USA > California > A history of California: the American period > Part 13
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"For six long years," however, as John Quincy Adams wrote, "he had mystified Jackson with the positive assurance that he was within a hairsbreadth of his object and sure of success, while Jackson was all the time wriggling along and snapping at the bait like a mackerel after a red rag."
The conception of Andrew Jackson, "wriggling along and snapping at the bait, like a mackerel after a red rag," would not likely occur to any other than Adams' sarcastic imagi- nation. But even Jackson at last came to understand the char- acter of the diplomat he had sent to Mexico; and at a later date, with his usual directness of speech, he branded Butler a liar, in whom there was "neither truth, justice, nor gratitude."
After Butler's withdrawal from Mexico, Jackson made a further effort to secure the cession of California, in connec- tion with the independence of Texas. In the Jackson Papers preserved in the Library of Congress, one may see the rough draft of a proposal Jackson drew up to submit to Santa Anna, when that illustrious general was in Washington seeking to arrange for the mediation of the United States between Mexico and Texas, after his disastrous defeat and capture in the battle of San Jacinto. The memorandum is unsigned, but the writing, like the spelling, is Andrew Jackson's. It reads as follows:
"If Mexico will extend the line of the U. States to the Rio Grand-up that stream to latitude 38 north and then to the pacific including north calafornia we might instruct our minister to give them three millions and a half of dollars and deal then as it re- spected Texas as a magnanimous nation ought-to wit-in the treaty with Mexico secure the Texians in all their just and legal rights and stipulate to admit them into the United States as one of the Union."
At the time that Jackson was making this proposal to Santa Anna, he was also urging upon W. H. Wharton, the Texas Minister at Washington, the necessity of including California within the limits of Texas in order to reconcile the commercial interests of the north and east to annexation, by giving them a harbor on the Pacific.
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"He is very earnest and anxious on this point of claiming the Californias," wrote Wharton to Rusk in reporting Jackson's sug- gestion, "and says we must not consent to less. This is in strict confidence. Glory to God in the highest!"
Though none of Jackson's efforts to secure California met with the least shadow of success, his program was taken up by a later administration with considerable zeal. Van Buren, harassed beyond measure by financial matters, had little energy to devote to foreign issues, but when Tyler succeeded Harrison, the California project became once more the subject of serious concern. Daniel Webster at that time was Secretary of State, and Waddy Thompson United States Minister to Mexico. The enthusiasm of the latter over California's possibilities bordered on the extrav- agant, and his efforts to secure the province's annexation to the United States were unceasing. Indeed, no man of his generation had a truer conception of the importance of the acquisition of California in the development of American greatness than Waddy Thompson.
In his first despatches from Mexico, Thompson urged upon President Tyler the advisability of securing California. He spoke of it as the "richest, the most beautiful, and health- iest country in the world," and described the Bay of San Francisco as being "capacious enough to receive the navies of all the world," and so strategically situated as to dominate the entire coast. The control of this bay and of the harbors of San Diego and Monterey, he went on, would give to the United States not only badly needed ports for her whaling vessels, but also a potential monopoly of the "trade of India and the whole Pacific Ocean."
For Thompson, however, California had many attractions beside those of a commercial nature. Its forests were large enough to build all the ships of the world's navies, and its agricultural possibilities so great that one day it would be- come the "granary of the Pacific." Since slavery was not likely to flourish in the province, he urged the north and south to compromise any difficulties that might arise on
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that score, and acquire the territory as soon as possible, especially because France and England both had their eyes upon it.
"I am profoundly satisfied," he concluded, after warning Web- ster against the designs of European nations upon the territory, "that in its bearing upon all the interests of our country, agricul- tural, political, manufacturing, commercial and fishing, the im- portance of the acquisition of California cannot be overestimated. If I could mingle any selfish feelings with interests to my country so vast, I would desire no higher honor than to be an instrument in securing it."
Ten days after he had written this despatch to the Secre- tary of State, Thompson sent one of like tenor to the Presi- dent.
