USA > Indiana > The Eighty-sixth regiment, Indiana volunteer infantry : a narrative of its services in the civil war of 1861-1865 > Part 21
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54
The brilliant and daring charge of General Hooker's troops on Lookout Mountain, was the successful opening of the battle that was to relieve the Union army from the siege of the two proceding months, and open the way to the further South. Sherman's battle at the north end of Mis- sionary Ridge and the assault by the Army of the Cumber- land upon the rebel left-center on the Ridge constituted the real battle of Chattanooga. General Grant gave his per- sonal attention to the attack made upon the Ridge and selected his most trusted lieutenants to lead or direct.
During the night of the 22d of November or early in the morning of the 23d some rebel deserters came into the Union lines and reported General Bragg withdrawing, or about to withdraw, from in front of Chattanooga. If this were true it was an unexpected turn of affairs and developed a crisis at once. General Bragg, satisfied now that he could
232
THIE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
not starve the Army of the Cumberland to evacuate Chatta- nooga, might withdraw from its immediate front and detach a sufficient force to completely invest and overwhelm Gen- eral Burnside at Knoxville. This crisis, to be met promptly, necessitated a change of the plan of the approaching battle and forced an immediate advance on the part of the Union forces. The safety of Knoxville and Burnside's army required that this should be done. To be deceived now as to the purposes and plans of the enemy might be fatal.
General T. J. Wood was General Officer of the Day and at 3:30 a. m. reported to Major Fullerton, Assistant Adjut- ant General, the incoming of the deserters and their state- ments, as follows:
MAJOR : I have the honor to forward you the following information obtained from two deserters who came inside the lines of this division after 12 this a. m. These men state the rebel army is retreating. Say the troops which passed over the ridge yesterday were going to Chicka- mauga Station. They say the rumor in camps was yesterday, that by this evening there would be nothing but their pickets left. Say their wagon trains had been ordered in, (they had been kept to the rear for forage purposes.) They fully corroborate the statement of prisoners received yesterday morning as to their artillery having all left. I send the prisoners to corps provost marshal herewith."
General Grant at once sent the following to General Thomas:
GENERAL: The truth or falsity of the deserters who came in last night, stating that Bragg had fallen back, should be ascertained at once. If he is really falling back, Sherman can commence at once lay- ing his pontoon trains, and we can save a day.
Therefore at 11 o'clock a. m. on the 23d of November, 1863, Major-General Gordon Granger, commanding Fourth corps, received the following from General Thomas' Chief of Staff, Major-General J. J. Reynolds:
The General commanding the department directs that you throw one division of the Fourth corps forward in the direction of Orchard Knob, and hold a second division in supporting distance, to disclose the position of the enemy, if he still remains in the vicinity of his old camp. Howard's and Baird's commands will be ready to co-operate if needed.
Upon receipt of the above General Granger at 12 m. sent to General Wood the following:
Brigadier-General Wood with his division will, as soon as possible,
233
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
carry out the foregoing instruction, and will be supported by General Sheridan's division, to be posted along near the line of railroad, its right resting about midway between Moore's road and the Brush Knob in front of Lunette Palmer.
General Sheridan in his report of the part taken by his division in front of Chattanooga on the 23d, says:
"About 12 m. of the 23d, I was notified by Major-General Granger that General Wood would make a reconnoissance to an elevated point on his (Wood's) front, known as Orchard Knob, and I was directed to sup- port him with my division and prevent his right flank being turned by an advance of the enemy on Moore's road and from the direction of Rossville."
The exact words of these orders and Sheridan's report are given in order to show beyond doubt or cavil that Wood's division, of which the Eighty-sixth Indiana was a part, was the one division that made the reconnoissance and actually opened the great battle of Chattanooga.
