USA > Michigan > Outlines of the political history of Michigan > Part 18
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On the 30th day of June, Hull and his army, after a tedious and fatiguing march of nearly three weeks, arrived at the Rapids of the Maumee, a
276
VESSELS SENT FROM MAUMEE. CAPTURE. [CHAP. XI.
few miles above the present city of Toledo. On the 24th, as before stated, Hull had received let- ters from Washington saying nothing about the declaration of war, but urging haste. He had also heard from Secretary Atwater, at Detroit, that affairs looked threatening. On the 24th Colonel McArthur also received letters showing that an immediate declaration was certain, and that it must before that have been made. General Hull refused to credit this, although coming from sure sources, because he could not imagine any one could be informed earlier than himself. On the first day of July he sent forward, by vessel, some of his invalids, his baggage and entrenching tools, and hospital stores, and a trunk containing all his instructions and military papers, with the muster rolls of the whole army. Three officers' wives went as passengers. A smaller vessel, under charge of a surgeon's mate, was sent up at the same time. The army moved on by land the same day.
The larger vessel sailed through the main channel of the Detroit River, which passes in a narrow space between Malden and Bois-blanc Island, and was there captured on the next day. The smaller vessel followed the American channel west of Grosse Ile, Dand reached Detroit without interruption. The first specification against Gen- eral Hull under the charge of treason, related to sending the vessels to Detroit, with his sick men, papers and baggage. Although he successfully
277
ARRIVAL AT SPRINGWELLS.
CHAP. XI.]
pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court martial to try him for treason, the court were satisfied he had no treasonable design, and so certified, and also acquitted him of criminal neglect in the matter. It is very doubtful whether he knew of the transmission of his papers before the vessel sailed. But as they were in the hands of his son, whom he had a right to trust, he was not at fault for not making special inquiry on the subject of their transmission, and so the court found.
It was discovered, some time before they reached the Maumee, that those among the Indians whose fidelity was doubted had already left the country and gone to Canada. The number of these from Ohio was not very great. The road to Detroit was not difficult, and it was traversed at the rate of twenty miles a day. One day (the 4th of July) was spent at the Huron River, near Brownstown, in building a bridge. Having learned of the declaration of war the day after leaving Maumee, there was some anxiety about an attack from Malden. But no difficulty occurred, and the troops arrived at the Sandhill, at Springwells, just below Detroit, on the evening of the 5th of July. This spot, just above the present fort, was then re- markable for a multitude of small springs or natural wells, amounting to hundreds, a few feet apart, and generally coming up to within a few inches of the top of the bluff, in holes of from three to six inches in diameter. On the continuation of the knoll, not many rods below, were three Indian
278
ENTRY INTO CANADA.
[CHAP. XI.
mounds, circular in form, one of which was covered with timber. These were removed when the present Fort Wayne was built, and were found full of Indian remains and ornaments. The sand- hill and springs, which have been destroyed by removal of much of the bank, reached consider- ably further up the river than the fort. This beautiful spot was known among the French as Belle Fontaine, and was, on account of its dryness of soil and salubrity, a favorite camping ground. It was the camping place of the troops who, twenty years later, were sent out against Black Hawk ; and six years thereafter, for a few hours, of the motley array that were enlisted in the so-called Patriot War. As a point commanding the river both up and down from the only bend in it, the place is of military value and now fortified.
Immediately on reaching Detroit, the army clamored to be led to Malden. Colonel Cass had been sent to that fort to communicate with the commander, St. George, concerning the persons captured on the Cuyahoga schooner. He had opportunities to see its condition, and made it known to the general. The latter put himself upon the terms of his Washington letters, and refused to move without orders. On the 9th, the orders came, authorizing him to commence offen- sive operations; and, after dallying a day or two, he moved across to Sandwich, at the centre of the present town of Windsor, and issued a spirited proclamation, which was penned by Cass, and which
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HULL'S INERTNESS.
CHAP. XI. !
