USA > New York > History of the state of New York, political and governmental, Vol. V > Part 4
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WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION CHAPTER IV
THE CIVIL WAR
"L IBERTY and Union" was Webster's phrase, and Webster, had he survived until its organi- zation, would have become a leader of the Republican party. It was fitting that the party should take to itself his war-cry, though the exigencies of the time made it necessary for it to reverse the order. Union and Liberty was the first program of the organi- zation when it was entrusted with the government of the nation.
The first duty was to save the nation, to preserve and to vindicate the integrity of the Federal Union. Of this there was instant need since the southern Democrats, in fulfillment of their ante-election threats, began the work of secession before Lincoln was installed in the Presi- dency. This process was disapproved and deplored by Buchanan, but in fact he was powerless to prevent it even had he so desired. His theory, openly proclaimed, was that the Federal government had no constitutional power to "coerce a sovereign State," that is, to restrain it from seceding from the Union. But, regardless of his personal opinion, with the imminent transfer of power and responsibility to a succeeding administration Bu-
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chanan could have done but little to prevent or delay the schism between the north and south, which was inevitable. So during the closing months of his admin- istration the work of dismembering the republic progressed without interruption. When, therefore, the Republican administration of Lincoln was installed on March 4, 1861, it was for the first time in American his- tory confronted with the spectacle and problem of a dissevered Union.
The Republican theory and policy directly reversed that of Buchanan. Lincoln harked back to the principle enunciated by Monroe more than forty years before, the principle of self-defense, self-preser- vation. That principle, Monroe contended, was primal and essential as much for the state as for the individual. So the first Republican government of the nation held in 1861 that the nation had the fundamental and inalienable right of self-preservation. It was the right and the duty of the government to protect itself from dissolution. A government that could not or would not do that had no right or title to existence.
The first step, then, was to check secession and pre- serve the Union. To that end the first efforts of the administration were directed. For a year and a half that was Lincoln's consistent policy. As late as August, 1862, he declared : "My paramount object is to save the Union and not either to save or to destroy slavery." In that policy he was severely criticised by some leaders of his own party who would have made the destruction of slavery the first and chief object. But Lincoln was wiser than they, as the chief of his critics, Horace
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Greeley, afterward gratefully confessed. He was right on the ground of morals and on that of logic; for obviously the whole, the Union, was of greater importance than any of its parts or issues, and it would have been folly to attempt the emancipation of the slaves unless first the nation could be maintained to protect them in their freedom.
But Lincoln was right, too, on the ground of prac- tical political expediency, or perhaps we should, in so transcendent a case, say of national strategy. With sur- passing prescience he anticipated the reaction of some of the northern States against his administration and realized the necessity, for the continued support of the government, of winning and holding the border States. He knew that these latter would be alienated and perhaps driven into the arms of the enemy by a prema- ture emancipation proclamation. Instead, therefore, of taking precipitate and radical action, he wisely and justly sought other means of disposing of the slavery question, in which he was cordially supported by Con- gress and by the Republican party. Especially did he offer the cooperation of the national government with the States or with any State in a voluntary, gradual, and compensated emancipation of the slaves. To this generous offer, however, not a single State responded.
Finally in September, 1862, finding that the slave States would not accept the offer and realizing that slave labor was one of the chief economic supports of the rebellion, he deemed the time ripe for emancipation, explicitly as a war measure for the preservation of the Union. He had been willing to retain slavery for the
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sake of saving the Union, but his offer had been rejected. Now he would destroy slavery for the sake of saving the Union. At first his announcement had a politically bad effect. It divided the north and united the south. All through the great free States of the north, where the clamor for emancipation had months before been loudest, men fell away from the support of the admin- istration, declared the war a failure, and called for "compromise" with the seceding States. So serious was the defection of northern Democrats and the hostility of the Constitutional Unionists, that there was danger of the election of a House of Representatives that would oppose the administration and its further prosecution of the war.
But the border States saved the day. New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, and other northern States went strongly Democratic. But Missouri and the other border States returned strong Republican majorities and assured the party continued control of Congress, though by a diminished margin. Lincoln's strategy was vindicated. And in his policy both of prosecuting the war and of emancipating the slaves he and his party resolutely persevered. At the third national convention of the Republican party in June, 1864, a platform plank was adopted declaring unequiv- ocally that "as slavery was the cause and now consti- tutes the strength of this rebellion, justice and national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the republic."
