USA > Tennessee > The Annals of the Army of Tennessee and early western history, including a chronological summary of battles and engagements in the western armies of the Confederacy > Part 31
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the first importance, and, therefore, companies, battalions and regi- ments offering for twelve months will be at once received." His ca !!. on the other Governors were couched in similar language, and all dated 2 Ist of September, 1861. In the face of his authority could anybody detect in this call a single objectionable feature ? Yet, on the 16th of October-less than a month-the Secretary of War wrote him as fo !. "lows : " Your call for troops on Mississippi and other States will, I am informed, produce embarrassment. When General Polk was sent to, take command of the department now under your orders, he was in- structed that he might use his own discretion in the calls on Arkansas and Tennessee, but not to draw on Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana or Georgia, without the consent of this department. The reason for this was, that Arkansas and Tennessee had not yet been subjected to any considerable drain of men, whereas the other States mentioned had been furnishing largely since the beginning of the war, and it was de- sired to proportion the calls on the different States with a due regard to their numbers of men capable of bearing arms. Signed, J. P. Benjamin, Acting Secretary of War."
The question naturally arises, Why, then, authorzie General John- ston to call on Mississippi at all? In reply, however, the General tells the Secretary : "The call upon Mississippi was small, compared with that on Tennessee, as only part of that State is within the limits of my department. I had no means of ascertaining the relative pro- portion of troops furnished before by each State, nor was I aware that instructions had been given Major-General Polk to refrain from mak- ing further calls on Mississippi."
It will be seen that "dispatch, now, is of the first importance, and. therefore, companies, battalions and regiments offering for twelve months will be at once received." The habit of volunteering for twelve months was familiar to our people. It was obvious they would come out more promptly than for an indefinite war period, and the Governors called for twelve months' men to fill this requsition. It would have been supposed, with the Arkansas 10,000 to go to McCulloch, and the War Department frowning down the call on Mississippi, that General John- ston would at least be let alone with his remaining 30, 000 called from Tennessee. Not so. On the 25th of October, the Secretary of War. amongst other things, stated divers objections to the agreement et General Johnston to accept twelve months' men, and adds : " I beg you will act promptly in this or some other manner, as shall seem to you
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best, but to get rid of the twelve months' unarmed men." * A circular, for General Johnston's guidance, accompanied this letter, the first item of which is: "1. No unarmed .troops can be accepted for a less period than during the war."
Up to the time of these peremptory instructions from the War Min- ister, but few troops had been mustered into service under this call ; most of those who had volunteered being still under State authority at the different rendezvous and without arms. As a soldier, General Johnston was bound to obey, and, accordingly, issued orders for the mustering out, and notified the Governors that he was no longer at liberty to accept the unarmed men in their camps. The effects are palpable : Johnston could get no army in time to successfully cope with the heavy masses of the enemy in his front, and the people were deluded into the belief that he had all the troops he wanted. The hope of being able even to hold his line of defense "vanished, like the baseless fabric of a vision." Doubtless the reasons for such orders were satisfactory to the War Department and Government. We have no word of censure for either of the eminent men at their respective heads; but the facts which occurred are matters of public history. The emergency was so pressing that on the 19th of November-in less than twenty days after he had received these unfortunate instruc- tions-General Johnston was compelled to ask the Governors of Ten- nessee, Alabama and Mississippi "to call out every loyal soldier of the militia into whose hands arms can be placed, or to provide a vol- unteer force large enough to use all the arms that can be procured ;" and added : "A volunteer force is more desirable, if it can be raised as promptly as the militia, as more economical and producing less in- convenience to the citizen; but time now is of the first importance, that I may cover the homes of your citizens and save them from the sufferings always attending an invasion." On the 29th of the same month he wrote the Secretary of War: "We are making every possi- ble exertion to meet the forces the enemy will soon array against us, both at this place (Bowling Green) and at Columbus. Had the exi- gency for my call for fifty thousand men in September been better compre- hended and responded to, our preparations for this great emergency would nowe be complete." These italics are our own, and are given that the reader may not lose the full significance of his words.
