USA > Indiana > The Eighty-sixth regiment, Indiana volunteer infantry : a narrative of its services in the civil war of 1861-1865 > Part 31
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enemy which fled, at his approach, to his rifle-pits. The energetic Wood soon dislodged him and compelled him to seek shelter under cover of their breastworks, from which he was driven later in the day."
The battle had been waged the whole day with great vigor. The red tide of war had ebbed and flowed from point around the lines as the struggle raged on. Sometimes the Confederates were successful, but usually the strong current of blue-coats overwhelmed the chivalry of the Southland and swept everything clean before them. The resolute North- men were not to be denied their demands as they crowded forward and enforced them with ball and bayonet. Far into the night might be heard the occasional outburst of sharp rattling musketry, as the hope of advantage induced one or the other side to strike out expecting to secure some strong foot-hold, and thus strengthen their side and increase their chance of ultimate success. Although the fighting was stubborn, and inch by inch over every foot of ground wrested from the enemy by the Union forces there seemed to be a decided balance in their favor. The troops were in correspondingly good spirits, notwithstanding their onerous duties and great dangers. Cheers, good and strong, fre- quently went the rounds of the Union lines and testified to the enemy of the pefect morale of Sherman's forces.
On the morning of the 15th the desultory picket firing of the skirmish-line began to quicken between 5 and 6 o'clock. This continued to increase in volume and fierceness through- out the morning, but nothing more than a determined skir- mish battle occurred until near the hour of 10 a. m. The brunt of the battle was expected to fall upon the extreme left of the Union forces, and so it proved. Hooker here con- fronted the impetuous Hood, who knew only to fight and who was a fair match for "fighting Joe" for down-right desperate fighting qualities. The attack of Butterfield's division of Hooker's corps, on Stevenson's division of Hood's corps, was successful, but not completely so. Stevenson was driven back and lost a battery that had been run forward into a com- manding position, but was so exposed that Hooker's men were
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not able to take possession of it, the guns remaining between the battle lines until night. But this attack of Hooker's showed Johnston the exposed condition of his right, and Hood received orders to retake the lost ground. In the mean- time Sherman had withdrawn two divisions of Schofield's corps from the line in the center, and ordered them to take position on Hooker's left, thus extending his left and so over- lap Johnston's right. Johnston had also ordered Polk to attack McPherson. Polk moved to the onset, and was beaten before Hood's forces arrived, whereupon Johnston counter- manded the order to Hood, but this command failed to reach Stewart, who was to make the attack, but was received by Stevenson who was to act as his support. Consequently, Stewart charging upon Hooker's forces without proper sup- port was roughly handled and driven back with heavy loss. This attack of Stewart's was made about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. At this time Beatty's brigade was ordered under arms and momentarily expected to be ordered into the battle on the left, but was not needed. Beaten at all points, with great loss, the enemy was disheartened and began to feel that he was overmatched. On the left he had been driven pell- mell into his works and an advantageous position secured by Hooker, while on the right McPherson had been equally suc- cessful, and had gained a position on the extreme right near the Oostanaula river, from which point his artillery com- manded very effectually the railroad and wagon bridges over the river. Besides Sherman had crossed Sweeny's division of the Sixteenth corps at Turner's or Lay's Ferry, while Gar- rard's cavalry threatened Johnston's line of communications at Calhoun, further south. Johnston at once determined to evacuate. Accordingly on the night of the 15th he retired south of the river to a point near Calhoun, on the railroad. He effectually destroyed both bridges, however, before leav- ing the river, and thus delayed Sherman's crossing. He left a lot of supplies and a four gun battery in the intrench- ments which he was unable to move.
