USA > Indiana > The Eighty-sixth regiment, Indiana volunteer infantry : a narrative of its services in the civil war of 1861-1865 > Part 23
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THIE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
low, the air trembled with glad echoes. Missionary Ridge was no General's battle. It was the battle of the soldiers themselves, who went, like an unchained whirlwind, without command, up to the crest, and to what, up to that time, was the most complete victory of the war. "It was a glorious victory."
At 4:30 p. m. Assistant Secretary of War Dana tele- graphed Secretary of War Stanton as follows:
Glory to God. The day is decisively ours. Missionary Ridge has just been carried by a magnificent charge of Thomas's troops, and rebels routed.
The point of the Ridge projecting to the west, which was mounted by the Eighty-sixth and Seventy-ninth, was one nat- urally affording a very strong position for the enemy, easily defended and difficult to climb, and therefore the exploit of these regiments leading the entire battle line is the more notable. On account of its elevation it was used as a signal station by the enemy during his occupancy. It was beyond all fair question the first point of the ridge carried.
To the Eighty-sixth and Seventy-ninth Indiana, there- fore, belongs the honor of being the first regiments on the Ridge. What member of the Eighty-sixth regiment was the first to go over the enemy's works cannot be told. The honor is not so much in being first as in the brave endeavor. When all were striving so nobly and where everything was in such a turmoil and excitement it is not easy, nay, it is almost impos- sible to decide positively who has the honor to be the first. It was an honor to have been even the hindmost. Let every member of the Eighty-sixth who scaled the mountain that afternoon share alike in the honor, and "let them all go to glory together." Jefferson McClelland, of Company H, fell within a rod of the enemy's works on the crest of the Ridge- shot dead by a musket ball through the chest when charging on the line while fully manned. He had led all in the np- ward rush for the last line of works as he had done from the first start at the line at the foot of the Ridge. He paid the penalty of his daring courage with his life. W. W. Barnes received a severe contused wound of the thigh by a grape-
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
shot or a rock set flying by a plunging shot or shell which was not reported. Sergeant Stephen Cronkite, of Company E, color-bearer, carried the colors bravely and nobly forward until near the summit of the Ridge, when he fell seriously wounded. Then the brave Thomas J. Graves, Sergeant of Company D, seized the flag and mounted the Ridge and gal- lantly marching to the left led the attack upon the advanc- ing Confederate reinforcements until he, too, was badly wounded. It was here that Sergeant Myron H. Belknap, of Company I, received an ugly gun shot wound through the shoulder. Captain William M. Southard gave up his life when near the crest, and not ten feet away that brave little soldier, Paris H. Peterson, of Company I, breathed his last breath. But the brave deeds of all on that memorable Novem- ber afternoon cannot be recorded. Colonel Dick reported five enlisted men killed and thirty-eight wounded, one officer killed and two wounded, a total of forty-six. The loss of the Seventy-ninth was twenty-eight enlisted men wounded.
The following is a list of the killed:
Company K .- Captain William M. Southard,
E. - Henry C. Cronkhite,
" -Milton Gallimore, H .- Jefferson McClelland,
I. - Paris H. Peterson.
"-Jeptha Custer-6.
The following is a list of the mortally wounded: Company B .- Frederick Lunenburg,
" -Charles Waters,
C .- Jacob Cooper, color guard,
D .- James Ruloson,
F .- Eli A. Tipton,
"-Oliver Wood, I. - Absalom Huffman-7.
The following is a list of the severely wounded: Company A .- John Harding, "-James E. Padgett,
C .- James H. Brown,
" _Uriah Stevenson,
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THIE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
Company D .- Thomas J. Graves,
E .- Harmon M. Billings,
" -Stephen Cronkhite,
F .- John Kent,
H .- William W. Barnes,
.. I. - Myron H. Belknap,
"-Jacob D. Bazzle,
K .- B. F. Snyder-12.
The following is a list of the slightly wounded:
Lientenant Colonel Jacob C. Dick,
Company A .- Wilson DeMoss,
"-R. W. Stoops,
. .
