USA > Indiana > The Eighty-sixth regiment, Indiana volunteer infantry : a narrative of its services in the civil war of 1861-1865 > Part 32
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A part of the Twenty-third corps pushed on after the retreating enemy and drove the rear guard out of Carters- ville. He continued his retreat, crossing the Etowah river and burned the railroad and wagon road bridges. Johnston had taken up a strong position with his center at Allatoona Pass. The mountains to the left and right of the Pass ren- dered his position a very strong one, easily defended and almost impossible to attack successfully in front. Prepara-
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tions were immediately begun for a movement to the right flank to turn the position now occupied by Johnston's forces. On the 21st and 22d the Union forces rested from their labors. But the excessive heat prevented them from recu- perating as much as they would have done under more favor- able circumstances. On the 22d the divisions' commissaries issued three days' rations to the troops, while they received twenty days' rations from the General Commissary of the Army. Preparations were completed on this day for the next move.
Many rumors, reports, and "grapevine telegrams" were going the rounds of the bivouac of the troops in regard to the next move the army was to make. It was well-known that it would be arduous duty whatever it was. Johnston's army was the chief object of attention, and it now held an impregnable position across the Etowah river. It was
impossible to cross in his immediate front and attack with success, consequently a flank movement was the only hope, and had to be made to secure a foot-hold on the far side of the river. Sherman says: "I made orders on the 20th to get ready for the march to begin on the 23d. The Army of the Cumberland was ordered to march for Dallas by Euharlee and Stilesboro: Davis' division then in Rome by Van Wert; the Army of the Ohio to keep on the left of Thomas, by a place called Burnt Hickory; and the Army of the Tennessee to march for a position a little to the south. so as to be on the right of the general army, when grouped about Dallas." These orders were issued on the 22d, but they were not fol- lowed out strictly as subsequent events proved. On the 23d General Beatty was compelled to relinquish the command of the brigade on account of serious illness, when the command was devolved upon Colonel Fred Knefler, of the Seventy- ninth Indiana.
In the meantime the soldiers were taking their ease. resting up, repairing clothing and haversacks, bathing in the streams and getting themselves in the best possible shape for the coming struggle, which all felt sure was close at hand. On the 23d the army was in motion. The Eighty-
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sixth was ready, but had to wait for orders. The Twentieth corps passed its bivouac going to the right. Wood's division moved out about 1 o'clock p. m., marching to the southwest and crossed the Etowah river at Gillem's bridge, together with the entire Fourth corps. The Fourteenth corps, except the Second division which crossed at Rome, crossed at Island Ford, a few miles down the river, while the Twentieth corps crossed at Milam's bridge, a few miles above, on pontoons, the bridge having been burned. The Twenty-third corps crossed at the same place, following Hooker's corps. The Army of the Tenessee crossed at Wooley's bridge below the Fourteenth corps.
The army was now in a country almost a wilderness wild, with but few roads, and those mere wagon ways cut through the forest. There was doubtless some uncertainty in regard to the route, as the command halted frequently and waited long. The march was continued after night, and Wood's division lay for some hours in the road near its place of bivouac. It was so late at night the command quietly lay down without preparing supper, even though the men were very hungry. General Sherman says: "The several columns followed generally the valley of the Enharlee, a tributary coming into the Etowah from the south, and grad- ually crossed over a ridge of mountains, parts of which had once been worked over for gold, and were consequently full of paths and unused wagon roads or tracks." The roads, many of them were in fact, mere paths, unused, in a wilder- ness of woods, and it became quite bewildering probably to follow the intended route.
On the morning of the 24th the march was resumed about 9 o'clock. The pace was at first slow, but was grad- ually accelerated. At noon the command came to a still more broken section of country, probably the mountains referred to by General Sherman, with rongher, poorer roads and more tangled and wilder woods, a veritable wilderness. After a short halt for dinner about 1 o'clock, the march was contin- ued at a slow pace until near sundown. It threatened rain, and the night was far from promising, and the men were
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soon busily engaged preparing their evening meal and shel- ter from the threatening storm.