It was generally believed that General Johnston had So, ooo troops at Bowling Green, but the gross inadequacy of his actual force may
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be seen from the following extract from his letter to the Secretary of War, dated 25th of December : "Information from various sources shows every effort has been made by General Buell to concentrate all his strength for a movement upon Tennessee through Central Ken- tucky, and that not less than 75,000 men are assembled in front of me, while I have not more than 17,000 men for active operations." Almost as great disproportions existed on his right and left wings.
General Johnston's instructions to Zollicoffer, dated 4th December, were as follows: " The most essential route to be guarded is that lead- ing through Somerset and Monticello, as in my opinion most practi- cable for the enemy. Mill Springs would seem to answer best to all the demands of the service; and from this point you may be able to observe the river, without crossing it, as far as Burkesville, which is de- sirable." On the 10th, Zollicoffer acknowledged receipt, and added : "I infer from yours that I should not have crossed the river, but it is now too late." He had crossed the day before, and commenced to fortify at Beech Grove, on the north side. Early in January, Major-General George B. Crittenden arrived there, soon took the initiative, and on the 19th sustained the disaster of Fishing Creek, where the gallant Zollicoffer was killed. Thus General Johnston's right was shattered and turned, despite his every effort to strengthen, equip and hold it. On the 6th of February, the gunboats attacked and captured Fort Henry, thus putting the Tennessee River under the control of the enemy, and turning both Nashville and Bowling Green on the left. A retreat was inevitable. It was evident Donelson would be at- tacked. This was a stronger work than Henry, was on the water-way from Nashville, and must not be given up without a struggle. Small as was his force, General Johnston sent 8,000 of his troops, under Floyd (chief), Pillow (second) and Buckner (third in command), to its defense ; leaving less than 10,000 effectives, with which he crossed the river at Nashville, to protect that capital against Buell, if Donel- son held out. On the 14th he telegraphed Floyd : "If you lose the Fort, bring your troops to Nashville, if possible." That day the gun- boats opened fire and were beaten back, but the Fort was invested on the land-side. A council of war resulted in a determination to cut their way out and retreat to Nashville. Some troops were moved out for the purpose, but, strangely enough, were ordered back, and the day passed off. In the meantime, the enemy were receiving and massing heavy reinforcements. That night it was determined to re-
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new the effort the next day. It was done, the enemy's right was doubled back, the way opened for safe egress; but, in the teeth of Buckner's earnest advice, the troops were again ordered back into the entrenchments, and that night agreed to be surrendered! Neither Floyd or Pillow would do this; left the army with Buckner, their sub- ordinate, for the purpose, went themselves to Nashville, and for this were afterward suspended from further command, under orders from the Government. Buckner, sharing the fate of his men, was made prisoner next morning, and the army, arms and munitions, with the fort, went into the hands of the enemy. Very soon afterward the present writer heard from the lips of President Davis the following criticism upon the course of the Generals at Donelson, which is so characteristic that it is here given. Said he: "As the fort was agreed to be untenable, they had four courses open to them, and but four. One was to destroy all they could not take away with them, throw the armed men across the river, keeping it as a ditch between them and the superior forces of the enemy, and thus retreat; or else cut their way out and save what they could of the army, leaving the naked fort to the enemy ; or destroying all arms, munitions, etc., surrender only the men and fort; or surrender men, arms, munitions, fort and all- the worst of the four -- which they have done." This disaster startled the public like a thunder-clap from a clear sky. Your pages have already de- scribed the scenes at Nashville. The excitement and confusion was by no means confined to that city; it assumed the proportion of a general popular clamor demanding General Johnston's removal from command. Press, politicians and the panic-stricken people united in denouncing him, but all failed to shake his self-poised equanimity or the well-grounded confidence of the President in his pre-eminent ability. The Govern- ment, however, was aroused, sent to his aid all reinforcements which could be spared, and these were ordered to Corinth. A question has been raised, and even of late somewhat discussed, whether the honor of this concentration belongs to General Johnston or another. The volume before us is full of the most convincing proof that the plan was General Johnston's, and was successfully executed by him in person. President Davis does not hesitate to state, as a fact, that the strategic movements by which the army was assembled at Corinth, preliminary to the battle of Shiloh, were agreed upon beforchand be- tween General Johnston and himself. Indeed, if the situation is con- sidered, it is not credible that any man of ordinary sense, in General
VOL. I, NO. VII .- 2.
