USA > Indiana > The Eighty-sixth regiment, Indiana volunteer infantry : a narrative of its services in the civil war of 1861-1865 > Part 14
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14S
TITE EIGHTY-SIXTII REGIMENT,
impetuosity of the Union attack that everything was swept before it.
The plan of General Rosecrans, so auspiciously .begun, was to avoid as nearly as possible the heavy intrenchments of General Bragg, and turn his flank, thus forcing him to give battle on open ground, or to abandon that portion of Tennessee altogether and retreat, and once upon the retreat the advantage would be with the Union army. The attack on Hoover's Gap was the first move and the success of the Union army made it possible for General Rosecrans to con- centrate his whole army against the enemy's left. It re- quired two days by the rapid movements of General George H. Thomas, aided by the mounted infantry and cavalry, and the concentration of the corps of Generals McCook and Crit- tenden, to compel General Bragg to abandon his first line of entrenchments. Then through rain and mud General Rose- crans pushed the enemy back toward the Tennessee River. On June 29, General Bragg was at Tullahoma, and the Army of the Cumberland was concentrated only two miles distant, and expected to attack on the following morning. On the morning of June 30, it was learned that Bragg had decided to decline a battle and had again fallen back, abandoning Tullahoma. The further pursuit of the enemy was delayed by swollen streams, the bridges having been destroyed by General Bragg in his retreat. Thus ended one of the short- est campaigns, and one of the greatest up to that time in its results, of any of the campaigns of the war. The close of the Tullahoma campaign left the Army of the Cumberland in complete possession of Middle Tennessee.
General Bragg in his retreat crossed the Cumberland mountains and established his headquarters at Chattanooga. Bragg nearly, or quite, a year before had moved around the Union armies, had crossed Tennessee and Kentucky, and had been again driven back from one line to another yet farther in his rear, time after time, until now with the close of the Tullahoma campaign was seen the final and decisive failure of the Confederate army to hold any of the territory between the Tennessee and Ohio rivers.
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
Immediately upon the close of the Tullahoma campaign began the preparations for the greatest of all the campaigns of the Army of the Cumberland, unaided and alone, the Chat- tanooga or Chickamauga campaign. The greatest because it was entered upon under what seemed almost insurmountable difficulties, and with more serious obstacles before it than any army of modern days had been called upon to meet and overcome; the greatest because at its conclusion in order to maintain the territory sought to be acquired and which in fact it did acquire, it was forced against great odds, to fight one of the most severe and bloody battles of the war, and then at the close of the battle and of the campaign, it held the gateway to the South and center of the Confederacy. The preparation for the Chickamauga campaign included the repairing of the wagon roads and railroads, the building of bridges over the route by which it had come to Tullahoma to bring forward a sufficient amount of supplies for the maintenance of the army, and ammunition of all kinds to be used in the campaign. Immediately upon the close of the Tullahoma campaign, General Halleck again began to press General Rosecrans to cross the Tennessee river and push the war on the south of that river. He, Halleck, far re- moved from the field of operations, never once seemed to realize that the railroads had to be repaired, that supplies must be procured, and when notified that in addition to these very essential matters, troops should be forwarded to rein- force his army so that the flanks might be guarded, and that the line of communication with the base of supplies could be protected, he absolutely ignored the requests of General Rosecrans. With General Halleck it was an order to "make bricks without straw," or in other words to make a cam- paign which necessarily included the fighting of battles without adequate supplies of subsistence, ammunition and men. He was not willing to listen to statements of General Rosecrans, or of the officers of the Army of the Cumberland, in regard to the situation which they, being on the ground, knew beyond all peradventure, and on August 5, 1863, issued
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
peremptory orders for General Rosecrans to advance, as follows:
"The orders for the advance of your army and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory. H. W. HALLECK."