From the above orders of Generals Grant, Thomas and Granger it will be seen that the immediate cause which brought on the battle of Chattanooga at the time it occurred was the report of the rebel deserters, that General Bragg was falling back. These deserters came in through the picket line of the Third division, Fourth corps, and it was right and eminently proper that this division should verify the statements of these deserters, which had been sent to headquarters by its commander. Therefore immediately after dinner on the 23d came the order "Fall in!" "Fall in!" The order, peremptory in tone, was repeated down the line, and was promptly obeyed by the Eighty-sixth. The regi- ment was speedily formed and marched at once with Colonel George F. Dick at its head outside of the intrenchments. Other regiments soon joined, and ere long Beatty's brigade was duly formed and waited for the other brigades. The formation and alignment of Willich's and Hazen's brigades were soon completed, Willich's on the left and Hazen on the right. Beatty's brigade was formed to the left rear of Wil- lich's command and was formed "in double column en masse," so it might readily be deployed and face the front or to the left and thus protect Willich's left flank. The Eighty-
234
THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
sixth and Seventy-ninth Indiana were consolidated for the occasion and formed, as one regiment, the front of Beatty's brigade. Other regiments of the brigade were consolidated in a similar manner. The Eighty-sixth formed the left bat- talion and was consequently on the extreme left of Wood's division, the force making the reconnoissance, and liable to attack in flank.
For two months the army had been besieged in Chatta- nooga. The time was now near at hand for raising the siege. General Wood, with his division, was to make a reconnois- sance to determine whether or not Bragg's army was present in full force, or develop the fact if, as reported by the de- serters, he was stealthily withdrawing. This reconnoissance became really the initiative step of the great battle. As has been shown the honor of the advance lies wholly with Wood's division, and whatever honor attaches to other divisions in this day's engagement it is solely that of supporting the Third division.
The general plan of attack was as follows: A division of Sherman's troops was to be sent to Trenton up Lookout valley, to threaten the enemy's left flank. Under cover of this movement, Sherman's main body of the Fifteenth corps was to march up by Hooker's lines, then in Lookout valley, cross the river at the Brown's ferry bridge, mostly at night, thence into a concealed camp on the north side of the river, opposite South Chickamauga creek. For this movement Sherman was to be further strengthened by Davis' division of Thomas' army. One division was to go to a stream on the north side of the river known as North Chickamauga creek. About one hundred and twenty pontoons were to be taken, under cover of the hills and woods, and launched into the North Chickamauga. These were to be filled with men, and floated ont into the Tennessee and down the river until oppo- site the South Chickamauga, about three miles below, effect a landing on the bank of the enemy's side, and throw up works. The remainder of the command was to cross in the same boats. Bridges were to be thrown across the Tennes- see and South Chickamauga, then cross the artillery, and
235
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
move at once to seize a foothold on the north end of Mission- ary Ridge, taking up a line facing the enemy's right flank, near the railroad tunnel. Howard's corps, of Hooker's com- mand, was to be held in reserve on the peninsula between the bridges of Brown's ferry and Chattanooga, in order to act with Sherman or Thomas, as the exigencies of the battle might determine. Subsequently he was directed to cross into the town, and fill the gap between Hooker's proposed position and the main body of the Army of the Cumberland. Hooker, with the remainder of his force, was to hold his position in Lookout valley and threaten the enemy's left. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, was to co-operate with Sherman. He was to concentrate his troops in Chattanooga valley, on his left flank. As soon as possible he was to form a junction with Sherman.
According to this plan the Army of the Cumberland was to be used merely to make a "demonstration, " and was to be an idle spectator in the real work of routing Bragg's army.
This statement of the original plan is supported by General Thomas, the heroic commander of the Army of the Cumberland, who, in his report of the three days' battle around Chattanooga, says:
"The plan of operations was written out substantially as follows: Sherman, with the Fifteenth corps, strengthened with one division from my command, was to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on Saturday, November 21, at daylight; his crossing to be protected by artillery planted on the heights on the north bank of the river. After crossing his force, he was to carry the heights of Missionary Ridge from their northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy could concentrate a force against him. I was to co-operate with Sherman by concentrating my troops in Chattanooga valley, on my left flank, leaving only the neces- sary force to defend the fortifications on the right and center, with a movable column of one division in readiness to move whenever ordered. This division was to show itself as threatening as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. I was then to effect a junction with Sherman, making my udrance from the left, well toward the north end of Missionary Ridge, and moring as near simultaneously with Sher- man as possible. The junction once formed and the Ridge carried, com- munications would be at once established between the two armies by roads running on the south bank of the river. Further movements to
236
THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
depend on those of the enemy. Lookout valley was to be held by Geary's division of the Twelfth corps, and the two brigades of the Fourth corps ordered to co-operate with him ; the whole under the com- mand of Major General Hooker."