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Johnston's position, would have failed to see this was not only the wise thing, but the only thing, to be done. The Tennessee River turned his position, compelling his retreat beyond it; the railroads under his control, North, East, South and West, crossing Corinth, enabled him to collect detachments and reinforcements more rapidly at that than any other point. Grant was massing an army at Pittsburg Landing, right in front of it, and Buell must march with his forces from Nash- ville before both their armies could unite, promising an opportunity to beat them in detail. In the name of common sense, what was he to do but mass all the forces he could get and crush Grant, leaving Buell far down within his lines, and face to face with the victorious Confed- erates? We must think this matter will no longer be considered de- batable. On the 3d of April the army was ordered to move forward, for the purpose of attacking Grant at 8 o'clock A. M. on Saturday, the 5th. On Friday night a heavy rain made the already bad roads almost impassable, and more than one detachment was delayed. It has been the general impression that this was the special fault of some particular General, but the facts given in this book leave no doubt that the cause was rain, making the roads impassable-a mere chance of fortune, or " providential dispensation," according to our notion. Says the author: "Under the circumstances, it is useless to attach censure to particular individuals or commands." This result of a calm and dis- passionate examination of all the known facts will, no doubt, be as gratifying to our readers as it is to ourselves. We would not willingly believe that in movements so important any one of our men had been justly censurable. At any rate, the fact is that instead of making the attack in the morning, the line of battle was not fully formed until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and "a day was lost." It was, how- ever, then established, and the Confederate army, of less that 40,000 men of all arms, stood in the immediate front of 60,000 Federals on their own chosen camping-ground, under the command of men whose fame has since filled the civilized world. But the more illy-clad, ill- armed, raw and undisciplined Confederates were themselves com- manded by men who, in the varied departments of their special excel- Iencies, presented a group of true military worth the like of which has rarely, if ever, been equaled. To say nothing of such men as Bate, Cheatham, Wheeler, Stewart, Gladden, Breckinridge, Cleburne, For- est and others, there, commanding the front line, stood Hardee, known in after times as " Old Reliable." At the head of the next line stood
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Bragg, whose first laurels were won at Buena Vista. Next Polk, the Bishop-General, who, with patriotic ardor, had stepped out of the pulpit to smite with the sword of Gideon his country's invaders. Then Beau- regard, whose genius as an engineer and artillerist has sent his name sounding down the ages as long as old Atlantic shall roll a wave into Charleston Harbor. And over them all, grandly towering, was Sidney Johnston, with his majestic presence, lofty heroism, and whole bushel of brains. Such was the scene upon which the sun went tranquilly down that night.
