one can doubt who believes in any ordinary probabilities. Nor is there any more doubt that most commanders would have done both. No one grudges the sparing of his life, or disputes the propriety of recognizing his honorable record in the Revolution, as rendering his pardon proper. And few would care to inquire whether the loss of his earlier intrepidity was due to physical infirmity, or a charge beyond his capacity to manage, or to both. He was manifestly unfit for his military responsibilities, in the shape in which they fell upon him, and he did not design to be treacherous.
· But the case which he undertook to make by his defence did not rest upon any personal dis-
311
HULL'S DEFENCE
CHAP. XI.J
ability to do what others might have done. It was not apologetic, but was rested on the ground that he had not lost his self-possession, but had acted deliberately, and done what ought to have been done by any competent and prudent com- mander. And it rested on the further claim that a fair court could not have found against him on any charge, and that the witnesses and court were both determined and employed to ruin him, in order to cover up their own defaults and the sins of the administration. In this point of view the inquiry concerns the truth of history, and concerns also the reputation of men without whose services Michigan would still have been a Canadian Province.
Attempts have been made by many historians to reverse the judgments of past generations, and rehabilitate those who have been under censure. Such attempts are usually, - however fairly de- signed, and, however plausible, - extremely so- phistical, and disregard the contemporary views of single as well as combined facts. There is but one case in which they can be very serviceable. It sometimes happens that there is newly discovered evidence, which should be allowed weight. Even this, however, is not always decisive. After the lapse of many years, it may easily be conjectured that something has been overlooked which was not in fact overlooked, but was not regarded as trustworthy and conclusive. In General Hull's case we know what testimony convicted him, and we
312
JUSTICE OF THE VERDICT.
[CHAP. XI.
know what testimony he claimed was not produced. We have not, as the court had, the power of see- ing the demeanor of the witnesses, or of the prisoner on the trial, nor that of seeing the various persons engaged in the drama. But so far as personal qualities are concerned, the estimates and opinions of eye witnesses and acquaintances, and the substantial agreement of public sentiment, are generally safer than the conclusions of their successors possibly can be; and courts of justice as well as the court of public opinion so regard them. The reputation of many of the witnesses, and of some of the members of the court, is familiar to all readers of history, and they were personally known to very many yet surviving in this region; and both their honesty and their judgment are held in esteem.
If the court had full reason to believe, and did believe, that Hull had failed to do what every commander of ordinary firmness and capacity should have done in his position, there was no escape from this verdict. Every man who, in civil or military pursuits, undertakes an office requiring skill and firmness, is liable to all the consequences arising from his not possessing them; and is morally as well as legally blameworthy for
the failure. Any fear of consequences, which it is a wrong in a military commander to be governed by, is cowardice, whether in its meanest and most selfish form or not. A man who for any reason is afraid to do his duty, cannot avoid that imputa-
313
MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY.
CHAP. XI.]
tion. It is rightly regarded in military law as next to treason, because it demoralizes soldiers and breaks up the power of the government. The recent case of Bazaine is one where no one ever suspected that officer of personal poltroonery, yet where he was justly sentenced to death for his neglect of duty, in not acting with that courage and persistency which the case demanded. The remission was properly left to the pardoning power, and not assumed by the court. If Hull was guilty at all, his military offence was very great, and the terrible consequences which actually followed were what might have been expected. The country came back under the control of the British, and under the ravages of the Indians. The advantages of Wayne's and Harrison's victories were all lost for a season, and the ground was only regained after many bloody battles and cruel massacres. Hull no doubt deluded himself at the time, (or more probably afterwards deluded him- self into thinking he had been led at the time) into believing these events might be spared. But he was, nevertheless, responsible for what he ought to have foreseen, and this blindness was itself, if he was not entirely right, one of the blamable results of his self-deception.