On the morning of the 25th, after a night of rain, the men lay around their bivouac until about 10 o'clock, when they again resumed the march into the enemy's country. The march was slow and halting. It seems that from Burnt Hickory the Fourth and Fourteenth corps made a detour to the right, having to feel their way over unused country roads and mining tracks and trails. It was the intention that they should strike the VanWert and Dallas road some distance out from the latter place. But Hooker's coming in contact with the enemy, unexpectedly changed this part of the plan; for whenever Hooker got a chance to strike the enemy he struck right out straight from the shoulder and followed it up as he did on this occasion, as will be seen later. The country through which the corps passed must have been the wildest of the wild country in Paulding county. Georgia. Only at long distances was the merest semblance of a house seen. The tracks followed as roads wound around in and out of gulleys, over and around rocky hills, and through thickets as dense as the thickets of Chickamauga. The com- mand probably had not covered a great many miles from the previous night's bivouac, when it was halted and lay in the road waiting. It lay here until 3 o'clock p. m. It then re- sumed the march through tangled woods and over a perfect labyrinth of winding paths and trails and meandering streams.
When passing one of the few cabins of this wilderness one of the Eighty-sixth boys claims to have heard the fol- lowing from the woman residing there: She said the " Yan- kees" couldn't fool her, she knew Sherman was "flanking" again. Upon being pressed to tell how she knew what Sher- man was doing, she said they "couldn't fool her, " she knew he was "flanking" because she had seen "his flanking machines" go by just a few minutes before, referring to a battery of artillery that had just passed the cabin. The fact of the matter was, that the whole great army was just at this time converted into a "great flanking machine," and this ignorant Georgia woman was not far wrong in her statement
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that she saw Sherman's "flanking machines" go by. She doubtless saw a very essential part of it, and one, too, that was to do some very effective work at an early day.
While still in this dense forest and about 6 o'clock in the evening, musketry firing was heard on the left front some distance ahead. Hooker had run on to the enemy-Hood's corps-and at once attacked him with his usual impetuosity. He fought on this occasion as if it was necessary to beat the whole rebel army at once before other corps could come up and aid him and win part of the glory. The enemy was evi- dently in force and on the alert. The sharp rattle of mus- ketry was sufficient evidence of a hard battle being fought. The command moved forward with more rapidity. About 8 o'clock it began raining, and the thunders of heaven, joined to those of battle, made the wilderness and hills roar again and again. The rain made the roads slippery, and up-hill and down-hill, marching was very tiresome and slow. How- ard had orders to reinforce Hooker. and his corps pressed on, stopping at no obstacle, through the darkness over horrible roads, drenched to the bone by the deluge of water. Cox says: "The night was utterly black in its darkness and storm." About 10 o'clock, wading a stream knee deep, the regiment came to the point where the real battle began, and soon after to the immediate neighborhood of Hooker's corps. He had continued his attack after nightfall and had fought the enemy valiantly. but he was too strongly intrenched to be successfully assaulted. Hooker had driven him some distance, but had lost heavily and had failed to drive him from his fortified position at New Hope Church, the key to the point attacked. As the regiment passed along the road over the battle-field the wounded lay in the woods alongside the road on the damp ground. Their pale faces could be seen by the light of the fires that had been built by camp- followers, giving the men a glimpse of the after scenes of battle which are even more heartrending than those of the battle itself which are usually witnessed under great excite- ment and pass almost instantly from view.
Wood's division wound its way slowly along the tortuous
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road among the wounded to its position to the left of New- ton's division, which had arrived early in the evening, and formed on Hooker's left. Wood's division, however. did not form a line that night with Newton and Hooker, but biv- ouacked to the left of the former, somewhat refused. Worn out with their long and laborious march and want of sleep, the men were almost used up and speedily sank, supperless, upon the damp earth to rest and sleep until morning. The bivouac was reached about 11 o'clock. A gloomy night with the prospect of a red day on the morrow, and for many days. Of this night a rebel author says: "The night, which came on, was very dark, with heavy rains; and there was much confusion in both armies, as they were endeavoring to assume position, facing each other, among the thickly- wooded hills, and each industriously working, though in darkness, to strengthen its ground against any sudden assault by its enemy." General Sherman says, of his night's rest and preparations for the next day: "I slept on the ground without cover, alongside of a log. got a little sleep, resolved at daylight to renew the battle, and to make a lodg- ment on the Dallas and Allatoona road if possible, but the morning revealed a strong line of intrenchments facing us, with a heavy force of infantry and guns. The battle was renewed and without success." When a general of a great army undergoes such hardships, it can be imagined what the life of a private soldier was only by those who have partici- pated in such a tremendous campaign as this.
