USA > Tennessee > The Annals of the Army of Tennessee and early western history, including a chronological summary of battles and engagements in the western armies of the Confederacy > Part 12
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VOL. I, NO. III. -- 2.
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I14
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
pede the enemy's dash ; besides, a portion of the works was without head-logs. The Federal troops fought bravely, and it is evident that nothing but the unflinching courage of the defenders saved the place from capture. A like success attended our arms on all parts of the field. It was not regarded at the time by the Confederates as a gen- eral assault, on account of its feebleness in most places. None of them . ever entertained an idea that Sherman would commit the folly of mak- ing such an attack, however eager they may have been for him to make as many trials as he wished.
General Johnston says in his narrative, pages 342-3 : "But the most powerful attack fell upon Cheatham's Division and the left of Cle- burne's. The lines of the two armies were much nearer to each other there; therefore the action was begun at shorter range. The Federal troops were in greater force and deeper order, too, and pressed forward with the resolution always displayed by the American soldier when prop- erly led. An attempt to turn the left was promptly met and defeated by Cheatham's reserve-Vaughan's Brigade." As Vaughan's Brigade was not in reserve, but on the main line and actively engaged, General Johnston is certainly in error. But he continues : "After maintaining the contest for near three-quarters of an hour, until more of their sol- diers lay dead and wounded than the number of British that fell in General Jackson's celebrated Battle of New Orleans, the foremost of their dead laying against our works, they retired unsuccessful : because they had encountered intrenched infantry unsurpassed by Na- poleon's Old Guard or that which followed Wellington into France out of Spain."
The Losses.
The First and Twenty-seventh Tennessee regiments lost twenty- seven (27) men killed and wounded. Among the killed were George B. Allen, James Carrigan, Ed. Ferris and Jerry Cook, of the Rock City Guards; James Brandon, of Co. H; Frank Lynch, of Co. F; Hus- ton McGarr, of Co. L; Dick Abernathy, of Co. K, and Captain Beas- ley, of the Twenty-seventh. Among the wounded were Colonel H. R. Fields, Captain W. D. Kelly, W. W. Southgate, Whitfield, E. A. Coldwell and W. S. McLemore, of the Rock City Guards; George Reddick, Co. L; - Thompson, Co. K, and a Lieutenant of the Twenty-seventh.
The enemy's loss was very heavy. Three hundred and eighty-five (385) dead were counted in front of Maney's Brigade on the 29th, when
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AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
the Federal burial parties were at work under flag of truce, which occu- pied eight hours. General Johnston says: "After the action of June :; th, we counted one thousand (1000) dead of the Army of the Cum- berland lying before two of Hardee's divisions, very near, some against, our works. The calculated proportion of wounded to killed Is five to one ; this would indicate a loss of six thousand (6,000) there." General Sherman, in his Memoirs, pp. 60-61, vol. II, states his loss at twenty-five hundred (2,500); five hundred (500) by McPherson, and near two thousand (2,000) by Thomas' attack on Hardee. But this is not the only statement that he has given. Abbott, in his Civil War in America, vol. II, p. 455, quotes General Sherman as saying: "Both attacks failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals McCook and Harker and Colonel Rice, and others badly wounded; our aggregate loss being near eight thousand (8,000)." The dead in front of General Vaughan are not counted in with those in front of Maney. My recollection is that it was five hundred and forty (540), which would make a total of nine hundred and twenty-five (925) in front of Cheatham's Division.
The enemy, after his repulse, began fortifying under the hill, about sixty yards in our right front, and being protected by the nature of the ground, trees and boxes filled with earth, soon had strong works, from which an incessant firing was kept up, without effect, until the night of the 2nd of July, when General Johnston fell back beyond Marietta. We should have stated, in its proper place, that the night after the battle head logs were placed on the works occupied by the Rock City Guards, and krveaux de frise thrown over in front. At the point of the works near- est the enemy, the head-logs and cheveaux de frise had, before our with- drawal, been literally shot to pieces with bullets. The fire of the en- emy hardly slackened day or night.