This seems to be conclusive as to the plan of the battle, but General Thomas in the same report says further:
"It will be perceived from the above report that the original plan of operations was somewhat modified to meet and take the best advant- age of emergencies, which necessitated material modifications of that plan. It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it been carried out, could not possibly have led to more successful results."
General Granger gives, in his report of the battle, sub- stantially the same "original plan " as General Thomas. Brigadier General T. J. Wood in his report says:
"The original plan of operations was briefly this: The force of Major General Sherman was to cross the Tennessee river at the mouth of South Chickamauga creek, ascend the northeastern flank of Mission- ary Ridge-which here juts against the river-sweep along the Ridge and take the enemy's intrenchments, both at its base and on its crest, in flank and reserve.
Two divisions of the Fourth army corps, General Sheridan's and my own, were to cross Citico creek near its mouth just above Chattanooga, move up the peninsula enclosed between the creek and the Tennessee river, form a junction with the right flank of General Sherman's force, swing to the right and sweep along the lower slope and the base of Mis- sionary Ridge. The remaining force in Chattanooga was to make a dem- onstration against the enemy's works directly in front of Chattanooga, while at the same time looking out for the safety of the town against a counter- attack. The force in Lookout Valley-General Hooker's-was to threaten Lookout Mountain.
It was conceded that a direct front attack of the enemy's works on Missionary Ridge could not be made with a reasonable prospect of suc- cess; or if such an attack should be successful, it could only be so at a great and unnecessary cost of life.
The original plan of battle now being impressed on the mind and thoroughly understood, let the reader turn his attention to the different movements and see how well it was carried into execution. It will be seen that the battle was not fought as originally planned.
A little after 2 o'clock p. m. the final preparations were completed, the order "Forward," was given, and the lines moved out. The musketry opened at once, not the musketry of lines of battle firing volleys, but the brisk, rapid
237
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
firing of strong skirmish lines earnestly and determinedly at work. The Union skirmishers pressed steadily and resolutely forward as the lines advanced. The line of battle moving quickly forward after the skirmishers, acted as a strong sup- port for them, and the enemy gave ground. But all did not get back, as quite a number of the picket reserve in front of Willich's brigade were captured. After passing the old picket line the line of battle encountered many obstructions in its forward march, but nevertheless it pressed steadily on until Orchard Knob and a low rocky ridge lying to the south of the Knob, were approached. These were the objective points of the reconnoissance which had been fortified, and would have been difficult of capture if they had been fully manned. A dash that Willich's brigade gallantly made, car- ried Orchard Knob, and a similar onset by Hazen's brigade, made simultaneously with that of Willich, carried the ridge to the south of the Knob. Willich and Hazen having per- fected their alignment after capturing the enemy's works on the Knob and the ridge, the Eighty-sixth and Seventy-ninth were deployed into line on the left of Willich's brigade with the left of the two regiments sharply refused. The move- ment was a complete success. No troops could have done better. General Wood, certainly a very competent judge of military matters and of the evolutions and movements of troops, says of this day's battle:
" Then at the bugle signal, the magnificent array, in exact lines and serried columns, moved forward. It scarcely ever falls to the lot of man to witness so grand a military display. Every circumstance that could heighten the interest of, or impart dramatic effect to, the scene was present. On the ramparts of Fort Wood were gathered officers of high rank, covered with honors gathered on other fields. There were also officers distinguished for scientific attainments and rare administra- tive ability. Troops in line and column checkered the broad plain of Chattanooga. In front, plainly to be seen, was the enemy so soon to be encountered in deadly conflict. My division seemed to drink in the in- spiration of the scene, and when the 'advance' was sounded moved for- ward in the perfect order of a holiday parade. It has been my good fortune to witness on the Champ de Mars and on Longchamps, reviews of all arms of the French service, under the eye of the most remarkable man of the present generation. I once saw a review, followed by a mock battle of the finest troops El Re Galantuomo. The pageant was held on
238
THIE EIGHTY-SIXTII REGIMENT,
the plains of Milan, the queen city of Lombardy, and the troops in the sham conflict were commanded by two of the most distinguished officers of the Piedmontese service, Cialdini and another, whose name I cannot now recall. In none of these displays did I ever see anything to exceed the soldierly bearing and steadiness of my division, exhibited in the ad- vance of Monday afternoon, the 23d. There was certainly one striking difference in the circumstances of these grand displays. The French and Italian parades were peaceful pageants: ours involved the exigencies of stern war; certainly an immense difference.
