USA > Michigan > Outlines of the political history of Michigan > Part 19
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37
During the interval of five days, when his army was awaiting the completion of the siege guns for attacking Malden, occurred the most tragic affair for which he was immediately responsible, and for which neither General Hull, nor any one else, has ever given an explanation. That he ap- preciated the act, or desired, or actually expected the horrid result, his worst enemy would never have charged against him. But, so far as can be known, he kept his action from the knowledge of his officers, and yet confided it to some one who made it known to the enemy. And it may be remarked that the coincidences of evil are so many, that it seems almost certain either that Hull himself was a traitor, which no one supposes, or
293
HULL'S MESSAGE TO CHICAGO.
CHAP. XI. ]
that he had a spy or traitor constantly with him, having means of getting possession of his plans. But that person, whoever he was, has not been detected and identified, and no reasonable sus- picions have ever been aimed at any one.
On the 9th of August, 1812, a Potawatamie chief named Winimeg, or the Catfish-said to have been a faithful friend to the Americans, and a private friend to the Kinzie family,-made his ap- pearance at Fort Dearborn, with a letter from General Hull to Captain Heald, the commander, ordering him to evacuate the post and proceed with his command overland to Detroit, leaving it to his discretion to dispose of the public property as he thought fit. Chicago was at this time sur- rounded with Indians, and had been for some time in a state of siege. Colonel Anderson, of the Michigan Second Regiment, at the Raisin, notified General Hull on the 5th of August, that the Indi- ans were swarming in from the west towards Malden. Winimeg privately informed Mr. Kinzie that he knew what was in the letter, and urged him to dissuade Heald from obeying it, or to per- suade him, if he did so, to depart at once, before the surrounding Indians found it out. But as the post was strong and well supplied, he urged that it would be safe to hold out, as they had done some time, for reinforcements. The Indians never made much impression on any defended post, and this advice was wise ; but Heald insisted he must obey orders, and yet dallied several days and ag-
294
CHICAGO EVACUATED.
[CHAP. XI.
gravated the danger. His associates and the civilians in the fort, who were experienced in In- dian ways, protested against his giving up the fort; but he was stubborn. He says in his report that the Indians knew of his instructions as soon as he did himself, and came flocking in from all quarters to receive the goods which he was to distribute. During the delay, Tecumseh sent over a message to the Indians informing them that Hull had crossed the river, and would no doubt soon surrender, and calling on them to arm and come over. In spite of all this, Heald was infatu- ated enough to imagine that the Indians had such a regard for him that they would not molest him if he set out. On the 13th, Captain Wells, who was a near relative of Mrs. Heald, and an adopted Indian chief, having heard of the state of things at Chicago, came over from Fort Wayne with 30 Miamis to escort Heald thither if he should be mad enough to leave. Wells failed to make any more impression on Heald than the rest had done, although he assured him it would be almost cer- tain death to go out. On the 14th Heald de- stroyed the liquor, and surplus arms and ammu- nition, and gave everything else to the Indians, who, although angry at the waste, committed no violence before he left the fort. There were some chiefs who were friendly to the garrison, though hostile to the Americans, and they warned Heald that the Indians were enraged at his destruction of the liquor and ammunition, and would murder them
295
MASSACRE AT CHICAGO
CHAP. XI.]
all. One, the Black Partridge, took off a medal which he had received from the United States, and returned it, saying his young men could not be restrained from shedding their blood, and he could not wear it as an enemy. He, however, was active in saving several of the party.
On the 1.5th, they set out from the fort, at nine o'clock, with drums beating and in military array. Wells had blacked his face, in token of expected death. They had marched about a mile and a half from the fort, when they were attacked from be- hind a row of sand hills. The Miamis took no part on either side, and after a bloody fight, in which 38 out of 66 soldiers were killed, as well as two women and twelve children, the remainder surrendered and were spared, though made pris- oners and treated very harshly. The story of the massacre, and of the sad fortunes of the survivors, has been made familiar by the narratives of Mrs. Helm, Mrs. Kinzie, and others, and need not be enlarged upon. Mrs. Helm afterwards discovered the scalps of some of the victims, for which boun- ties had been paid by Colonel Proctor, and her fearless exposure of the fact led to further im- prisonment and insult.
