USA > New York > History of the state of New York, political and governmental, Vol. V > Part 17
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than the declared necessity of safeguarding the no-slavery system and rights of the northern States against the alleged menace of slavery intrusion. There was in fact no incertitude in the public mind, especially at the south, respecting the subsequent steps likely to be taken after slavery should be successfully placed and held in the positively restricted position desired by Lincoln. Every important Republican leader disclaimed any intention of prescribing limita- tions for the final program of the party. This signifi- cantly non-committal attitude was stated as follows by Seward in his Rochester speech: "One class say that they cannot trust the Republican party, that it has not avowed its hostility to slavery boldly enough or its affection for freedom earnestly enough. Others cannot support the Republican party because it has not sufficiently exposed its platform and determined what it will do, and what it will not do, when triumphant. It may prove too progressive for some, and too conserva- tive for others. As if any party ever foresaw so clearly the course of events as to plan a universal scheme for future action, adapted to all possible emergencies. I know, and you know, that a revolution has begun. I know, and all the world knows, that revolu- tions never go backward."
The national party conventions of 1860 were con- fronted with the tremendous responsibility of dealing with the sectional problem in terms of finality. It was impossible that the uncertainty could continue through another Presidential administration. The commanding feature of the situation was the south's demand that the
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country should accept unequivocally the dogma that the Constitution of its own force carried slavery into the Territories, and hence that slaveowners were fully entitled to locate with their "property" in any Territory without having their rights impaired by either Con- gressional or Territorial legislation, and that it was the duty of the Federal government to afford them ample protection accordingly. In that demand the northern Democrats refused to concur, asserting that there were differences of opinion in the party "as to the nature and extent of the powers of a Territorial Legislature, and as to the powers and duties of Congress, under the Constitution of the United States, over the institution of slavery within the Territories," and that the whole subject was one of constitutional law for the decision of the Supreme Court. These conflicting views divid- ing the southern and northern Democracy represented, on the one hand, the interest of the south in maintaining to the utmost the right of slavery, and, on the other, the firm adherence of the northern Democrats to constitu- tional principles and processes without presumptions either for or against slavery claims.
It was inevitable that the south would stand by its interest. At the Democratic national convention which . assembled in Charleston, South Carolina, on April 23, 1860, resolutions were adopted (April 30) in accord with the position of the northern wing of the party as above stated. Many of the southern delegates then withdrew. The convention proceeded to the nomina- tion of a candidate for President, but after fifty-seven ballots was unable to make a choice under the two-
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thirds rule, and on May 3 adjourned to meet again in Baltimore June 18. After it reassembled there was another split. The regular convention nominated Douglas for President and Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, for Vice-President; the latter declined, and Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, was named in his place by the national committee. A separate conven- tion was held by the bolters (Baltimore, June 23), which nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon-candidates who were promptly endorsed by the original Charleston seceders in their adjourned convention held in Richmond, Virginia.
The differences in the Democratic party thus result- ing were neither composed nor in any manner mod- erated during the campaign. No man in the country knew better than Douglas the terrible earnestness of the southern leaders on the slavery issue or understood more clearly the imminence of the Union's dissolution in the now expected event of the election of a Repub- lican President. Though in former Presidential years ambitious for the honor of his party's nomination, he had on this occasion regarded the prospect of his elevation with entire diffidence, caring only for the maintenance by the platform of a middle course con- cerning slavery-a course which, he was perfectly con- vinced, would, if sustained by the people, appeal in the end to the practical judgment of the southerners and so save the Union. He had the support of the immense majority of the northern Democracy and some follow- ing in the southern States, but unfortunately for his
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cause had incurred the strong disfavor of the Buchanan administration. President Buchanan never forgave him for his action on the Lecompton question, and disapproved his divergence from the views of the southerners on the issue of 1860. The President had been brought up in and always had adhered to the early school of extreme conservatism, was punctilious respecting his authority as the head of the party, and, in addition to his great temperamental rigidity, had the fixity of mental habit and predilection that usually attends advanced age and a life-long austerity of char- acter. The whole influence of the administration was exerted in the interest of the southern candidate, Breck- inridge. The south, on its part, continued uncompro- mising in its rejection of Douglas as the party spokes- man. His popular sovereignty plan had not worked for its advantage, and his constant allusion to the institu- tion of slavery as rightly subject to popular action was repugnant to southern feeling. The south also resented his frank declaration that "unfriendly legislation" could properly be brought to bear against slavery in the Territories whenever the people locally should object to its presence among them.