" Since my depatch to Mr. Webster," he began, " I have had an interview with Gen. Santa Anna and although I did not broach to him directly the subject of our correspondence I have but little doubt that I shall be able to accomplish your wishes and to add also the acquisition of Upper California.
" This latter, I believe, will be by far the most important event that has occurred to our country. I should be most happy to illustrate your administration and my own name by an acquisition of such lasting benefit to my own country.
" Upon this subject I beg your special instructions, both as to moving on the matter and the extent to which I am to go in the negotiations and the amount to be paid. The acquisition of Upper California will reconcile the northern people, as they have large fishing and commercial interests in the Pacific and we have literally no port there. Be pleased also to have me pretty strongly instructed on the subject of our claims or leave the responsibility to me. Procrastination, the policy of all weak governments, is peculiarly so with this, and they are very poor and will never pay us one farthing unless pretty strong measures are taken."
Both Webster and Tyler were evidently in strong sym- pathy with the views expressed in this and other official communications from their representative in Mexico. Thompson was given permission to open negotiations for the purchase of San Francisco and as much more of the
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province as seemed wise. At this time there were a large number of outstanding claims held against Mexico by citizens of the United States. Most of these were long overdue and as Mexico had no money in sight to meet them, it was suggested that these might be satisfied by a cession of the desired territory in lieu of cash.
While Thompson was seeking to open direct negotiations with Mexico, Webster and Tyler were at work upon another proposition, in which the acquisition of California was combined, not only with other phases of the Mexican ques- tion, but also with the growing difficulty between the United States and Great Britain over the Oregon boundary. The plan, which bore the name of the Tripartite Agreement, aimed to make Mexico, Great Britain, and the United States parties to a common arrangement for the settlement of all three questions.
As outlined by Webster, the Tripartite Agreement in- volved the following proposals:
1. Mexico to cede Upper California to the United States.
2. The United States to pay millions of dollars for the cession.
3. Of this sum, millions should be paid to American claimants against Mexico.
4. The remainder to be paid to English creditors or bond- holders of Mexico.
5. The Oregon boundary to be settled on the line of the Columbia.
Both Webster and Tyler felt that this arrangement would not only solve most of the difficulties of the adminis- tration in foreign matters, but would also allay much of the domestic friction which the proposed annexation of Texas had brought out. At the same time it would make the boundary of the Columbia acceptable to the extreme expan- sionists of the west.
"Texas," wrote the President, "might not stand alone, nor the line proposed for Oregon. Texas would reconcile all to the line, while California would reconcile or pacify all to Oregon."
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The plan was therefore pushed vigorously for a time by the administration. Additional impetus was given it by Webster's deep rooted desire to secure a harbor on the Cali- fornia coast for the development of New England's whale fisheries and her Chinese trade. It was even proposed that he should head a special mission to Great Britain to carry through the program. But this plan never materialized; and for a time, also, direct negotiations with Mexico were rendered useless because of the seizure of Monterey by Commodore Jones of the United States Navy.1
When the excitement created by Jones' act had somewhat abated in Mexico, Thompson made one or two tentative efforts to bring forward the California project; but in these he saw little chance of success unless Santa Anna, then filling his usual rôle as dictator, should become involved in war with England and cede California to the United States to keep it from falling into British hands.
Thompson returned to the United States in the early part of 1844. About the same time Webster resigned his position as Secretary of State and Abel P. Upshur came in to take his place. The latter, in turn, after only a few months of service, was killed by an explosion on the U. S. S. Princeton, leaving John C. Calhoun to manage the affairs of State. By this time, the administration was so thoroughly involved in the Texas issue that it had little opportunity for other matters of foreign concern. And where the acquisition of California is mentioned at all in the diplomatic correspond- ence of the period, it is generally linked with the subject of the annexation of Texas.
So far as Mexico was concerned, moreover, in whatever negotiations were carried on, there was one insurmountable barrier in the way of the sale of California. The difficulty was clearly stated by Duff Green, one of Calhoun's special agents charged with negotiating for Mexican territory.