In his narrative, and in his defence, Hull claims to have had no military authority except over Michigan and the army at Detroit, and towards the Maumee. He even asserts the fall of Chicago as having added to the Malden troops before the surrender, and as having been referred to in a
296
BATTLE OF MONGUAGON.
[CHAP. XI.
letter received by him on the 6th of August. Chicago was not connected with any of his com- mand; and the mystery remains why he ventured to assume such an authority, and why, if having authority, he could have been so utterly ignorant and reckless as to send what, if obeyed, was a death warrant. And it is still further a mystery what spy or traitor at once disclosed and circu-
lated the news. It is said to have become known afterwards that the Indians were acting under British orders, but whether this be so or not, they certainly got their intelligence from that quarter, and it started as soon as Winimeg, who did not get his own knowledge from Hull.
On the Sth of August, Colonel Miller set out with a detachment towards the Raisin, to join Captain Brush. They rested at Monguagon that night. The next morning they had an encounter with a strong force of British and Indians, in which Miller was victorious. He was compelled, however, after waiting in vain for provisions, to return.
On the 12th or 13th, Brock arrived at Malden, with 40 regulars and 260 militia. At this time the American outpost in Sandwich had been evacuated, and the British began constructing batteries near by. On the evening of the 14th, they were discovered, and Captain Dalliba asked leave to attack them, and said: "Sir, if you will give me permission, I will clear the enemy on the opposite shore from the lower batteries." The
297
McARTHUR AND CASS DETACHED.
CHAP. XI.]
General answered : " Mr. Dalliba, I will make an agreement with the enemy, that if they will never fire on me, I will never fire on them," completing his answer with the aphorism, "Those who live in glass houses, must take care how they throw stones."
The Canada batteries were in the same place with those which had been erected on the 5th of July, just before Hull had arrived, which had been broken up by Captain Dalliba, under Major Whistler's orders, before Hull's arrival, from the 24-pounder battery at the lower end of the town. Whistler was then in command. On the 14th, Hull ordered McArthur and Cass to march with a considerable force to the River Raisin, by an inland trail running back from the border, by the way which has since been known as the Ypsilanti and Tecumseh trail, striking the Raisin some dis- tance up, at Godfroy's trading post. This road had been taken by General Wayne when he first came to Detroit. Captain Brush had been directed, on the 14th, to go up and meet them. On the 15th, Brock unmasked his battery, and sent over a demand for a surrender, coupled with the stereo- typed threat, that if resisted, he could not control the Indians. This demand was received by Hull about 10 o'clock in the morning. At this time a court of inquiry was sitting to examine into the surrender at Mackinaw. Upon seeing the white flag, Colonel Miller adjourned the court, and Captains Fuller and Snelling were sent to receive
298
BRITISH SUMMONS REJECTED. [CHAP. XI.
the flag. Lieutenant Colonel McDonald and Captain Gleig were the bearers, and were taken blindfolded to the house of Major Henry J. Hunt, and detained for Hull's answer. The answer was not given until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when it was handed over. This reply was a proper one, that the general was prepared to meet Brock's force and any consequences from its use. It contained, in addition, a disclaimer of two acts in Canada, one an unauthorized flag of truce which had gone about a month before, while Cass was at the Canard, without that officer's know- ledge, and the other the burning of a house when the battery in Canada was abandoned a few days before, either destroyed by accident or by others than the troops. It does not appear 'that any explanation had been demanded of these acts, or that complaint had been made of them recently, if at all. On the same day, Hull sent out a message to recall Cass and McArthur. They had been gone not far from twenty-four hours when the messenger started, and had been sent on urgent business. They were reached in the even- ing of the 15th, and the detachment hurried back by a night march, and arrived at the River Rouge the next morning, about the time of the surrender.