Very soon after the line of battle was fully established, an incident took place which, with a less able man at the head of the army, would probably have prevented the battle of Shiloh. It was an accidental colloquy, which really assumed the dignity of a council of war, and was held between Generals Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg, Polk and Breck- inridge, Hardee not being present, but at his post in the front line. In the conference General Beauregard urged, with all the might of his rank, prestige and influence, that the army should be withdrawn with- out a battle, and the purpose for which they had marched and were then deployed should be given up. In this he was not opposed by any of his subordinates present, except the Bishop-General, who was openly for the attack. General Johnston terminated the council by a peremptory order to open the battle at daylight next morning, and turning away, with evident surprise and chagrin, remarked significantly to his brother-in-law, Preston, "Polk is a true soldier and a friend." These words are pregnant with meaning. He thus shouldered the whole responsibility, gave the highest pledge that he would make it a success, and silenced all question that but for him Shiloh, with its glo- ries and melancholy memories, would never have been fought. After his death it was supposed that, stung to desperation by the misguided abuse of his countrymen, he had recklessly thrown his life away. Nothing could be further from the truth. To those who knew him, no explanation is needed. They would as soon expect to see the sun moved from his course through heaven by the dust of a passing whirl- wind, as Sidney Johnston from the path of appropriate duty by an ill- judging clamor. At every time and everywhere his eye was fixed singly and unselfishly upon his country's cause. To those who knew him not, it will be sufficient to state the facts. His army was the smaller, and but few of them had ever been under fire; they were less instructed in maneuvres, worse armed and equipped, and to be led by
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Generals the most prominent of whom did not wish the battle fought, and were ordered to fight it. He knew, too, that this was to be a de- cisive battle; that if its grand purpose was a success-if Grant and Sherman were crushed, their army destroyed, their arms and munitions captured, that Buell, far down within his lines, suddenly confronting the victorious Confederates, could scarcely hope to recross the Ohio with a corporal's guard ; that the South would be electrified, an army would flock to his standard with which he could invade, whilst Lee moved forward from the East, and that soon his beloved South would be acknowledged as a free and independent nation. All this he saw and felt, and of this alone he thought. He fought the battle as he had ordered, and amidst the fire and smoke, the rattle of small arms, and thunder of cannon, grandly and gloriously with his heroic little army he overwhelmed, routed and crushed the masses of the enemy, till at last he fell and expired in the very arms of victory. With him, alas! that bright vision, which, had he lived, we doubt not would have been realized, vanished into shadow, which, with an occasional gleam here and there, steadily and surely deepened into the inky blackness of the final surrender. We have no heart to describe this brilliant but fruit- less battle ; that is well done by the author of this book, which we again commend to every English reader as worthy of perusal, and close, by reproducing a life-like pen-and-ink picture of General John- ston, that those of our readers who did not know, may see him as he was in life.
In person General Johnston was tall, square-shouldered, full-chested and muscular. He was neither lean nor fat, but healthily full, without grossness, indicating great bodily strength. His bust was superb, the neck and head mounting upward from the shoulders with majestic grace. His compact jaws terminated in a chin somewhat prominent and but slightly square, above which one of the very few really orna- mental moustaches ever worn by man partly concealed, but could not render ferocious, the sweet and genial expression of his mouth. Over this stood somewhat boldly forth the clear-cut and expanded nostrils of a broad-based nose which, slightly inclining upward, grew out from beneath his prominently developed brow where thought sat as upon a throne. His full and angular though rounded forehead rose upward till its high " window's peaks" were lost under dark brown hair a little mixed with gray, extremely fine and wavy, almost to curls. His deep- set, blue-gray eyes, small, and, when unexcited, somewhat dull, were
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of that sort which Campbell describes as " melting in love and kindling in war." Over these features a skin naturally soft, white and clear, though now slightly bronzed from exposure, completed a picture of more than ordinary manly beauty. Courage and modesty, intellect and goodness, cheerfully divided the empire over his expressive face.
When absorbed in thought his head leaned forward and his body slightly bent. At all other times he was strikingly erect. His sol- dierly port, devoid of stiffness, was characterized by a dignified and benevolent repose, at once calm, self-poised, simple and unostentatious. I do not remember a man filling high position so utterly uncontami- nated by that vulgar " divinity which doth hedge a king." There was, in both his appearance and bearing, that nameless something which, while it chastened impertinence, invited confidence, and rendered even the humblest at perfect ease in his presence. He was eminently ap- proachable to everybody of every rank and condition in life. Neither his movement while walking, nor his manner in repose, could justly be called awkward, yet neither was light and airy; in fact, there was in both something too ponderous for grace. On horseback his appear- ance excited universal admiration. A cavalier by instinct and train- ing, he sat upon a horse as if, centaur-like, he had grown up part of him. Whenever his soldiers caught sight of him in the saddle their shouts were irrepressible.