"I am convinced," he wrote the Secretary, "that it is impossible to obtain the consent of this Government to the cession to the 1 See pps. 148 et sqq.
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United States of Texas, California, or any part of the public domain of Mexico whatever .... In the midst of a civil conflict where each party is seeking pretences to murder and confiscate the property of their opponents and where the principle is main- tained that it is treason to sell any part of the public domain to the United States, it is worse than folly to suppose that either party can alienate any part of Texas or California."
Green was plainly right in his diagnosis of the situation. But most Americans, eager for territory and cognizant of Mexico's need of funds and the easy virtue of her officials, were slow to grasp the simple fact that any administration, even so much as suspected of a willingness to sell Mexican territory to the United States, was inviting certain over- throw and probable execution at the hands of rival factions, backed by an outraged and excited people. This was the barrier that Butler could not surmount in his attempt to purchase California. Similarly, it wrecked the hopes of Thompson, Green, Shannon, and every other American representative sent to Mexico before Polk overthrew it by the stern recourse to war.
While Tyler was vainly, but hopefully, seeking to pur- chase California, the interest of our government in the province was being shown in other ways. One of these was the seizure of Monterey by Commodore Jones, to which reference has already been made. The details of this affair, which antedated the performance of Sloat and Stockton by five years, were briefly as follows.
Toward the close of 1841, Abel P. Upshur, then Secretary of the Navy, having received a request from American residents in California for some form of naval protection along the coast, had increased the size of the Pacific Squad- ron and placed it under command of Thomas Ap Catesby Jones. The relations of Mexico and the United States at that time were quite normal, that is to say, they were strained almost to the breaking point.
Early in September, 1842, Jones, then in the harbor of Callao, Peru, received a despatch from John Parrott, Ameri- can Consul at Mazatlan, on the west coast of Mexico, which
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led him to believe that war had actually broken out between the two nations. Having been without advices from Wash- ington for nine months and of course lacking an opportunity to communicate with his home government, the American commander, after consulting with the United States Chargé at Lima and the higher officers of his fleet, acted upon his own responsibility in the crisis. There appeared, moreover, to be need of imperative haste if an English fleet under Admiral Thomas was to be forestalled in the seizure of California, for rumor had it that Mexico, having declared war upon the United States, was about to cede the province to Great Britain for safe keeping.
Alarmed by these reports, Jones made all speed from Callao to Monterey, entering that port on October 19 with the frigate United States and the sloop Cyane. Here he found neither the British fleet, nor sign of warlike preparation. Most of the garrison were off at work in the fields; fort and guns were in their usual state of decay; and the ammunition was about gone. Everything, indeed, was quiet, peaceful, and normally dilapidated. Jones immediately summoned the authorities to surrender, a demand which naturally excited a good deal of surprise and consternation, since no one on shore had heard of any breach between Mexico and the United States. Monterey, however, was so completely at the mercy of the invader, that Juan B. Alvarado, acting governor, and Mariano Silvia, military commandant, did not even avail themselves of the eighteen hours allowed by Jones for capitulation, but almost immediately yielded up the port to the American commander.
The latter took possession of the city, raised the American flag, cautioned his men against any outrages upon the in- habitants, issued a proclamation inviting the Californians to accept peaceably the sovereignty of the United States- and then began to investigate the report of war between the two countries upon which he had acted.
The next day, becoming convinced that the United States and Mexico were still at peace and that his seizure of Mon- terey was premature, to say the least, Jones restored the
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city to its former rulers, lowered the American flag, and made formal apology for his unintentional offense against inter- national law.