On receiving Hull's message, the Canadian guns opened upon the town, and the cannonade was kept up until late in the night, being vigor- ously responded to from the American batteries, not
299
CHAP. XI.] PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK.
without effect. The summons was understood to be the prelude to an attack, and on the afternoon of the 15th, Major (afterwards General) Jessup, who was Hull's brigade-major, inquired into the arrangement of the forces, which were all ordered to be posted in proper positions. Colonel Brush was to command the Michigan militia, at the up- per end of the town, which bordered on his farm. Colonel Findlay's regiment and the Michigan Le- gion, (a corps of four companies of experienced soldiers, under Major Witherell, Judge of the Su- preme Court, and a Revolutionary officer,) were to form back of the town, where the remainder of McArthur's and Cass's regiments were also stationed. These positions not being well-chosen, were changed before daylight the next morning, so that Findlay's regiment was moved further west, where he commanded the approaches to the town under cover of lines of high picket fences along the road; and the other Ohio troops were subsequently, or about the same time, joined to his.
The movement of the enemy towards Spring- wells, and the collecting of boats and moving up of British vessels, began before dark on the 15th. Captain Snelling had been sent down to the Sand Hill, with a few men and a small field-piece, to watch the crossing and report, and to return be- fore daylight. It was urged by him, and by Major Jessup and General Taylor, that one or two 24-pounders could be placed so as to drive off
300
NON-RESISTANCE.
[CHAP. XI.
the vessels and command the crossing. A proper place was found on high ground, but Hull re- fused, on various pretexts, all of which were shown to be insufficient. Both Jessup and Snelling begged permission to cross and spike the guns, but vainly. No movement was made by the enemy to cross during the night, nor until 7 o'clock in the morn- ing of the 16th. At this time the troops and guns were all well posted near the town, so as to command the approaches, and Lieutenant An- derson had a battery on the bluff directly com- manding the road and ravine where the British would be obliged to cross the Savoyard on a narrow bridge. No resistance was made to their landing at Springwells, and no attempt was made to harass them on the road-about three miles long-which was lined most of the way, on one or both sides, with close pickets and orchards, which could have been made available to annoy them. There were also two or three bridges along the road, the destruction of which would have made any approach difficult. The British bat- teries in Canada opened in the morning, and were answered from the American batteries.
After some time two balls took effect in the fort, killing Lieutenant Hanks, Lieutenant Sibley, Dr. Reynolds, and two privates, and wounding Dr. Blood. Up to this time, the forces outside had not been allowed to do anything against the ene- my, who were advancing 750 strong up the River Road. Upon the fatal result of these balls, which
301
HULL'S AGITATION.
CHAP. XI.]
appeared to bewilder and terrify him, Hull im- mediately sent over his son and aid (Captain A. F. Hull) with a flag of truce, to Canada, to Gen- eral Brock, whom he supposed to be there. At this time, and through the morning of the 16th, (although there was some conflict as to the ap- pearances on the 15th), there was a general agree- ment among the majority of the witnesses that Hull showed signs of extreme agitation and fear ; that his appearance was squalid, and his face stained and filthy with, tobacco juice, and his self-posses- sion entirely destroyed.
It has been gravely urged that opinions of eye-witnesses cannot be given to show their im- pression of a man's state of mind, from the ap- pearance of his countenance and his actions. General Hull has laid great stress upon this, and some others have thoughtlessly followed him, and arraigned the court martial as unfair for receiv- ing it. Such an objection is so palpably absurd to any one who has ever paid attention to testi- mony, and the means of proof of human emo- tions and sentiments, that it is surprising it was ever started. That this testimony produced great effect was inevitable, as it was very plain and forcible, and harmonized with the surroundings. It convinced the court, as it has convinced others, and as it can hardly fail to convince any one who does not accept General Hull's theory, which seems to have been that the witnesses were perjured conspirators, and the court a forsworn body of
302
SURRENDER. [CHAP. XI.
administration satellites, bound to make him a scapegoat for the transgressions of the President and War Department.
During this time the British, under Brock, were advancing up the road, and approaching within a mile of the fort. Hull ordered Findlay's regiment to march into the fort, where there was no room for such a crowd to do anything. Be- fore they reached it, he hoisted a white flag, and had sent to General Brock announcing that he would surrender. And he did surrender, under the same abject terror and bewilderment, without the ordinary terms. His troops were not even al- lowed the honors of war, nor permitted to be discharged on parole, nor was any arrangement made for the benefit of the Canadians who had accepted his protection. He put himself entirely in the control of Brock, by offering surrender without any previous parley, and the articles as drawn and signed by the officers on both sides, were as nearly as possible the terms of an un- conditional surrender. He had difficulty in getting any officers to represent him at all, and only succeeded upon the representation that it was his act and not theirs.