With the further details of the prosecution of the war we need not here concern ourselves. They do not
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directly pertain to the subject now before us. It suffices to remember that the Republican party was in full control of the national government all through the war ; that despite an opposition that was often factional and venomous it enacted the legislation and performed the administrative acts necessary for the successful conduct of the war both in field operations and in fiscal and other provisions; and in April, 1865, ended the war in the complete restoration of the Union on terms of unprecedented generosity and benevolence. Thus was the first of the two supreme tasks accomplished. The other was brought to its completion in 1865 by the adoption of the Thirteenth amendment to the Constitu- tion, declaring that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
The Presidential campaign of 1864 involved three parties : The Republican, Democratic, and Radical Republican. The last named was composed of a few members of the Republican party who wished a more vigorous prosecution of the war, the confiscation of all lands belonging to secessionists, and numerous radical changes in various governmental matters. Its conven- tion nominated General Fremont for President, but long before the election he withdrew his candidacy and the party rejoined and supported the regular Repub- lican party. The Democratic convention nominated General George B. McClellan for President on a plat- form devoted exclusively to the issues of the war. It
ELIHU ROOT
Elihu Root, diplomat and statesman; born at Clinton, N. Y., February 15, 1845; graduated from Hamilton college, 1864; law school of the university of New York, 1867; appointed by President Arthur U. S. district attorney for the southern district of N. Y .; served till July 1885; appointed secretary of war by President Mckinley, August 1, 1899; appointed secretary of state by President Roosevelt, July 1, 1905; resigned January 27, 1909 upon election to the U. S. senate to succeed Thomas Collier Platt; member American boundary tribunal, 1903; counsel for U. S. north Atlantic fisheries arbitration, 1910; temporary chair- man of the republican national convention, 1904; chairman of republican state conventions of 1908, 1910 and 1914; delegate at large to and president of constitutional convention of 1915.
WHITELAW REID
Whitelaw Reid, publisher; born near Xenia, O., October 27, 1837; graduated from Miami university, 1856; political speaker and writer in the first Lincoln campaign; legislative cor- respondent from Columbus, O., to Ohio newspapers; war correspondent of the Cincinnati Gazette during the Rebellion; became connected with the New York Tribune in 1868; suc- ceeded Horace Greeley as editor of the Tribune, 1872, and became principal owner in 1873; regent of the university of the state of New York, 1876; appointed minister to France by President Harrison, 1889; candidate for vice-president with Benjamin Harrison, 1892; died in Paris, December 15, 1912.
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declared the war to be a failure, raged against the administration for despotically violating the Constitu- tion and trampling upon the rights of the people, threatened violent resistance to the authority of the national government, and demanded an ending of the war through compromise. Although he accepted the nomination, General McClellan openly repudiated the platform, denying especially that the war was a failure.
The Republican convention was held at Baltimore on June 7. On the first and only ballot for the Presi- dential nomination President Lincoln received every vote save the votes of Missouri, which, under instruc- tions from the State convention, were cast for General U. S. Grant. Of course the renomination of Lincoln was made unanimous. For Vice-President on the first ballot Andrew Johnson, a former Democrat and United States Senator from Tennessee, was nominated. The Republican platform heartily approved the adminis- tration of Lincoln, and demanded the uncompromising prosecution of the war to a successful termination and the complete extirpation of slavery. It also urged the encouragement of immigration by a liberal and just policy, the completion of the Pacific Railroad, the faithful redemption of the national debt, and the unfal- tering maintenance of the Monroe doctrine against the French aggressions in Mexico.
The electoral campaign was spirited, but the result was never at any time in doubt. The Democrats carried Kentucky overwhelmingly and New Jersey and Dela- ware by narrow majorities, securing 21 Electoral votes. The Republicans carried all the other States, with 212
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Electoral votes. The popular vote stood: Lincoln, 2,216,067 ; McClellan, 1,808,725. Arrangements were made for voting by the soldiers in the army, and the result was: Lincoln, 116,887; McClellan, 33,748.
This was the first Presidential election at which a number of States did not vote on account of being in a state of war against the national government and of secession from the Union. The States thus unrepre- sented had a total Electoral vote of 88 (on the basis of the apportionment at the election of 1860). Had those States voted, and cast all their votes for McClellan, he would have had only 109, or but little more than half the number cast for Lincoln. There was, indeed, a pretense of holding elections in Ten- nessee and Louisiana, and there was a prospect that Congress would be confronted with an offer of Elec- toral votes from those States determined by a mere handful of men, largely mere adventurers. To deal with such a contingency Congress in January, 1865, in advance of the counting of the Electoral votes, adopted a joint resolution declaring the eleven se- ceding States not to be entitled to representation in the Electoral College and ordering that no votes from them be received or counted.