The principal charges against others on which Hull relied for vindication are in the nature of what might be termed impeaching testimony, as indicating faults, and attempts to conceal them by sinister means. In his original defence all
314
AFTERTHOUGHTS.
[CHAP. XÌ.
of those were set out which then occurred to him, or which were deemed appropriate. Nearly ten years later, when the general knowledge of facts may be supposed to have lost some of its sharpness of outline, an elaborate series of me- moirs was printed, which left out nothing, but in- troduced some new suggestions and enlarged and dwelt more fully upon some old ones. The first great complaint was against the administration for getting him into trouble in the first instance, and afterwards trying to ruin him to save its own credit, by avoiding a trial as long as it dared, and then packing the court.
Some suggestions in the memoir as to the desire to use these means in furtherance of a Presidential election, would not have been made but for slips of memory. Indeed, while it is the commonest and most natural thing in the world for a well-meaning man charged with wrong to try to persuade himself he cannot possibly have done it, and to multiply reasons to convince him- self that its very mischief is conclusive that he did not do it, such self-deception is necessarily brought about by means which are not satisfactory to the judgment of others. Hull speaks of him- self as having been a prisoner during a consider- able period. This was nominally so, as he was not exchanged. But there is no other instance during the war of a prisoner of his rank being so soon released and paroled, with or without solicitation ; and except as a personal favor from
315
CHAP. XI.] HULL'S DISCHARGE ON PAROLE
the enemy, there was no personally creditable reason for it." He was at home within a little more than three weeks after the surrender-being discharged as soon as he reached Montreal. He was within reach of the press, in a region where the administration was not popular, and had every facility for vindicating himself and punishing the administration before the Presidential election. If this was not a proper thing for him to do before trial, it was vigorously done by some one on his behalf, and the trial was certainly not postponed for the purpose of getting the case beyond the election. It would have been gross injustice to prefer his exchange to that of earlier prisoners, though he had been bravest of the brave. But
I The real reason is given in a letter from Colonel Baynes to General Brock, September 10th, 1812. Colonel Baynes was Adjutant General of Canada, and an officer of high standing, who was a confidential corres- pondent of General Brock.
" Sir George has also consented to allow General Hull to return upon his parole: he is loud in his complaints against the government at Washington, and the general thinks that his voice, in the general cry, may be attended with beneficial effects, and has allowed him to return and enter the lists. General Hull appears to possess less feeling and sense of shame than any man in his position could be supposed to do. He seems to be perfectly satisfied with himself, is lavish of censure upon his government, but appears to think that the most scrupulous cannot attach the slightest blame to his own immediate conduct at Detroit. The grounds upon which he rests his defence are not, f fancy, well founded, for he told us that he had not gunpowder at Detroit for the service of one day. Sir George has since shown him the return of the large supply found in the fort; it did not create a blush, but he made no reply. He protesses great surprise and admiration at the zeal and military preparation that he has everywhere witnessed ; that it was entirely unlooked for, and that he has no doubt that his friend, General Dearborn, will share his fate, if he has the imprudence to follow his example. Hull seems cunning and unprincipled : how much reliance is to be placed on his professions, time will show." -- P. 289-90.
316
CAUSES FOR DELAY OF TRIAL.
[CHAP. X1.
an exchange could not have been made, and a trial had, before the election, even if he had been the first to be cared for. A note from Eustis to Dearborn, which is especially relied on as indicat- ing preparations to aid the election, was written December 18, 1812, long after the election was over.
The fact, however, that a trial was appointed for February, 1813, and then prevented and not renewed for about a year, is a circumstance which does call for explanation, and he dwells on it as showing a distrust in the pliability of the first court, which was made up of very good offi-
cers. This charge is very disingenuous. It is im- possible that he could have been ignorant of the reason, and on his trial no such ground was taken or alluded to. The facts were these: On the 18th of January, 1813, official announcement was made by the Adjutant General, of the exchange of Hull, McArthur, Cass, Findlay, Miller, and the remainder of the Detroit prisoners, with Winfield Scott and others from other quarters. The court martial was at once called for February 25th, 1813. On the 8th of February, Sir George Prevost notified our government that he did not recognize the exchange, for reasons which, if true, were valid ; and that, if they claimed and asserted it, and were captured again, he would hold them guilty of violating their parole.' The difficulty necessarily stopped the trial, and the matter was not settled until December, 1813,2 when he was
1 4 Niles K., 44.
