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REYNOLDS HISTORICAL GENEALOGY COLLECTION
C 73.74 alan 791001
GEN
ALLEN COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY 3 1833 01479 2714
Gc 973.74 Aalann
The Annals of the Army of Tennessee and early western history. ...
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THE
ANNALS
OF THE
ARMY OF TENNESSEE
AND
EARLY WESTERN HISTORY,
INCLUDING A
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF BATTLES AND ENGAGEMENTS IN THE WESTERN ARMIES OF THE CONFEDERACY.
EDITED BY DR. EDWIN L. DRAKE, Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. A.
VOLUME I .- APRIL-DECEMBER, 1878.
NASHVILLE, TENN. : PRINTED BY A. D. HAYNES, 49 SOUTH MARKET STREET.
1878.
1
L
.
annals of the Army of Tennessee and early western his- y, including a chronological summary of battles and en- rements in the western armies of the confederacy. Ed. Dr. Edwin L. Drake. v. 1, no. 1-9, Apr .- Dec., 1878. shville, Tenn., Printed by A. D. Haynes, ISTS , 1879?] IBY p., 1 1., 99, [1] p. frent. (fold. map) 21gem.
applement) Chronological summary of battles and engagements of stern armies of the Confederate States, including summary of Lt. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry engagements. By Edwin L. Drake" ... 99, [1] p., at end.
. S .- Ilist .- Civil war Period_ 2. U. S .- Hist .- Civil war-Regi- I histories-Army of Temberg (C. S. A.) 3. Mississippi valley- -Civil war. 4. Tennessee --- Hist. 5. Confederate States of Amer- Ist .- Period. !. Drake, Edwin L., Heat .- S. A., ed.
5-41645.
ary of Congress
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1791001
16913
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Allen County Public Library 900 Webster Street PO Box 2270 Fort Wayne, IN 46801-2270
:
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
APRIL.
PAGE
The Dalton-Atlanta Operations: A Review, in part, of General Sherman's Memoirs. By General Joseph E. Johnston
Colonel James W. Starnes' Official Report of the Battle at Douglass' Church ... Diary of Private W. J. Davidson, Company C, Forty-first Tennessee Regiment .. The killing of Captain Freeman 2} Colonel Granville Lewis.
Early Western History -- Indian Battle at Rock Island, Tenn. Sketches of Captain Edmund Jennings-A Buffalo Hunt-Swimming the Tennessee at Florence-Swimming the Tennessee at Nickajack. Sketches of Thes. Sharpe Spencer. Heroism of Hugh Rogan, at Bledsoe's Station .... ..... The Soldiers' War- Bag -- Old Darb Greer's Joke on Lewis Peach. A Mother's Devotion. Take Me to the Rear, Quick. "Jeff Davis" Captures "Abe Lincoln ". 35
Editorial. 40
Correspondence. 45
1
MAY.
Governor Harris' Letter on the Spring Hill Failure
General Cleburne's Views on Slavery. 50
The Second Tennessee Regiment at Chickamauga. 52 Battle of Bentonville-Charge of the Fourth Tennessee and Eighth Texas Cavalry. 62
Diary of Private W. J. Davidson. Continued. 65
Tales of Forrest's Escort. 70
Error Corrected. 74
Camp Chase Letter 75
Early Western History-Letter from President Andrew Jackson. Killing of William McMurray So
The Soldiers' War-Bag-Incidents of a Fight at Mossy Creek-James Mor- gan's Adventure-Killing of Captain Talbot-Butchery of " Nashville." Personal Daring of General Wheeler. He Saved His Oxen. A Texas Ranger's Strategy. Origin of the Term "Josh." Covered Himself With Glory S-
Editorial.
Correspondence 93
1
iv.
CONTENTS.