P. S .- Since writing the above, I have received from General George W. Gordon a statement of his recollections concerning the number of the enemy's dead, which also shows the terrible carnage, and what the enemy had to encounter in front of Vaughan's Brigade :
MEMPHIS, TENN., April 30, 1878.
My Dear Sir: Yours of the 16th current, inquiring about the num- Wer of Federal troops killed in front of General Cheatham's Division in the assault upon what was popularly known as the "Dead Angle," on the Kennesaw Mountain line, is to hand. Two days after the assault, I was out among the dead under a flag of truce, and saw a great many
II6
THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
of the killed, but did not count them. I remember distinctly, how- ever, that while out on the field among the dead, the number of killed was discussed between myself and other Confederates or Federals with whom I had conversations during the truce, and when the matter was being discussed some one present (I cannot say whether Federal or Confederate) said that the dead had been counted, and that there were · eight hundred killed outright, besides the wounded, and I was so dis- tinctly impressed with this statement, that in alluding to this assault, and the horrible scenes there witnessed, I have always spoken of the number of dead on the field as eight hundred. As indicating the in- tensity of this slaughter, I remember to have seen eleven dead Feder- als around one large tree in front of the position occupied by the Eleventh and Twenty-ninth regiments of Vaughan's Brigade (my regi- ment being the Eleventh), behind which tree they had evidently taken refuge, but where they were subject to a destructive enfilading fire from the One Hundred and Fifty-fourth and Thirteenth, and Twelfth and Forty-seventh regiments of the same brigade. Another fact may be mentioned as illustrating why the carnage was so great. I observed that many of the guns of the dead were uncapped, but loaded and bay. onets fixed. On asking why this was so, I was informed that the front line of the assaulting four brigades had been ordered to storm our position with fixed bayonets and guns uncapped to prevent it from halt- ing to fire in the event it should encounter obstructions, being ordered not to halt at all, but to pass all obstructions and give us the bayonet. They did encounter obstructions in the form of thirty paces of strong abatis; earthworks with head-logs, and cheveaux de frise above the head- logs. These obstructions were too formidable to be passed under fire. and the carnage was frightful. Only a few ever passed through the abatis and reached the earthworks and they were killed on the outside. But this is beyond the scope of your inquiry.
Very truly yours, G. W. GORDON.
Putting the loss in Maney's front at three hundred and eighty-five (385), this would make the loss in front of Vaughan four hundred and fifteen (415) killed, and counting three wounded to one killed, the total loss in front of Cheatham would be thirty-two hundred (3, 200). To summarize :
Federal loss in front of Cheatham 3200
Cleburne 1 800
.€
Loring 2500
Bate and Walker
Total
7500
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AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
The following is a summary of the casualties of Cheatham's Division during the time the army was on the Kennesaw line, from June 17th to July 2d, as shown by the official report of Dr. Rice, Chief Surgeon, August 6, 1864:
BRIGADES. .
WOUNDED.
KILLED.
Maney's.
75
· 22
Strahl's
43
4
Vaughan's
82
II
Carter's
29
5
Grand total
229
42
NOTE .- Those marked " killed" were killed on the field, and many of those under the head of "wounded " died at the Field Infirmary. A discrepancy al- ways exists between the Adjutant General's report and the Surgeon's report, from the fact that many are slightly wounded, who are not disabled for duty, that never report to the Field Infirmary.
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
FTER the lapse of sixteen years, the smoke of this battle-field still obscures many of its features, judging from the ideas of it yet pre- vailing among most historical writers. All accounts seem to be simply a rehash of the first impressions which went forth to the country, ex- cept that of General Thomas J. Jordan, of General Beauregard's staff, which puts the whole movement in a clearer light than any we have
seen. The writer cautiously refrains from any but the most obvious deductions and criticisms, and if he has told all that he knows, it is well and commendable. But this battle-field was in the purview of many witnesses, and until these speak its story is yet incomplete. Beyond what General Jordan has written (and his sketch of these operations will become classical as a piece of fine military description), there has been no studied account in print on the Confederate side, and many of those on the Northern side have been prepared, rather to bolster up the military reputations of men now famous, than to deal justly and fairly with the facts abundantly in reach.
