USA > Indiana > The Eighty-sixth regiment, Indiana volunteer infantry : a narrative of its services in the civil war of 1861-1865 > Part 43
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
Brigadier General T. J. Wood, commanding Fourth army corps. after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Laurens' Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the Fourth corps on the Hillsboro pike, to support General Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position on the Montgomery Hill.
Major General Schofield, commanding the Twenty-third army corps, will replace Brigadier General Kimball's division of the Fourth corps with his troops, and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Laurens' Hill with a strong skirmish linc. He will move with the remainder of his force in front of the works and co-operate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the enemy.
Major General Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah, will occupy the interior line in the rear of his present position, stretching from the reservoir on the Cumberland river to Fort Negley, with a strong skirmish line, and mass the remainder of his force in its present position, to act according to the exigencies which may arise during these operation. * * *
Should the weather permit, the troops will be formed to commence operations at 6 a. m. on the 15th, or as soon thereafter as practicable.
On the morning of the 15th General Thomas finding the weather favorable ordered the attack to be made in accord- ance with the plan promulgated in the Special Field Order above quoted. The weather was even more favorable than had been apprehended the evening before. The formation of the troops in battle array was wholly concealed from the enemy by a dense fog which did not clear away until near noon. This gave General Thomas a great advantage, General Hood being taken completely by surprise, and was not, therefore, ready for such a "hustling mill" as Thomas gave him from the first round. There was, however, considerable delay in completing the alignment, still the fog veiled the movement and shortened the vision of the doomed rebel army. But there was an important change made in the plan of the battle as first proposed by General Thomas. Finding that General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as was intended, Thomas directed General Schofield to move his command-the Twenty-third corps-from the position in reserve to which it had been assigned, over to the right of General Smith, enabling the cavalry thereby to operate more freely in the enemy's rear. This was rapidly accomplished
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by General Schofield, and his troops participated in the clos- ing operations of the day. In making the alignment the Third brigade, Third division, Fourth corps, was moved . back and forth many times before the line was finally adjusted according to General Thomas' wishes. When the line was completed ready for the advance, the Eighty-sixth on the front line, was almost directly in front of the salient of its old line of works. Here it was ordered to construct a new line of breastworks, some two hundred yards or more in advance of the old, but advanced upon the right of the line. The men were ordered to "stack arms" and go for- ward about one hundred or one hundred and fifty yards in front of their own line to a stone fence, tear this down and carry the stone thus procured back to the battle-line, and there to be used to make the revetinent of breastworks. It proved to be an extremely dangerous duty to perform. By this time the fog had cleared away. The enemy had a strong skirmish line in the regiment's immediate front, and observ- ing what it was doing, opened a brisk fire upon it which he maintained as long as he was permitted to remain and occupy his line of rifle pits.
Right at this point the Eighty-sixth met one of its most trying ordeals. To be exposed to a galling fire, without being permitted to resist or fire upon the enemy in return, is what puts the nerves of soldiers to their severest test. This is what the Eighty-sixth experienced here. It was another Rocky Face Ridge or worse. Clothing was repeat- edly cut by rebel missiles, rocks were shattered in the very grasp of men as they carried them back to the proper line, but the work went steadily on. There fell a man severely wounded, here another. They were removed by the stretcher- bearers and the work proceeded. The enemy, like so many malignant hornets, stung every moment and persevered in it with a persistence worthy of a better cause. Here Jesse W. Carter, of Company H, and A. B. Walker, of Company K, were wounded. William W. Sanders, of Company K, was killed instantly, shot through the head. Colonel Dick was standing near by. ] He ordered the stretcher-bearers to
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remove the body at once, and the work on the intrenchments was not interrupted. The loss of the regiment here in open ground while subject to the fire of this skirmish line was some ten or twelve. Directly after this experience of the Third brigade, the Second brigade of Beatty's division, com- manded by Colonel Philip Sidney Post, of the Fifty-ninth Illinois, assaulted the most advanced position of the enemy's forces on Montgomery Hill. The hill was swept from foot to crest in a most gallant manner and with very small loss. The hill was about midway between Hood's main line of works and the salient of the Fourth corps' line. In point of time this movement had just terminated successfully when General Thomas ordered General Schofield to move from his position in reserve to take his place in the line on General Smith's right. But this success was not enough. The fiery and determined Wood pressed his lines forward and captured the enemy's main line. W. O. Blake, the historian, of this last movement and the first day's fight. says: "The Fourth corps continued to advance, and carried the entire line in its front by assault, and captured several pieces of artillery, about 500 prisoners, some stands of colors, and other material. Just before dark the command again advanced, but night coming on it bivouacked before completing the designed movement. The total result of the day's operations was the capture, by the forces under General Thomas, of sixteen pieces of artillery and 1.200 prisoners, besides sev- eral hundred stands of small arms and about forty wagons. The enemy had been forced back at all points, with heavy loss, and the Federal casualties were unusually light. The behavior of the troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement, and the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, strictly adhered to."
