USA > California > A history of California: the American period > Part 14
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The revolution of 1836, bloodless and triumphant like
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most affairs of its kind in California, possessed at least two distinctive features. One of these was the part played by foreigners in its outcome; the other was a program of sepa- rating the province entirely from Mexican control. The idea of independence, it is true, received only superficial support from Castro and Alvarado; but it had great attrac- tion for Graham and his followers, as well as for many other foreign residents. The plan never went farther than a provisional declaration of independence, the preparation of a lone star flag, and vague proposals on the part of the Americans to repeat in California what Houston's forces had just accomplished in Texas.
After the affair of 1836, the next revolt against Mexican authority, serious enough to warrant consideration, was that of 1844. The eight years of comparative harmony between the two revolutions, were due not to any increase of loyalty on the part of the Californians toward Mexico, but merely to the fact that the mother country left her distant colonists pretty much to their own devices during the interval. In January, 1842, however, Santa Anna returned to the old plan of send- ing a governor direct from Mexico. This honor (or misfor- tune) fell to Manuel Micheltorena, a brigadier general who had won some distinction (and a claim for reward), by sup- pressing an incipient revolt in Mexico City.
Micheltorena arrived at San Diego in August. With him he brought several high sounding titles and ample authority (on paper) to make himself supreme in both the Californias. As a practical means to this end, as well as to render the coast immune to foreign aggression, the Mexican govern- ment had placed at his command one of the choicest armies the province had ever known. This consisted of two or three hundred gallant souls, for the most part picked from the jails of Mexico-a motley collection of rascals and beggars, not one of whom, according to an eye-witness, "possessed a jacket or pantaloons" when the battalion arrived in Califor- nia. Instead, each soldier "trusted to a miserable, ragged blanket to cover his filth and nakedness."
Long before this aggregation reached California, rumor
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had preceded them, causing as near a panic among the philosophic Californians as they were capable of experiencing. Yet bad as this advance reputation was, Micheltorena's troops in the main lived up to it. They stole, intimidated peaceful citizens, and made themselves generally obnoxious. Many years before, a despairing California governor had written to the viceroy, regarding certain newly arrived immigrants from Mexico, that their absence from the colony "for a couple of centuries, at the distance of a million of leagues would prove beneficial to the province and redound to the service of God and the glory of the king." No words could better have expressed the sentiment of the Californians toward Micheltorena's precious vagabonds.
Nearly two years elapsed, however, before armed resis- tance was made to the new governor's rule. But in the meanwhile, Castro and Alvarado, with a few others, busied themselves in preparation for revolt. In November, 1844, a number of these conspirators openly "proclaimed" against the usurper from Mexico. The first phase of the revolution was an immediate triumph for the Californians. On Decem- ber 1, Micheltorena, either realizing his helpless situation or seeking merely to gain time, signed an agreement to ship his undesirable followers back to Mexico within the next three months.
But it soon became apparent that the governor had no intention of keeping his pledge to the Californians. In various ways he set about strengthening his position, and finally enlisted the aid of nearly a hundred foreign riflemen under John A. Sutter and Isaac Graham. Whatever may have been the motives of these two leaders in supporting Micheltorena, the most of their followers did so because they feared, for some reason or other, that the success of the revolutionists would result in more stringent regulations against American settlers in California.
With this formidable body of foreigners, augmented by as many Indians from Sutter's ranch, Micheltorena was at first more than a match for the Californians. Alvarado and Castro, however, abandoning the northern part of the
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province, retired to the south, where, in Los Angeles, after defeating Micheltorena's adherents in the severest skirmish of the revolt, they succeeded in stirring up an enthusiastic opposition to the governor's cause. Like the latter, they too enlisted a number of American residents among their forces. The leaders of this foreign contingent were James McKinley and William Workmen, and nearly all the other respectable Americans in the south lent the movement their support.
The pursuit of the revolutionists as they retreated south- ward, had been carried on by Micheltorena without the slightest evidence of haste. Among his foreign supporters, such a program naturally bred impatience and disgust. This in turn was fed by a number of the riflemen themselves, who had joined Micheltorena solely for the purpose of creating dissatisfaction within the foreign battalion.
At Santa Barbara a delegation from Los Angeles sought to affect a compromise between Micheltorena and the revolutionists, but the governor was unwilling to make the necessary concessions. Accordingly, the city authorities of Los Angeles, now thoroughly under the influence of Castro and Alvarado, issued a proclamation deposing Micheltorena, and appointed Pío Pico governor ad interim in his stead. At the same time all able bodied citizens were commanded to take arms against the approaching enemy.