On the morning of the 16th Sherman's forces were early in pursuit and pressed on into the town of Resaca at an
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early hour. The battle-field around Resaca bore evidence of the great struggle that had taken place. Thickets of brush, even great saplings, were literally mown down by the storm of musket balls, shot, shell, grape and canister. The Union loss was heavy, but so was the enemy's. He had been badly beaten at all points, and had been compelled to give up another strong position and abandon supplies which he so much needed. This was very discouraging to Johnston's forces, while it greatly encouraged the Union troops. The Third brigade moved np near the town and bivouacked to await the building of a bridge or the putting down of pon- toons to cross the river. Quite a large quantity of corn meal was captured and the Eighty-sixth got its full share, and therefore feasted on corn cakes for dinner, having a better relish for them than during the preceding winter in East Tennessee. Immediately after noon troops began crossing the river on a pontoon bridge just below the burned railroad bridge, the Fourth corps leading the advance, the Fourteenth corps crossing immediately after the Fourth. It was slow work and Hooker was ordered to march out upon the New- town road and cross the Oostanaula in the southward bend of the river near the junction of the Connasanga and Coosa- wattee. Schofield was to cross the Connasanga at Fite's Ferry or Echota, then cross the Coosawattee at McClure's. McPherson crossed his command at Lay's or Turner's Ferry. where Sweeny had crossed to turn Johnston's flank. Thus once more the whole army was abreast ready to meet the enemy.
The attack upon Resaca was simply a continuation of the attack upon Dalton and Rocky Face Ridge, and had taught the Confederate officers a dear lesson in the art of war; for while Jeff Davis, Beauregard, and a few others of the South- ern leaders and the Southern press were continually flatter- tering the troops of the South and disparaging those of the North, and sneering at the ability of the Union commanders, General Johnston more justly estimated the soldierly qual- ities of the rank and file, and judged more correctly of the transcendant ability of their matchless leader, General Sher- man. He had been furnished much new evidence on which
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to base his judgment. He, therefore, left no stone unturned that would ward off a blow or obstruct his opponent's path- way and delay his progress. He well knew that it was to be a battle to the death, and that with Sherman's matchless generalship and fertility of resources, sustained by the indom- itable firmness and fortitude of the soldiers of the North- west, he was a foeman worthy of the steel of the choicest legions of any nation's forces directed by their best military genius. He knew, too, that Sherman and his dlieutenants would push every advantage gained to the last, leaving him no hope of escape, except by the most ceaseless vigilance and untiring and persistent effort. Therefore, Johnston built works, fortifying, at every defensible point, and invited the attack of the Union forces, for while acknowledging Sher- man's ability and skill, he also regarded him as "audacious and enterprising." Thus it was that Sherman came to be confronted by breastworks upon almost every mile of his route to Atlanta. Only in this way was it possible for John- ston to place his command upon a footing of equality with Sherman's incomparable legions as they marched trium- phantly and resistlessly onward into the very heart of the Confederacy. Never, no not even at Vicksburg, had the enemy been so staggered and beaten. If constantly assaulted in works of the strength which his troops built, the equaliza- tion of the two armies would soon be brought about when the advantage would be wholly upon Johnston's side; for while his friends and supplies were all round him and ever at hand to aid and assist him, Sherman was surrounded by enemies ready to injure and betray him, and his friends and supplies were far away. It required long and tedious transportation to bring them to hand ready for use. But Johnston made the most of his opportunities, and though maneuvered out of the impregnable position at Dalton, beaten and out-flanked at Resaca, and forced to leave the place, he only gave the ground he was compelled to yield and hold on to Calhoun as though he meant to give battle to retain its possession.
CHAPTER XXII.
RESACA TO PICKETT'S MILLS.
Across the Oostanaula-Calhoun-Adairsville-Oothcaloga Valley-Kingston- Cassville-A Three Days' Rest-Across the Etowah-Where the Different Commands Crossed-A Wild Wilderness-Burnt Hickory-New Hope Church -- The Battle of Pickett's Mills-The Eighty-sixth's Part in this Engagement- Colonel Dick Wounded-The Regiment's Loss.
Wood's division having crossed the Oostanaula river on the afternoon of the 16th, pressed on in pursuit of the enemy, and having covered three or four miles was halted and pickets detailed. But the progress was slow as the army was now divided, and it was not deemed prudent to get too far from support. The skirmishers in front could be plainly heard as they took up their duties when their line came upon that of the enemy. It was sharp and determined, Johnston no doubt holding this place to gain time. It is now well known that Johnston decided to make a stand in the lower part of the Oothcaloga Valley near Calhoun, but upon look- ing over the ground carefully and more fully considering all points, he decided the valley too wide in which for him to give battle, and determined to retire farther up the valley where he was informed by his engineers that a line quite defensive might be found a mile or two north of the town of Adairs- ville. A strong rear guard was left in the vicinity of Cal- houn to make a show of giving battle, and thus delay the advance of Sherman's forces, and thereby give more time for fortifying and preparing for the expected contest farther south.