General Brock found much in his way.' This ended his serious work of invasion. Cass and McArthur, with others, made several expeditions and reconnoisances in force, and demonstrated the weakness of that part of the Province,-McArthur pushing up the Thames as far as the Moravian towns, and bringing back considerable supplies, and Cass reaching the Canard River, five miles above Malden, and driving back from the bridge, where a battery was erected, its original guard and reinforcements sent -up from Malden, and only pausing when darkness set in. The refusal of Hull to follow up their advantage was a charge on which he was convicted. The garrison at Mal- den was actually preparing to evacuate the place, in expectation of an attack which they had no force to resist.
I The following passages from Brock's Life are fully sustained by Brock's official and private letters :
"The invasion of the western district by Brigadier General Hull, and the artful and threatening language of his proclamation, were productive at the outset of very unfavorable effects among a large portion of the inhabitants of Upper Canada; and so general was the despondency, that the Norfolk militia, consisting, we believe, chiefly of settlers of American origin, peremptorily refused to march.
* # * " Not only among the militia was a disposition evinced to submit tamely, but five hundred in the western district sought the protection of the enemy. It is true that the people were then far removed from the seat of government, and the more subject to hostile influence, as they were principally composed of French Canadians and of the natives of the United States, or their immediate descendants; but even the Indians, who were located on the Grand River, in the heart of the pro- vince, positively refused, with a few exceptions, to take up arms; and they announced their intention, after the return of some of their chiefs from General Hull, to remain neutral, as if they wished the authorities to believe that they would remain in peace in the midst of war."-Life of Brock, p. 204-5.
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WEAKNESS OF MALDEN.
[CHAP. XI.
General Brock, complaining of the apathy or disaffection of the people, referred to the success of "one Watson, a surveyor from Montreal, of a desperate character," in penetrating unopposed with a small cavalry force as far as Westminster.I This was no doubt Captain Joseph Watson, at one time Secretary to the Governor and Judges, and City Register.
The story of this period has been amply told by many others. Malden was exposed and weak, and its condition was known to the army, not only from Cass, but from spies and prisoners. The capture was certain, and would have given the Americans command of the Detroit River and its approaches, as well as broken up the Indian head- quarters ; and the line of supplies would have been open by land to Ohio and Indiana, as he had anticipated in his manifesto of March 6th to the Department. The Indians along the Ameri- can side of the Detroit River did not go over to the British until the early part of August, and then did it unwillingly, if not under compulsion; and if Malden had been taken, it would probably never have happened. No vessel could have gone up and down the river without coming within easy range of batteries. The British vessels were not formidable against land-batteries, and, more- over, during all this time the American ves- sel, Adams, was idle at the navy-yard on the River Rouge, repairing, but capable of
I Brock's Life. 199.
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DELAYS.
CHAP. XI.]
speedy fitting, and stronger than the Queen Charlotte. Within a very short period after the surrender she was armed by the British with 18 guns, as the "Detroit," and on the 8th of October was captured near Buffalo, with the Caledonia, by Lieutenant Jesse D. Elliott, of the navy. She was burned and General Hull lost some of his baggage and papers in her.
Up to the fourth of August, there was no in- timation given by the General to the Secretary of War, that he felt any anxiety for lack of forces or support. In his letter of July 9th, in answer to that allowing him to move forward, he does in- deed say that he does not think his force equal to the reduction of Amherstburg, and that the Sec- retary must not be too sanguine, but that he will do everything possible to be done. But on the 22d he speaks much more decidedly. He writes that he is making preparations for the siege, which will be ready in two weeks; that his army is able to take Malden by storm, but thinks it would be with too great a sacrifice under present circum- stances; that he is making preparations for an attempt on the Queen Charlotte, and that if Mal- den was in his possession he could march his army to Niagara or York in a very short time.
At this time he knew there was to be no lake force, and he asked for no reinforcements, and the tone of his despatch was that of a resolute and firm commander. His communications had not been disturbed, and no detachments of Indians
282
DELAYS.
[CHAP. XI
had been sent across the river. The ordinary mails came through in about fifteen days from Washington, and he had never sent expresses, which could have gone in half the time, or resorted to any cypher or other device to prevent mischief by this interception. He did not inform the Sec- retary of the opinions or urgency of his officers, but left him to understand that they were all of one mind with him; and in every instance when he resorted to a council, he followed it if a single vote of an inferior officer made a tie or a ma- jority against action, though opposed by the su- perior officers; and when the majority was in favor of prompt action, he as uniformly disregarded it.