The Eighty-sixth was up early and ready for business, for Colonel Dick never permitted it to be behind. The men lay, however, quietly at their bivouac until 8 or 9 o'clock. They were then ordered under arms and moved out close to the skirmish line. The lines were formed as though a general attack was to be made upon the enemy's position. The skirmishing was sharp all along the line, and the spiteful hiss of the musket balls was extremely annoying. The mus- ketry fire at times assumed the magnitude of a battle, rolling as a great wave of sound from one end of the line to the other, and back again, as this, or that part of the line
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renewed the struggle. About noon there was a general advance of the line of the Fourth corps and the musketry fire grew quite severe, and was steadily maintained for some- time. The enemy's batteries, too, opened a hot fire, but owing to the density of the timber and the heavy growth of underbrush they were unable to deliver a very effective fire, although it was sufficiently accurate to make it very annoy- ing. This move of the Fourth corps served the double pur- pose of completing the alignment of the forces and of devel- oping pretty accurately the position of the enemy, enabling the officers to locate his line and the position of his batteries. Late in the evening Wood's division withdrew from its advanced position, drew three days' rations to do four, and bivouacked for the night. These were "days of danger and nights of waking," as frequently the picket firing was sharp and of such volume as to betoken an attack, which caused the division to be called into line and held in readi- iness until the firing subsided.
Save one or two wakings caused by the booming of ex- ploding shells near, from the rebel batteries, the Eighty-sixth slept soundly on the night of the 26th, and it was well. Good rest is conducive to steadiness of nerve and the. Eighty-sixth, and all of Wood's division, needed all of its fortitude on the 27th, as will be seen further on.
A rebel author writing of this day's doings, the 27th, around the lines, says: "A determined attack by the Federals, under cover of a furious artillery fire, upon Clayton's and Baker's brigades of Stewart's division, behind breastworks they had thrown up on the battle-field of May 25. The Fed- erals were repulsed with considerable loss. The fire of solid shot. shell, grape and cannister, from the Federal battery of Parrott guns continued all the morning and from 4 p. m. till nearly dark with terrific effect. The Confederate works were riddled and their loss was severe. They finally practically silenced the battery by sharp-shooters detailed for that pur- pose by General Baker." This author admits the severe treatment of the enemy in the neighborhood of New Hope Church. Yet he manages to weave in his admission two or
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three false statements which make the whole very mislead- ing. First, he speaks of the rebels as being behind works which they had "built on the battle-field of New Hope Church," as though they had not had works to fight behind on the 25th. "They succeeded in silencing the battery, and the Federals were repulsed with considerable loss," says this writer. Now, the fact is, it was only a strong demon- stration, made to attract attention and deceive the Confed- erates from the real purpose of the Federals which was to be an attack far to the Federal left and was intended to be a decisive blow.
On the 27th the Eighty-sixth was astir by the time it was light, and was soon ready for the duties of the day. About 9 a. m. Colonel Dick gave the order "Fall in." The men were in line in an instant. Then came the order, "Take, arms," "Shoulder, arms." Moving by the left flank the regiment passed to the rear of the Twenty-third army corps. After the column was uncovered to the left of the Army of the Ohio, and was liable to be attacked. it proceeded very slowly and cautiously. The front was covered by a strong line of flankers. After passing well to the left of the Twenty-third corps, once or twice the command "fronted" and advanced in battle array, the flankers acting as skirm- ishers, but finding the enemy in front in force and well intrenched it would withdraw and continue its march to the left. As the object was to turn the enemy's right flank the command was to work its way to the extreme right of the enemy, then attack with vigor. The attack was to be made by Wood's division of the Fourth corps, and was to be sup- ported by Johnson's division of the Fourteenth corps, on the left, and by McLean's brigade of the Second division of the Twenty-third corps, on the right It will readily be seen that the object of Newton's and Stanley's attack in the vicin- ity of New Hope Church was a mere demonstration to attract attention to their front, and create the impression that an assault was contemplated in that locality and thus prevent a concentration of large masses of troops against Wood's and Johnson's divisions, which were detached from the main army
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and were in danger of being repulsed and overwhelmed before assistance could reach them. This tedious process was continued until 6 o'clock in the evening, when a point was reached where it was thought the line over-lapped that of the enemy, and where the attack was to be made. A rebel cavalry picket was captured here, and this perhaps led Gen- erals Howard and Wood to suppose there was nothing in their immediate front but cavalry. But if so they were sadly mis- taken as subsequent events will fully show. As soon after the capture of the rebel cavalryman as an alignment of the troops could be completed, the assault was ordered. Hazen's Second brigade led the charge, then Willich's or Gibson's First brigade, then Beatty's Third brigade.
