USA > Tennessee > The Annals of the Army of Tennessee and early western history, including a chronological summary of battles and engagements in the western armies of the Confederacy > Part 32
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52
General Johnston's piety was a principle. I shall not discuss, with those who see nothing but impiety in others who do not adopt their cherished dogmas, whether or not his views were orthodox. I know, however, that his piety was deep and sincere, and, as illustrative of this trait, state that he and myself had been at work till long after midnight, when he proposed to me to "adjourn to his bedroom, take a drink, say our prayers, and go to sleep." I told him I would take that night a glass of water, and feared he would find me no better at praying than drinking. He bent on me a look of almost paternal ten- derness, and said, solemnly, "I never lay my head upon my pillow at night without returning thanks to God for his protecting care, and invoking his guidance in future."
Such was Sidney Johnston-the model soldier, gentleman and patriot.
-
312
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
ANDREW JOHNSON.
The Attempt to Kidnap Him, while Military Governor of Tennessee, by Captain Dirks.
STATE of war gives occasion to many strange inconsistencies of conduct on the part of a class of individuals who exhibit the faculty of serving, in turn, both parties to the contest, and that with great zeal ; but the strangest instance of this kind, and the hardest to explain, was the case of Dirks, the Captain of Andrew Johnson's Body Guard, at the time he was Military Governor of Tennessee. Those who were concerned most intimately with him in his attempted ex- ploit have never been able to satisfy themselves of his real motives in the part he played. We will give the circumstances, and allow each reader to judge for himself and reach his own conclusion.
Captain Dirks was a trusted officer of Governor Johnson, and the in- strument of his will in dealing with the Rebel element at Nashville, Tenn. He made arrests of citizens almost daily, at the command of his chief, and conducted them to the State Penitentiary for safe keep- ing. Among these, on one occasion, was Mr. Mat. Stratton, a re- spected citizen, whose active sympathies were with the people of his State, but who, at that time, was living quietly at his home, in the vi- cinity of Nashville. His arrest was instigated by a native loyalist, for what was deemed disloyal utterances, and made by Dirks. On the way to prison, Dirks grew very confidential, though he knew nothing whatever of his prisoner until then, and proposed, with seeming earn- estness, to desert to the Confederate army, then stationed at Tullahoma, if he could procure his assistance in getting through the lines. Mr. Stratton, fearing that it was a trap laid for his destruction, refused to seriously entertain the proposition at first; but Dirks insisted with such earnestness that he at length determined to run the risk of probable bad faith, and agreed to see him safely into the Confederate lines, which he could promise confidently to do, on account of his knowledge of the country and extensive acquaintance with the inhabitants on the route. The arrangement was accordingly made, and in due time the plan was carried out, the party arriving safely at General Van Dorn's headquarters, at Columbia, Tenn. They then proceeded without diffi- culty to General Bragg's headquarters, at Tullahoma, Dirks all the
313
·
AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
while retaining on the Federal uniform. On the way, or perhaps be- fore starting, the traitor disclosed his design of kidnapping Governor Johnson, of the success of which he had no doubt, as he was familiar with his habits and knew exactly where to find him on certain nights of the week. His plan was to take a small party of horsemen, work his way to the vicinity of Nashville, procure a carriage and drive to the house where his victim would be lodging, and forcibly carry him off through the lines at rapid speed before the alarm could be given. He disclosed his plan to Captain C. W. Peden, the Provost Marshal, and pressed him to further his scheme with his influence and provide the means of its execution. This Captain Peden refused to do, saying that he had no authority and would not do so, unless directed by Gen- eral Bragg. Dirks then besought an interview with the General, which was granted; but the latter-either from scruples of the propriety of the step, or doubts as to the deserter's sincerity-also refused to have any hand in the project, and directed the Provost Marshal to keep strict surveillance over him. Dirks had some liberties allowed him, however, and was the subject of much speculation when his exploit became known. He soon became aware that he was not trusted, al- though he had deserted a man and a cause at that time extremely odi- ous to the army ; yet he talked very unreservedly of his desertion, saying that he had come to cast his fortunes with the Confederacy and fight his former friends. His air and manner were those of a man who ex- pected