Near Ventura there were some minor skirmishes between the Micheltorena forces and an advance guard under Castro; but the latter, without having either inflicted or suffered much injury, retired before superior numbers to the revolu- tionary headquarters in Los Angeles. With the advance of Micheltorena to the upper part of the San Fernando Valley, Castro and Alvarado, in command of nearly 300 men, marched out through the Cahuenga Pass to meet him. Later they were reënforced by Pío Pico with perhaps a hundred additional troops.
The battle was joined on the banks of the Los Angeles River, about noon, February 20, 1845. It was an artillery engagement at comparatively long range, and was carried
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on very briskly until sundown by the five small cannon which constituted the ordnance equipment of the two armies. In this fighting the foreign contingent of neither faction took part; and when the casualties were accounted for, after the half day's bombardment, it was found they consisted of two horses killed on one side, and a mule wounded on the other!
After this sanguinary encounter, which was followed the next morning by a brief and bloodless skirmish near the Verdugo ranch, Micheltorena was ready to capitulate. The next month he left California with most of his ragged fol- lowers. The grievances of the native inhabitants against Mexico, however, were only temporarily alleviated by the governor's withdrawal. Relations with the parent govern- ment still continued unsatisfactory and full of friction.
One of the difficulties, partially responsible for this condi- tion, was the lack of adequate means of communication be- tween the colony and the mother country. Only three routes between California and Mexico were available, and all of these were inconceivable tedious and full of hardship. The voyage from San Blas or Mazatlan to Monterey required many weeks, and was nearly always attended by storm and sickness. Mexican vessels were scarce; and the foreign traders commonly lengthened the voyage by running from the west coast of Mexico to the Sandwich Islands before touching at a California port.
Travel by the overland routes were even more dangerous and fatiguing than by sea. The oldest line of communi- cation between Mexico and California was that opened by Garcés and Anza in the first days of California settlement. It ran from Mexico City, by way of Sinaloa and Sonora, to the Gila River, which it followed to the Colorado; thence the trail crossed the sandy wastes of the present Imperial Valley, and emerged from the desert to the coastal region through one of the passes in the San Jacinto Mountains. Lack of grass and water, together with the difficulty of travel through miles of heavy sand, made this journey at best a difficult and problematical venture. When to
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these adverse elements, there was added the destructive hostility of various Indian tribes, such as the Yumas and Apaches, the route was rendered virtually impassable. So rarely was it used, indeed, in the early years of the century that J. J. Warner, who came over it in 1831, found it vir- tually unknown to the Mexicans of Arizona and Sonora.
"There could not be found in either Tucson or Altar," he wrote, "-although they were both military posts and towns of consider- able population-a man who had ever been over the route from those towns to California by the way of the Colorado River, or even to that river, to serve as a guide, or from whom any informa- tion concerning the route could be obtained, and the trail from Tucson to the Gila River at the Pima villages was too little used and obscure to be easily followed, and from those villages down the Gila River to the Colorado River and from thence to within less than a hundred miles of San Diego there was no trail, not even an Indian path.
The third route from Mexico to California was the old trail from San Gabriel to Santa Fé. Originally explored by the Domínguez-Escalante expedition late in the eighteenth century, this route was not used again until the American trapping and trading parties of the early thirities followed it from New Mexico to California. From that time on it became an important line of communication between the two most outlying provinces of Mexico; and over it a very considerable and picturesque commerce was carried on. Travel, however, on the Santa Fe-Los Angeles trail, as on the Gila route, was attended by great privation and constant dangers. Transportation was entirely by pack-train; and so perilous was the undertaking, that the New Mexicans and Californians resorted to the practice of forwarding goods by annual caravans, under heavy guard.
Then, too, Santa Fe itself lay a long way from Mexico City, the seat of the central government. From Santa Fé southward by the old Chihuahua road travel was also beset with difficulties and Indian menace. So that, whether by sea or by land, by the Anza route or the newer "Spanish "
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Trail, communication between California and Mexico was exceedingly irregular and uncertain. As a result of these conditions, the colony inevitably drifted away from the parent country. Mutual sympathy and understanding were impossible. The Mexican government knew little of current happenings in California, and received official despatches from Monterey or Los Angeles only once or twice a year. The California deputy in the National Con- gress heard from the province with even less regularity and of course had only the vaguest notions of what was going on among his constituents.
Another deep seated grievance of the Californians, which alienated still further their affections from Mexico, was the inadequate military protection afforded the province by the central government. This condition of affairs was al- most as old as the colony itself. At the beginning of the century, William Shaler, the New England fur trader, found the fortifications of the sea port towns, from San Francisco to San Diego, so fallen into decay that they could present only a "sorry defense " against even the smallest naval vessel. As for the rest of the province, he said, its conquest "would be absolutely nothing; it would fall without an effort to the most inconsiderable force."