CHAPTER V
CONSTRUCTIVE LEGISLATION
T HE achievement of "Liberty and Union," the preservation of the Federal Union, and the aboli- tion of slavery would in themselves and alone have been a noteworthy performance, sufficient to en- title the first Republican government to everlasting renown. But such was by no means the full measure of its public services. Partly because of and partly in spite of the tremendous burdens and duties of the Civil War, it engaged in a number of works of constructive statesmanship of the highest importance. It realized that with its accession to power and with the disposition of the two great issues of the war a new era was dawn- ing upon the United States, second in importance only to that which was ushered in by the adoption of the Constitution; and that to meet this era and to take advantage of its conditions and opportunities new laws, new methods, and new systems of administration were necessary. To the task of supplying these the Repub- lican party through its official representatives at Washington committed itself.
One of the foremost of these needs was that of a reformed tariff system. The Democratic tariff of 1832 had been succeeded by the so-called "Compromise tariff" of 1833. In 1842 the Whigs repealed the 1833
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tariff and restored that of 1832; this in turn was super- seded in 1846 by the Walker revenue tariff, under which the country prospered until 1857, when occurred a serious business depression or panic, the responsibility for which was attributed by some to the tariff but which was in fact the logical result of a combination of indus- trial and economic conditions to which necessarily the tariff was closely related. To correct these conditions the Republicans of the House of Representatives in 1860 adopted a bill framed by Justin S. Morrill of Ver- mont restoring some of the features of the former Whig tariff. This was rejected by the Democratic majority in the Senate. The next year it was put forward again, and finally on March 2, 1861, became law. Later it had to be materially altered to meet the fiscal exigencies of the war. Its essential principle, however, remained unchanged for many years, and its effect was to cause a rapid development and immense enlargement of American industry. Great new industries were created to supply the American people with home-made articles of indispensable use for which they had formerly been dependent upon other lands. The American standard of wages and the American standard of living among wage-earners were placed and kept far higher than in any other country. American industrialists were pro- tected against unfair competition of the poorly-paid labor of Europe; a fact which soon induced multitudes of European workingmen to migrate to the United States in quest of better wages and better conditions of labor and of life. In this way the Republican govern- ment at once supplied the revenue needed for paying
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the extraordinary expenses of the war and enormously stimulated and expanded the profitable industries of the nation.
Another need was that of an improved banking and currency system. Formerly, because of Democratic hostility to a National bank, State and local banks had flourished and had issued their notes as currency. Some of these were of course sound and trustworthy institu- tions. Others were of the speculative and "fly-by- night" order. If such a bank failed its notes were worthless. The result was that banknotes as currency were worth not their face value but a varying sum, determined by the standing of the bank of issue and the distance from it at which the notes were offered. Com- mercial journals printed daily or weekly lists of the banks and the current value of their notes. The traveler setting out with a pocketful of bills worth a hundred cents on the dollar found their negotiable value diminishing as he proceeded on his journey until perhaps in some distant State they were at a discount of twenty-five or fifty per cent. or a notice of failure left him completely stranded.
The Republican party determined to reform all this, partly because the exigencies of the war required it and partly because it was obvious that "wild-cat" banking, as it was aptly called, was not only discreditable but also potentially disastrous to the commercial and business interests of the nation. Accordingly there was devised and enacted a scheme for the organization of a system of National banks, chartered and supervised by the Federal government, the notes of which, used as
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currency, would be guaranteed by government bonds purchased by the banks and deposited by them with the Federal government as security. The act of February 25, 1863, with some subsequent amendments, was the beginning of the National bank system which has ever since prevailed and of which the London Times, not always a friendly critic of things American, said that "the genius of man has never invented a better system of finance." The creation of the National bank system was of great service to the government during the war inasmuch as it assured a certain market for the govern- ment bonds which were then issued. The National banks which were organized had to buy them as security for their notes. But in addition to that it rendered the people the inestimable service of provid- ing them with a convenient banknote currency of stable and uniform value. It was not necessary to examine a bill to see what bank had issued it and then to look up its current value in the market reports. A dollar bill of any National bank was worth a hundred cents at any time and at any place. The bank that issued it might fail, but the note would still be good for its face value.
The National Bank act became law in 1863. In 1864 there were 508 such banks; in 1865, 1,513; in 1875, 2,088; in 1885, 2,714; in 1895, 3,712; in 1905, 5,757; and in 1915, 7,560.
Another fiscal measure of the Republican party, enacted at the same time with the National Bank act, was the Legal Tender act, which put into circulation as legal tender for all save certain specified purposes notes of the United States treasury, familiarly known as
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"greenbacks." This measure was bitterly opposed by the Democrats and its validity was contested in the courts. After much litigation the Supreme Court of the United States in 1883 fully sustained its constitu- tionality and validity. In a decision in which all but one member of the court concurred it was held that Congress had full power to provide for the issuance of such notes in time of war or of peace and thus to make paper money legal tender. These "greenbacks" and the notes of thousands of National banks have now for a generation been the familiar and favorite circulating medium of the nation. The treasury notes and bank- notes are used indifferently and indiscriminately, and both are recognized as always and everywhere worth their full face value in gold coin. They form, in honor of the Republican party, one of the greatest monu- ments to constructive statesmanship that the world has seen.