Ordinarily his conversation was grave, the style being simple, vigor- ous and rigidly concise. His manner of talking was slow, measured and thoughtful, evincing an anxious care to choose the very words which would express only his exact meaning. From this care to say just the thing he meant he never departed. Still, socially, he was one of the most interesting of men. His scholarship was ripe; his knowl- edge of books, of men and of things was extensive and varied. His views, always comprehensive and clear, never failed in their expression to rivet attention and confer pleasure. To his cheerful temper was superadded a fund of the richest humor, which not unfrequently sparkled into diamond-pointed wit. The prominent and distinguishing features of his intellect, however, were an intense perception and real- ization of surrounding circumstances; a power of analysis which no complication of facts could baffle ; a logical accuracy of thought which could follow the most delicate clew through the mazes of any labyrinth ; and a solid judgment which correctly estimated forces and values. Of the use of these faculties he was perfect master. They were thor
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oughly disciplined-enlightened by extensive knowledge, and perfected by a larger experience. His sound sense, therefore, was of that per- fect kind which constitutes wisdom.
To strangers his intellectual action seemed to be slow. This was a misapprehension, requiring for its correction only a better knowledge of the man. In communicating his thoughts to the outer world, in the use of the mere machinery of words, he was simply unready. Where words were not to be used, but things were to be done; where his thoughts were to be translated directly into acts, they moved with all the quickness and force of the electric flash. Of oratorical power he had none. Like Moses, he was "slow of speech," and could write better than he spoke. Some men can both speak and write greatly above their true intellectual worth. In neither could Sidney Johnston approach the very high mark of his own, and he was fully conscious of the defect. In counsel he was always great-in action, greater still ; as at Shiloh, where, in penetrating the designs of the enemy and ·thwarting them, in seizing at a glance the decisive points of the battle- field, and concentrating upon them more troops than could be opposed to 'him, in grasping his army, hurling it like a thunderbolt upon the foes and scattering all opposition from before him, his genius blazed forth in all its full-orbed splendor and glory. In his short career as a Confederate General, that victory is his greatest monument. Alas! that the "proud temple he builded there" should have crumbled into dust at his death. But its, memory and his will live in the bosoms of his countrymen as long as there is left on earth one true Confederate heart-beat. To these high intellectual gifts was united a large-hearted goodness of which he was " full as the dew-drop of the morning beam." Together they shed upon his name a lustre belonging of right only to the immortals. I close this sketch with a few illustrative anecdotes.
While we were at Bowling Green, a man claiming to hail from Nashville presented himself at headquarters and inquired for me. Being shown in, he said a certain friend of mine had directed him to make my acquaintance, as he had something important to communi- cate. I soon saw he only desired to get into communication with the General, and presented him. He was a glib talker, but had a counte- nance at once acute, sinister and malignant. I saw the General fix his gaze upon him as. the fellow at once went on to tell how "above all earthly things he had the Southern cause at heart; that he believed Andrew Johnson was the most dangerous enemy we had in Tennessee,
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if not in the whole South, and that his death would be a public bene- faction ; that he knew just where he was in South-eastern Kentucky. and that he could be easily disposed of at a trifling cost of money." The General rose up and said : "Sir, the Government which I serve meets its enemies in open and honorable warfare. It scorns alike the assassin's knife and the debased scoundrel who would suggest its use !" .It is scarcely necessary to add that there was a vacant seat instantane- ously in that room. The General turned to me and said, "That scoundrel wanted me to bribe him to assassinate Andrew Johnson."
On another day, while riding, we came unexpectedly upon a Colo- nel who was a West-Pointer, and had made a most favorable impression at headquarters. He was in the midst of a portion of his regiment. cursing and d-ning the men at a furious rate. After we had passed, the General remarked : "That man has not as much sense as I had believed ; he does not know how to command men. It is an error to suppose it can be done by fear. The true secret of command lies in the exercise of' moderation, united with superior sense and justice. No man can command others with permanent success unless he has learned to command himself. Nor is this a regular army; these are people who have left their homes to fight for their independence. All they require is a little patient instruction." And few officers know this.
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