B .- Lieutenant Jerre Haugh,
C .- James S. Butcher,
D .- Bartley Scanlon,
. . "-John Solomon,
E .- Samuel Cloyd,
"-Levi A. Cronkhite,
G .- Jeffrey O. Cutts,
"_B. F. Paxton,
"-George W. Tull,
. . "-Allen Devoll,
H .- William F. Adams,
"-William H. Trulock,
I. - Thomas Decker,
K .- Tilghman A. Howard,
"-James Harrington,
"_Morris Welch,
"-William Sanders,
"-James Williams-21.
The loss of the Eighty-sixth greatly exceeded that of any other regiment of Beatty's brigade, and was nearly double that of the Seventy-ninth, its companion regiment. The only reasonable explanation of the small loss of these two regiments is that they went quickly up the Ridge from the first line of works at its foot and thus gained the cover and protection from the enemy's terrible fire by the steep- ness of the western slope.
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
It will thus be seen that the plan of battle, as given in the preceding pages of this chapter, was not carried out as orig- inally intended by General Grant. The order given by Gen- eral Granger, the commander of the Fourth corps, "Take the Ridge if you can, " and sent to Wood and then to Sher- idan, was not given until the Eighty-sixth and Seventy-ninth, cheered on by their officers, had climbed almost to the very top of the Ridge, and as Sheridan said "lay down below the crest," and held on by their teeth, nails and eye-lashes. Then and then only was the thought of the possibility of captur- ing the Ridge by a direct front assault conceived by the gen- eral officers. Then were the supports and reserve ordered up, and the attack made by the whole line that made the as- sault upon the first line of works at the foot of the Ridge.
General Grant did not order or expect the assault to be made upon the Ridge at that time, or in the manner in which it was made, but simply an attack upon "the first line of works at the foot of the Ridge as a diversion in favor of Sher- man who was hard pressed."
General Wood's report shows that the intended attack upon the Ridge was quite a different thing from the one that was actually made, the one being a flank attack, while the other was a direct front attack upon the enemy's chosen position and fortifications. General Grant says of the troops and the assault: "Without awaiting further orders or stop- ping to reform, our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest, thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle, and of the 24th for this charge." General Grant here refers to an order issued while under a mistaken idea of the situation of the armies. In that order it is stated that Thomas will either "carry the rifle-pits and Ridge, or move to the left as the presence of the enemy may require." The order was conditional, and the condi- tions were not at all what they were thought to be, for in the opening sentence General Grant says: "General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing." This conditional order for attacking the Ridge was given under the supposition that Sherman's attack had
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTII REGIMENT,
been successful and would continue to be so, and that in fact there would be little for Thomas' force to do. It is cer- tainly plain that there was a change in the plan of the battle. General Grant did not expect a direct assault by the cen- ter. The evidence of this is complete and convincing. Gen- eral Henry M. Cist, on this point says:
Then, when Sherman had been fighting for nearly two days, and had failed to make the headway Grant's plan contemplated, the plan underwent another modification. On the 25th, Grant ordered Thomas to move out his troops from the center, to make another " demonstration" in Sherman's behalf, so he could take the tunnel in accordance with the original plan. Thomas was ordered to take the first line of riffe-pits and hold his command there, while Bragg was expected to draw off part of his troops from Sherman's front and strengthen his line in front of the demonstration. Thomas' orders to his corps and division Generals were given in accordance with Grant's instructions, and as the orders reached the brigade and regimental commanders, the movement was only to be a "demonstration." When the troops reached the rebel line, cap- tured it, and then found themselves under the fire from the enemy's lines on the heights above, without orders, and even against orders, the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland pressed up the face of the Ridge under the deadly musketry fire that greeted them, with cannon in front of them, to the right and left, raking with converging fire, and won for General Grant the battle of Missionary Ridge, driving Bragg away from Sherman's front, and thus enabling him to take the tunnel as ordered. Whenever the victory of Missionary Ridge shall be narrated on his- tory's page, this gallant charge of the brave men of Wood's and Sher- idan's divisions, with those of Baird and Johnson on their left and right, will always be a prominent feature of the engagement as told in the coming years, and will be the last to lose its glory and renown.
