USA > Tennessee > The Annals of the Army of Tennessee and early western history, including a chronological summary of battles and engagements in the western armies of the Confederacy > Part 2
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THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSE
The Federal Losses.
Pages 60 and 61: "The description of the attack on the Confeder- ate army on the 27th of June, prepared from the 24th, and the state- ment of the Federal loss, contrast strangely: "About 9 A.M. of the day appointed the troops moved to the assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fire of artillery and musketry was kept up. At all points' the enemy met us with determined courage, and in great force. . . . By 11:30 the assault was over, and had failed." The statement of loss was 2,500 killed and wounded. According to this, an army of Americans inured to war was defeated by a loss of but two and a half per cent. It is incredible. General Sherman's subordi- nates must have imposed upon him. It is equally incredible that another army of American veterans, as completely protected as men using arms can be, could strike but two and a half per cent. of men exposed to their muskets and cannon, in seven lines, at least, two hours and a half. The writer has seen American soldiers, not inured to war, win a field with a loss ten times greater proportionally. Page 70: The Confederates are accused of burning their pontoon bridges. after crossing the Chattahoochee. They did not commit that folly, On the 17th it was reported that the Federal army was on the south-east bank of the Chattahoochee, from Roswell to Powers' ferry. That night General Hood was placed in command of the Southern army by tele- graph. On the 18th, at his urgent request, Johnston formed the troops on the high ground overlooking the valley of Peach-tree Creek from the South, to meet the advance of the Federal forces reported that morning by General Wheeler. General Sherman's returns, on pages 24 and 136, show 98, 797 men present for duty May 1; 112, 819 June I ; and 106,070 July I. Those of the Southern army show 42,800 present for duty May 1; 58,562 June 6; and 53,275 July 1 : 14,200 infantry and artillery, and 7,000 cavalry were received in six detach- ments, coming at different times-all in May. General Sherman points out these additions to our forces, but says nothing of the rein- forcements he received-except the arrival of the Seventeenth Corps (9,000 men) June 8. His reported losses in May, corrected by Gen- eral Thomas (on page 5, " Report of Committee on Conduct of the War," supplementary, part 1), and the difference between the May and June returns above, show that he received above 25,000 men in May alone. According to the table on page 133, before July 18, the Federal army lost, in killed and wounded, about 21,000 men, of whom about
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AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
2,500 were killed. The Southern army lost in the same time 9,972 killed and wounded, of whom 1, 288 were killed. The Southern offi- cers believed that the Federal losses compared with theirs about as five to one. . And circumstances justify that belief.
Confederate Marksmanship.
Except on three occasions the Southern troops fought in their . intrenchments, exposing scarcely a thirteenth of their persons, while their adversaries were fully exposed to open ground. Therefore, with equal marksmanship, they would have given thirty hits for one received. According to the reports of Gen. Sherman's subordinates they gave but two; or on equal ground would have made one effective shot to the ene- my's fifteen-which is incredible; the more so, because a fire so utterly ineffective could not have repulsed or checked, in seventy days of such close and continual fighting as General Sherman describes, veteran Amer- ican soldiers such as his. We had, too, direct proofs of the inaccuracy of these reports. After the action of June 27 (pages 60, 61), we counted 1,000 dead of the army of the Cumberland lying before two of Hardee's Divisions, very near, some against our breastworks. The calculated proportion of wounded to killed is five to one; this would indicate a loss of 6,000 there. But the officers of that army reported 1, 580 killed, wounded, and missing (see page 223 above Report)-less than two per cent. of the 60,000 men of that army. The dead belonged to the first and second lines, and we could see seven exposed to our muskets and cannon, so that many others must have been killed. In like manner, on the 27th of May we repelled an assault by four divis- ions, and counted 700 dead within thirty paces of our line. As five or six lines immediately behind these dead were exposed to our shot, there must have been considerable additional loss. Yet Federal offi- cers reported but 1,400 as the entire loss, when it could not have been so little as 4,000. General Sherman does not allude to this action. In the engagement two days before (referred to on page 44) we had a much greater force engaged longer, and therefore must have inflicted a much greater loss. In the three actions at least 2,500 Federal sol- diers must have been killed; as many as. according to Federal officers, were killed in all the fighting in ten weeks described by General Sher- man-of which that in these three actions was not a fourth part.