I should do injustice to the brave men who then moved forward to the conflict in such perfect order were I to omit to record that not one straggler lagged behind to sully the magnificence and perfectness of the grand battle array."
General Granger says of the movement:
" The troops moved into line and position with such regularity and precision as to present the appearance of a formation for review or parade, and the enemy's pickets, but a few hundred feet off, were ap- parently awaiting a display or military pageant when our skirmish line advanced and opened fire."
Later in the evening General Granger reported the suc- cess of the movement to General George H. Thomas, the De- partment Commander, and explained the position of Gen- eral Wood's division. In return he was ordered to hold firmly the ground gained and was complimented on the suc- cess of the action.
During the evening there was constant skirmishing, and the enemy opened with his batteries from Missionary Ridge, but did not do more than make a great noise, cut some limbs from the trees overhead and render the position uncomfort- able and life insecure. As the Eighty-sixth was on the left of the division, and the left was sharply refused, the fire of the enemy's batteries on the ridge enfiladed the regimental line. At dark the men were ordered to lie down with ac- couterments on and guns at hand. About 11 o'clock p. m. they were called up, furnished spades, shovels, picks, and axes and ordered to fortify the line as speedily as possible. General Howard says General Grant gave the orders to fort- ify as soon as he saw the movement was a success. General Howard says: "On November 23, 1863, Grant began his at- tack against Bragg, by a reconnoissance in force. Bragg's men at first thought the operation was one of Grant's re-
239
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
views. Quietly smoking a cigar, Grant watched the advance, and did not speak until Bragg's outpost, Orchard Knob, was in our hands, then he said emphatically, "Intrench them, and send up support." The order, however, did not reach Beatty's brigade until about 11 o'clock, sometime after the men had been asleep. The regiment was divided into divis- ions of two companies each, in order to better facilitate the work of intrenching. Everybody worked with a hearty good will. There were no laggards, and in a little more than two hours' time good heavy timbers were cut down and carried up and a strong barricade built; a trench was dug behind this and the dirt thus procured banked up on the enemy's side of the newly erected barricade, thus completing a strong line of intrenchments. Again the men were permitted "to lie upon their arms" and secure such rest as they could under the circumstances.
At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 24th the entire divis- ion was ordered up. The Eighty-sixth and Seventy-ninth stood in line, in the ditch, ready for the enemy should he choose to advance. This position, "standing to arms, " was maintained until after daylight, which for men thinly clad and who had worked hard for two hours or more late at night with insufficient sleep, was a very trying duty. Picket firing began as soon as it was light enough for the opposing lines to see each other. About 9:30 a. m. the enemy opened a strong fire with his artillery from Missionary Ridge. For an hour the cannonading was very severe. Little or no damage was done to life or limb, but the location was exceed- ingly uncomfortable. Bridge's battery, on Orchard Knob, consisting of four 33 inch Rodman guns and two Napoleons, as well as the batteries in Fort Wood and at other points returned the enemy's fire, but with what effect was not known.