The long delay, and the General's obstinacy in refusing to allow any decisive action, led to all the worst evils that followed. Knowing the delay in his own advices, he must have known the Brit- ish would get news of the war to the upper coun- try first, as he was in the only American line of travel. He took no steps to forward advices, and does not seem to have paid any heed to the ex- istence of Mackinaw, or the dangers it must in- evitably run from a surprise. It was a very im- portant post in his own civil jurisdiction, and the lives of its garrison and people were as important as those of his Detroit neighbors. He had dwelt much in his former communications to the gov- ernment upon the influence of the trading com- panies over the Indians, and their inveterate ha- tred to the Americans; and the prospect of the
283
CAPTURE OF MACKINAW.
CHAP. XI.]
capture of Mackinaw, and of the consequent let- ting loose of the northern tribes upon the lower country, was one which could not have escaped his notice, if he had given ordinary thought to his duties. The capture of that post, and the rising of these tribes, are dwelt upon in his apology and defence as justifying his timid course after- wards. But they were inevitable, unless by some vigorous course at Detroit. The rallying place of British influence at Malden could have been broken up; and he had, in March, declared that this would be an effectual measure, as no doubt it would have been. If he had been more dili- gent beforehand, and less astounded afterwards, the long list of massacres on our borders would have been diminished, if not entirely prevented.
The news of war reached the British post at the Island of St. Joseph, and the American friends and abettors of the British at the Sault, about the middle of July. The force of regulars sent from there was forty-two men and four officers, which probably comprised most of the garrison. On the 16th of July they started for Mackinaw. The expedition consisted, besides, of the armed brig Caledonia (afterwards captured with a large cargo of furs at Buffalo, and doing good service under Lieutenant Turner in Perry's fleet), 250 Ca- nadians, servants and agents of the Northwest Company, and traders, and 500 Indians, the sava- ges being under command of Robert Dickson, and John Askin, Junior, and his son. The white
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CAPTURE OF MACKINAW.
[CHAP. XI.
Canadians were led by John Johnston, Crawford, Pothier, Ermatinger, La Croix, Rolette, Franks, Livingston and others, all traders. From 80 to 100 Indians joined them on the way, and they found about 70 allies in Mackinaw.
Lieutenant Porter Hanks, a brave and estim- able gentleman, commanded at Mackinaw, with a garrison of 57 effective men and officers. On the 16th, he had heard from an interpreter some rumor of an intention of the Indians at St. Joseph to make trouble, and the coolness of the chiefs at Mackinaw induced him to believe mischief was brewing. He consulted with the American gentle- men on the island, and it was agreed to send Captain Michael Dousman of the militia, who volunteered to go out and watch the Indians. He started in the evening near sunset, and was captured about 15 miles out. The British landed that night on the side of the island away from the fort, at a beach ever since known as the British Landing. Dousman gave his parole to take the people and assemble them on the west side of the island, and put them under protection of the British guard, warning them not to go to the fort, and telling them, if any resistance was made from the garrison, there would be an indiscriminate massacre of the whole population. He also agreed not to inform the commander of anything. Pursu- ing these directions, he succeeded in collecting the people, and in concealing all movements from the garrison, until the surgeon Dr. Day, passing
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CHAP. XI. | CAPTURE OF MACKINAW.
through the village, noticed and inquired into the excitement, and informed Hanks, who at once prepared for defence. He discovered, however, that the height known as old Fort Holmes, a short distance back of the fort, and completely command- ing it, was already occupied by the British with artillery, and that resistance was useless. This was the first notice he received of the declaration of war. He did not surrender until he had sent three American gentlemen, besides his officers, with a flag, to ascertain the force of the enemy, and obtained honorable terms; nor until the un- animous opinion of both garrison and citizens declared it necessary.