An Estimate of Sherman's Losses. The reports made to General Sherman charge his troops indirectly
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THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
with being checked, repulsed - intimidated by such losses as ordi nary troops would have disregarded. This is incredible to those who, like the writer, have often witnessed the vigorous and persistent cour- age of American soldiers, the best of whom were not superior to Gen- eral Sherman's. But the testimony of the 10,036 graves in the Union cemetery at Marietta, of soldiers killed south of the Etowah, is con- clusive. About 2,000 of them fell in the actions about Atlanta. But at least as many were killed north of the Etowah, and buried at Chat- tanooga. As the towns and villages in the route of the Federal army were burned, there could have been no hospitals, and, therefore, few deaths by sickness south of Dalton. These proofs show that the esti- mate on page 357, "Johnston's Narrative," which General Sherman pronounces erroneous, is not much so, to say the least. On page 48 General Sherman claims to have taken 3,245 prisoners in May, be- cause he had captured 12,983 in the four and a half months ending September 15. We had no loss by capture in May, and only a little more than two hundred up to July 18; the marches and results of the fighting in that time did not enable the enemy to make prisoners. His successes and prisoners were subsequent. On page 49 General Sher- man claims that the strength of the country by mountains, streams, - and forests gave his enemy a fair offset to his numerical superiority. Between Dalton and Atlanta one sees but two semblances of mountains- Rocky Face, which covered the march by which he " flanked " Dalton, and Kenesaw, less than two miles long. The country was no more unfavorable for the offensive than the Wilderness, or that on which Ivee and McClellan fought near Richmond, or that between Amelia and Appomattox Court-houses.
Was Sherman's Plan the Best ?
General Sherman certainly executed his plan of operations with great perseverance, skill, and resolution. But it is a question if that plan was the best. The results obtained, compared with those attain- able, indicate that it was not. At Dalton only the Southern left flank was covered by Rocky Face, not its front, and an attack in front would have been on ground as favorable to the Federal army as its General could have hoped to find. With odds of near ten to four, he might well have thought the "breaking up of Johnston's army" attainable there. If defeated, Atlanta, its place of refuge, was one hundred miles off, with three rivers intervening, while the Federal army, if unsuc-
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cessful, had a secure refuge in Chattanooga, which was easily reached. At Resaca the Federal General had a still better opportunity, for the two armies met there without intrenchments between them, the Federals having a line of retreat from its center directly to the rear, while the Southern troops, formed near and parallel to the road to Atlanta, would have been driven from that road by defeat, and, consequently, destroyed. Battle at either place, whatever the result, would not have · cost a fourth of the number of men actually lost; and success would have ended the campaign and decided the war.
On page 39 General Sherman says: "Of course, it was to my inter- est to bring him to battle as soon as possible." His overwhelming numbers ought to have made it possible at any time. The flanking operations forced the Southern army back to Atlanta, but could do no more. There it was safe in intrenchments much stronger than any it had previously occupied, and too extensive to be invested; and three railroads met there, either one capable of supplying the army. So it could have maintained itself there indefinitely, and so won the cam- paign with little more loss. This is no afterthought, but was expressed to General Hood when he took command. The Federal march to Jonesboro caused, but did not compel, the abandonment of Atlanta ; for if the Southern troops had remained in the place, the enemy would, in a few days, have been forced to return to his railroad; and, beside, Atlanta could have been sufficiently supplied from Macon through Augusta, but at Jonesboro the Federal troops could not be fed. This mode of gaining Atlanta made the acquisition of no great value ; for the campaign continued, and General Sherman was occupied by Gen- eral Hood until late in October, when he commenced the disastrous expedition into Tennessee, which left the former without an antog- onist.
"Wide Discrepancies."