No wonder that General Grant failed to appreciate this movement at the time, not understanding the troops who had it in charge. When he found these commands ascending the Ridge to capture it, when he ordered a " demonstration" to be made to the foot of the hill and there wait, he turned sharply to General Thomas and asked, "By whose orders are those troops going up the hill?" General Thomas taking in the situation at once, suggested that it was probably by their own. Gen- eral Grant remarked that " it was all right if it turned out all right," and added, " if not, some one would suffer." But it turned out " all right," and General Grant in his official report compliments the troops for fol- lowing closely the retreating enemy without further orders.
General Cist relates these things from personal knowl- edge. As a member of General Thomas' staff he was pres- ent on Orchard Knob when the orders were issued, in fact,
259
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
they were issued through him, and being present he heard the above quoted remarks of General Grant. General Jo- seph S. Fullerton, of General Granger's staff, having described the capture of the line of works at the foot of the Ridge, says:
The order of the Commanding General now had been fully and most successfully carried out. But it did not go far enough to satify these brave men, who thought the time had come to finish the battle of Chickamauga. There was a halt of but a few minutes to take breath and to re-form lines; then, with a sudden impulse, and without orders, all started up the Ridge. Officers, catching their spirit, first followed, then led. There was no thought of supports or of protecting flanks, though the enemy's line could be seen, stretching on either side.
As soon as this movement was seen from Orchard Knob, Grant quickly turned to Thomas, who stood by his side, and I heard him say angrily: " Thomas, who ordered those men up the Ridge?" Thomas re- plied, in his usual slow, quiet manner: "I don't know; I did not." Then, addressing General Gordon Granger, he said, " Did you order them up, Granger? " "No," said Granger; " they started up without orders. When those fellows get started all hell can't stop them." General Grant said some- thing to the effect that somebody would suffer if it did not turn out well, and then, turning, stoically watched the Ridge. He gave no further orders.
As soon as Granger had replied to Thomas, he turned to me, his chief-of-staff, and said: "Ride at once to Wood, and then to Sheridan, and ask them, if they ordered their men up the Ridge, and tell them, if they can take it to push ahead." As I was mounting, Granger added: "It is hot over there, and you may not get through. I shall send Cap- tain Avery to Sheridan, and other officers after both of you." As fast as my horse could carry me, I rode first to General Wood, and delivered the message. "Ididn't order them up," said Wood; " they started up on their own account, and they are going up, too! Tell Granger, if we are supported we will take and hold the Ridge!"
General O. O. Howard confirms these statements as to Grant's remark to Thomas. He says:
The nearest he came to chiding anybody was when Thomas' sol- diers went forward from the base of the Ridge to the bristling erest without orders, when he remarked: "Well, somebody will suffer if they don't stay there." They did stay there and went beyond the cap- tured summit.
Of all the officers on Orchard Knob, General Gordon Granger alone has the honor of ordering, "Take the Ridge if you can." Of course it is understood that the division
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
commanders accompanied their troops. Charles A. Dana. Assistant Secretary of War was present on Orchard Knob during the day, and in his report of the assault to Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, says:
The storming of the Ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military history. No man who climbed the ascent by any of the roads that wind along its front can believe that 18,000 men were moved up its broken and crumbling face unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as a visible interposition of God. Neither Grant nor Thomas intended it. Their orders were to carry the rifle-pits along the base of the Ridge and capture their occupants, but when this was accomplished the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily np those impracticable steeps, over the bristling rifle-pits on the crest and thirty cannon enfilading every gully. The orders to storm appears to have been given simultaneously to Generals Sheridan and Wood, because the men were not be held back, dangerous as the attempt appeared to military prudence. Besides, the Generals had caught the inspiration of the men, and were ready themselves to under- take impossibilities.
This is clear as to Grant's order at the time of the assault. As to the judgment of the practicability of an assault on Missionary Ridge, Dana had dispatched November 8, 1863:
Reconnoisance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge made yesterday by Thomas, Smith and Brannan, from the heights opposite on the north of the Tennessee, proved Smith's plan of attack impractic- able. The creek and country are wrongly laid down on our maps, and no operation for the seizure of Missionary Ridge can be undertaken with the force which Thomas can now command for the purpose.
General Granger in his report says:
General Sherman was unable to make any progress in moving along the Ridge during the day, as the enemy had massed in his front; therefore, in order to relieve him, I was ordered to make a demonstra- tion upon the works of the enemy dircetly in my front, at the base of Missionary Ridge.