that he would be received joyfully and treated with great con- sideration by the Confederates for what he had done; in other words, to be made a hero of, and to afford the subject of a great sensation. However, he told off on his late friends so freely and unsparingly that an officer of Bragg's Staff, learning of his kidnapping project, became thoroughly impressed with his sincerity, and besought the General to furnish Dirks with the authority and means to carry out his design. The General again refused, but finally told the officer he had no ob- jection, provided he undertook the matter upon his own responsibility. This the latter agreed to do, and repaired with Dirks to General Van Dorn's headquarters for the purpose of putting the project into execu- tion. A small squad of cavalrymen, under a lieutenant, was permit- ted to volunteer as an escort, but enjoined to be on guard against treachery. When the expedition reached the vicinity of Nashville, the officer in command became so much dissatisfied with Dirks's claim to the sole management and direction of the affair that a hot altercation
314
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
ensued between them ; whereupon he arrested him, and securing his feet with a rope beneath his horse, carried him a prisoner back to Columbia. Dirks was very indignant at the imputation and harsh treatment put upon him, when he was about to perform an important service for the Confederacy, as he claimed; but his protest was re- ceived with general distrust, and he was carried, with his feet still pin- ioned, back to Tullahoma. On meeting Captain Peden, he exclaimed, "Here's my friend ; he will release me," and began to declaim vio- lently against the authors of his bad treatment; but Captain Peden told him that he had no authority in the matter, and that he must go to General Bragg. The General, becoming thoroughly disgusted by this time with the traitor, ordered him to be confined in the guard-house for safe keeping until further instructions. Dirks resented his confine- ment by such abuse of everyone whom he failed to impress with the idea of his injured innocence, and annoyed the authorities so much with his importunities for release, that he was at length sent to Atlanta, Ga., and ordered to be kept closely confined. Here he remained for more than a year, still pleading for release, until he finally effected his escape, by burrowing under the wall of his prison.
But the strangest part of this story remains to be told. After his escape from prison, Dirks turned up at Washington City, where he received a colonel's commission and a large amount of back pay. Whether he imposed upon the authorities there with a tale of adven- ture and cruel treatment in a Rebel prison, or whether they were privy to some plot that Dirks was to execute in the first instance, but not able to effect, is a secret that has never transpired to the general public, as far as the writer or his informants are aware.
In sifting the facts as they appear for a solution of the mystery, we are of the opinion that Dirks, animated by a morbid fancy for the sensational, did give way to a passing weakness and desert his coun- try's service. This view is supported by the fact of his sudden resolu- tion to desert, and making it known to a prisoner with whom he was unacquainted. Possibly he was animated by an impulse of repugnance for the task assigned him, which required a large share of sternness, and gave way to a feeling of sympathy for his prisoner. At any rate. under the view that he was a deserter, he seemed to think that the very fact that he held an important and 'responsible office under a Mil- itary Governor at that time particularly offensive to the people of the South, would give him eclat with these people and create a sensation,
315
AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
making him a hero in his estimation of the qualities and attributes that belong to that character. Poor fool! If this was the spring and motive of his conduct, he bitterly atoned for it in the treatment he re- ceived at the hands of those who, he fondly thought, would receive him with open arms and bursts of applause. Yet he received a balm for his physical suffering in the promotion and emoluments awarded him by the Government he had deserted, and this may have satisfied him in the end. As said before, the strangest part of this story is that he should have been rewarded for his self-imposed sufferings, when the fact of his desertion was made known at Nashville in a short time, by the publicity given to it by the Southern papers. To say the least of it, this story of Captain Dirks is a curious combination of the fickle- ness and favor of Fortune.
THE BATTLE OF ALLATOONA. Official Report of Major-General S. G. French.
COLUMBUS, GEORGIA, October 8, 1878. Dr. E. L. Drake-Dear Sir :-
TOUR letter of the 2d instant is received, and I send you my re- port of the battle of Allatoona. Fourteen years have now passed, and it has brought to light nothing concerning this battle that, for the truth of history, would require any material change of facts set forth in my report.