The conditions noted by Shaler in 1803 showed no im- provement after the lapse of a generation. When Lieutenant Wilkes, of the United States exploring expedition, visited San Francisco in 1841, he found the presidio deserted, the walls fallen in ruins and the guns dismantled. The garrison consisted of one officer and a single barefooted private, neither of whom could be found when Wilkes arrived. A year or so later, the English traveler, Sir George Simpson, of the Hudson's Bay Company, discovered much the same condition at Monterey, the commercial and political center of the colony. At the time of his visit, however, the guns of the fortress were able to return the salute of the English vessel, a courtesy the garrison was not always able to offer without borrowing the necessary powder from the ship they wished to salute.
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When Jones took possession of this port, he found a garrison of twenty-nine regular soldiers, with twenty-five untrained militia from the interior. There were eleven pieces of cannon, most of which were dismounted. The rest were practically useless because of a scarcity of ammunition. There were also about 150 muskets and a few carbines, with less than 3,000 rounds of ammunition. The fortifications, according to the California officer in command, were of no consequence, "as everybody knows."
The regular army, entrusted with the defense of Cali- fornia from Sacramento to San Diego, a distance of some six hundred miles, consisted of less than six hundred men. More than half of these were Mexican troops, much feared and hated by the Californians. A native militia was also supposed to be available in time of war; but while this theoretically was composed of about a thousand men, scarcely one tenth of that number could actually be counted upon in case of need. The effectiveness of even this small force was reduced by half, since it was divided between the northern part of the province and the south.
From the naval standpoint, the protection afforded Cali- fornia by Mexico was even more ridiculous. The single vessel maintained by the government on the coast, "a mere apology for a coasting cruiser," was described "as an old, cranky craft, not mounting a single gun, and so badly manned that she was unable to make any progress when beating against the wind."
This utter lack of protection for their interests, and the apparent indifference on the part of the Mexican govern- ment for the welfare of the province, led to bitterness of feeling and a steadily growing policy of independence among the Californians. With almost no regard for the home government, they made their own laws, collected and spent their own revenues, chose their own officials, and obeyed Mexican regulations only as their fancy chose.
Unfortunately, as this breach between Mexico and her colony widened, friction also developed among the Cali- fornians themselves. Even at that early date, the north and
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south were jealous of each other; nor had these relations been improved by the removal of the capital from Monterey to Los Angeles. The former still kept the customshouse and treasury, and remained the military headquarters, as well as the center of social life. Los Angeles, however, be- came the seat of the civil government, which was thus sepa- rated by nearly four hundred miles from the fiscal and military headquarters.
Between the northern and southern leaders there was also much of personal dislike. Pío Pico, who was the domi- nant figure of Los Angeles, had been elected governor to succeed Micheltorena; while José Castro, one of the northern representatives, was chosen military commander. Bad blood soon developed between these two. Charges and counter-charges, in keeping with the Mexican custom, flew thick and fast. Each official, summoning his partisans to aid, set out to save the republic by overthrowing his op- ponent. And in the meantime, government almost ceased to function. Justice was no longer administered; the finances became utterly demoralized; and the army, such as it was, degenerated still further into an undisciplined, unpaid, un- equipped rabble.
This confusion and uncertainty in the political affairs of the province, which almost amounted to anarchy, coupled with the lack of protection to life and property, and the feebleness of Mexican control, changed very radically the mental attitude of the more conservative Californians. Most of them came to realize the hopelessness of the situation and gradually prepared themselves for an inevitable change. What this change should be, there was as yet no common agreement. Some favored independence; some a protectorate under France or England; and some advocated annexation to the United States.
The foreigners in the province on their part were united in a desire to separate from Mexico. Most of them favored union with the United States; a few stood out for independ- ence; and the English inhabitants naturally advocated the establishment of British sovereignty. The merchants, and
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long established foreign residents generally, favored the separation movement because of the danger to property rights and the uncertain business conditions under Mexican rule. The newly arrived and more restless American im- migrants saw in the situation an opportunity to hasten Manifest Destiny along the proper road. Incidentally, they perhaps expected to derive some excitement and a little personal profit from the process.
Such, in the main, was the internal situation of California when James K. Polk, disciple of Andrew Jackson, Scotch Presbyterian, and avowed expansionist, came to sit in the President's chair. To him we owe the Mexican War and the annexation of California. By what strange irony of fate has history ranked this man among the minor Presi- dents?
In addition to the general histories, various descriptions of California by American travellers of the period have furnished material for this chapter.
CHAPTER XIII
PLANS FOR ANNEXATION
WHEN Polk was inaugurated on the fourth of March, 1845, the California situation was ripe for some form of settlement. No one at all familiar with conditions in the province looked for a continuation of the existing state. A change was inevitable; and before he assumed office, Polk had determined what that change should be. So far as he was concerned, the issue was already settled. California was to be annexed to the United States.