JUNE. PAGE
Vicksburg During the Siege. By Major Edward S. Gregory. 97 Battle of Kennesaw Mountain-Part Borne by the First and Twenty-seventh
(consolidated) Tennessee Regiments, Maney's Brigade. By Samuel Robinson, of the Rock City Guards 109
The Battle of Shiloh 117
Diary of Private W. J. Davidson. Continued. I22
Attack on Fort Gilmer. By Adjutant R. G. Cross. 127
Early Western History-Dr. Ramsey's Letter. Jennings' Knob 135
The Soldiers' War- Bag -- A Cavalryman Swindles a Georgia Doctor. Off for
the Wars. Don't Repeat. Seeking a Surgeon. An Improvised Surgeon, 140 Editorial 143
Correspondence 144
JULY.
Vicksburg During the Siege. By Major Edward S. Gregory. Concluded ... 145 Nine Months in a Northern Prison. By Sergeant G. W. D. Porter, Forty- fourth Tennessee Regiment. 157
Colonel Colyar's Paper -- Gen. R. E. Lee's Views of the Military Situation in the Latter Part of 1864. 162
Diary of Private W. J. Davidson. Continued. 165
Captain Murphy's Escape from Johnson's Island. By Captain E. W. Holt ... 171 An Incident of Fort Mackinaw-How a " Rebel" Prisoner saved an Indi- an's Life. By Judge Joe C. Guild. 175
On the Picket-Line. 180
Ear'y Western History-Graves of Revolutionary Soldiers. Sketches of Ed-
mund Jennings. IS4
The Soldiers' War- Bag -- A Short Furlough. "Loved to Hear 'em Pop." Rough Surgery. Sabre Against Pistol. Gunboat on the Mountain.
A Youthful Bummer 190
Editorial 192
AUGUST.
Notes on General E. Kirby Smith's Kentucky Campaign. By Vieux
Seconde. 193
Ex-President Davis's Reply to Colonel Colyar's Paper. 211
Diary of Private W. J. Davidson. Continued 214 The Evacuation of Nashville. By Jno. Miller McKee. Continued 219
The Hampton Roads Conference-Another Reply to Colonel Colyar. By
Hon. Ethel Barksdale. 220
Early Western History-Andrew Jackson at a Foot-race. Death of Nath.
Thomas. Adventures of Nat. Parker and Peter Fisher. Cornwallis and DeKalb. 233
The Soldiers' War- Bag-Female Courage. Prowling a Prisoner. President
Davis's Speech at Chickamauga Station 236
Editorial 238
-
CONTENTS. V.
SEPTEMBER.
General Patrick R. Cleburne.
241
The Evacuation of Nashville. By Jno. Miller McKee. Concluded. 249 Prison Life-Reminiscences of Point Lookout, Maryland, and Elmira, New York. By Marcus J. Toney 269
Diary of Private W. J. Davidson. Continued. 279
Early Western History-Indian Attack on Greenfield, May, 1793. By Cap-
tain Frank Rogan. 283
The Soldiers' War- Bag -- A Guerrilla Adventure 285
Editorial ..
287
OCTOBER.
Petersburg, Virginia-Its Defense on the 16th of June, 1864-From Manu-
script Notes of Sergeant G. W. D. Porter, of the Forty-fourth Tennessee, 2S9 The Hanging of Sam. Davis. By Colonel J. B. Killebrew 294 General Albert Sidney Johnston-Review of his Life by his Son, Colonel William Preston Johnston. By E. W. M 298
Andrew Johnson-Captain Dirks's Attempt to Kidnap Him, while Military Governor of Tennessee 312 The Battle of Allatoona -- Official Report of Major-General S. G. French. 315
Diary of Private W. J. Davidson. Continued. 325 Early Western History-Battle of King's Mountain-From the Tennessee Historical Society Papers. 330
The Soldiers' War- Bag-Colonel Clanton's Adventure near Shiloh. The Kill-
ing of William Quinn. Considerate 334
Editorial
3.36
NOVEMBER.