On the morning of the 17th of May, the Eighty-sixth drew rations. Having filled their haversacks full of hard tack, bacon, sugar, coffee and salt, the men were ready
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for duty. The regiment resumed the advance. Wood's division took the railroad as its line of march, with Hazen's brigade in front, while Newton's division was on a wagon road to the left or east of the railroad. The progress was slow on account of the resistance of the enemy. Still Hazen pushed ahead with his characteristic energy. The skirmish- ing was lively, although great caution had to be used. About 9 a. m. the Eighty-sixth passed through Calhoun, a town of perhaps 350 or 400 inhabitants, and the county seat of Gor- don county. Here Hazen had had a sharp fight with the rear guard of the enemy, he having built a strong barricade and maintained a bold front for some time, but he pressed him so hotly he gave ground, retiring, however, in good order. As the Third brigade advanced the skirmishing in front and on the flanks continued at a brisk rate, showing the enemy to be in force in its front as well as Newton's on the left, and McPherson's on the right. About 2 o'clock Wood and Hazen had pushed the column on the railroad so ener- getically forward that the division trains, following on the wagon road almost parallel with the railroad, were abreast of Newton's division skirmishers, which were mistaken for that of the enemy and were fired into. This caused considerable excitement and some confusion and delay. But Hazen pressed on and about 4 o'clock in the afternoon came up against a strong line of the enemy well posted, which mani- fested a disposition to give battle. The skirmishers had a hot time of it. The shells flew thick and fast over and about the Eighty-sixth as it advanced, but it moved steadily and quietly forward and took the position assigned. The furious galloping of staff-officers, aides and orderlies, here and there, betokened the rapid transit of orders, and the intended speedy concentration of troops for the purpose of giving the enemy battle should he be so disposed, as his present attitude indicated.
It seems strange that so many errors are made in writ- ing the history of this campaign, by those, too, who were active participators in its momentous movements and battles. General Cox, in speaking of the advance on the 17th, says:
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"Sherman was now with Newton's division in advance, and had a narrow escape from shots of the enemy's artillery as he was reconnoitering, the group about him having attracted their fire." The statement in regard to the incident of Gen- eral Sherman's being exposed to the enemy's fire is no doubt true, but it is misleading as one would infer from it that Newton had the advance of the corps, and he alone was exposed to the enemy's fire, whereas throughout almost the entire day Wood's division on the railroad was leading that of Newton on a parallel wagon road in pursuit of the enemy, and was constantly skirmishing with him. But even Gen- eral Sherman, in his "Memoirs," lends credibility to the statement of Newton's being in advance by the following statement of the same incident: "On the 17th toward even- ing, the head of Thomas' column, Newton's division, encoun- tered the rear-guard of Johnston's army near Adairsville. I was near the head of the column at that time, trying to get a view of the position of the enemy from an elevation in an open field. My party attracted the fire of a battery; a shell passed through the group of staff-officers and burst just beyond which scattered us promptly." Notwithstanding the seeming contradiction of General Cox and General Sherman, General O. O. Howard, himself then commanding the Fourth army corps, and an officer who usually knew the order of marching of his men, their order and lines in or out of bat- tle, in his report, says: "The enemy's custom is when retreating, to form his rear-guard of cavalry, with a battery or section of artillery, sometimes strengthened by infantry. During this day's march the resistance was unusually great. He formed three lines, some half or three-quarters of a mile apart, and barricaded with rails, seeking the cover of the woods with open fields in his front. As soon as we suc- ceeded in driving the first line it passed to the rear of the third, and in some new and favorable position made another ine. However as we moved in two columns, we were enabled to make considerable progress. The resistance ncreased as we approached Adairsville. General Newton continued to deploy regiments as skirmishers until he had a
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large brigade engaged. General Wood abreast of him also skirmished heavily. About 4 p. m. it was found we had come upon the enemy's infantry in considerable force. Prepara- tions were made immediately to assault and carry the posi- tion, if possible; but it required time to bring up the troops and get them in readiness. General Thomas not deeming it best, on account of the nearness of night to make a formal attack, the movement already set on foot was postponed. Yet a real engagement was going on, since both parties con- tinued to re-enforce their skirmish lines until they were tan- tamount to a line of battle. The enemy opened upon our column with artillery, to which our batteries replied with spirit. During the night the enemy withdrew."