As regards the Federa accounts, I have seen but one that correctly states the cause of my withdrawing my forces. General Sherman, in his report, says the movement he directed of troops up the railroad had the desired effect of causing me to withdraw from Allatoona. That is the truth, and it was, I might say, the sole reason why I left the place. It subordinated all others. When I reached Allatoona my information was that there were but three regiments and a half forming the garrison, and I very properly demanded a surrender. Major D. W. Sanders waited at the works over twenty minutes for an answer; none was given him, and he returned. I never received any reply.
The depot of stores was in my possession, and would have been
316
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
destroyed during the fight, had it been deemed desirable to have done so then; but no one doubted the place would be taken. When with. drawing, however, I directed that they be burned, and, strange as it may at this day appear, only three matches could be found in the pos- session of all persons present, and those General F. M. Cockrell had, if I remember rightly, and not one of them would ignite.
The enemy, no doubt, did capture a good many small arms, as they relate, for our men exchanged many inferior muskets for fine Spring- field rifles, not being able to carry two to the man; others were left with the killed and wounded. The enemy appeared to have a regi- ment armed with what is now known as the " Winchester rifle." A few of them were captured.
The statements made in a number of Federal accounts that my com- mand was "driven off," or even repulsed at Allatoona, by the forces · there, is entirely erroneous.
Very respectfully, S. G. FRENCH.
Official Report of the Battle of Allatoona.
HEADQUARTERS FRENCH'S DIVISION, TUSCUMBIA, ALA., November 5, 1864.
GENERAL :- Some time since I had the honor to submit to you a brief preliminary report of the battle of Allatoona. As the reports of the Brigade Commanders are now in, I have the honor to forward one embracing some of the details of the battle. About noon on the 4th of October, when at Big Shanty, the following order was handed me by Lieutenant-General Stewart, it being a copy of one to him :
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, 7:30 A.M., October 4, 1864.
GENERAL :-- General Hood directs that later in the evening you move Stevenson back to Davis's X Roads, and that you bring two of your divisions back to Adams's, and between Adams's and Davis's X Roads, placing them in such way as to cover the position at Adams's now oc- cupied by Stevenson ; and that your third division (say French's) shall move up the railroad and fill up the deep cut at Allatoona with logs, brush, rails, dirt, etc. To-morrow morning, at daylight, he desires Stevenson to be moved to Lieutenant-General Lee's actual left, and that two of your divisions, at that time at Adams's, to draw back with your left in the neighborhood of Davis's > Roads, and your right in
317
AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
the neighborhood of Lost Mountain, and the division that will have gone to Allatoona to march thence to New Hope Church, and on the position occupied by your other troops-that is, that the division shall rejoin your command by making this march out from'the railroad and via New Hope.
General Hood thinks that it is probable that the guard at the rail- road bridge on Etowah is small; and when General French goes to Allatoona, if he can get such information as would justify him, if pos- sible, move to that bridge and destroy it.
General Hood considers that its destruction would be a great advan- tage to the army and the country. Should he be able to destroy the bridge, in coming out he could move, as has been before indicated, via New Hope. Yours, respectfully, (Signed) A. P. MASON, A. A. G. Official-W. D. GALE, A. A. G.
Major-General FRENCH, Commanding Division.
Soon after an order, of which the following is a copy, was sent me :
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF, October 4, 11:30, A. M., 1864.
GENERAL :- General Hood directs me to say that it is of the greatest importance to destroy the Etowah railroad bridge, if such a thing is possible. From the best information we have now, he thinks the enemy cannot disturb us before to-morrow, and by that time your main body will be near the remainder of our army. He suggests that, if it is considered practicable to destroy the bridge when the division goes there and the artillery is placed in position, the commanding officer call for volunteers to go to the bridge with lightwood and other combustible material that can be obtained, and set fire to it.
Yours, respectfully, A. P. MASON, Major and A. A. G. Lieutenant-General STEWART, Commanding.
General Stewart's Corps had struck the railroad at Big Shanty on the evening of the 3d, and all three of his divisions had worked all night in destroying the railroad from near Kennesaw up to Acworth Station. As we had been informed at Big Shanty that the Allatoona pass or cut was fortified, and that the enemy had there a garrison of three regiments, and had accumulated a considerable amount of pro- visions, it was considered a matter of importance that the place should
318
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
be captured; and, after the orders were handed me, General Stewart sent with me Major Myrick, with twelve pieces of artillery.