French's Division-Official Report of its Operations in and around Atlanta. By Major-General S. G. French 337
Wheeler's Cavalry-Its Strength and Operations during the year 1864. Con- tinued 344
Battle of Richmond, Kentucky-Official Reports of Lieutenant-General E.
Kirby Smith and Brigadier-General T. J. Churchill. 356
Battle of Bentonville, North Carolina-Official Report of Major-General W. B. Bate $62
3/
Diary of Private W. J. Davidson. Concluded
366
The Retreat from Murfreesboro-Letter from Major-General J. M. Withers in Defense of General Bragg 369
Early Western History-The Attack on Buchanan's Station. By Major
Thomas Washington. From the original Mss. of the Tennessee Histor- ical Society. Continued 370
The Soldiers' War- Bag-Exploit of Colonel J. W. Starnes. Cruelty Re-
sented
3S2
Editorial 3S6
PAGE
vi
CONTENTS.
DECEMBER.
The Campaign in Tennessee-Official Report of Major-General William B. PAGE
Bate of the Operations of his Division at Franklin, Murfreesboro and Nashville 385
The Battle of Murfreesboro-Official Report of Lieutenant-General W. J.
Hardee
402
Wheeler's Cavalry-Its Strength and Operations during the year 1864. Concluded. 413
Naval Victory at Sabine Pass 422
Report of Rock Island Prison in 1865 425
Early Western History-The Attack on Buchanan's Station. By ajor Thomas Washington. From the original Mss. of the Tennessee Histor- ical Society. Concluded. 426
The Soldiers' War-Bag-The Death of General Forrest's War Horse, Rod- erick 429
Editorial 431
SUPPLEMENT.
Chronological Summary of the Battles and Engagements in the Western Ar- mies of the Confederacy .. I Letter of Lieutenant-General Wheeler, Accompanying his Tables 67 Chronological Summary of Battles and Affairs of Lieutenant-General Wheel- er's Cavalry Command 74
1/2 check at.
THE
ANNALS ARMY OF TENNESSEE
EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
VOL. I. { NASHVILLE, TENN., APRIL, 1878. ¿ No. I.
THE DALTON-ATLANTA OPERATIONS.
A Review, in Part, of General Sherman's Memoirs-An Authoritative Confederate View of the Famous March to the Sea-Comparative Strength and Losses of the Armies --- The Terms of Capitulation.
BY GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.
TT is stated on page 24 of General Sherman's "Memoirs," volume 2, that on the ist of May, 1864, the strength of the three armies- the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio-with which General Sherman was about to invade Georgia, was 98,797 men of all arms present for duty, with 254 field-pieces. As the forces of the three de- partments furnishing these troops amounted at the, time to 229,524 men present for duty (see Secretary of War's report, 1865, page 5), the strength of the invading army could have been doubled without leaving its communications insufficiently guarded. Therefore, General Sherman must have regarded the forces he assembled as ample for his object. That object was (see General Grant's letter on page 26) "to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the inte- rior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could against their war resources." That army was in front of Dal- ton, of 42,800 men of all arms present for duty, with 150 field-guns. Its position had not been selected, but was occupied by accident. General Bragg took it for the encampment of a night in his retreat from Missionary Ridge; but the troops remained there because it was ascertained that the pursuit had ceased. During the previous winter, General Gilmer, Chief Engineer of the Confederacy, had wisely pro- vided a strong base for this army by the intrenchment of Atlanta, and
VOL. I, NO. 1 .- I.
2
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
the engineers of the army constructed some field-works at Resaca for the protection of the bridges there, and three very rough country roads from Dalton to Resaca were converted into good ones. In the spring the works there were considerably enlarged.
Mc Pherson's Arrival Not a Surprise.