It was an absolute impossibility to move until the middle of August, and at that time General Rosecrans had done all in his power to repair the roads and put his army in condi- tion to move, but in so far as sending him any reinforce- ments either of cavalry or infantry, not one thing had been done by General Halleck. In the attempt to shield General Halleck in thus forcing the army to move without reinforce- ments, it has been urged by some that there were no troops that were available and for that reason the request of Gen- eral Rosecrans could not be granted. But was this truc? A brief statement will answer this pretended reason. General Grant at Vicksburg on the 4th of July, only a month pre- vious to General Halleck's peremptory orders, had with 80, - 000 troops under his command captured or destroyed Pem- berton's Confederate army. There was then no armed force in front of General Grant, nothing required that he should hold that immense army at Vicksburg, or in that department, if any of his troops were needed elsewhere. He could easily have spared 30,000 men and the Government could easily have made the Chattanooga campaign an assured success from its beginning, if immediately after the surrender of Vicksburg a sufficient number of those troops had been transferred to General Rosecrans. The truth of this state- ment was verified two months later when General Grant came to the Army of the Cumberland besieged in Chatta- nooga and brought with him the Army of the Tennessee under Sherman, and in addition thereto had the Eleventh and Twelfth corps sent to him from the Army of the Po- tomac.
It is well for the reader to note some difficulties that sur- rounded General Rosecrans and his army in making a further move to the south, and it should not be forgotten that each one of these difficulties was a positive danger to the Army of the Cumberland. The Army of the Cumberland was now in
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
a country that had been for months the forage grounds of the Confederate army. There were no supplies of any kind left for the men under General Rosecrans. The forage for the horses and mules had all been consumed by General Bragg's army and it was as yet too early in the season for corn or grain of that year's crop to be ripe enough to use. Both men and animals must be fed if the army ad- vanced; they could not subsist upon the country. How was it to be done? There was but one way, and that was to bring the supplies to the army over the route by which it had come. To bring supplies by the river route to Bridgeport and then furnish the army was impossible, both because of the length of time required, and at that season of the year the stage of the water would not permit the larger boats to pass up the river. The only remaining route was a single line of railway. The actual base of supplies was at Louisville, although there were sup- plies at Nashville as an intermediate base, but the depot at Nashville depended upon Louisville for its supply. The ab- solute dependence for rations was therefore upon Louisville.
The distance from Louisville to Nashville is 185 miles, and the distance from Nashville to Chattanooga, the objec- tive point, is 161 miles, being a total distance of 346 miles. The entire line of railway over which rations for the men, and grain for the animals must needs be brought was through a country friendly to the Confederate army. The road crossed many streams spanned by bridges of greater or lesser length, or passed through mountain passes where dangers lurked both by day and night. As a matter of fact almost every mile of the 346 from Louisville to Chattanooga had to be guarded from raids by the Confederate cavalry or by bands of guerrillas that masqueraded during the daylight as inoffensive citizens. Already General Rosecrans had been compelled to leave a large portion of his army along this line of railway to guard against the burning of bridges, or the tearing up of the tracks and destruction of trains in the mountain defiles. It was for the purpose of relieving this
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
large force that was then guarding the road that General Rosecrans had asked for additional troops.
He had asked for cavalry also, that he might prevent the Confederate cavalry from passing around to his rear and de- stroying the line of communications. Notwithstanding the fact that all of these conditions that then surrounded, har- rassed and endangered the Army of the Cumberland, were fully presented to General Halleck, they were absolutely ig- nored, and even the earnest request for equipments with which to mount 5,000 infantry in order to destroy or prevent the enemy's cavalry from making its raids, were passed by in silence, if not contempt. Every day's advance placed the Union army in greater peril unless the requests were granted.
But aside from the question of a failure of supplies as stated, there was yet a greater danger that was not at all to be forgotten. The Army of the Potomac was lying quiet and Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was in no imminent danger of attack. General Lee and the Confederate War Department was in such position that they could transfer whatever number of troops might be desired to reinforce Gen- eral Bragg and leave him free to send his entire cavalry force along the line of the railroad to General Rosecrans' rear, and so thoroughly and absolutely destroy the railroad that neither supplies nor reinforcements could come forward to the Army of the Cumberland.
If it was " All quiet on the Potomac, " the same condi- tions prevailed in all of the other departments, and men and guns and supplies and assistance of any or all kinds could be sent to aid General Bragg in the absolute destruction of the army. Subsequent events showed that this was exactly the plan that was adopted by the Southern government.