The Republican national convention of 1860 (Chi- cago, May 16-18) nominated Lincoln for President and Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, for Vice-President, and in its platform repeated the declarations on the slavery question adopted by the party in 1856, with several additional expressions condemning the Democratic party, and particularly the national administration, in very severe language. The undiscriminating accusation
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was made that Democratic members of Congress had often uttered or countenanced threats of disunion "without rebuke and with applause from their political associates"; this charge being manifestly intended to cultivate the impression that the Democracy in its responsible capacity (including the intensely and exclusively Unionist northern Democracy) was dis- posed to be indifferent, if not opposed, to the Union's continuance! Use was made of the word "sectional," as if the south alone, and by no means the Republican party, was sectional. (It may be noted as one of the most interesting facts in the history of politics that the Republican party, without the hope, at that day or the present, of any substantial support from the representa- tive people of the south, has throughout its career been excessively sensitive on the sectional topic and meticu- lously denunciatory of all sectionalism.) There was a plank adverting to "the recent reopening of the African slave trade." No such reopening had occurred under affirmative or consenting action by the government, and the Republican party and every informed person knew none could occur because no administration or party would ever take the responsibility. There had been certain incidents showing that the damnable trade was still being carried on by piratical villains for the sake of profit, and that southern sentiment was opposed to enforcement of the laws against it. But no party issue could justly be made on the subject as against the north- ern Democracy. Douglas had declared his unalterable opposition to the trade. During the canvass he wrote: "I am irreconcilably opposed to the revival of the
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African slave trade in any form and under any circum- stances."
It was still deemed important by the Republicans to observe discretion on certain points so as to do no injury to the prospects of party success. So far as the election chances in the fifteen southern States1 were concerned, it would of course be immaterial how "sufficiently" (to use Seward's expression) the party "exposed its plat- form"; for the vote of every one of those States was already lost. But the Republicans well knew that independently thinking people of the north cherished deep in their hearts the sentiment of national harmony, and that, while they were thoroughly in sympathy with the cause of non-extension of slavery, a generally pro- vocative attitude toward the fiery southerners would not appeal to them. The warning voiced by the Demo- cratic national platform of 1856 against "civil war and disunion" was not taken seriously by active partisan Republicans in the respect of suggesting obligations of actual concession on their part; but it had great weight with conservative voters, and moderation for discre- tionary reasons was therefore a Republican necessity.
The Chicago platform practically advocated nothing more on the slavery subject than preservation of the territorial status quo, confinement of slavery to the southern States as a "local interest," admission of Kansas as a free State, and the country's rejection of
1Before the Civil War "the south" was understood to consist of all the slave States, including Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri in addition to the eleven States of the subsequent Confederacy. West Virginia as yet had not been detached from Virginia.
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all the pretensions of slavery to an established footing in the Territories. The platform embodied several expressions and references of a general character designed to encourage the more positive anti-slavery people ; but on a number of particular matters deemed very important at that period it showed great caution so as not to repel the conservatives. John Brown's raid of October, 1859, was condemned by the declara- tion that "we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes." There was no demand for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, no approval of the "Personal Liberty" measures that had been enacted in northern States to make difficult the recovery of escaped slaves, and no objection to the proposed acquisition of Cuba. Those were matters that had long been before the country. It was not because of reluctance further to antagonize the south that the Republican party refrained from taking a position concerning them. It was because of the political inexpediency of intensifying the already strong belief among northern voters that the south could be antagonized too far.
Northern Democrats have never denied that their organization was controlled in 1860 by expediency for the sake of the Union. It is a historical fact that the Republican organization also was expedient-expedi- ent, however, for a different desideratum, that of judi- ciously limiting the "exposure" of its platform.
In addition to the Douglas Democracy, the Breckin- ridge Democracy, and the Republican party, there
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was a consolidation of the old-line Whigs and the con- servative Know-Nothings under the name of the Constitutional Union party. This organization was improvised by a convention held in Baltimore, May 9, which adopted a brief declaration disapproving "geo- graphical and sectional parties" and asserting that it was "both the part of patriotism and of duty to recog- nize no political principle other than the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the enforce- ment of the laws," and which nominated for President John Bell, of Tennessee, and for Vice-President Edward Everett, of Massachusetts.