On the 5th of May the Federal army was in order of battle three or four miles in front of Tunnel Hill. On the 6th it approached Tunnel Hill; on the 7th drove our advanced guard from that place, and placed itself in the afternoon near and parallel to Rocky Face, its right some distance below Mill Creek gap. On page 32, 33, 34 and 35 General Sherman describes the operations of the 8th, 9th and Ioth, except the very sharp fighting. In his report that of the 9th is characterized as almost a battle (see page 14). In these engagements the Confederates, who were completely sheltered by intrenchments, had almost no loss ; but the Federal troops, standing on open ground and in great numbers, suffered very severely. On page 34 General Sherman claims to have surprised Johnston by McPherson's arrival before Resaca on the 9th ; forgetting, apparently, that his approach was discovered on the 8th (see his report, page 14), and that the place was found well prepared for defense, being held not by " one small brigade," as he supposed, but by a division-so intrenched as to be able to maintain itself a full day, at least. So if McPherson had attacked on the 9th, according to General Sherman's plan, Resaca could easily have been held against him until next morning, when the army, having left Dalton the night before without the enemy's knowledge, would be ready to fall upon him from the rear while holding his line of retreat. With twice his number on one side and Resaca on the other, he could not have escaped. If the other course suggested for McPherson by General Sherman had been taken-that of "placing his whole force astride the railroad above Resaca "-Johnston must have marched against and as- sailed him in the same manner with the same advantages. Either course suggested taken by McPherson would have compelled Johnston to attack him, and with such advantages of numbers and position as to secure his destruction. We never found it difficult to leave the pres- ence of the Federal army at night without its knowledge. The retreat to the east, which General Sherman supposes that the Confederates would have attempted, was impossible. But even if it had been easy, they could not have hesitated to attack the Army of the Tennessee in
3
AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
either of the cases supposed-opportunities for armies to fight detach- ments of half their strength are rarely offered in war.
The Position in Front of Dalton.
General Sherman is mistaken in the opinion, appearing both in his report and memoirs, that the Confederate army at Dalton was brought to the verge of ruin by his movement through Snake Creek gap. This operation had been provided against by making Resaca strong enough to hold out at least a day against 20,000 or 30,000 men, and by the making of roads by which the Southern troops at Dalton could reach Resaca before their antagonists. Resaca was held instead of Snake Creek gap, because it was nearer than the latter to the main Confed- erate position, and much farther from the Federal main body, and could be held by a smaller body of troops. This operation could have produced no better result than that gained-the abandonment of Dalton by the Southern army. Rocky Face, instead of covering Dal- ton, completely covered the Federal flank march to Snake Creek gap, and, therefore, was advantageous to him (General Sherman), and not to his adversary.
On page 32 General Sherman gives the impression that the position in front of Dalton was very strong, and he says in his report (page 73) : "To strike Dalton in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge." This ridge covered the left flank, not the front, and terminated but two miles north of the position, which was east of the mountain, in ground as fit for the manœuvres of a large army as a tactitian can expect to find in the interior of the Southern country. On page 35 the general writes that the bulk of the Southern army was "found (on the 13th) inside of Resaca. . A complete line of intrenchments was found covering the place." The two armies were formed in front of Resaca nearly at the same time ; so that the Federal army could give battle on equal terms, except as to numbers, by attack- ing promptly-the difference being about ten to four. The two armies intrenched that day. There was very brisk fighting all day of the 14th-greatly to our advantage, for we were assailed in our intrench- ments. General Sherman was misinformed as to the taking of an im- portant ridge by the advance of McPherson's whole line, and bloody repulses of Confederate attempts to retake it-this on the 15th; there were no such occurrences. But on the 14th, about dusk, the left of our line of skirmishers-forty or fifty men-was driven from a slight elevation in front of our left ; but no attempt was made to retake it.
4
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
The Capture of a Four-Gun Battery.