The successful attack of the Confederates on the 6th of April, the fill of their noble commander, the utter rout of Grant's army, the pre- sumed opportunity consequent on this for its capture or destruction, the
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THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
arrival of Buell and his attack on the 7th, while the Confederates were "rioting in the spoil of the captured camp," and their defeat: these assumed facts are considered all that is worth knowing upon which to predicate confident criticism. General Beauregard, in his letter to the "ANNALS," complains of the injustice done him by ignorant or incon- siderate writers, and with good reason, as he explains in his letter pub- lished in the April No. of the "ANNALS." Pending the great struggle for Southern independence, there occurred no proper time for a discus- sion of this battle, the good of the service requiring reticence on the part of the Commanding General and those at issue with him. Fur- ther, important official reports were suppressed from the public; conse- quently the materials of truthful history have not been available to writers, and no one, that we are aware, has taken the trouble to dig up the facts and put them in print.
These reflections have been called forth by reading in the March No. of the Southern Historical Society Papers, for 1878, the advance sheets of General Richard Taylor's "Reminiscences." He dismisses the points of this battle in a dozen lines, but amends with a page and a half of heartbreaking tribute to the life and services of the "foremost man of the Confederacy," Albert Sidney Johnston. Under the head- ing of "Gettysburg," on a previous page, he expresses a purpose to "dwell on Shiloh," but as his work seems to be of the nature of per- sonal reminiscences, we are compelled to suppose that under the head- ing of "Shiloh " he embraces all he will have to say of this battle. His short summary of its events repeats the old story, and coming as it does from such a distinguished source, we are loth to dissent from some of his statements, but feel compelled to do so in justice to the men who fought one of the hardest battles of the war. As to his statement that General Beauregard took little part in the direction of affairs after General Johnston's fall, on account of want of time in which to "gath- er the reins," he being in a distant part of the field, we have nothing to say, further than to express the opinion that such was a difficult task indeed in the heat of a great battle then being fought in a thick forest by raw troops. But we beg leave to differ with him as to the course of events on the 7th of April. He says that "Buell attacked with fresh troops on this day, and finding the Confederates rioting in the spoil of the captured camps, drove them from the field with loss." This is a most discreditable accusation, if true, and being so curtly expressed, his words convey that meaning without any qualification. While it is
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AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
true that the Confederates did finally abandon the field, the statement of General Taylor fails signally to convey a correct idea of the real facts in the case. For the present, we only wish to state that General Beau- regard's lines were in as good order as was possible under the circum- stances, many of his men having sought their Friday night's encamp- ment some distance from the field, and consequently were not readily available at first. There was no "rioting in the spoil of the captured camp" on this day, or the day previous. This word expresses vastly more than was applicable on these occasions, and has too long done duty as scapegoat for the Confederate failure. There was no bodily breaking of ranks on either day for the purpose of plunder; no prowling in the spirit or to the extent afterwards practiced on less tempting fields. Curiosity was great, but often satisfied with the appropriation of arti- cies of trifling value as mementoes. Our recollection is that some cap- tured animals still remained unmolested in the camps in front of Shiloh Church at the opening of the second day's fight. The field was far from being gleaned of valuable trophies at the time the Confederates retreated. . The work of spoliation, as far as it was practiced, was done the evening before, after the cessation of active forward movements, and little time was allowed for this business on Monday morning when the firing at the front warned all without further instructions to fall into their places or seek safety anywhere but in the captured camps, which were soon to become the theater of another hard conflict. The truth is, the disintegration in the Confederate ranks was not due to the temp- tations of camp spoil, but to many causes combined. With many of the troops engaged it was their first battle, and the shock was fearful. We know that some Tennessee regiments in Cleburne's Brigade lost fifty (50) per cent. in taking Sherman's camp alone. The average gen- eral loss in the infantry regiments was over thirty-three (33) per cent., nearly all of this belonging to the first day's operations. These facts tell the tale of Confederate disintegration. Thirty-three per cent. of killed and wounded means over fifty per cent. hors du combat, including un- der this head stragglers and attendants on the wounded.