Bentonville, pages 203-4-5-6: Johnston attempted to unite the three little bodies of his troops near Bentonville on the 18th of March, to attack the head of General Sherman's left column next morning on the Goldsboro road. Less than two-thirds had arrived at 8 A. M., of the 19th, when the Federal column appeared and deployed, intrench- ing lightly at the same time. The fighting that day was a vigorous attack on our left, defeated in half an hour; then a similar one on our right, repulsed in like manner. About three o'clock, all the troops being in line, the Federal army was attacked, driven from its position,
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THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
and pursued a mile and a half, into an extensive thicket, which com- pelled the Southern troops to halt when otherwise they were not opposed. Two hours after we were slightly attacked-by a reconnoi- tering party, probably, it was so easily repelled. We made no other attack, but held our ground till after nightfall to carry off our wounded. Our army remained in line nearly parallel to the Goldsboro road to remove the wounded to Smithfield. Its flanks were somewhat thrown back-the left only of cavalry skirmishers. Butler's cavalry was ob- serving the right Federal column; Wheeler's arrived from Averysboro the evening of the 19th. Mower's movement (see page 304) was made after three o'clock; for he had proceeded but a mile and a half when attacked and driven back, about half-past four o'clock, being then in rear of our center, where orders could not reach him. So the skirmish- ing mentioned on page 304 must have been very brief. Our men being intrenched, easily drove off the enemy. In reference to "wide discrepancies," General O. O. Howard's (right) wing fought only in this skirmish; yet it is claimed (page 305) that its loss was but 408, while it inflicted one of near 2,000, including wounded, on the Con- federates-four times as great as that they suffered, June 27, by the assault of the whole Federal army (see page 61). It is claimed also, on page 305, that the Southern army, which was successful in all the fighting, and intrenched in most of it, lost fifty per cent. more than the Federals. These " discrepancies" cannot be charged to the Southern officers.
An Error of Memory.
Meetings of Sherman and Johnston, April 17 and 18 : By a not unu- sual error of memory, General Sherman probably attributes to Johnston language that he heard in Raleigh the following evening (see pages 349 and 351). It could not have entered the mind of the latter that any of the class to which General Sherman belongs could entertain a suspicion that Mr. Davis was accessary to assassination. The object of our meeting, expressed in a letter in his report, page 137, was to make a general armistice-"to enable the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war." He said that this was impracticable, and offered such terms of surrender as were granted to the army of Northern Virginia. Johnston declined to capitulate, because the military condition in North Carolina was unlike that in Virginia, and proposed that they should agree upon preliminaries of peace, citing authorities. General Sher-
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man assented, and in less than two hours the terms drawn up and adopted next day were agreed upon, except that General Sherman refused to include Mr. Davis and his cabinet in the article (6th) grant- ing amnesty. This question was discussed till sunset, when they agreed to resume the subject next morning. General Breckinridge accompanied Johnston to the meeting, and Mr. Reagan put on paper the terms discussed the day before, which Johnston had given, and sent the paper after him. As soon as received, without any discussion aside, these terms were proposed to General Sherman, with the reminder that they had been almost accepted the day before. With this paper before him, General Sherman wrote rapidly that which was adopted and signed, which expressed in his language the terms discussed the day before. The terms of this convention show that there was no question of surrender, but of peace; nor of Johnston's power over other Confederate armies, for in the last paragraph both acknowledge that they had not power, but pledge themselves to obtain it.
COLONEL JAMES W. STARNES OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE BATTLE AT DOUGLASS' CHURCH.
BRIGADE HEAD-QUARTERS, CAMP NEAR SPRING HILL, TENN., April 13, 1863.
M AJ. ANDERSON : In making a forced reconnoissance of Fed- eral forces at Franklin, by the First Cavalry Corps, my brigade moved down the Lewisburg pike. General Armstrong's brigade was some half or three-quarters of an hour in advance of me. In conformity to General Forrest's order, I ordered Captain Groves' com- pany, with five or six guides, on the right of the pike to scour the country for some distance, throwing videttes well out on either side. On reaching Douglass' Church, six or eight of General Armstrong's command came back at the top of their horses' speed, and in great alarm, hotly pursued, as they said, by cavalry. I immediately threw forward Company F, of the Third Tennessee cavalry, numbering thirty men, which I had ordered up to act as guides, should it be nec- essary; also, Captain Gray's company of thirteen men ; at the same time, ordering Colonel Biffle's regiment to the left, across Reams' plan-
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tation to get a position on a woodland hill just beyond; the battery (Freeman's) to take position on Dr. Odin's hill, to be supported by Captain McLemore's regiment.