Every indication on the evening of the 17th appeared to point to the offering of battle by General Johnston on that evening or the following day. Therefore, Sherman ordered McPherson, who was somewhat extended on the right. to close upon Thomas and prepare to give battle, should the enemy stand his ground. Sherman was very anxious, at this stage of the campaign, to bring on a general engagement in this comparatively open country, before Johnston should reach the mountains of Allatoona and the rough and broken country along the Etowah river. Johnston contemplated giving battle, seeking to secure a good position with his flanks protected by high and broken ground, so that Sher- man's numbers would be of little advantage, and then stand his ground, give battle and cripple Sherman until their forces would be equalized. But " finding that the breadth of the Oothcaloga Valley exceeded so much the front of his army, properly formed for battle that he could obtain no advantage of ground, ordered the troops to march for Cass- ville." So the expected battle between these two grand armies was, at least, postponed, although the following day and for two or three days, Sherman expected Johnston to make a decided stand.
On the morning of the 18th the Eighty-sixth led the col- umn of Wood's division, marching as before on the railroad. Colonel Dick kept the regiment well up to the skirmishers as
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they advanced. Starting at 6 o'clock a. m. Adairsville was soon reached, as Johnston once more had deemed it prudent to withdraw. At Adairsville the command was halted. There seemed to be a hurrying forward of troops, and frequent con- sultations of corps and army commanders, which indicated very important movements on hand and a probable engage- ment. Generals Logan, McPherson, Thomas, Howard, and Sherman were all at Adairsville some time during the day to talk over the situation. It turned out afterward the cause of all this consultation and worry arose from the doubt existing in the minds of these Generals as to the route taken by Gen- eral Johnston with his main force. Therefore, great caution was necessary not to fall into a trap which might be laid by the wily foeman. Reports from the advanced guards, con- sultations, and the various means of information used by gen- erals of armies to learn the exact situation of the enemy, were made, while the Fourth corps lay here waiting for McPher- son to pass his command through to other roads on the right, having been called in from the roads upon which they were marching when a battle seemed imminent. These roads, too, carried him farther away from the rest of the command. Hooker, too, with the Twentieth corps, had been concen- trated here in the vicinity of Adairsville. He now passed to the left and took the direct road to Cassville. The Fourth corps followed the line of the railroads, marching on a wagon road just east of the railroad, this road leading to Kingston. The Eighty-sixth resumed the march about 2 o'clock p. m. Great caution was now deemed necessary in the advance. The regiment kept close to the skirmishers as they contin- ued to move. Near sundown the enemy's rear guard was struck, well posted and in force. A lively skirmish at once ensued. The skirmishing, before going into bivouac, seemed a regular evening entertainment-a sun-set festivity which could not be dispensed with. The Eighty-sixth bivouacked on a high hill close to the skirmish line. From this high hill a good view of the surrounding country could be secured for some miles. Wood was now within about three miles of Kingston. Hooker was on his immediate left. with Schofield
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still to the left of Hooker, McPherson with the Army of the Tennessee being to the right, all being ready for battle.