The first paragraph on page 36 is inaccurate. The fighting on the 15th was to our advantage (none of it at night), for we were on the de: fensive-behind breastworks. As to the capture of a four-gun battery : On the morning of the 15th General Hood advanced one eighty or one hundred yards. Soon after its fire opened the men and horses were driven off by an infantry fire from a ravine near. The Federal sol- diers who attempted to carry them off were in like manner driven back by our musketry. So the guns were left between the two lines until the Southern troops abandoned the position. What is said on page 36 might create the impression that the Southern army crossed the Oostenaula in consequence of the fighting described. It was be- cause two bridges and a large body of Federal troops were discovered the afternoon of the 14th at Lay's ferry, some miles below, strongly threatening our communications by the indication of another flanking operation-covered by the river as the first had been by the ridge. To avoid this danger, the Southern army crossed the Oostenaula about mid- night, and moved along the railroad some seven miles. The 17th it marched eight miles to Adairsville by 8 o'clock A.M., remained there till next morning (18th), and marched nine miles to Cassville before II O'clock; passed that day and the 19th there, and at 1 or 2 o'clock A. M. of the 20th marched to the Etowah, and crossed it early in the afternoon near the railroad.
On page 36 the difficulties overcome by the Federal army seem some- what magnified, and its advantage of greatly superior numbers depreci- ated. The operations in question can scarcely be termed "rapid suc- cesses." Indeed, it is not easy to see the progress made in "break- ing up Johnston's army " by the advance of the Federal army sixteen miles at the expense of five days of sharp fighting, all to the advantage of its enemy.
Hood's Erratic Movement.
The circumstances referred to on pages 40 and 41 are these (related in "Johnston's Narrative," pages 321 to 324): In the morning of May 19 the Federal army was approaching Cassville in two bodies, one following the railroad, the other the direct wagon-road. Hardee's Corps was near the former, Polk's and Hood's at Cassville. Johnston determined to attack the column on the direct road with Polk's and Hood's Corps when the other was at Kingston, three hours' march to
5
AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
the west. Polk was to meet and attack the head of the column; Hood, marching a little in advance of him on a road on his right, was to join in the action as the enemy deployed. When the latter had marched some miles in the proper direction, he turned his corps and marched back and formed it facing to the east, about a mile east of Cassville, upon a wild report brought him, he said, by one of his aide-de-camps. Neither this information nor his action upon it was reported. As the plan depended on the distance between the two Federal columns, for success, it was defeated by the loss of time produced by this erratic movement. The army was then drawn up in the best position it ever occupied, in which it skirmished during the afternoon. But at night General Hood's persistent declaration that he and General Polk would not be able to hold their ground an hour, caused the withdrawal of the army.
Page 43 : The broken ground south of the Etowah can nowhere be called a "ridge of mountains." The route through it chosen by Gen- eral Sherman was the least unfavorable. Page 44 : The action at New Hope Church was the attack on Stewart's Division by Hooker's Corps. It began an hour and a half before sunset and continued until dark, Stewart holding his ground. As the corps had a front equal only to that of the division, and was exposed to the musketry of 5,000 in- fantry and the cannister of sixteen guns at short range, great execu- tion must have been done in its ranks. Page 45: The "bloody bat- tle " mentioned was an absurd attack on the Federal right made with- out orders by two Confederate brigades. It was quickly ended by the division commander, who drew back the troops as soon as he heard the firing-after they had lost 300 men. But a real battle, which oc- curred the day before, is unnoticed-a carefully prepared attack upon our right by the Fourth Corps, supported by a division of the Four- teenth. The battle began about 5 o'clock P.M., and continued two hours. After the repulse of the assailants we counted about 700 dead within thirty yards of our line. The description of daily fighting on the same page is correct as to spirit and frequency ; but as the Confed- erates were not permitted to leave their breast-works, the sallies and re- pulses were all Federal. Page 46: The Confederate army abandoned the line of New Hope Church on the 4th of June, because it was dis- covered that day that the Federal troops were moving by their left rear toward Allatoona, under cover of their line of intrenchments. On the same page General Sherman claims that substantially during
6
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
May he had fought over one hundred miles of most difficult country- from Chattanooga to Big Shanty. The fighting commenced at Tunnel Hill, thirty miles from Chattanooga, and he reached Big Shanty only on the 10th of June.