So far as the Montereyans were concerned, this opera bouffe affair called forth little, if any, ill-feeling against the United States or American residents of California. Indeed, Jones and his command seem to have met with un- usual hospitality at the hands of their supposed enemies after the town had been restored to Mexican control. In other quarters, however, the flood gates of indignation and oratory were loosened in a way that Mexican officials alone understand. When news of Jones' act reached Governor Micheltorena, recently arrived from Mexico, and even then two days march from Los Angeles on an inspection tour of the northern part of the province, the latter's patriotic fervor immediately rose to the occasion. To the Secretary of War and Marine, he thus described his conduct in the face of such an outrage:
"I wished myself a thunderbolt, to fly and annihilate the in- vaders, but 110 leagues intervened between them and me and my forces were all infantry. ... On the following day, the 26th, I began my march with my troops, of whose enthusiasm I cannot say too much. . .. North and south of my headquarters every- thing was in motion; and the fever of patriotism which I excited with energetic heat beat quickly, as you will see by document 9 We thus marched for two hours, during which my soul was rapt in ecstasies at the flattering prospect of a speedy and certain vic- tory."
At this juncture, rudely breaking into Micheltorena's ecstatic dream, a courier arrived with the news that Jones had restored Monterey and retired to his vessel. This sudden change of front, if we may believe Micheltorena's official statement, was not altogether pleasing to the Governor, who gave to it a far different explanation from that offered by Jones.
"So his excellency Mr. - did not choose to await our ar- rival as a hostile force!" wrote Micheltorena. "And the feelings
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of my heart, which were thence transmitted to those of all the officers, soldiers, and inhabitants of the country, were at once of grief and joy, of regret and pleasure, of contentment and disap- pointment; but Providence has so willed it; therefore it is for the best, and we have only to respect and bow to its decrees."
In conclusion, Micheltorena modestly pointed out that had it not been for the "activity, foresight and energy " of four men in forcing Jones out of Monterey, the whole of California would inevitably have been lost to Mexico. The illustrious four were "the Benemerito President", General Don Antonio López de Santa Anna, General Don José María Tornel, Minister of War in Mexico, Don Gabriel Valencia, Chief of Staff, and-Manuel Micheltorena. The services of the latter, especially, were dwelt upon as worthy of President Santa Anna's approbation. From Micheltorena's military ability, as elsewhere exhibited, one may fairly say that his genuis expressed itself far better with the pen than with the sword; and Jones could have kept Monterey with little fear of being molested had the United States and Mexico actually been at war.
In Mexico, also, the seizure of Monterey naturally called forth indignant protest. The affair was the subject of very vehement correspondence on the part of the government, which demanded not only the condign punishment of Jones, but much other satisfaction for its injured feelings, as well. The United States replied by recalling Jones and offering formal apologies for his hasty action. Beyond this, how- ever, both Webster and Tyler refused to go. One, indeed, in spite of official denial, halfway suspects that Jones had received instructions before sailing for the Pacific that led him to believe the administration would be much more tolerant with over-zealousness in seizing California ports than with a timid and unwise delay.
A curious aftermath of Micheltorena's activities against the invaders appears in the demand he addressed to Jones for the payment of an indemnity. This included satisfaction for 1500 complete infantry uniforms, which the Governor
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claimed had been ruined by the Mexican forces on the march to Monterey; fifteen thousand dollars to reimburse the Mexican treasury for expenses incurred to meet the invasion; and finally, "a complete set of military musical instruments to replace those ruined on this occasion." If the first item on the list was a fair criterion of the validity of the entire claim, then Micheltorena was certainly gifted with a glorious imagination. His force could not have numbered more than 300 troops at any time, and not one of these had probably ever had a "complete infantry uniform " in all his life.
This chapter has been based chiefly upon government docu- ments and manuscripts in the files of the State Department and in the Congressional Library at Washington. The substance of the chapter is also embodied in, Cleland, R. G., The early sentiment for the annexation of California.
CHAPTER XII
"ANARCHY AND CONFUSION "
WITH the United States government taking more than casual interest in Pacific Coast happenings, with the over- land routes becoming more clearly defined each year, and with the steady increase of immigration across the Sierras, conditions in California were fast approaching a crisis by the beginning of 1845. American activities, however, con- stituted only one element of danger in the situation. Equally alarming from the standpoint of the loyal Californian were the unhappy relations of the province with Mexico, and the domestic discord and military weakness which he saw every- where around him. This phase of California history, some- what endowed with local interest as well as an essential background of the Mexican War, is discussed in the ensuing chapter.