The contest was hopeless for both branches of the Democracy, as well as for the Constitutional Unionists, except upon the chance that enough northern votes could be carried against the Republicans to prevent a decision by the Electoral College and accordingly throw the result into the House of Representatives -- in which eventuality the party differences represented by the opposed candidacies of Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell would still exist and render it very doubtful whether a successful combination of States could be effected against Lincoln. Therefore the Republicans alone occupied a confident position in the campaign. Yet Douglas waged a most aggressive fight, which he carried into the south. Everywhere he maintained the supremacy and inviolability of the Union as the true Democratic doctrine. At one of his meetings he was asked : "If the southern States secede from the Union upon the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, before he commits an overt act against their constitutional rights,
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will you advise or vindicate resistance by force to their secession ?" Douglas replied: "I answer emphati- cally that it is the duty of the President of the United States, and all others in authority under him, to enforce the laws of the United States as passed by Congress and as the court expound them. And I, as in duty bound by my oath of fidelity to the Constitution, would do all in my power to aid the government of the United States in maintaining the supremacy of the laws against all resistance to them, come from what quarter it might. In other words, I think the President of the United States, whoever he may be, should treat all attempts to break up the Union by resistance to its laws as Old Hickory treated the nullifiers of 1832."
The result of the Presidential election was as follows : Electoral vote-Lincoln, 180 (all the votes of the free States, except 3 in New Jersey) ; Douglas, 12 (9 in Missouri and 3 in New Jersey) ; Breckinridge, 72 (all the votes of the eleven slave States of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Caro- lina, and Texas) ; Bell, 39 (the votes of the slave States of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia). Popular vote -Lincoln, 1,866,352; Douglas, 1,375,157; Breckin- ridge, 847,514; Bell, 587,830.
In the fourteen slave States that chose their Electors by popular vote (South Carolina still held to the prac- tice of choice by the Legislature), Lincoln had 26,430, Douglas 163,525, Breckinridge 570,686, and Bell 515,923-the combined vote of Bell and Douglas being 679,448, or 108,762 more than the Breckinridge vote,
HUGH MCLAUGHLIN
Hugh Mclaughlin, political leader; born in Brooklyn, N. Y., April 2, 1822; educated in public schools; learned rope-making trade; engaged in lighterage and later in fish business; master mechanic Brooklyn navy yard, 1857-1861; defeated for sheriff of Kings county, 1860; register of deeds, Kings county, 1861 and held office for three terms; many years democratic leader of Kings county; active in promoting construction of Brooklyn bridge and in establishing Prospect park; died in Brooklyn, De- cember 4, 1904.
PATRICK HENRY MCCARREN
Patrick Henry McCarren, senator; born in East Cambridge, Mass., 1853 ; came to Brooklyn with his parents when 8 years old; educated in public schools; elected to the assembly and served in 1882, 1883 and 1889 having been one of the leaders of the floor in the latter year; state senator fsom 1890-1893, 1896- 1909; identified with much important legislation and it was through his efforts that free text books were introduced into the public schools; also led to securing passage of original bill for a second bridge of the East River for the benefit of the eastern district of Brooklyn; died in Brooklyn, N. Y., October 22, 1909.
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a fact of peculiar interest. On the paramount issue of the Union as against the policy of exclusive southern sectionalism maintained by the Breckinridge men there was an undoubted affinity between the Douglas and Bell followers, who proved themselves to be in a con- siderable majority in the south itself. The inference is plain that up to the election the south was far from agreed-to state the case moderately-upon a disposi- tion of hostility to the Union. It was made measurably united by the national victory of the Republican party.
CHAPTER VIII THE CIVIL WAR AND ITS OUTCOME
1860-1865
A FTER the Presidential election (November 6, 1860) a period of four months was to elapse before the change of administration. South Carolina took the lead in the southern seccession move- ment, withdrawing from the Union on December 20, and was followed in January by Mississippi (9th), Florida (10th), Alabama (11th), Georgia (19th), and Louisiana (26th), and on February 1 by Texas. The Confederate government was organized in February at Montgomery, Alabama, with Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, as its head. Arkansas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee joined the Confederacy after the breaking out of the Civil War, and the southern capital was established at Richmond, Virginia. The border slave States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri remained loyal to the Union throughout the war.