The nature of the ground, with its obstacles of ravines, tangled brush and marshes, was another factor which operated largely in breaking the order of battle and making confusion. Thus, we knew of regiments which had to take a concentrated and converging fire while in column at the crossings of marshes. The truth is, there were few battles of the war fought under greater difficulties of advance than this; otherwise,
.
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THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
Grant's army would have been routed several hours earlier, and ruined without doubt. As it was, this army was repeatedly enabled to take up strong defensive positions and hold them with some success against isolated attacks which were often made by single regiments, and for which they "most grievously atoned." One of Sherman's brigades, posted to the right of Shiloh Church in his line, probably Buckland's, occupied a strong position, covered in front by a marshy stream diffi- cult to cross, and inflicted a fearful loss on Cleburne's Brigade as it advanced by regiment into position. In fact, this was one of the most stubborn combats on the field, and was finally terminated in favor of Cleburne by successes elsewhere, as he was only able to hold his place under fire without power to advance.
The statement that the Confederates were "driven" from the field on Monday, needs a great deal of qualification, if it is meant by this that they were forced back at the muzzle of Grant's guns, vi et armis. As far as we have been able to ascertain, the only successful attack made by a single body of Federals on this day was by Hazen's Brigade, a mile or so from Shiloh Church on our right, and this advantage was relinquished in a short time on the first appearance of a hostile advance to recover the lost ground. When the last Confederate brigade with- drew from the vicinity of Shiloh Church, nearly a half hour had elapsed since all musket firing had ceased. Under the effect of their last re- pulse at this point, and the artillery fire with which General Beaure- gard covered his withdrawal, the backward movement of Grant's lines · seemed to amount to a temporary abandonment of the field here. How far this movement extended right and left, we are unable to say, but in front of Stewart's Brigade no "blue line" was visible, and the open- ings in the forest gave vistas of fully half a mile. Further, several pieces of the enemy's artillery, posted a long way off, fully three-quar- ters of a mile, shelled the intervening woods, and this is evidence that Stewart's front was cleared for that distance and to that depth. There is another fact which can be mentioned in this connection as corrobo- rative of the above statement. General Grant says he drove the Con- federates from the field at 4 p.M. General Beauregard says he had completed the withdrawal of his forces at 212 P.M., without molesta- tion. The discrepancy of these two statements can be accounted for only on the supposition that the former was too far from the front to note the fact of the latter's withdrawal. From the character of the en- emy's advance on this day, the feebleness of his attack and the situa-
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AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
tion of affairs at 2 o'clock p. M., we think that the opinion may be safely ventured that two fresh brigades at General Beauregard's disposal would have enabled him to hold the field and possibly to have forced Grant back to the shelter of his gunboats. The effect of General Beau- regard's presence along the lines was magnetic. Wherever he ap- peared, loud cheers rang out and fell with ominous force on the ears of the advancing enemy; and when at one stage he ordered an advance, the troops went forward with shouts of confidence, although they knew they were fighting fresh troops, in spite of the General's protestation that "they were the same men they had beaten the day before." We will mention several circumstances which will illustrate the character and quality of the Federal fighting on this day. We saw a line yield a good position and retreat pell-mell before a shot had been fired at it, fleeing simply from a display of force. In no instance during the day, and we witnessed four or five different combats, did the enemy sustain an advance under musketry longer than fifteen minutes. These men went into battle with a bugaboo idea gotten from their friends who were beaten the day before, that the rebels were in overwhelming force; consequently each step of their pathway was strewn with imaginary pitfalls, and Beauregard's heroic defense gave the color of truth to such forebodings. The result was, the splendid Army of the Cumberland was awed into playing an almost passive part on a field where it alone outnumbered its antagonist nearly two to one.