The historian of the Spanish period has described the re- lations of California and Mexico when Spanish authority still lived in the New World. Even at best, as he has so well shown, the control of New Spain over a territory so distant and difficult of access as California was never satisfactory; and the economic and military assistance, so sparingly dealt out by the central government, was wholly inadequate to support the colony or to defend it against an enemy's invasion. With the overthrow of Spanish sover- eignty, the situation became materially worse. Mexico, torn continually by internal revolution, financially exhausted, striving desperately to maintain her own autonomy, and helpless, as in the case of the Texas revolution, to preserve herself from dismemberment, had little energy to devote to California, and neither money nor troops to send there in case of need.
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Officials for California, it is true, Mexico had and to spare. But for the most part these were only presidential favorites, sent to Monterey or to Los Angeles to pay an embarrassing political debt, or to be got away from the capital as far as pos- sible-men of low motives and inferior talent, supposed to recruit their fortunes as best they could from the revenues of the province. For these evidences of maternal affection on Mexico's part, the people of California showed a total lack of respect and even a rude dislike, which frequently vented itself in successful revolution-almost as frequently, indeed, as a Mexican governor had the temerity to venture into the province.
To go into the details of all such revolts would require much more space than their importance justifies.1 Two, however, may be described as typical of the rest. About mid-summer of 1836, Mariano Chico, Governor of California for a few brief weeks, quit the territory for the latter's good, leaving behind him an unsavory reputation and a disputed question of succession. His place was taken by Nicolás Gutiérrez, already filling the position of military command- ant, who had come from Mexico some years before to make his political fortune in California. The native leaders naturally viewed this new arrangement with little favor. Personal ambitions and resentment against Mexico alike made them hostile to the new administration. This com- bination, coupled with the instinctive Hispanic American tendency to revolt at more or less regular intervals, with or without provocation, led shortly to the outbreak of civil war.
The leaders in the movement, which ostensibly broke out over questions of revenue and official etiquette, were Juan B. Alvarado, inspector of the customshouse and a member of the provincial Diputación, a man of considerable ability and wide popularity; José Castro, a former governor of California; and José Antonio De la Guerra. Alvarado's uncle, Mariano Vallejo, at that time the dominant figure in provincial affairs north of Monterey, was also urged to
1 See Chapman, A history of California: the Spanish period, Chap. XXXV, for an adequate discussion of the subject.
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join the revolt. He could not be persuaded to play an active part in the rebellion, but lent it some measure of passive support and profited by its success.
From the standpoint of numbers, the force which Castro and his companions were able to muster was insignificant. But it had three things in its favor: it outnumbered the fifty men Gutiérrez had at his command by more than two to one; its members, temporarily at least, were ardently patri- otic, while the enemy were inspired only by a desire to live and be at peace; and most effective of all, in its ranks was a motley troop of foreigners-Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, trappers and sailors, rough fellows for the most part, eager for excitement, and much more skillful in the use of arms than the Californians of either side. The leader of this supporting force was a Tennesseean named Isaac Graham, a man of doubtful morals but considerable force of character, who had entered California with one of the trapping parties of the early thirties and afterwards set up a crude distillery near Santa Cruz. With his subsequent career, California history has somewhat more to do.
Aided by these factors, the success of the revolution was never seriously in doubt. Gutiérrez, shut up in Monterey with a handful of men, part of whom were hastily armed convicts, had little choice but to surrender. Yet after the manner of Mexican commanders, he sought to uphold his dignity so long as the conflict was confined to wordy negotia- tions. When, however, a cannon ball, the only shot of the revolution, came rumbling down from the heights above the town, making his headquarters untenable and giving a business-like tone to the demands of the insurgents, Gutiérrez bowed to the inevitable and surrendered both the town and the governorship. The latter was filled, through an ad interim appointment as it were, by José Castro, but was eventually taken over by Alvarado, the real instigator of the revolution. Gutiérrez was sent home with little cere- mony, and for some years the Californians conducted their political affairs unmolested by meddlesome Mexicans officials.
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