It would appear, however, from these orders, that the General-in- Chief was not aware that the pass was fortified and garrisoned that I was sent to have filled up.
Under these orders I left Big Shanty about 3:30 P.M., and marched to Acworth, a distance of six miles, arriving there before sunset. There I was detained, awaiting the arrival of rations, until II o'clock at night. As I knew nothing of the roads, the enemy's works or posi- tion, it was important to procure a guide, and at last a young man, or rather a boy, was found, who knew the roads, and had seen the posi- tion of the fortifications at Allatoona, he being a member of a cavalry company. At Acworth Captain Taylor, of Pinson's Regiment of Cav- alry, with twenty-five men, reported to me for duty. He was imme- diately directed to send fifteen men, under a trusty officer, to strike the railroad as near the Etowah railroad bridge as possible, and to take up rails and hide them, so as to prevent trains from reaching Allatoona with reinforcements, as well as to prevent any trains that might be there from escaping. From an eminence near Acworth the enemy could be seen communicating messages by their night signals from Allatoona with the station on Kennesaw, and to the east of us were the fires of a large encampment of the Federals, and apparently opposite Moon Station.
Citizens residing here informed me that there was a block-house, with a garrison of about one hundred men, at the Allatoona bridge; that at Allatoona there were two small redoubts, with outworks, defended with four pieces of artillery, and garrisoned with three and a half regiments of infantry.
About 11 P.M. the march was resumed. The night was very dark, and the roads bad.
After crossing Allatoona Creek, Colonel Adair, with the Fourth Reg- iment of Mississippi Volunteers and one piece of artillery, was left near the block-house, with instructions to surround it, capture the garrison, and destroy the bridge over the creek.
Continuing the march, the division arrived before Allatoona about 3 A.M. Nothing could be seen but one or two twinkling lights on the opposite heights, and nothing was heard except the occasional inter- change of shots between our advanced guards and the pickets of the garrison in the valley below. All was darkness. I had no knowledge of the place, and it was important to attack at the break of day.
319
AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY,
Taking the guide and lights, I placed the artillery in position on the hills south and east of the railroad, and the Thirty-ninth North Caro- lina Regiment, under Colonel Coleman, and the Thirty-second Texas were left as a supporting force, both under command of Colonel J. A. Andrews, commanding the latter regiment.
This being done, I proceeded with the guide to gain the heights or ridge crowned by the works of the enemy. Without roads or paths the head of the line reached the railroad, crossed it, and began the ascend- ing and descending of the high, steep and densely-timbered spurs of the mountains; and, after about an hour's march, it was found we were directly in front of the works, and not on the main ridge. The guide made a second effort to gain the ridge and failed, so dark was it in the woods. I thereupon determined to rest where we were, and await daylight. .
With dawn the march was resumed, and finally, by 7:30 o'clock in the morning, the head of the column was on the ridge, and about six hundred yards west of the fortifications, and between those he occu- pied and an abandoned redoubt on our left.
Here the fortifications, for the first time, were seen, and, instead of two redoubts, there were disclosed to us three redoubts on the west of the railroad cut, and a star fort on the east, with outer works, and the approaches defended to a great distance by abattis, and nearer the works by stockades and other obstructions.
The railroad emerges from the Allatoona Mountains by crossing this ridge through a cut sixty-five feet deep.
Dispositions for the assault were now made by sending General Sears's Brigade to the north side or rear of the works; General F. W. Cockrell's Missouri Brigade to rest with center on the ridge, while Gen- eral W. H. Young, with the four Texas regiments, was formed in rear of General Cockrell. Major Myrick had opened on the works with his artillery, and was ordered to continue his fire until the attacking force should interfere, or until he heard the vollies of musketry. Gen- eral Sears was to commence the assault on the rear, and when musketry was heard, General Cockrell was to move down the ridge, supported by General Young, and carry the works by (as it were) a flank attack.