In the very foremost rank of beneficent legislation of the Civil War era must be placed the Homestead act. As soon as Republicans secured an influential footing in Congress they moved for legislation which would make it possible for actual settlers to acquire farms in the public domain at a merely nominal cost, and thus develop the agricultural resources of the then unoccu- pied western prairies and plains. Such a policy was opposed by the southern pro-slavery Democrats, who did not wish the free States and Territories thus to be improved; and accordingly when, in 1860, the Repub- licans put the first Homestead act through Congress, President Buchanan vetoed it. But it was presently
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repassed and went into effect simultaneously with the Emancipation proclamation, on January 1, 1863. Under this beneficent act any actual settler could acquire absolute title to a quarter-section, or 160 acres, of public land by payment of a registry fee of ten dollars and by then for five years occupying and cultivating the land in question. Within twenty miles of a railroad in a State, or ten miles in a Territory, only half that amount could be acquired because of the supposedly greater value of the land within such zones. A supple- mentary Timber Culture act provided that in regions lacking natural timber growth title to a tract of 160 acres could be acquired by planting ten acres of it in timber and keeping it in good condition for eight years, or a tract of eighty acres by planting and caring for five acres of timber.
It must be remembered that prior to the enactment of these measures public lands had largely been acquired in huge tracts by speculators, who then resold to actual settlers at high prices. The Democrats in Congress persistently opposed homestead legislation, because of the attitude of the southern plantation owners. When the first Homestead bill was put for- ward in 1859 every Republican voted for it and every Democrat against it. When it was brought up again in 1860 every Republican voted for it and every Demo- crat, with the exception of a few from northern States, against it, and the Democratic President vetoed it. The Homestead law and its results in the settling and development of the west must be credited, therefore, exclusively to the Republican party. What its results
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have been may be partially estimated from the fact that in less than thirty years from the enactment of the measure there was thus taken up by settlers a total of 141,606,400 acres, or as much as the area of all the New England and Middle States and the State of Virginia united, these homesteads supporting a population of above six millions.
Nor must we overlook the act for land grants to agricultural colleges. As early as 1857 Justin S. Morrill introduced into Congress a bill for giving public lands for the founding of colleges of agriculture and the mechanical arts. This was passed by Congress in 1859 but was, like the Homestead bill, vetoed by the Democratic President. Mr. Morrill introduced it again in 1861, when there was a Republican President, and it was passed, signed, and became law in 1862. This great measure for the common weal gave to each State in the Union-east and west, north and south alike -30,000 acres of public land for each Senator and Representative that it had in Congress, the proceeds of the land to serve as a fund for creating colleges for instruction in agriculture and the mechanical and industrial arts. To States which had no public lands within their borders scrip was issued for lands located elsewhere. About seventy such institutions of practical learning have been established under that system, with a present attendance of probably more than 100,000 students; another incomparable monument to the con- structive statesmanship of the Republican party.
Reference has hitherto been made to the Pacific Railroad and the recommendations in party platforms
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that national aid be given to that necessary enterprise. Both parties made such recommendations, but it was the Republican party that gave them practical effect. It was under Republican government, on July 1, 1862, that the Pacific Railroad charters were actually issued, and it was under Republican government that bonds were issued to assist in the construction of the roads. The bonds issued aggregated $64,623,512, and they were practically all repaid to the government, with interest, between the years 1897 and 1899. The great steel highways which connect the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the continent are thus another memorial of the national services of the Republican party.
To save the nation from dissolution, to make it a nation of free men, to give it a stable and secure banking and currency system, to give millions of its people free homesteads, to conserve and enlarge its natural resources, to provide generously for the most useful education, to provide it with continent-spanning trans- portation facilities and to give it the industrial primacy of the world-these were the things for which the Republican party stood, and these were the things which it achieved in its first administration of the Res Publica, the commonwealth.
CHAPTER VI SOME EXTERNAL INTERESTS
W HILE thus the Republican administration was efficiently serving the domestic interests of the nation, there were other matters of commanding importance that required attention in our relation to other countries. The Civil War itself profoundly affected our foreign relations. While the attitude of most of the nations was entirely correct, the government of one was persistently unfriendly, while that of another was unsympathetic and permitted itself to be used greatly to the disadvantage of the United States.
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