After describing the capture of the first line at the base of the Ridge, General Granger goes on to say :
My orders had now been fully and successfully carried out, but not enough had been done to satisfy the brave troops who had accomplished so much. Although the batteries on the Ridge, at short range, by direct and enfilading fire, were still pouring down upon them a shower of iron and the musketry from the hillside was thinning their ranks, they dashed over the breastworks, through the rifle-pits, and started up the Ridge. They started without orders. * * Eagerly they rushed forward
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
to a danger which the bravest, marching under orders, might tremble. Officers caught the enthusiasm of the men, and the men were in turn cheered by the officers. * * At several points along the line my troops were ascending the hill and gaining positions less exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, though more exposed to the fire of his musketry. Seeing this, I sent my Assistant Adjutant General to inquire, first of General Wood and then of General Sheridan, whether the troops had been ordered up the Ridge by them, and to instruct them to take the Ridge if possible. In reply to this, General Wood told him that the men had started up without orders, and that he could take it if he could be supported.
It will be observed that orders were sent to Wood first. Why was this? Simply because his advance was farther up the Ridge. They had started up first and they kept ahead. According to both Granger and Fullerton the order, "Take the Ridge if you can, " was sent first to Wood and then to Sheridan. General Wood, stout-hearted Wood, "the iron- gray e teran, " says:
As the day progressed the interest which attracted every eye and absorbed every feeling was that involved in the attempt of General Sherman's command to effect a lodgment on Missionary Ridge near the tunnel. Severer opposition than had been expected was evidently being met with. To lessen the opposition General Sherman was encountering, it was determined that a movement should be made against the rebel center. I was ordered to advance and carry the enemy's intrenehments at the base of Missionary Ridge and hold them. * * When the first line of intrenchments was carried, the goal for which we had started was won. Our orders carried us no farther. We had been instructed to carry the line of intrenchments at the base of the Ridge and there halt. But the enthusiasm and impetuosity of the troops were such that those who first reached the intrenchments at the base of the Ridge bounded over them, and pressed on up the ascent after the flying enemy. Moreover, the intrenchments were no protection against the enemy's artillery on the Ridge. To remain would be destruction-to return would be both expensive in life and disgraceful. Officers and men all seemed impressed with this truth. In addition, the example of those who commenced to ascend the Ridge so soon as the intrenehments were carried was con- tagious. Without waiting for an order the vast mass pressed forward in the race for glory, each man anxious to be the first on the summit. The enemy's artillery and musketry could not check the impetuous as- sault. The troops did not halt to fire. To have done so would have been ruinous. Little was left to the commander of tho troops than to cheer on the foremost-to encourage the weaker of limb, and to sustain the very few who seemed to be faint hearted.
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
To the eternal honor of the troops, it should be recorded that the laggards were, indeed, few in number. The interval which elapsed be- tween the carrying of the intrenchments at the base of the Ridge and the crowning of the summit must have been one of intense and painful anxiety to all who were not participants in the assault. The ascent of Missionary Ridge was indeed an effort to try the strongest limbs and the stontest hearts. But suspense and anxiety were not of long duration. Upward steadily went the standard of the Union-borne onward by strong arms, upheld by brave hearts-and soon it was seen flying on the erest of Missionary Ridge. Lond indeed were the shouts with which this spectacle was received.
This evidence is conclusive and proves beyond cavil that General Grant did not intend that the assault should be directed against the Ridge itself. Dana in a dispatch to Stan- ton, sent November 23, 1863, at 8 p. m. says: "Nothing shows decisively whether enemy will fight or fly. Grant thinks lat- ter; other judicious officers think former." On the 24th at 7:30 p. m. in a dispatch Dana says: "If Bragg does not with- draw the remainder of his troops we shall probably have a decisive battle." Sherman was now in position and Grant expected him to fight the battle if Bragg did not withdraw, but with Sherman threatening his line of communications Grant evidently expected the rebel forces to be withdrawn in accordance with the report of the deserters on the 23d. On the 25th, at 7:30 a. m. Dana, who was in constant com- munication with Grant, even when not present with him in person, dispatched Stanton: "No firing at front. This makes it pretty certain Bragg retreated." At 9 a. m., however, he dispatched again: "Bragg evacuated Lookout Mountain last night and our troops ocenpy it, but he still holds to his rifle- pits along base Missionary Ridge." Once again before the attack Dana dispatched to Stanton on that memorable November day. At 1 p. m. he wired: "In our front here rebel rifle-pits are fully manned, preventing Thomas gain- ing the Ridge." These messages show two things: First, that it was confidently believed and expected by Grant, Dana, and others during the 24th, that on the following night Bragg would evacuate his position and works on Mis- sionary Ridge in front of Chattanooga. In the last message it is very plainly hinted that the Ridge was too strong to be
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
gained by an assault, and it cannot be reasonably doubted that both ideas were based upon expressed judgments of Grant. The last one, at least, by a tacit acknowledgement that Bragg's position was too strong to be assaulted.