During the forenoon the low hung clouds drifted over Lookout Mountain into Chattanooga valley until the moun- tain could not be distinctly seen, and about 12 m. the rain began to fall. Near the hour of noon the sound of battle was borne across the valley from the heights of Lookout
240
THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
Mountain. The ball was rolling. "Fighting Joe " Hooker was in command of the Union forces there and was evidently maintaining his reputation made in the East. By reason of the rain and dense mist the mountain on which the battling hosts were contending was completely shut out from view, but the roar of the artillery and rattle of musketry told of the struggle then being waged to those who lay in the valley behind the works and listened, watched, and waited. Gen- eral Grant did not contemplate an advance on Lookout Mountain, but merely the holding of Lookout valley. Gen- eral Thomas accordingly had ordered Hooker to remain in Lookout valley and content himself with making demonstra- tions against the enemy then on the mountain. Hooker, however, ever ambitious and enterprising, was not content to be still and allow others to do all the fighting. In a letter to Secretary Chase he said: "Things began to look squally for me. I said to Butterfield that it was cut and dried for me to be a spectator to the fight, but thought that I would have a toe in the stirrup somehow before it was over." And he did. Hooker asked General Thomas that he be permitted to engage the enemy, and fortune favoring him, permission was granted. By the heavy rains, the Tennessee river had risen very high, the bridge at Brown's ferry was broken, and Osterhaus' division of the Fifteenth corps-Sherman's- could not cross and reach Sherman as had been contem- plated. General Thomas in his report concerning the attack by General Hooker said:
"Therefore it was determined that General Hooker should take Osterhaus' division, which was still in Lookout valley, and Geary's division, Whittaker's and Grose's brigades, of the First division of the Fourth corps, under Brigadier General Cruft, and make a strong dem- onstration on the western slope of Lookout Mountain, for the purpose of attracting the enemy's attention in that direction and thus withdrawing him from Sherman while crossing the river at the mouth of South Chickamauga. General Hooker was instructed that in making this demonstration, if he discovered the position and strength of the enemy would justify him in attempting to carry the point of the mountain to do so."
General Hooker therefore having received orders from General Thomas, at once found that he would be justified in
241
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
making the attempt to carry Lookout, and so the battle of Lookout mountain was fought. The battle of Lookout and Missionary Ridge together, constituted the great battle of Chattanooga.
While the men of Wood's division lay in their trenches on the 24th of November listening to the boom of Hooker's guns and the rattle of his musketry, and the answering guns of the enemy, they knew full well that their time would soon come, and that they would have an important part in the bat- tle which was now fully opened, and they were ready. The Army of the Cumberland was determined to take its revenge on Bragg's army for bloody Chickamauga. Still Hooker kept pounding away at the Gibraltar. Numerous and exagger- ated reports of his success traveled round the lines. Wood's division could judge that Hooker was gaining ground, as the advancing roar of battle indicated as much, but at what cost his advantage was gained was unknown. Orders had been given to Wood's division to be ready to move at a moment's notice, and yet no order to move came. Therefore, the enemy in their front and Hooker's noisy battle alone attracted their attention. There seemed to be no movement on the part of the enemy toward Lookout, no sign of a disposition to lend assistance to the forces on the mountain opposing Hooker.
During the afternoon of the 24th, the Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth Indiana were exposed to a very heavy artillery fire from the Ridge, and again the batteries from Orchard Knob and other points returned the fire with spirit and gave the enemy shot for shot twice told. This was the red blast of war indeed-the wild mad game of battle once more for this army.
The fighting on Lookout Mountain continued far into the night,
" The waves
Of the mysterious death-river moaned; The tramp, the shont, the fearful thunder-roar Of red-breathed cannon, and the wailing cry Of myriad victims, filled the air."
The sound of the battle from time to time would die away until nothing could be heard but a desultory skirmish fire,
242
THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
then suddenly it would burst forth again, a perfect tempest of musketry, accompanied by the boom of cannon. This con- tinned until near midnight, when silence and the mist reigned over all.
After dark the Eighty-sixth, together with the entire division, drew two days' rations of hard-tack, bacon, sugar and coffee.
The night of November 24 was not promising, and it more than fulfilled the unfavorable weather signs. As the night advanced it grew extremely chilly, and the soldiery unpre- pared for cold weather suffered much. Many were forced to rise at 1 or 2 o'clock, build fires and thaw out their be- numbed extremities. On account of the cold it was a night of extreme discomfort and suffering.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.