So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the troops could not be got in position until about 9 A.M., when I sent in a summons to surrender. The flag was met by a Federal staff officer, and he was allowed seven- teen minutes to return with an answer. The time expired without any
" Corse give a culpa of the letter of summons, where : ' five minutes .
-
320
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
answer being received, whereupon Major D. W. Sanders, impatient at the delay, as bearer of the summons, broke off the interview and returned.
No reply being sent me, the order was given for the assault by di- recting the advance of Cockrell's Brigade. Emerging from the woods and passing over a long distance of abattis, formed of felled timber, and under a severe fire of musketry and artillery, nobly did it press forward, followed by the gallant Texans. The enemy's outer line and one redoubt soon fell. Resting to gather strength and survey the work before them, again they rushed forward in column, and in a mur- derous hand-to-hand conflict, that left the ditches filled with the dead. did they become masters of the second redoubt. The third and main redoubt, now filled by those driven from the captured works on the west side of the railroad, was further crowded by those that were driven out of the fort on the east side of the road by the attack made by General Sears. They had to cross the deep cut through which our artillery poured a steady and deadly fire. The Federal forces were now confined to one redoubt, and we occupied the ditch and almost entirely silenced their fire, and were preparing for the final attack.
Pending the progress of these events, I had received a note from General F. C. Armstrong, dated seven A.M., asking me at what time I would move toward New Hope and pass Acworth; informing me also that the enemy had moved up east of the railroad above Ken- nesaw, and encamped there last night. I had observed this movement when at Acworth. But, at 12:10 P.M., I received another dispatch from him, written at 9 A. M., saying : "My scouts report enemy's in- fantry advancing up the railroad. They are now entering Big Shanty. They have a cavalry force east of the railroad."
On the receipt of this second note from General Armstrong I took my guide aside and particularly asked him if, after the capture of the place, I could move to New Hope Church by any other route than the one by the block-house at Allatoona Creek, and thence by the Sand- town road to the Acworth and Dallas road, and he said I could not.
Here, then, was General Sherman's whole army close behind me, and the advance of his infantry moving on Ackworth, which changed the whole condition of affairs. Ammunition had to be carried from the wagons, a mile distant, at the base of the hills, by men, and I was satisfied it would take two hours to get it up and distribute it under fire before the final assault. I had learned from prisoners that before day-
321
AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
light the place had been reinforced by a brigade under General Corse. I knew the enemy was in Big Shanty at 9 A.M. By noon he could reach Acworth, and be within two miles of the road on which I was to reach New Hope Church. I knew General Stewart had been or- dered to near Lost Mountain. My men had marched 'all day on the 3rd; worked all the night of the 3rd destroying the railroad; that they had worked and marched all day on the 4th; marched to Alla- toona on the night of the 4th; had fought up to the afternoon of the 5th; and could they pass the third day and night without rest or sleep, if we remained to assault the remaining work ?
I did not doubt that the enemy would endeavor to get in my rear to intercept my return. He was in the morning but three hours distant, and had been signaled to repeatedly during the battle. Under these circumstances I determined to withdraw, however depressing the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen, and when, in all probability,we could force a surrender before night. Yet, however desirous I was for remaining before the last work and forcing a capitu- lation, or of carrying the work by assault, I deemed it of more im- portance not to permit the enemy to cut my division off from the army.
After deliberately surveying matters as they presented themselves to me, I sent word to General Sears to withdraw his men at once, mov- ing by the route he went in, and directed General Cockrell to with- draw at 1:30 o'clock P.M.
Before the action commenced, it was foreseen that it would be im- possible to carry any wounded on litters to the road where the ambu- lances were placed, owing to the steepness of the hills, the ravines and the dense woods. Accordingly, the wounded were brought to the springs near the ridge. All that could be moved without the use of litters were taken to the ambulances. The others were left in charge of surgeons detailed to remain with them.
The troops reformed on the original ground west of the works, and marched back to the south side, near the artillery, and, at 3:30 o'clock p.M., commenced the move toward New Hope. After the troops engaged in the assault had left, I rode on down to Colonel Andrews' position in front of the works, and directed him to remain until 5 o'clock p.M., and then withdraw and move on in our rear.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.