These remarks on this great battle have been extended further than we intended, our object at the outset being only to call attention to what we considered some common misconceptions in regard to it. General Beauregard promises at no distant day to give a full history of this unequal contest, and from his thorough comprehension of the whole movement and acquaintance with its details, we hope he will be relieved by its publication of the injustice he has suffered at the hands of inconsiderate or ignorant writers. We, ourselves, had always been of the opinion that he might have held the field on Monday with his artillery, giving a tit-for-tat for what he had suffered the evening before, until we learned through his letter published in the April No. of the "ANNALS," that two of Buell's corps, which had not yet participated in the fight, were in a position to inflict a great disaster on the thinned and exhausted ranks of the Confederates. We suppose the term "corps" means a corps d'armee, and is not used in a more general sense. A commander has often to act in the face of great peril and decide
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THE ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
weighty matters from a momentary consideration. In such cases he might as well act upon the toss of a penny as to hope to reach the best conclusion by any species of ratiocination he could bring to bear on the question. Posterity will be apt to decide that General Beauregard acted wisely with the lights before him in withdrawing his exhausted army to a place of safety, while he had the power to do so.
VIEUX SECONDE.
DIARY OF PRIVATE W. J. DAVIDSON, COM- PANY C, FORTY-FIRST TENNES- SEE REGIMENT.
[Continued.]
PORT HUDSON, LA., Feb. 27, 1863.
W TE arrived at this port yesterday at noon, having made a quick run from the scene of our late action, coming through without acci- dent or incident worthy of note. The rest of the fleet went up Red river, I suppose, as we have not seen them since night before last. They have a part of our command and some are up the Mississippi. We are badly scattered, which speaks poorly for our discipline.
We are to start on another expedition this morning, but I do not know the nature of it yet.
WATERLOO, Feb. 28th.
We got under way yesterday evening and came up to Waterloo, the scene of our first battle, where we again tied up, to allow the men to cook rations and take on wood. We will impress some negroes here, and make some other preparations for the voyage, so that we might get started to-day, our gallant commander being too much of a sailor to begin any great undertaking on Friday.
We had quite a peaceful time last night, as the officers and men were not allowed to approach the vicinity of the Bad Spirit, as Surgeon Hous- ton facetiously terms the Louisiana rum on which we all got so drunk on the first voyage. Speaking of the Doctor, I will say that he is a trump. He keeps a journal in which he jots down every good thing that is said and done, and has written an account of our late victory for the papers.
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AND EARLY WESTERN HISTORY.
We have no better fellow on board ; and during the fight with the Indianola, he was on deck all of the time, though his proper place was below. It is now ascertained that we are going to raise the wreck of the Indianola, if possible, and have twenty-five carpenters on board for this work. It is confidently believed by practical men, that she can be raised without much trouble.
We are now opposite Bayou Sara, once a pretty village of which nothing remains except the blackened walls and a few scattering houses which escaped the flames. It was destroyed by the Federals last summer, in retaliation for the loss of one of their gun-boats which got aground on the opposite shore and was burned, after it was aban- doned, by some of our cavalry. This morning the weather is deci- dedly wet.
Sunday, March 1 .- Went up to Atchafalaya last night where we threw off our cotton and took on wood. This is a bright, sunny morning, though rather cool. I have observed that nearly every Sun- day since the first of the year has been beautiful and bright. No matter how gloomy the weather has been through the week, I have come to look for a pretty Sunday as regularly as the day comes.
Friday, March 6. - After a lapse of several days, I again resume my diary. I was taken sick on the Ist inst., and have been unable to note the incidents as they occurred, and will have to depend on my memory for the facts. On Sunday morning we met seven skiffs loaded with men from the wreck of the Indianola, who reported that there was an- other Federal gun-boat in the vicinity, and that our men had thrown part of her armament overboard, and had burnt her to the water's edge. They gave, however, a rather confused account of the ap- pearance of the vessel, and all acknowledged that they had not been near enough to make her out, but believed her to be quite as formida- ble as the Indianola. Colonel Brand determined to go on up the river until he got some more reliable information, and at Natchez the report was confirmed that the Federal vessel was above and the Indianola was destroyed. It was then determined to go up Red river as far as Alexandria and prepare for the capture of another prize. Accordingly We returned to the mouth of Red river, and ascended that muddy, crooked stream to Alexandria, where we arrived on the morning of the 5th, and where we are now lying, waiting for General E. Kirby Smith to assume command of this department and give us orders, as General Dick Taylor refused to have anything to do with us.
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