2 5 Niles R., 213.
317
REASONS FOR DELAY.
CHAP. XI.]
finally exchanged, and a second court martial was called at once. The government was not respon- sible for the delay, and it is very questionable also, (though of course this would not excuse re- missness,) whether the delay did not save him from some peril. There was the same opportun- ity and temptation to pack the first court as the second. If the first court had heard the testimony introduced on the trial, and viewed it, as they might and probably would have done, as the second court did, such a trial and conviction, coming just after the massacre of Frenchtown, would not have been free from the dangerous pressure of the general horror and indignation arising from that act, which was the sequel to the surrender ; and mercy would have been very doubt- ful. The last trial was held when the mischief had been overcome in a great measure by the brilliant successes of Perry and Harrison, and the country restored ; and people were much more disposed to be lenient.
The idea of a conspiracy among such officers as the court and witnesses, the latter of whom had no losses of reputation to make up, and had made famous names by their subsequent conduct, is too atrocious to discuss. When a prisoner convicted asks the world to presume that his rep- utation is to be so sacredly esteemed as to raise presumptions against the honor of a dozen men, who have been much better known and tried than he ever was, and who have acted in his case under
318
HULL'S MEMOIRS
|CHAP. XI
rules generally supposed well calculated to secure justice, he goes beyond the bounds of credulity. McArthur, and Cass, and Miller, and Van Horne, and Jessup, and Whistler, and Snelling-to say nothing of the rest,-are names that, in Michigan at least, cannot be easily smirched with suspicions of cowardice, or conspiracy or perjury.
The memoirs create an impression that Gene- ral Hull had dwelt so long upon his case as, after ten years, to have persuaded himself that all of the reasons which he gives why he ought not to have expected to succeed, or to do anything more than he did, were before his mind and deliberately acted upon, and actually governed him. Some facts he has certainly forgotten, and assumed as very different from what they appeared in other testimony than his, which is at least as reliable. In regard to the numbers of Brock's troops, he resorts to a method of dealing with Colonel Snel- ling's testimony which is so absolutely ridiculous as to excite surprise. Snelling estimated the force of Brock at 750 regulars and militia, which is within fifteen or twenty of the official returns. On the trial, General Hull (although not admitting its accuracy) did not question the effect of this testimony, if believed, but claimed that, whatever the numbers were, it was not the force present merely, but the one which might be expected to come after it, which he had reason to fear, and which made a surrender proper in view of future dangers. In his memoirs, he gravely insists that
319
UNRELIABLE ASSERTIONS.
CHAP. XI.|
Snelling's language indicated that 750 was only a third of the whole force, and that the other two- thirds were regulars and uniformed troops, instead of showing that one-third of the entire force of 750 was ordinary militia, and two-thirds uniformed regulars and militia. It appears from the official reports that there were 400 militia, in command of a major and four captains, and 330 regulars, consisting of 30 Royal artillery, 250 of the 41st Regiment, and 50 of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment. Colonel Snelling counted them by platoons, and his count was therefore very accurate, and slightly in excess.
In accounting for his own numbers, Hull is equally unreliable. He represents in the 16th number of his memoirs that 1,200 Ohio militia and 300 regulars were all he ever had regularly put under his command, and that "a few strag- gling volunteers, from the novelty of the scene, curiosity, or a desire to see the country, followed the army and were included in the return." Out of those he intimates that several details were made along the road, and several invalids left be- hind, and 180 would not cross the river, making with the rest, at least 300, to be deducted from his army. To this deficiency was added an offi- cer and 30 men left at the Raisin. The Michigan troops were summarily disposed of by represent- ing them as drawn from a population of not much more than 4,000, scattered along over 500 miles of territory, and of no account.