Under the peremptory orders of August 5, given by General Halleck, there was no course left open to General Rosecrans, and he was compelled with his army to brave all the dangers that surrounded the way. There was only one thing that was left open to the judgment of General Rose- crans, and that was the planning of the campaign. "Chat- tanooga must be taken," was the order from Washington.
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
The place was altogether important to both armies, important to the Confederates because it was the key to our advance further South, and if for once it should be securely in our hands it would deprive them of the rich products of Tennessee, on which they had relied for the maintenance of their army. It was important to the general government in that it had been made by nature a remarkably strong position from which to carry on operations toward every direction in the South. To reach Chattanooga the Cumberland range must be crossed and every foot of the ground must be con- tested if a direct attack was to be made to reach the goal. Stubborn fighting with a continuous loss of men from start to finish could most assuredly be expected, if such a campaign was to be inaugurated. With Gen- eral Rosecrans' army about equal in point of numbers with that of General Bragg, it was assuming a fearful risk to divide his army and undertake a flank movement. The danger in dividing the army for a flank movement was, that once it was divided for such a system of strategy, then Gen- eral Bragg with his army intact might fall upon any one por- tion of the Army of the Cumberland and destroy it before the remaining portions could come to its support, and so in
turn destroy each part. This plan of campaign notwith- standing the perilous conditions that surrounded it was the only possible hope for ultimate success. Having determined upon his line of action, on the 16th of August, General Rose- crans commenced the movement across the Cumberland mountains. Two divisions of the Twenty-first corps march- ing by different routes crossed the mountains into the Se- quatchie valley. Two brigades of VanCleve's division of the Twenty-first corps moved to Pikeville, the other brigade, to which the Eighty-sixth Indiana was attached, was yet at McMinnville.
Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division and Wagner's brigade of Wood's division of the Twenty-first corps were sent over Walden's Ridge into the valley of the Tennessee, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, together with Lilly's Eighteenth Indiana battery, joined Hazen and Wagner.
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
While these three brigades were pushing their way over the mountains and into the valley, Minty's Union cavalry were driving before them the remnant of the rebel cavalry that was yet on the west side of the Tennessee river. Hav- ing freed the west side of the river from the enemy, Minty and his cavalry created the impression on the minds of the Confederates that Rosecrans was receiving larger reinforce- ments, as they, Minty's men, rode up and down the river for a distance of thirty miles. These demonstrations also pre- vented General Bragg from sending troops to ascertain the actual situation of affairs. In the meantime the troops of Hazen, Wagner and Wilder had reached the valley and conld be seen by Bragg's army from its position across the river at Chattanooga. Every prominent point and ridge overlook- ing Chattanooga was filled with tents, unoccupied 'tis true, and at night camp fires were built for miles. At morning bugles sounded reveille from every hill top, and at night tat- too was blown for the imaginary hosts of the Union army overlooking Chattanooga. Lilly's battery was multiplied into many batteries as it appeared from out the woods, and disappeared soon after with its infantry supports to appear again in another place. From the movements of what seemed such large bodies of men General Bragg was entirely de- ceived as to the intentions of General Rosecrans. Believing that the attack was to come from above and opposite Chatta- nooga, General Bragg did just what General Rosecrans had wished for, he, Bragg, withdrew the last infantry brigade that was watching the river below Chattanooga, and thus gave General Rosecrans the opportunity to cross the river with his army. The river now being clear, Rosecrans at once began his movement southward, and around Bragg's right to threaten his communications, and thereby force him to abandon his strong position in the mountain country and evacuate Chattanoga.