Comparative Strength of the Two Armies.
Page 49: " I always estimated my force at about double his ; but I also reckoned that in the natural strength of the country, in the abundance of mountains, streams and forests, he had a fair offset to our numerical superiority." Such being General Sherman's opinion, it is not easy to understand why he did not make his army 150,000 or 200,000 men. He knew the strength of the country, and it has been seen that on the 5th of May he had 130,000 men under his control, beside those assembled around him. Page 51: It is stated that the Seventeenth Corps, lately arrived, with new regiments and returned furloughed men, "equaled the Federal losses by battle, sickness, and by detachments ;" so that the three armies still aggregated about 100,- ooo effective men. According to the table on page 136 they aggre- gated 112,800 men. On the same page, below, it is said that the Confederates had signal stations and fresh lines of parapets on Kene- saw, Lost mountain and Pine mount. Kenesaw was not occupied by our (Southern) troops until the 19th, and Lost mountain was aban- doned on the 8th. Our only signal stations were on Kenesaw, as an observatory, and at head-quarters. Page 53: The circumstances of General Polk's death were these: He had accompanied General Har- dee and I to Pine mount to reconnoitre. We placed ourselves in a battery near the summit, on the enemy's side. After seeing every thing that interested us we turned to leave the place. As we did so a cannon-shot from a battery opposite, probably fired at a crowd of sol- diers on the summit behind us, prssed over us. A second came after about a minute, and a minute later, while we were walking slowly toward our horses, General Polk being on the very top of the hill, a third shot passed through the middle of his chest, from left to right. He was lifeless when I reached him in a few seconds, for we were but twenty or thirty feet apart. A brisk fire of artillery (shell) commenced soon after ; there had been no volleys, and there was no signal station there.
Night Attacks Never Made.
Page 54: "We captured a good many prisoners, among them a
7
7
AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
whole infantry regiment, the Fourteenth Alabama, three hundred and fifty strong." The occurrence of the day made this highly improba- ble, if not impossible-it was the 15th. On the 16th a company of skirmishers was forgotten in a change of position, and captured. Page 55: The Confederate intrenchment was much smaller than that described-a ditch about two feet deep, the earth thrown up on the outside, making a parapet two feet and a half high, surmounted with a head-log. We had no intrenching tools, a disadvantage for which all the mountain-streams and forests of Georgia would not have com- pensated. Page 56: "These successive contractions of the enemy's line encouraged us and discouraged him, but were doubtless justified by strong reasons. On the 20th Johnston's position was unusually strong;" by which his troops were greatly encouraged-indeed, made confident. Pages 59 and 60: The reports upon which General Sherman's telegram of the 23d was based, were extremely inaccurate. Johnston had not half so many miles of connected or other trenches as he. The Federal army had gained no ground by fighting, unless the driving in of a few skirmishers can be called so. The Southern army was never, during this part of the campaign, driven from a posi- tion by fighting, or the fear of it; only by danger to its communica- tions by the extension of the strongly intrenched lines which the enemy's greatly superior numbers enabled him to make and man. The positions gained on the 21st near the south end of Kenesaw, and on a hill near, were outside of our position-not occupied by our line, and, if at all, only by pickets, and General Sherman was deceived by reports of efforts to retake them, and night attacks, which were never made by our troops. If the Confederate troops were so incessantly beaten, it is unaccountable that they were permitted to remain before Marietta four weeks, and then shifted their ground only to avoid losing their communications. The attack on Hooker and Schofield on the 22d was made against orders by General Hood with Stevenson's Divis- ion, supported by Hindman's. It was defeated by intrenched artil- lery. But the troops held the ground they gained long enough to remove their dead and wounded. On the 25th an attack like this was made on Stevenson's Division by the troops that had repulsed it on the 22d, and they were repelled with as heavy a loss as they had inflicted then. But this affair escaped Gen. Sherman's notice.
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