Many historians record the capture of Kingston as tak- ing place on the 18th of the month by the Fourth corps, but this is evidently a mistake. The Eighty-sixth was in advance of Wood's division, which division was on the direct road from Adairsville to Kingston, and skirmished with the enemy in the evening of the 18th, bivouacking as before stated, in the face of the enemy two or three miles to the north of Kingston, a thing wholly improbable if any part of the corps had secured possession of the town. On the morning of the 19th the column resumed its onward march about 6 o'clock, feeling its way until it became evident that the enemy had continued his retreat farther south. However, there was some skirmishing as the town of Kingston was reached. As the advance guard drove the enemy the command marched forward at a more lively pace, and the Eighty-sixth reached Kingston, the point of junction of the Rome railroad with the main line from Chattanooga to Atlanta, about noon. The day was exceedingly hot and the troops felt the effects of the great heat and their rapid marching. However, just east of the town they were given a good rest and permitted to get dinner. Wood's division remained here until about 2 o'clock p. m. By this time General Sherman had completed his plans, given his orders, and had the various columns in motion on their proper routes to concentrate upon Johnston's posi- tion. It was understood that the Southern forces were con- centrated at Cassville, five miles to the east of Kingston, and there awaited to give battle, having reached " the last ditch" again. Howard and Wood were equal to any in energy and push. Passing to the left, to the southeast of Kingston per- haps a mile, the command struck the enemy's skirmishers. But they were no raw recruits and they struck back quite effectively. They were borne back by weight of numbers. They maintained their ground with great stubbornness, only yielding when forced to do so. Beatty's brigade, and in fact the whole army, was at once formed in the order of battle and moved forward as if to the attack. The Eighty-sixth
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closed down upon the skirmish line, and it in turn pressed the enemy vigorously, driving him back inch by inch. Now the battle between very strong skirmish lines began in dead earnest. The enemy was in bad humor and spiteful; the Union boys were exultant and determined, and so the battle raged. Just as dark came, a determined push was made and the enemy crowded back some distance. The enemy fell back with such stubbornness that it seemed certain a night battle would be fought. The Eighty-sixth, close to the skirmish line and fully exposed to the enemy's fire, was ordered to lie down, and the order was most cheerfully obeyed. The battle was fiercely contested for some time after dark, but at length the fire slackened and then died out. The main line was not permitted to rest. Without any supper the men were ordered to intrench. They were soon busily engaged, and ere the morning's dawn lit up the east they had a sub- stantial line of breastworks. But it was at a great cost- loss of sleep and great exertion after a day's marching and the the nerve strain incident to battle.
A rebel authority speaking of this day's fighting, calls the first contest of the day, the " Battle of Kingston, " and the second one, the " Battle of Cassville." He says of the first skirmishing: Heavy skirmishing between Howard's Federal and Hardee's Confederate troops on the southeast side of town, Kingston, in the morning. The Confederates retired toward Cassville; but before noon a sharp fight occurred near an old mill by the railroad, about a couple of miles east of Kingston, during which was considerable artillery firing on the part of the Federals." Of the battle in the evening. known as the "Battle of Cassville, " the same writer says: " Heavy cannonading from the opposing batteries, and obstinate fighting between the lines of the two armies." General Sherman says: "Thomas' head of column which had followed the country roads along side of the railroad, was about four miles east of Kingston, towards Cassville, when, about noon I got a message from him that he had found the enemy, drawn up in line of battle, on some extensive open ground about half way between Kingston and Cassville. and
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that appearances indicated a willingness and a preparation for battle. Hurriedly sending orders to McPherson to re- sume the march, to hasten forward by roads leading to the south of Kingston, so as to leave for Thomas' troops and trains the use of the main road, and to come up on his right, I rode forward rapidly over some rough gravel hills, and about six miles from Kingston found Thomas, with his troops deployed; but he reported that the enemy had fallen back in echelon of divisions, steadily and in superb order into Cass- ville."
Johnston had now been beaten back some forty or fifty miles, and it was having a bad effect on the morale of his troops, and he determined to make a stand. He had done this several times, but strong reasons had forced him each time to give it up and fall back. But now he intended mak- ing a stand just south of Cassville where his troops took a strong position which he says, "That I remember as the best that I saw occupied during the war." But once again he was doomed to disappointment, for owing to objections urged by both Hood and Polk to making a decisive stand at this point, Johnston once more decided to withdraw. Conse- quently when it was expected that he would give battle on the morning of the 20th, he was not to be found. He had "hopped the twig" and "gone glimmering to the "misty mountain top." The Eighty-sixth was relieved from the front line early on the morning of the 20th, but as the enemy had again retreated, it made but little difference. On this day the Nineteenth Ohio rejoined the brigade, having been on detached duty guarding trains since leaving McDonald Station.
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