Let us now briefly examine the topography of the coun- try over and through which the Fourteenth corps under Gen- eral Thomas, and the Twentieth corps under General Mc- Cook, must pass in order to carry out the plans of the cam-
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
paign. On the east side of the Tennessee river and parallel to it are Sand and Raccoon mountains, with the northern point of Sand mountain abutting on the river opposite Walden's Ridge. East of these two mountain ranges, rising boldly for 2,400 feet above the sea level, is the rocky and precipitous wall of Lookout Mountain, leaving between its perpendicular northern point and the Tennessee river a narrow way cut from the solid rock, leaving between that towering wall of rock and the water's edge barely space wide enough for the railroad trains to find their way around the point of the moun- tain and into Chattanooga, about two miles distant. Extend- ing southward from the river at this point the Lookout range extends for forty-five miles to what is known as Pigeon moun-
tains. Between these mountains, Lookout and Pigeon, is McLemore's Cove. From MeLemore's Cove starts another range of lofty hills and mountains north to east, known as Missionary Ridge. Beyond the east of all these ranges is Chattanooga creek or river, passing through Mclemore's Cove and so flowing in a deep and murky stream to the northward, until having united all its branches, it empties itself into the Tennessee about five miles above Chattanooga. Between all of these mountain ranges and General Rose- crans army flowed the deep waters of the Tennessee river which must be crossed before the flank movements could be begun. At various crossings of this river it was but reason- able to expect to meet some portions of the Confederate army. On August 29, General Rosecrans had pushed an ad- vance column across the river at a point called Caperton's, had captured the rebel pickets, put down his pontoons, and began the work of sending over the army. Crittenden was now concentrating all of his Twenty-first corps, at the Ten- nessee river, and by September 4, had all of his pontoons in the river at Shell Mound and his troops were passing over, the last to cross being VanCleve's which, with the ex- ception of Dick's brigade, had all crossed by the 7th.
The Union army was then in the following positions: The Twenty-first corps, Crittenden, on the left, advancing by way of Whitesides toward Chattanooga to cross the mountain
-
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
ranges near the river. The Fourteenth corps, Thomas, had pushed forward in the center moving southward, and on the morning of September 3 was with his advance over Lookout mountain, twenty-six miles south of Chattanooga. The Twentieth corps, MeCook, was on the right, and had moved yet farther south in the vicinity of Alpine and Mclemore's Cove, forty-six miles south of Chattanooga. The cavalry was on the extreme right. Never was an army compelled to place itself in so perilous a position as was that into which the Army of the Cumberland was forced from the 9th of Sep- tember until the morning of the 19th of that month, and as subsequent events showed, had the order of General Bragg to his corps commanders been obeyed, the probabilities are that our Union army would have been utterly destroyed, corps after corps, while in this scattered position.
Having seen the disposition of the troops of General Rosecrans we will now look to the movements of General Bragg and his army. Bragg had found himself being rapidly hemmed in at Chattanooga, with a prospect of having all of his communications cut off. Wilder's mounted brigade with Spencer repeating rifles, and Lilly's Eighteenth Indiana bat- tery, were on the west bank of the Tennessee river opposite Chattanooga, and were then throwing shells into the town. There was nothing left for General Bragg to do but to move out, and fall back southward toward Rome and Lafayette, Georgia, until he could meet the reinforcements he was daily expecting from the Confederate army of Northern Virginia, Buckner's corps from East Tennessee which was then within supporting distance and Johnston's army then on its way to join him and then to fall upon General Rosecrans' scattered army before it could be united and destroy it piece meal. There- fore on the night of September 8, he evacuated Chattanooga. On the afternoon of September 9, Wilder's brigade crossed the river and took possession of Chattanooga. Could it have been possible at this time for General Rosecrans to have united his army at Chattanooga there then would have been closed the most skillfully planned and most daringly exe- cuted campaign of the war. In only about three weeks time
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
General Rosecrans had repeated the Tullahoma campaign though a campaign by far vaster in its scope and results. It was a campaign beset by difficulties and dangers that at the outset seemed to be all but insurmountable, and yet it had been accomplished, with Chattanooga in his possession, and up to that point of time could have been termed almost a bloodless campaign, for it had been accomplished with the loss of only about a hundred men.
Upon retiring from Chattanooga General Bragg, as was afterward learned, sent two of his corps, Polk's and Hill's, to LaFayette by way of Lee & Gordon's Mills. Two other corps, Walker's and Buckner's, were sent by way of Gainesville, near to LaFayette, while his other forces moved by way of Ringgold. Cleburne's division, one of the strongest and best fighting divisions of his army, was thrown forward to try to occupy the gaps in Pigeon mountain. General Bragg established his headquarters at Lee & Gordon's Mills, with Hindman's division.