After the capture of the main line of the enemy's works there were some indications of a precipitate retreat on the part of the enemy, and therefore General Thomas ordered General Wood to move his corps farther to the left to the Franklin pike and southward upon it. The movement was commenced immediately, but night overtook the command
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before it reached the Franklin pike and it bivouacked as before stated. In fact, the entire line of battle of Thomas' army bivouacked where darkness found it. The men ate a soldier's meal and sank to rest on the damp earth, while their . commanders planned their work for them and made prepara- tions for the next day's battle. ยท
Of the loss sustained on the 15th the Fourth corps was the greatest, being about 350. Smith's loss was a little less and Schofield's was about 150, and those of Steedman's and Wilson's were still less, being a very small loss when the magnitude of the battle and the results are considered
It had been a day of activity, excitement and peril to those engaged. The results had been unexpectedly great as can readily be seen. Hood had been driven from his advanced position, then followed up and forced from his main fortified line and compelled, toward the close of the day, to fall back and again fortify to have any hope of staying the conquer- ing Union forces. Thomas' troops had been uniformly suc- cessful, capturing every position attacked, driving the Con- federates pell mell before them, killing, wounding and cap- turing many, and greatly demoralizing all of them. So suc- cessful had the Union forces been in the day's battle that Hood himself saw certain disaster before him unless the whole army could be aroused to superhuman courage and effort, and therefore on the morning of the 16th he gave orders to his subordinates to prepare to retreat that even- ing. He hoped by the very strong position taken, and the good fortifications erected, to be able to ward off Thomas' attacks for the day and then march his command away intact under cover of the darkness of the following night. But it was too late. The powerful, crushing blows of Thomas were not to be parried or stayed. Hood had dallied with oppor- tunity until it was no more. He could not well retreat while pressed so closely on every hand, and before night of the second day's battle his army was a disorganized, disorderly mob.
Reveille was sounded at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 16th of December for the Eighty-sixth, and in fact for the
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Third brigade. It was expected to be a very busy day. At sun-rise Colonel George F. Dick gave the regiment the com- mand "Double-column on the center at half distance- March!" and the regiment performed the evolution as though it was on the parade ground instead of the bloody field of bat- tle, and in a very few moments the command was ready for the day's work. Marching eastward as the command was when night had overtaken it the previous day, it soon crossed the Franklin pike. Beatty's division, and probably the whole corps, executed a wheel to the right until its line extended at right angles with the pike, and then advanced southward on the line of the pike, Beatty's division east. and Kimball's west, of the pike, Elliott in reserve. But General Wood finding that there was a division's space upon the line be- tween Kimball's right and General A. J. Smith's left, he ordered General Elliott's division to forward into line. Thus early in the afternoon of the 16th all three divisions of the Fourth corps were upon the front line facing the enemy. The distance traveled by the Confederates from the line from which they had been driven was only sufficient to find an easily defensible position-no farther. Hood had not found it practicable to get away on the night of the 15th, but had chosen an exceedingly strong position and built very good strong breastworks. The position and works appeared almost impregnable. There were several strong forts on the line that had been previously constructed which added greatly to the strength of his otherwise strong position. His line extended from Overton's Hill on the right of his line east of the Franklin pike, westward some distance beyond the Granny White pike, thence turning nearly due south ended by a sharply refused line of intrenchments on a high hill, that since the battle, but previously nameless, has been known as Shy's Hill, from the Colonel of the Confederate Twentieth Tennessee, who was killed there in the evening of the sec- ond day's battle. Hood's line was also sharply refused on the crest of Overton's Hill running south. Refusing the ends of his line made his flanks more secure and more diffi- cult to flank or turn. The Union line was facing the Confed-
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
erate line, the latter only being outflanked upon the left of its line by Wilson's cavalry. The Confederate line being the interior line could be more strongly manned with an equal number of men, and troops held in reserve could re-in- force any particular part of their line much more quickly and easily than the Union troops could. Thomas' superior numbers, however, allowed him to maintain the strength of his line and extend it equal to that of Hood's.