The prisoners marched out with the honors of war, and were paroled; and Lieutenant Hanks and his associate officers arrived at Detroit with the news, on the 29th of July. The inhabitants who refused to take the oath of allegiance were compelled to leave the island. Some of them be- came more than submissive, and were active and willing renegades. The conduct of the Indians at Mackinaw, as well as subsequently in the lower country, showed that they were sufficiently under control of some, at least, of the British officers and agents, to restrain their savagery until allowed to indulge it by their white leaders; and while these deserve such credit as is due for any forbearance, the responsibility for outrages actually committed in the presence and under control of similar agents elsewhere, is justly chargeable to all who intentionally* favored or allowed them.
286
DISLOYALTY IN THE NORTHERN POSTS.
[CHAP. XI.
Whatever allowance may be made for the old predilections of those traders who had taken up their abode in the United States, without electing to retain their British allegiance, their voluntary and unnecessary enlistment in such expeditions was a plain act of treason, for which they deserved punishment. But by some strange oversight in the subsequent legislation of Congress, or by an interpretation of their statutes which was at the extreme verge of liberality, every one of the settlers at Mackinaw, Green Bay, or the Sault Ste. Marie, who occupied land on the first of July, 1812, was confirmed in it, as a donation and not as a right, although the testimony was clear that nearly the whole Green Bay settlement, and many of the people at Mackinaw and the Sault, were actively disloyal. How far, if at all, Dous- man, against whom the land office affidavits were very strong, was engaged in active disaffection, was never judicially examined. Some of the commissioners regarded the charges as malicious.
The arrival of Lieutenant Hanks disturbed Hull's quiet, and gave him natural alarm, and he called for reinforcements on the day when he received the news. But he spoke in the same confident tone to the Secretary, and to Governors Scott and Meigs, as he had done before, with the air of a general who had been constantly on the alert, saying: "The operations of this army have heen hitherto successful, and it is of the greatest importance that the objects should be effected."
287
INDIAN DEFECTION
CHAP. XI.]
It is needless to add that those patriotic gover- nors acted with their usual promptness, and that Detroit was not lost through their remissness, nor from any reason to fear their duty would not be performed.
Colonel Proctor reached Malden a day or two before the arrival of Hanks. He came by Lake Erie and brought no force with him. But the news from Mackinaw had its natural effect in de- ciding the Brownstown Wyandots, under Walk-in- the-Water, to submit or adhere to the British. Information being received that Captain Henry Brush of Ohio was coming up with supplies, Hull, on the 4th of August, detached Major Van Horne of Findlay's Regiment to meet and escort him. Proctor sent over a force of soldiers and Indians to intercept him, and he was, after a gallant fight, compelled to return. On the day when he sent down this detachment, General Hull had written to the Secretary of War, informing him of the movements on the upper Thames by Major Chambers of the British army, whom he expected to hear from as gathering the Indians and militia to reinforce Malden, but who, as it turned out, failed to accomplish anything, because they would not join him. He also mentioned Proctor's arrival, and the capture of the Brownstown Indians, by whites and Indians from Malden, as not unwilling captives. He speaks of consulting the principal officers, and says, as if there had been no discord, that an attempt to storm the fort without artillery
288
PECULIAR PRETEXTS.
[CHAP. XI.
was deemed unadvisable. He also shadows forth the idea that possibly he may be compelled to re- cross the river to keep open his communications with Ohio, and states that "I am constantly obliged to make a strong detachment to convey the pro- visions between the foot of the rapids and De- troit."
Some of these statements are singular, when compared with the testimony and his own defence. Van Horne's was the first detachment he had ever sent out for the purpose, and this, in view of the known facilities of Proctor to send troops and In- dians over from Malden, was represented by Mc- Arthur, at least, to be, as it was, grossly insufficient. One of the charges Hull was convicted of was neglect of duty in not keeping open his commu- nications, and in sending out Van Horne without adequate force. He leaves the Secretary to infer that he has always kept them open, that a large force was necessary to do it, and that it might need a movement of his entire army. This move- ment meant, as was afterwards avowed, a conver- sion of the whole army into a couple of garri- sons at Brownstown and on the Raisin, which would have left Detroit with no considerable force, and which would almost have insured the capture in detail of the whole line. But in fact this pro- ject of re-crossing the river, though submitted to a council on the first of August, had been unan- imously scouted; and the opinion was given, with no serious, (if any) dissent, that the only effectual
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MAIL CAPTURED.