In order to preserve the record of the Eighty-sixth Indi- ana, it will be necessary to return to the regiment with its brigade at McMinnville. The monotony of camp life for an army in the field is broken always to a certain extent by the rumors that are set afloat from some indefinable source, in regard to what is or is not to be done by the army. These rumors often have some foundation in fact and serve to give interest and zest to soldier life. Situated as was the regi- ment and brigade at McMinnville, on the extreme left of the army, it was not possible for anyone, not even the brigade commander, to receive any very reliable information, beyond the fact that important operations of the entire army were contemplated, and such action could be none other than a forward movement which meant a battle in the very near future. Of one thing all had more or less reliable informa- tion, and that was that the Second brigade, Third division, Twenty-first corps, would soon be relieved, and would then rejoin its division and corps, but when it would be relieved, or where it would rejoin its division and corps no one knew. This uncertainty and unrest continued through the entire
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TIIE EIGHTY-SIXTII REGIMENT,
month of August, and the last day of the month had closed and no orders had been received for the movement.
On September 3, the headquarters of the Third division, Twenty-first corps, were at Jasper, Tennessee, and on that day General VanCleve, by his Adjutant General, Captain E. A. Otis, issued the following special orders, No. 202:
By direction of the General commanding the Twenty-first Army Corps, this command will move to and across the Tennessee river at Shell Mound as soon as the way is open, of which notice will hereafter be given. The troops will be supplied with three days' rations in haver- sacks, commencing with tomorrow morning. * * X *
Under this order Colonel Dick's brigade moved out from McMinnville to join the division and cross the Tennessee river and bear its part in the Chattanooga-Chickamauga campaign then fairly opened. That afternoon, September 3, at 2 o'clock, the brigade left its comfortable and home-like en- campment at McMinnville, marched twelve miles, and bivouacked. The next morning, the 4th, it started early, during the forenoon ascended the Cumberland mountain, and at nightfall encamped on its summit. September 5 the brigade moved out at 6 o'clock, descended the mountain dur- ing the day, and at night bivouacked near Dunlap in the Sequatchie valley. September 6 the brigade started at 4 o'clock and marched down the valley all day, and encamped near a big spring. On reaching Jasper, September 7, Col- onel Dick received an order from General VanCleve to change his line of march, and instead of going to and crossing the river at Shell Mound, as first ordered, that he should march to and cross the river at Bridgeport. In obedience to this order the route was changed and the brigade passed on through Jasper, crossing Battle Creek and reached Bridgeport and crossed the Tennessee river on the evening of September 7, going into bivouac on the east side of the river about 9 o'clock, at night, having marched during the day twenty-two miles. At 5 o'clock the next morning the brigade again moved out, and marched that day to Whitesides, a distance of fourteen miles.
Of the advance from Whitesides by the Second brigade,
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
Third division, Twenty-first corps, Colonel George F. Dick, in his report of the battle of Chickamauga, says:
"On September 9, a march of sixteen miles on the Trenton road brought me within ten miles of Chattanooga. On the 10th, I crossed the Lookont Mountain after a considerable delay, occasioned by the difficulty of getting a large supply train which was moving in front of my column, over the road. At the Widow Gillespie's, I halted until by brigade train should come up for the purpose of complying with the order for the reduction of baggage. This caused a delay until 4 p. m., when I again moved forward, reaching Rossville at sunset. Here a courier came in, reporting that about sixty rebel cavalry had attacked General Wood's supply train about two miles ahead. I immediately ordered the Thirteenth Ohio, Fifty-ninth Ohio, and Forty-fourth Indiana regiments, with a section of the Third Wisconsin battery, on the double quick, to drive back the raiders, leaving the Eighty-sixth Indiana as a guard to my own train. After double quicking a little more than two miles, the Fifty-ninth Ohio, being in front, came up to the train, when the enemy withdrew. The road being now clear, I moved my column forward, and at 11 p. m. I came up to General Wood's encampment on Chickamauga creek, where I bivouacked for the night.
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