The advance, after crossing to the east of the pike, had brought the Union battle front well up to the enemy's intrenched line, within striking distance. Now, however, there was not the same decisive action and rapidity of advance as on the previous day. The Union command " had run up against a stump," and wanted a little time to consider the situation before he took further action. The enemy had chosen a much stronger position than the one he had held on the morning of the previous day. Hood, too, had his com- mand better in hand for battle. There were no outlying detachments to be taken by surprise and in detail. The whole army now was solidified into one mobile mass as it were, a strong battle line well intrenched, and with a single purpose to hold his position firmly until nightfall, when darkness would cover his intended retreat. Every man in Hood's army facing the Union forces knew this must be done or cer- tain defeat awaited them, and defeat meant rout and ruin and such disaster as had never yet befallen their flag in a single day's encounter. Therefore, if their hearts were at all in the cause which they represented they must fight to the last, as never men fought, or give up hope. This was the sit- uation from which there was no escape.
About noon of the 16th Steedman's troops, consisting of two brigades of colored soldiers, joined Knefler's brigade on the left, and extended that flank of the Union army. By order of General Thomas, General Wood, the Fourth corps commander, also took direction of these two brigades for the day. The skirmish lines were pushed well up to the enemy's works and annoyed him greatly by maintaining a sharp fire upon his line, and especially on his batteries on
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Overton's Hill. The courageous part played by the skir- mish line enabled officers to make a pretty careful reconnois- sance of the enemy's position and works, to find if possible where an assault might be directed with the best chance of success and the greatest results if successful. General Thomas was with General Wood directly after noon, but the position of the enemy was so very strong and so fully manned that he would not order an assault. In fact, after passing on to Smith's command, and then to Schofield's, and hearing the report of the reconnoissances made of the enemy's position and strength, General Thomas did not order an assault, but left the corps commanders to decide that for themselves. The "Iron Gray Veteran" of the Fourth corps soon decided to make the attempt on Overton's Hill, the strongest point on the enemy's entire line, but the one. which if attained, would yield the greatest results to the Union cause, as it would place in the hands of the Federal troops the main road on which the Confederates must hope to retreat. With their retreat cut off in this direction, as it would be with Overton's Hill captured before the rest of their line was broken, they must surrender or disperse, and this would indeed be a death blow to their cause.
Knefler's Third brigade, of Beatty's division, was ordered to construct a line of intrenchments some hundred yards in front of the enemy's works on the hill and hold it, and Post's Second brigade was ordered to assault the key to the enemy's position, Overton's Hill, supported by Streight's First brigade. Thompson's brigade of colored troops, of Steedman's command, supported by the other brigade. Gros- venor's, was also ordered by General Wood to assault the hill simultaneously with Post's brigade. The lines of the advance of the two brigades converging, their flanks woukl come together at the angle of the enemy's works on the crest of the hill to be assaulted. This was the strongest point, but if attained, would place Hood at Thomas' mercy and therefore worthy of an heroic effort. A heavy fire of artillery by order of General Wood had been concentrated
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on the enemy's position on the hill for sometime before the assault was made.