CHAP. XI.|
way to keep open communications with Ohio was to take Malden. The General assented to this, and, upon the assurance that the artillery would be ready in a day or two, it was carried by Hull's casting vote that they should wait for the artillery. At this time one of the two guns was ready, and the other nearly so, and prepared in five days after. All the colonels were in favor of an im- mediate movement.
The mail was sent on immediately behind Van Horne, with a small mounted escort, which caught up with him and was captured during the en- gagement. It is a little singular, and shows dili- gence and activity in Proctor, as well as a lack of secrecy or fidelity in some one in the Amer- ican camp, that both Van Horne's and Colonel Miller's detachments, which started in the even- ings of the 4th and 8th of August, were encoun- tered in the morning at Brownstown and Mon- guagon, by forces sent across the river by boats during the night. Monguagon, the present site of Wyandotte, (the old home of Walk-in-the-Water,) is about six miles from Malden, and Brownstown not far from the same distance, and the river is very wide, with islands intervening. The news must have gone down on the Canada side much faster than the troops did on the American side.
The letters captured in the mail at Browns- town were very dismal, and furnished Brock with the intelligence of Hull's state of mind, which gave
19
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HULL RETREATS FROM CANADA.
[CHAP. XI.
him confidence to assume a bold front and count on success.I
On the 6th of August, the artillery being ready, General Hull issued an order to attack Malden on the 8th. On the 7th everything was completely prepared, when (as Hull says, because of certain letters received from Generals Porter and Hall on the Niagara, intimating that a force was moving westward from that quarter,) he suddenly, and against the indignant remonstrances of his officers, ordered a retreat across the river ; and the army, except a small detachment left in an entrenchment, crossed that evening. In his then asserted desire to open his communications, and his subsequent profession of a wish to spare the effusion of blood, which has since come to the front as a reason for self-gratulation for daring to be governed by humanity, he proposed to take his whole army back to the Maumee. How it would tend to save the blood of the Michigan settlers, to leave them unprotected, and with the assurance that the American army would not help them, to the tender mercies of the thousands of savages who were expected to overrun the country, is not manifest. His whole defence against the principal charges against him is based on this notion of saving blood. But when he came out from Washington, if he did not expect to fight British, he did expect an Indian war, and all its attendant horrors. He knew that Tecumseh was determined
I Brock's Life, p. 267.
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HULL DEMORALIZED.
CHAP. XI.]
to clear the land of the Americans, and that the natural process of depopulation was by unlimited massacre and barbarity, and that this would come unless there was fighting. The whole experience of the west had shown that when the Indians once begin mischief they never end it until they are thoroughly put down; and that the first sign of timidity is an infallible invitation to the use of tomahawk and scalping knife. That Hull would not have quailed from danger that was merely personal is very possible. He had certainly been brave enough in his youth. But his conduct during the whole period, from the arrival of Hanks to the surrender of Detroit, can only be honestly as well as charitably explained by supposing him to have been completely unmanned and confounded by his responsibilities and surroundings, which before he had as strangely failed to appreciate. He was entirely lacking in executive ability, yet fond of asserting himself. He was afraid to take decisive action, and a chronic procrastinator, and these defects relieved him from the most serious imputations of disaffection which would otherwise have been inevitable. If he had not been found lacking in ordinary military qualities, no charity could have saved him from worse charges.
There is no doubt, as he complains, that from this time forth, and probably very much earlier, his officers did not conceal their opinions of his conduct. The proposal to retire upon the Mau- mee was met by an unequivocal avowal that his
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DISTRUST OF OFFICERS. MYSTERY. [CHAP. XI.
troops would not follow him. It became clear that he had become disposed to avoid any fight- ing. It is quite likely that thus early he saw in- dications that his command might be divested, then or soon after, and active measures enforced by others; for when the time drew near for the final act in the drama, the two most active volunteer colonels were on detached service. As early as the 12th of August, Cass and McArthur had in- formed Governor Meigs that Hull had talked of a surrender, and they had then determined to dis- place him. And he probably had either informa- tion, or else sufficient shrewdness left, not only to know that they would never tolerate a surrender, but to know, or infer, how they would have pre- vented it; and he managed to thwart them.
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