320
MATERIAL OF HULL'S ARMY.
[CHAP. XI.
The Ohio regiments of militia, amounting to 1,200 or more, were all infantry. In addition to this, there was a cavalry force, to which he makes no allusion. The whole Ohio troops, at the small- est calculation, were reckoned as not less than 1,500. At Fort Findlay, on the 26th of June, the rolls showed there were present 1,960 of regulars and volunteers. The evidence on the trial showed that there was no lack of dragoons, to go on escort duty and special service, and none of these appear to have been regulars. Two troops of cavalry were included in the surrender. The as- sertion that General Brock's return of 2,500 troops captured was a fiction of that officer, is not en- tirely satisfactory, when that General enumerates the companies and regiments taken; and their forces, so far as known, would accord with his aggregate very closely. But the statements con- cerning the Michigan troops are equally fallacious. Although the population was small, it was within a narrow region, and not scattered all over. The troops are shown, by clear proofs, to have been good soldiers. Colonel Anderson, who command- ed the 2d Regiment on the Raisin, showed by his letters to Hull of August 4th, that he relied on his men and expected them to fight, and they never were disparaged. While insinuations are thrown out concerning Colonel Elijah Brush's Regiment at Detroit as disaffected, there is nothing to indicate they were well founded, beyond Hull's own assertions. Knaggs, whom he reports as go-
321
MICHIGAN TROOPS
CHAP. XI.]
ing over to the enemy, was for many years there- after government interpreter. Judge Witherell's troops are passed over in silence. The Legion, originally, organized in 1805, under Colonel Brush, was a thoroughly reliable force. Captain (after- wards Colonel) Richard Smythe, a very gallant offi- cer, commanded a company of horse belonging to it. Hubert La Croix was captain of another company, and did good service all through the troubles. Stephen Mack, another good officer, had a third company. Antoine Dequindre, also cap- tain in it, received the thanks of the Michigan State Legislature many years after, in 1845, for his gallantry at Monguagon, where his men and all the Michigan volunteers under Miller were specially commended. .
Justice would not be done to the Michigan troops by leaving the character of the First Regiment undefended. This regiment had been organized by Colonel Brush, and well drilled, long before Hull's arrival. Colonel Brush was a very brave man, and had got this regiment into thorough effectiveness, as Hull's own course shows,-inas- much as he posted it on the northeast side of the town, which was exposed to the Indians. Its officers . were mostly French gentlemen of character and spirit, proverbially fearless, and in no way inclined to Great Britain. General Brock's own letters, and the memoir compiled from them, show that the disaffection, if any, was the other way, and that the French Canadians, both in Upper and in
21
322
CANADIAN BACKWARDNESS.
[CHAP. XI.
Lower Canada, were very lukewarm in their Brit- ish sentiments, and not at all disposed to be for- ward against the United States. Early in July, General Brock was informed by the Adjutant General of a considerable gathering of French Canadians at Lachine, who refused to join the militia, and were only dispersed by a force from the 49th Regiment, with artillery. Brock, in his confidential letters, written while Hull was delay- ing his movements, expressed great discourage- ment at the prospect, and showed that neither the western Canadian militia nor the Canadian Indi- ans would join the British Army in any strength. Major Chambers, who was sent to the Thames to enlist their services, utterly failed. The Detroit Regiment was made up of excellent material, and in the interval between the discovery that war existed, (made by the arrest in Canada of Mr. Moran and a companion,) until Hull's arrival, had been on the alert for an attack, and ready for it.