Preceding the beginning of hostilities it was the earnest desire of the northern political leaders, with- out distinction of party, to avert, if possible, the threatened conflict. At first there was a very general disinclination to form presumptions unfavorable to an
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ultimate accommodation, and it was even hoped that Union counsels might yet prevail in the southern States with the exception of South Carolina. President Buchanan was desirous of giving no provocation. His circumspect course during the months of November and December, particularly in reserving decision as to reinforcement of the forts in Charleston harbor, has been the subject of much criticism. No doubt can be entertained of his preference for leaving to his suc- cessor, so soon to be inaugurated, the responsibility of a positive policy. He believed it was not incumbent on his expiring administration to take measures likely either to initiate war or accelerate secession. Assum- ing the probability of ultimate disunion and war, he was persuaded that the most important service he could render the national cause would be that of adding nothing to the incitements to separatism during the critical time of the labors of the secessionist leaders to consolidate southern support for their schemes and secure the more doubtful States for their Confederacy. It was well known, and was a fact that stimulated ardent hope at the north, that the States of Georgia, Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina, absolutely indispensable to a powerful Confederacy, were in the balance on account of the Union sentiment with which they were permeated. Would it not, therefore, be the course of wisdom not only to stay the hand of the Federal government but abstain from any proceedings calculated to exacerbate southern feeling? Moreover, Congress was to be considered, and it was unquestion- able that Congress, responsive to the general desire of
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the northern people, would make strong efforts toward conciliation. These were some of the considerations that influenced Buchanan in the first few weeks after the election. As against the rigid view that the authority and prestige of the government ought to be maintained at all hazards, they were of course at best only specious; but few thinking people would have approved rigorous measures in conformity to that exclusive view, except on the question of the forts, in the terrible crisis that was upon the country.
In his annual message to Congress (December 4) Buchanan denied unqualifiedly the right of secession. On the subject of the forts he asserted the unquestioned authority of the United States, adding that the officer in command, Major Anderson, had received orders to act strictly on the defensive, and that in case of attack "the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the assailants." The ultimate course and spirit of the administration were wholly in accord with northern sentiment. At the end of December three Commissioners from South Carolina arrived in Wash- ington to "treat" for relinquishment to their common- wealth of the "real estate" within its bounds which was occupied by the national government. The Presi- dent refused to give them any official recognition. The real aims of the Commissioners were, First, to procure practical admission by the Democratic Executive of the right of South Carolina (and therefore any other State) peaceably to secede with all its territory includ- ing harbors and islands; and Second, to accomplish the greatly desired result of peaceable expulsion of the
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United States military forces from Charleston harbor. Realization of those aims would have established the whole claim of legal secession and relieved the south of the necessity of military aggression. But Buchanan was firm in his Union principles and attitude. Upon the points of the impossibility of lawful dismember- ment of the Union and the sole responsibility of the south for aggression, he never yielded to the slightest degree.
One of his most notable acts was his reconstruction of the cabinet. The names of his principal advisers -eminent Union Democrats-during the last two months of his Presidency are among the most illustri- ous in the history of the struggle against the Confed- eracy. Jeremiah S. Black, of Pennsylvania, was Sec- retary of State; John A. Dix, of New York, Secretary of the Treasury; Edwin M. Stanton, of Pennsylvania, Attorney-General ; and Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, Sec- retary of War.
Black was the dominating personality and the Presi- dent's mainstay. Inflexible on the principle of resolute maintenance of the Union's integrity and pursuance of the government's duty, he was the embodiment of the administration's final policy-a policy which not only was irreproachable from every point of view, but was continued without essential change by Lincoln so long as peace with the south remained possible.
Stanton was afterward the celebrated War Secretary of the Lincoln administration.
Dix it was-acting in performance of his official duty under Buchanan-who wrote and sent the immortal dis-
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patch to New Orleans: "If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot."
Early in January the administration undertook to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort Sumter. The Presi- dent was in favor of dispatching a powerful naval vessel, but was dissuaded by General Scott, com- mander of the army, and a merchant steamer, the "Star of the West," was sent instead. It did not reach its destination, being fired on by the shore batteries and forced to put back to sea. Although Major Anderson at the fort was a spectator of the affair, he kept his guns silent. The sentiment of the country approved his forbearance, and there was no general demand either for practical notice by the government of the South Carolina flourish of war or for repetition of the hazardous experiment in Charleston harbor pending Republican assumption of national control.
We have endeavored to write an unprejudiced account of the course of the Executive in the crucial period from the election until Lincoln's inauguration. This is due an administration so extraordinarily beset with difficulties. The facts are little understood gen- erally. In broad respects they have been much mis- represented for partisan objects. Buchanan was not a great President. He made marked mistakes, which operated for the grievous injury of the Democratic party. But he was a devoted Union man, and he trans- mitted the government to his successor without blemish upon its honor or prejudice to its interest in principle, and moreover without any occasion existing either to reverse its position or undo its transactions.
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It was from the country at large and Congress that all the noteworthy offers of compromise proceeded.
A national Peace conference was held, under the chairmanship of former President John Tyler, which adopted a series of recommendations. More impor- tant than the measures of that unofficial body were several undertakings and propositions directly on behalf of the controlling influences of political power at the north.
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