About 3 o'clock in the afternoon the columns of attack were ordered forward. The troops advanced slowly at first until nearing the enemy's works. When it was thought they were in striking distance they were ordered to charge "double quick." Now, the full manly voices of the men of the Northwest rang out in their startling, terrific yell of defiance, joined at once by the colored troops on their immed- iate left, and the final rush was made. The assault was made in truly gallant style and the attack was well sustained, but they were attacking veterans of the. Confederate army who had been tried in the fire of battle many times, and who were as brave as the bravest of the heroes of Waterloo. These veterans were in a good position, behind excellent works which protected them effectually and rendered them practically secure. The Confederates were not to be stam- peded by noise, and true to their cause, they fought desper- ately, never giving an inch of ground or exposing them- selves unnecessarily from the protecting cover of their good works, but maintaining a rapid steady fire of both musketry and artillery. Both columns of attack were severely handled and finally repulsed. But before the commands retired the wounded came streaming back through the Eighty-sixth and the other regiments of Knefler's brigade. This gave the men to understand how desperate had been the attack and defense in their immediate front. Indeed the Eighty-sixth well up to the front did not need to see the wounded to know that it had been a desperately fought bat- tle-a maliciously hot engagement. The thunders of the rebel batteries, the dreadful crash of grape and canister, the the spiteful hiss of the little bullets oracularly communi- cated the fact that there was red-handed work right there in front-in arm's length, and in which the Third brigade might at any moment expect to be in- vited to participate. The attack did not last long. The Union troops were compelled to retire from the attack. Knefler's brigade covered their retreat and the attacking
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columns withdrew from their advanced position with- out molestation. They had fought gallantly, had almost attained the object .of the attack, mounted the rebel works, but the lines of the enemy were unshaken and the fire was too hotly maintained, and they were forced reluctantly to yield ground. This was attributable to two causes: the strong position, and the enemy, warned by the maneuvers, had divined that the attack was to be made at this point first, and had been able to reinforce Overton's Hill until he felt secure in point of numbers. He was, therefore, unintimi- dated and stood his ground resolutely. The loss of the Sec- ond brigade was considerable, Colonel Post himself being among those who were severely wounded. The colored troops fought no less bravely than did the Second brigade, and their loss was equally great, but all was without avail. Yet it showed conclusively that the "smoked Yankees" could be relied upon.
General Wood's attack upon the point most to be desired had failed. It was too strong a position and too well forti- fied to be swept by a handful of men, when the enemy was warned and had time to reinforce the ordinary battle line which held it. It was a commanding position, both as to the battle-field and as to his line of retreat. The enemy was fully aware of this, and therefore determined to hold it if possible. But not in the least disheartened the corps com- mander, with General Thomas' consent and direction, made preparation for a combined attack that would at least put matters on a different footing, and to a certain extent rob the enemy of the advantage he seemed to possess after the repulse of Post's and Thompson's brigades. The left of the enemy's line had been extended until it was very thin and weak, and he beheld with great dismay the preparation for assaulting his position. The officer in command called for reinforcements in all haste, but then at other points he was in but little better shape to spare men and resist an attack, as he had been roughly handled all round the line during the day, although no direct assault had been made except on Overton's Hill, at least, by the infantry. But the batteries
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had knocked his works right and left, and the skirmishers had crept near his works in many places, and maintained a hot and commanding fire. All soldiers who have campaigned in really great campaigns know how trying it is on one's nerves to be set up as a mark for sharp-shooters for ten or twelve hours at a time. This was the situation of the Con- federates at many points on their line late in the afternoon of the 16th.