The charges against the administration as en- tirely responsible for his failure, would not exonerate him, even if true as made. They amount sub- stantially to these: That war was declared with- out providing for commanding the lakes by a naval force, which Hull had represented to be. absolutely necessary ; and that notice was delayed so that the British got the earliest news; that Mackinaw fell, and the Indians were set loose on the lower country by reason thereof; that the Province of Upper Canada was more populous
323
EXCUSES AND PRETEXTS.
CHAP. XI.]
than Michigan, and had a force of 4,000 or 5,000 militia, besides the regulars; that Dearborn, in August, made an armistice, whereby Brock and his army were enabled to turn their whole attention to Detroit; that the Indians were all in the British interest, and he was compelled to surren- der to avoid the terrible evils to be expected from all these forces, especially Indian massacres ; and that the administration found it necessary to. ruin him to save its own credit.
It would seem to people generally to be a sufficient answer to all this, to say that, whatever may have been the blame belonging to others, while it might relieve him from fault for not doing what it prevented, it could be no excuse for failing to do what he could. Whether it might or not have been possible for Brock to have brought an overwhelming force, large enough to have annihilated Hull, yet, as matter of fact, there was no occasion where Hull's force was not su- perior, and none where his men were not willing and anxious to try conclusions with the enemy. No superior flesh and blood hosts prevented his capture of Malden, or his resistance to Brock at Detroit. His early experiences should have re- strained him from such pretexts. The same rea- soning which made it his duty to give up before the spectre of those imaginary forces, would have made it utter madness, and a sin against human- ity, for the patriots of the Revolution to enter that contest. On such a theory wars should be disposed of by footing up the census.
324
NECESSITY OF THE WAR.
[CHAP. XI.
We are not concerned, in this generation, with covering up any faults of Madison's administra- tion. It had its share of failures and was often open to criticism, but the President, who is claimed to be the chief offender, has not been thought by the people, whose sober second-thought is usually just, to have forfeited the right to be respected for his patriotism and general fairness. The war . of 1812 was one which no administration could have resisted without popular contempt; and those who attempted to prevent its successful conduct never got rid of the stigma which attached to lack of patriotism. 'To the northwest it was a ne- cessity, and it has been called, with almost literal truth, the Second War of Independence.
It was undoubtedly one of General Hull's weak- nesses, (and a very dangerous one), that he be- lieved it impossible that his views and sugges- tions as to the proper way of conducting the ex- pected war should not be accepted and adhered to. His own witness, General Peter B. Porter, a very good officer, who went twice with Hull to visit the President on the subject of a navy, says that "at first it was agreed to have one; but afterwards it was agreed to abandon it, doubtless as inexpedient ;" and he also states that while General Hull proposed 3,000 men, "the Secretary replied that there would not be so many ; perhaps 2,000." It certainly would be a remarkable thing for an administration to allow itself to be gov- erned by the discretion of a brigadier general
325
SOPHISTICAL PRETEXTS.
CHAP. XI. ]
concerning the conduct of a war, and there is no proof that it did so. The notion rests on the assumption of the General that he had a right to expect it, and that his subsequent renewal of his programme should have bound the Secretary to follow it.
The same lack of judgment appears in his assurance to himself, that the war could not be declared before the ist of July ; - as if even the . pledge of the President could have retarded the action of Congress. All this, however, is of small account, for he never, after his arrival at Detroit, expected a navy. The occurrences on the Niagara frontier were, however, important for his protection. But it is not clear why he was not also bound to keep up his own end of the line, for the help of the army at Niagara; and if he had done his duty, the results there might have been more satis- factory. Dearborn's armistice would very possibly have provided for a cessation of hostilities at Detroit as well as at Niagara, if it had been supposed Detroit required it. To all appearance, a check on the movements of the Detroit army, if commanded as it should have been, would not have been in the interest of the United States. But, be this as it may, the act of Dearborn was disapproved, and neither Hull nor Brock heard of the armistice till after the surrender.1 Brock's
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