By the time Colonel Biffle's rear had reached the church I discovered a heavy force of the enemy in the wood, one hundred or one hundred and fifty yards to my right, advancing upon me. I sent back for the rear regiments to move up. Discovering that the enemy was on three sides, the battery captured, and all in rear cut off from me, I ordered a few of Colonel Biffle's men to post themselves behind a stone-fence at the church, who held the enemy in check until Colonel Biffle could dismount his men, load his guns, and get ready for action.
At the moment that Colonel Biffle's regiment started forward, Cap- tain Allison, my Aid, came up to me with Company F and Captain Gray's company. I ordered Colonel Biffle to move on the enemy on the right. With his support I charged the enemy with the command that Captain Allison had brought up, sending him around to the regi- ments in the rear which had been cut off from me. The enemy were then moving down from Dr. Odin's hill in heavy force, and another force of cavalry, supposed to be a regiment, which I directed Colonel Biffle's men at the stone-fence to hold in check at all hazards. The charge was made in the most gallant and determined style, driving the enemy back from my right in confusion. I then turned on the force that was moving against me from the rear : this was deployed, and moving firmly and steadily forward with a mounted force on the pike. I ordered Colonel Biffle forward, and to shelter himself behind trees as he went. I made a charge upon them with Company F, commanded by Lieutenant Pierce, and Captain Gray's company, which routed and drove them back. Being checked by a woods-lot fence, some little delay was occasioned, at which time I ordered Colonel Biffle with part of his force to check the enemy, which had appeared in pretty strong force, moving up the pike. Another charge by the gallant Gray and Pierce completed the victory, dispersing the enemy in confusion, retaking our battery and most of the artillerists. At that moment the Fourth Mississippi cavalry came across Dr. Odin's field from the north- west, and I ordered them up for a pursuit of the routed enemy, but they did not come.
In the meantime I sent couriers back to the front to learn what was going on there. All reports agreed that the enemy was moving upon me from Reams' plantation, when I moved up my artillery and opened
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fire on General Armstrong, being unable to distinguish him from Yan- kees on account of the duskiness of the evening and the amount of dust floating in the air. The enemy, as you will see by Lieutenant Douglass' report (Freeman's Battery), had made a simultaneous move- ment against the Third Tennessee regiment, immediately in rear of the battery, and charged it on horseback. The horses of the rear caissons taking fright, ran through one-third of this column, and threw it in confusion ; owing to the fact that their guns were not loaded, they fell back some distance to the right and rear, and other regiments par- took more or less of the same confusion.
I ordered a squadron forward and to the right, under the command of Captain William Forrest, to drive off the enemy, who had appeared in that direction, which he did in handsome style. Colonel Biffle is entitled to great credit for his prompt and determined action during the whole of the fight; my thanks are also due to Captain Allison for the invaluable services he rendered; also, to Tullass and Parke for coolness and promptness in carrying my orders. Without detracting in the least from Colonel Biffle, whose action in the engagement was invaluable, I will say that my success was greatly due to the gallant charges and persevering movement of Lieutenant Pierce and Captain Gray, the latter having four (4) men wounded out of thirteeen (13), and seven (7) horses killed and wounded.
Among the many individual instances of gallantry and daring which deserve particular mention, as he does in every battle in which he participates, is that of Sergeant John Norris, of Company F, of the Third Tennessee; Lieutenant Lyle, of Captain Gray's company, who carries a crutch from a wound received in a previous engagement, dis- tinguished himself in charging and shooting down the enemy, and in recapturing our prisoners. Notwithstanding the precaution of putting out scouts on my right, and other precautionary measures, the enemy captured my videttes, and was upon me without notice. With all of these advantages, the force which fought them did not exceed two hundred and twenty-five (225) men, yet they whipped General Stan- ley's brigade, and drove it from the field in most handsome style.
Most respectfully,
JAMES W. STARNES, Colonel Commanding Brigade.
P. S .- My loss was six (6) killed, seventeen (17) wounded, and thirty-one (31) captured. The enemy's was seventeen (17) killed, fif- teen (15) taken prisoners, and wounded unknown.
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THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE.