A supplementary article allowed the Ohio troops to go home on parole. A second supple- ment gave the same privilege to Major Witherell's Michigan troops. These conditions were no part of the original stipulation, nor is it explained how or why they were made. Cass and McArthur
303
TERMS OF CAPITULATION.
CHAP. XI.]
had not come in, and might easily have escaped. The capitulation would, no doubt, -and Hull so intimates, - have been gladly accepted without them, rather than not obtained, and he says he included them for their own safety. Brock was in great dread that they would attack him in the rear, and if the fort had held out an hour or two he would have been in a very perilous condition. He states that he hastened his movements to reach the fort, and attack it, before McArthur could come up, knowing him to be near. No proof could be more conclusive that he knew Hull would capitulate; for the idea of a garrison of larger force than the assailants being unable to defend themselves for two or three hours, never could have entered the head of that gallant soldier.' He says in his report, somewhat cautiously : "Certain considerations induced me to agree to the two supplementary articles." What these considerations were, he does not ex- plain. General Hull himself refers to them as separate private agreements. No doubt it was for Brock's advantage not to have to furnish ra- tions to so large a body of men, nor could he probably have felt very safe in having a force of unparoled prisoners larger than his own army. He may also have had some compunctions for
I In a private letter to one of his brothers, General Brock says : " I crossed the river, contrary to the opinion of Colonel Proctor, -- , &c .; it is, therefore, no wonder that envy should attribute to good fortune what, in justice to my own discernment, I must say proceeded from a cool calculation of the pours and contres."-Life, p. 267.
304
HULL PAROLED.
[CHAP. X1.
General Hull, whose condemnation and punish- ment for such an unconditional surrender could not have been avoided. The article concerning the Ohio troops was made very shortly, and on the same day. Cass and McArthur had sent up Captain Mansfield to inquire into the terms of the surrender, with notice that they should not submit if it was unconditional. That concern- ing the Michigan troops must have been made later, as Major Witherell was taken down the lake as a prisoner, and only submitted to parole at Kingston. There is something curious about this, as Brock's report implies that it was made as early as the 17th. General Hull was, on his arrival at Montreal, offered his discharge on parole, by Sir George Prevost, without request, and was allowed to go home. The other officers who had been captured at Detroit, or while fighting else- where, were not so easily parted with. General Brock's reports are destitute of any expressions of respect towards General Hull, and the contem- porary reports of the private statements of Gen- eral Brock, and other British officers, indicate that they did not regard him favorably. 1
The garrison and forces thus basely surrend- ered were enraged and confounded, as well they might be. The American force at Detroit, with- out counting Cass and McArthur's detachments. exceeded Brock's white army by about 400. Upon this the testimony is full. It is very well known
1 3 Niles Reg., 44.
305
CHAP. XI.] CONTEMPORANEOUS EVENTS ELSEWHERE.
that Indians were never of any use against a gar- rison in camp; and the forces of Cass and Mc- Arthur, with the rest, far exceeded Brock's whites and Indians together. When we remember the previous sieges of Detroit, under Dubuisson and Gladwin, and the subsequent events at Fort Meigs and Fort Stephenson, the course of Hull becomes so astounding that it excites our amazement to know what men can be led to do, when their judgment and courage have utterly deserted them.
On the very day when Detroit was surrendered, Fort Dearborn - evacuated the day before under Hull's orders - was burned. At the same time another Hull was actively engaged in looking after enemies on the ocean ; and three days thereafter, in the Constitution, captured the Guerriere from a gallant enemy, Captain Dacres, who was not long after exchanged for Colonel Miller, one of the noblest soldiers of any of our wars.
On the 17th of August, Captain Elliott made his appearance at Brush's camp, near Godfroy's post on the Raisin, and claimed his surrender under the capitulation. The outlying troops were not included in the articles, but Hull undertook to cover them afterwards. It being the unanimous opinion of Colonel Anderson, Captains Rowland and Brush, and the remaining officers, that they were not within the surrender, they declined to accede to the demand. Captain Rowland was in favor of remaining in camp and keeping up the
20
306
TWO COURTS MARTIAL.