Polk soon announced this purpose to his Cabinet. To carry out the program of annexation there were several possible methods. The simplest of these was acquisition by purchase, a plan which Jackson and Tyler had already tried, but without success. If this should fail again, there was next the ever growing spirit of revolt among the Cali- fornians against Mexican rule-an attitude which might be used to great advantage by the United States. Or, if the Californians themselves could not be relied upon to bring about the desired object, there was still a sufficient body of Americans in the province, eager for adventure, restless under native rule, contemptuous, it must be confessed, of Mexican authority, holding to the Manifest Destiny creed in its most exaggerated form, and inspired by the easy success of the Texas revolution, to wrest California from its Mexican rulers and place it under the protection of the United States. If none of these measures should succeed, or if they proved too slow to meet the emergency, there was always the last resort of war.
Polk's first move in the California issue was a direct offer to purchase the province from Mexico. One cannot under- stand the negotiations by which he sought to accomplish
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this purpose without some knowledge of the existing political situation across the border. Revolution was then the normal condition of Mexico. At least seventeen such movements had taken place in less than a quarter of a century. Presidents held their position in a purely tentative fashion, never sure from one sunrise to the next whether the night would see them still in office or exiles from the country.
Under such conditions, when hostile factions were ever waiting an opportunity to stir up an inflammable people to overthrow the existing administration, a Mexican president's first care was to stay in office and to give his enemies as little material for revolutionary propaganda as possible. His decisions on public questions and matters of policy were necessarily based on this primary consideration. Another difficulty, however, confronted every Mexican president, and one always of pressing necessity. This was to find sufficient funds with which to run the government; or, to speak more plainly, sufficient funds with which to hold his followers in line and keep them from going over to the opposition.
The two considerations just mentioned had always to be taken into account when the United States sought to negotiate for California. A desperate need of money, the hopelessness of making Mexican rule effective in California, and perhaps a desire to establish more cordial relations with the American government, prompted more than one presi- dent to dispose of the province. On the other hand, something of national pride; the ill-concealed opposition of European governments to the American control of California; a traditional antipathy to the United States; and above all, the perfect realization that any cession of territory, no matter what the circumstances, would lead to popular ret- ribution for such an act of sacrilege, compelled the repudia- tion of every offer. Common sense and an eager desire for ready cash were thus both alike out-weighed by the fear of revolution.
This dilemma, which confronted every Mexican president with whom negotiations for California were undertaken,
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was not appreciated by the Washington government. American officials, with a fixed determination to acquire the territory, knowing how little it actually benefitted the Mexican government, aware of the chronic bankruptcy of the latter's treasury, and somewhat acquainted with the devious course of Mexican politics, could not understand why their oft-repeated offers to purchase the province were so consistently declined.
When Polk opened his negotiations, the situation in Mexico was normally unsettled. In December, 1844, a revolution had deposed Santa Anna for various high crimes and misdemeanors, and placed General Herrera in the presidency. In June of the next year, Santa Anna was banished from the country and took up his residence at Havana. From this point of vantage he kept a watchful eye on the political situation in Mexico; and when condi- tions favored, entered into those secret negotiations with the United States which resulted in his return to power after the outbreak of the Mexican War.
In the meanwhile, President Herrera was encountering a few perplexities of his own. A dangerous rival had arisen in the person of General Paredes, while a dozen lesser oppo- nents were also in the field. The national treasury was bare of funds and the army without pay. Congress was daily becoming more hostile, and the press noisily denounced the administration for its Texas policy. Various bills were passed to remedy the economic and military situation, but as these were accompanied by prohibitions on the sale of national territory-the only source of revenue available they served to intensify rather than to relieve Herrera's troubles.
Diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico had been broken off with the annexation of Texas. But Herrera was suspected of seeking to restore them; and also of a willingness to recede from the position the Mexican Congress had taken with regard to the lost province across the Rio Grande. Paredes, skillfully playing upon the popu- lar mind and also undermining the President's control of the
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army, was only waiting a favorable opportunity to unseat his rival and assume control of the government himself.
Such were the internal conditions of Mexico and the impossible position occupied by Herrera, when Polk brought forward his program of purchasing California. The first step in this plan was, of course, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Mexican government. This, in itself, was a difficult undertaking, because of the embar- rassing effect it was sure to have upon the tottering Herrera administration. But Polk had reason to believe (through information received from William S. Parrott, an American dentist resident in Mexico who had been appointed confi- dential agent of the United States government) that Herrera was willing to take the risk of receiving an American diplo- mat. In this opinion, Dimond and Black, United States Con- suls at Vera Cruz and Mexico City respectively, concurred.
Accordingly, with the consent of his Cabinet, Polk ap- pointed John Slidell of New Orleans, a man familiar with Mexican conditions and acquainted with the Spanish lan- guage, to undertake the negotiations.
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