But Wood's gallant attack, unaided, failed, and some- thing else must be attempted. The attack upon Hood's position began with General Schofield's command on the Union right, and ran along the blue-coated line from right to left like a wave along the shore. Knefler's brigade was still at work on its line of intrenchments when the wave of action reached it. "Forward, " was the word that rang from the lips of Colonel Dick. This was the regiment's only prepar- ation for the assault. The Eighty-sixth and, in fact, the Third brigade, were to attack directly in their front, on Overton's Hill, where the brave brigade of the gallant Col- onel Post had made its attack and failed. Now began a charge in some respects almost equal to the wonderful assault on Missionary Ridge. Colonel Dick, always a prompt and energetic commander, threw the whole of his soldierly spirit into his every command, as if it were a forlorn hope. His subordinates seconded his efforts with equal spirit and reso- lution, and thus the regiment was sent ahead for the enemy's works under a full head of steam. There was no time to "fall in" and "form a line." All that could be done was to grab one's gun and rush to the front. Not a moment was lost, and the men went forward at a full run, no halting, no hesitating, no seeking shelter behind stumps or trees, but right on for the works and the enemy. Cheers far to the right indicated that there, too, Union men were pressing the enemy, and that he would have work all along the line, and could not mass at any particular point. For this reason, if for no other, they would have a better chance to win what seemed to be an impregnable position. Could this point be carried, even then? Could this hill be captured, this strong-
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hold, the citadel of the enemy's position? If it could be done, complete success was assured. On the run, over the ground of the previous assault, the regiment passed heaps of the slain, both white and black, but the men had little time to note the horrors of the battle-field now, although a glance was sufficient to show that it had been a fearful slaughter for so brief a time. On the regiment went, still at a run for the works and their occupants. The fire of the enemy was not as severe as had been expected, and the men literally. ran over the works and many Confederates.
"As ye dance with the damsels to viol and flute, So we skipped over breastworks and flocked in pursuit."
Capturing the fort, guns and prisoners, and kept right on scarcely stopping to notice what was captured, but almost treading on the heels of the fleeing fugitives. Colonel Dick in his report says: "At the point where my regiment gained the enemy's work he had left in good condition four pieces of artillery, over which I placed a guard. Here also the regi- ment captured fifty-five enlisted men and three commissioned officers." Captain McInerny went to the rear with a squad of some fifty odd prisoners, while the regiment continued the pursuit of the enemy still east of the Franklin pike. Only those who were in first-rate racing condition could keep the pace set after the enemy, and many fell behind the regi- ment from sheer inability to maintain the high rate of speed for so long a time and distance. The Eighty-sixth in the very front of all the army raced on after the fleet-footed Con- federates until the darkness of night fell. When finally halted the Eighty-sixth was within fifty yards of quite a large number of demoralized rebels, who by their officers had been brought to a stand. There were a number of teams and a battery, but all were fearfully shaken up, and it was only by the most strenuous exertions that the officers could hold them here from one minute to another. The Eighty-sixth had raced on after the enemy with such headlong impetuosity that there was only a handful of the regiment present when the halt was called, the others having fallen behind from sheer exhaustion. Had the enemy had the nerve he might
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have turned and captured the entire squad, as he probably had ten times the numbers. But of course the Confederates were so frightened that they thought of nothing but to try and escape.
Just beyond where the Eighty-sixth was halted was a little swale, thickly grown up with underbrush, and just the other side of the swale was the demoralized enemy, with a battery and some teams. They could not be seen, but the teamsters shouting and swearing at their teams, and the offi- cers giving commands and trying hard to bring the men under control, could be heard. The battery fired one or two rounds and then hastily retreated. The men had been halted here in their mad flight, and undoubtedly a strong attempt was made to organize a rear-guard to cover the retreat. Every few moments some of the men would break away for the rear, and then a general breaking up of the ranks would occur. The officers tried to rally them and called them cow- ards and swore horribly, threatening to shoot the very next one who made the attempt to retreat without orders. A num- ber of the Eighty-sixth wanted to continue the pursuit-to push on over the swale and attack this squad and try at least for their capture, but the officers, probably under positive orders to halt, did not deem it prudent to push ahead farther with so few men, not knowing exactly what was in their immediate front. The rebel artillerist, as stated, braced up sufficiently to fire one or two rounds, then retired still farther south. There was every evidence of extreme demoralization on the part of the enemy: teamsters were shouting at their teams, wagonmasters were giving their orders in stentorian tones, officers were cursing their men as cowards and pol- troons of the meanest kind and lowest grade. The men in turn were vociferating that they would face the enemy as long as the officers, but that they were greatly outnumbered and overpowered, and that further resistance here was wholly useless. But during all this talk, some of the men, impatient of restraint, would break away and occasion another outbreak of profanity on the part of the officers. The officers
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