DIARY OF PRIVATE W. J. DAVIDSON, COM- PANY C, FORTY-FIRST TENNES- SEE REGIMENT.
VICKSBURG, MISS., 8 O'Clock P.M., Dec. 27, 1862.
W TE left Jackson this morning and arrived at this place a few min- utes since, traveling forty miles by rail in twelve hours, and hav- ing but one run-off. Considering the road, this is quite remarkable. Officers and men, with a few honorable (?) exceptions, left Jackson considerably tight, if not more so.
8 A.M., Dec. 28 .- Left our bivouac in Vicksburg this morning at 2 o'clock, and moved in darkness through mud and over hills; just be- fore day, halted at our present camping-ground, which is on the top of one of the thousand and one hills which surround Vicksburg. While I write, the booming of artillery and the rattle of musketry are waking the echoes far and wide, and grate harshly on the ear this spring-like Sabbath morning The fight has commenced in earnest on our left wing, and we are expecting every moment to be ordered to the scene of conflict, although we are pretty well worn out already, for the want of sleep and nourishment. But here comes a courier, and, I have no doubt, he has orders for us to double quick to the battle-field. Just as I expected, I hear " fall in !" Heaven protect us to-day !
Jan. 1, 1863. - We have spent three days in front of the enemy, and, notwithstanding the fact that we have been under the fire of one of their batteries and of their sharp-shooters all of the time, the Forty- first has not lost a single man. Yesterday we were out on picket, and were compelled to lie behind logs to prevent the enemy's sharp-shoot- ers from picking us off. We lay in this position for twenty-four hours. Half of the time the rain was pouring down in torrents, but at day-light the rain closed, and the weather changed to freezing cold. We cer- tainly passed a very disagreeable time during this day, for if we at- tempted to straighten our frozen and cramped limbs by rising to the erect position, the instant bang and whiz of a minnie-bullet about our ears proved the experiment was dangerous. [Donelson repeated ] I noticed that some of our fighting men at home were the first to get be- hind some convenient log and the last to leave its friendly shelter. As for myself, I make no pretensions to bravery at home or abroad, and
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I freely acknowledge that I laid very close to my log. The fact is, a bullet, which whistles like it had a shuck tied to it, does not give out a very musical sound to my ears.
Jan. 2 .- Yesterday passed off in comparative quiet ; a few shot and shell thrown from our batteries into the lines of the enemy, and a few rounds from their sharp-shooters in return, was all that disturbed the Sabbath-like stillness of the first day of the year. The enemy were engaged in burying their dead, under flag of truce, and I understand that they have a big job of it. In Sunday's and Monday's fighting we killed, wounded and captured near fifteen hundred, * and sustained a very slight loss. The Third and Thirtieth Tennessee and the First Louisiana regiments were the troops who bore the brunt of the fight, and right nobly did they do their duty against the fearful odds.
Jan. 3 .- Early in the day yesterday it was announced that the enemy were re-embarking on their gun-boats and transports, and before night the report was confirmed. We captured one hundred barrels of crack- `ers and fifty boxes of axes, which they had left in their haste to get out of the way. They did not quite get Vicksburg, after all of their boast- ing. Our commander is of the opinion that they will endeavor to land at the wharf to-morrow, under the cover of the fog, and take the place by storm. For this reason, we are still held in position, though nearly worn out by exposure and prolonged abstinence.
Jan. 4 .- At 4 o'clock yesterday we were moved from our old posi- tion to a bridge. We had stood out in the rain since the evening be- fore, and were completely soaked with wet, and had to climb the steepest and slickest hills a man ever lives to stand upon. Half of the time we were down in the mud, and the balance in water up to our waist, while the darkness was so thick that we could n't see our file- leaders; but I never heard a single murmur from the cold, wet and hungry men. Lieutenant-Colonel Tillman, who has command of the regiment, led the way on foot, and was as deep in the mud as we were in the mire; and, after we arrived at the bridge which we were sent to guard, the officers "stood and took it" as cheerfully as though they were basking in the sunshine of an April morning. One of the boys, who was up to his knees in mud, and over whose face the rain was streaming from a narrow brim cap, said to Major Miller, who was leaning against the side of a house and under the drip, " I say, Major, you look like a man trying to hide behind a ladder." The Major took
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