M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster General of the army, in a dispatch to Secretary Stanton says: "General Grant pro- ceeded to the summit, and then only did we know its height," conceding that the difficulties of mounting the Ridge were greater than he and other general officers had supposed, al- though before the assault was made they were considered to be insurmountable.
The honor of the assault lies clearly with the rank and file who conceived the idea under a storm of iron hail, and to the general officers who first observed what their gallant men would do and encourage them in their brave endeavors by ordering up their supports and reserves. The honor belongs distinctly to the two divisions of the Fourth corps, Generals Wood and Sheridan. The troops of these two divisions led all others in their magnificently conducted as- sault. Of these two divisions it will be conclusively shown
that Wood led Sheridan. Sheridan's remark when at the first line of works at the foot of the Ridge as much as con- cedes Wood's claim. That remark was: "Looking to the left I saw a single regiment far over in Wood's line dash up the hill and lay down below the crest. General Hazen's men also commenced the ascent." Wagner's brigade, of Sher- idan's division, had been recalled and his division lay on the foot of the Ridge, while the advance of Beatty's brigade of Wood's division, the Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth Indiana, had almost crested the Ridge. Captain Reilley, of the Tenth Kentucky, which was in Baird's division of the Fourteenth corps, certainly an unbiased witness, supports this claim. The claim is further strengthened by the testimony of Con- federate officers. They were on the Ridge carefully watch- ing the advance and their own line of defense. Generals Bate and Bragg, who were present until after their lines were broken on the north of Bragg's headquarters, both tes- tify that their lines were first broken in that part held by Pat-
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
ton Anderson's division, whereas Sheridan, and those who uphold his claim, state that the Confederate lines were first broken south of Bragg's headquarters, a point far to the right-Federal right-of that given by Generals Bate and Bragg. General Bate's division, of Breckenridge's corps, of Bragg's army, occupied the crest of the Ridge somedistance north and south of Bragg's headquarters. It would, there- fore, be in the line of Bate's duty to have this part of the line under the closest observation. He was reputed to be a courageous, careful, and skillful division commander. From his more favorable position to view the entire field he would be the better able to know exactly where the Confederate line was first broken and the Ridge carried than any Union officer en- gaged in the assault. Besides General Bragg agreed with the statement of Bate. Sheridan necessarily had his atten- tion engaged and probably very closely confined to his divis- ion in directing its attack and upward progress. Sheridan says it was the right of his division that first mounted to the crest of the Ridge, and that it was south of Bragg's head- quarters. This is probably true of his division, but Bate, supported by the testimony of Bragg, says the Confederate line was first broken some distance to the north of Bragg's headquarters, in the line of Patton Anderson's division, and this seems to agree exactly with the statements of Wood, Beatty, Reilly and others, and is therefore true. Wood's division was on the left-north- of Sheridan's, but Bate's line was more extended than Sheridan's and overlapped it and covered a part of Wood's front. By this formation Wood's brigades attacked, in their assault, the troops of the two divisions. Wood's right brigades fought Bate's troops, with the possible exception of the left of Willich's brigade front, while Beatty's, the left brigade, fought Patton Ander- son's left on Signal Hill, "beyond the depression north of Bragg's headquarters, where a section of artillery of Dent's battery had been firing and was then located." If due notice is taken of General Bate's words it will satisfy any reasonable person that the first break was at the point where the two regiments, the Eighty-sixth and Seventy-ninth In-
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