[CHAP. XI.
post. In this he was overruled, and the troops retired. Captain Brush having been tried by court martial for an alleged violation of duty in regard to the surrender, the court unanimously decided that his course in refusing to hold it binding on his force was correct and laudable.
A court martial was ordered in January, 1813, to meet on the 25th day of February, 1813, to try General Hull. This court was dissolved without meeting. A second court convened at Albany on the 3d of January, 1814, consisting of Major General Henry Dearborn, President; Brigadier General Joseph Bloomfield, Colonels Peter Little, William N. Irvine, J. R. Fenwick, and Robert Bogardus ; and Lieutenant Colonels James House, William Scott, William Stewart, Samuel S. Conner, S. B. Davis, and John W. Livingston. Martin Van Buren acted as special judge advocate, Philip S. Parker being army judge advocate.
The trial was had on the charges and specifi- cations drawn up by Alexander J. Dallas for the first court, including charges of (1) treason, (2) cowardice, and (3) neglect of duty. He was ac- quitted upon the charge of treason, and convicted upon the other two charges, though acquitted on some of the particular specifications under charges 2 and 3.
The charges of cowardice on which he was convicted embraced, first, his retreat from Canada after his entry and proclamation, and other pro- fessions of activity ; second, fear shown during the
307
CHAP. XI. ] FINDINGS OF THE COURT.
cannonade and at various times ; third, a series of delinquencies on the 16th day of August, embrac- ing cowardly acts and expressions, skulking from danger, making no attempt to prevent the enemy's crossing, making no personal reconnoissance on their approach, and failing to offer battle, and other acts immediately connected with the sur- render. These last were hastily sending out flags of truce for surrender, keeping away from the troops in a place of safety, giving fluctuating, inconsistent, and in some cases incoherent orders, calling troops from without into the fort where they were over-crowded, and the precipitate declaration of surrender before asking for terms. Fourth, because in his surrender he did not require that his men should receive the honors of war ;- that he did not stipulate for protection to the Canadians who had joined him, and who would otherwise be liable for treason; that he did not reserve the right to report to the Secretary of War, but turned everything over to the enemy ; and that the surrender was not due either to the superior force or means of the enemy, or to lack of means in his own army.
The specifications of neglect of duty on which he was convicted were, first, a neglect to inspect, train, review and order his men, between their arrival at Detroit and surrender. The charges of previous neglect were not sustained, because there was no opportunity on the march. Second, his delays in Canada; third, allowing his communica-
308
CONDUCT OF THE COURT.
[CHAP. XI.
tions to be cut off, and failing to supply and support Van Horne. He was acquitted of any criminal negligence in failing to supply Colonel Miller. Fourth, his failure to advance upon Malden after Cass had taken the bridge on the Canard . River ; fifth, neglect to prevent the erection of the Sandwich batteries, or to fortify at Springwells, in advance of the landing, or to annoy or oppose the enemy while landing.
It has been intimated that the court made a wholesale and indiscriminate finding, and that the verdict was only qualified enough to give an ap- pearance of deliberation. This is not a fair state- ment. There was testimony, which, if this had been a trial by jury, would have authorized them to consider every one of the charges and speci- fications from treason downwards. That, in weigh- ing the testimony, the court regarded the treason as not proven, does not indicate that the charge was frivolous. Their conclusion was satisfactory to candid minds. If it had not been, public opin- ion would have criticized the remission of the penalty for the other acts. The editor of Niles' Register, after the first publication of General Hull's statements, used this language: "We have now before us the letters of this unfortunate com- mander. If we give all faith to everything he says, we must acquit him of treachery, though we may form opinions of his conduct almost as dis- honorable to him."I His letters contained the
1 3 Niles R., 57.
309
CHAP. XI.] CONDUCT OF THE COURT.
whole substance of his subsequent defence, con- tradicting some things sworn to by witnesses afterwards; and this was not the verdict of an enemy. Under the charge of cowardice he was convicted of every specification but one, which was that he was guilty of "forbidding the Ameri- can artillery to fire on the enemy on their march to Detroit." The evidence on this, though con- flicting, was that Anderson was reserving his fire until the enemy got in grape-shot range, near the crossing of the Savoyard, and the white flag went up before they got there. The other specific charges have been mentioned above.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.