The Eighty-sixth was placed upon the extreme right of the division, and was not in the assaulting column proper. But it was advanced close up to the enemy 's intrenchments- a narrow open field intervening between its position and the enemy's works-in the edge of a woods in plain view of the batteries of the enemy. He had full and fair play and it is needless to say that he did not idle any time away, but kept his guns in a perfect blaze. The Eighty-sixth was thus exposed to a most terrific fire of artillery during the whole time the battle raged on the left. As the Eighty-sixth threatened the enemy's line and his batteries, by its prox- imity, it drew his fire which should otherwise been turned against the storming column. Thus it shielded and protected the troops that made the assault and saved them from des- truction, as they would literally have been cut to pieces. As it was they were quite severely handled. The rattle of musketry was terrific, but the troops with dauntless courage fought their way to within a few feet of the breastworks, and came well-nigh being victorious, and probably would have won, had not timely reinforcements come to the aid of the sorely pressed defenders. The lines of attack were subject to a terrific cross-fire of musketry and suffered heavily. Beaten back they rallied and renewed the assault time and again, but it was futile. The enemy was too well intrenched. Pat Cleburne, the most daring fighter of Johnston's army,
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was there with the flower of the South, and they fought as brave men fight.
While the battle raged on the left, the Eighty-sixth lay under a sharp musketry fire, and the most terrific cannonad- ing which the regiment ever experienced, and that, too, without lifting a hand in self-defense. A number of batteries concentrated their fire upon the regiment. Shells shrieked and burst all around, solid shot tore the limbs from trees overhead, which fell with a crash threatening to crush the men, and added to the horrid din, grape-shot and canister rattled like hail about and whipped the underbrush and shrubs like a hurricane, but the Eighty-sixth never flinched. The men had stood the fire about as long without doing any- thing as Hoosier patience cared to do. The cries and groans of the wounded added to the unpleasant features of the ter- rible situation. In the midst of a particularly fierce blast of the enemy's batteries the word ran along the line of the regiment that Colonel Dick had been killed. This was very disheartening to the boys for he was greatly loved and trusted as a commander. Fortunately this proved to be a mistake, but he was very badly wounded, and had to be carried from the field, severely and dangerously wounded by an exploding shell, his life probably being saved by his saber, which broke the force of the stroke of the flying fragment. His steel saber-scabbard was shattered by the terrible blow. Still the battle raged and it was still un- decided, and had General Johnson, with his division, done his full duty, success might have crowned the efforts.
Far into the night it was continued between the lines of battle. But at length the order was given to withdraw from the immediate front of the enemy's work. General Willich's, or Gibson's, brigade bugler sounded the "recall. " This was the signal for the enemy to attack in return, and he swarmed over the works and made a fierce onset, expecting to create a panic and stampede the entire command, but not so. How- ard, Wood, Hazen, Beatty, Gibson were all upon the ground and were men of unflinching courage and nerve, and soon had their troops well in hand. The enemy, however, suc-
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ceeded in capturing some wounded and a number of men who had taken refuge in a ravine immediately in front of Cle- burne's works. Wood soon had his division in good shape, and was ready to give the enemy a warm reception if he at- tempted to push out beyond the immediate front of his works whose protecting cover would not be so easily reached. In Cox's account of this battle he says: "When the preparations were completed, and the troops had rested a few minutes, the order to advance to the attack was given. Hazen led boldly forward, and the enemy's skirmishers were quickly driven within the works, which he promptly assaulted. His left seemed still to outflank the position and it pushed forward confident of success. The movement of Johnston's division still farther to the left brought it near to Pickett's Mill, on a tributarry of Pumpkin Vine creek, and the leading brigade-Scribner's-receiving a fire in flank from across the stream, halted and faced in that direction. Through some mistake McLean's movement on the right did not result as expected, and Wood's column was assailed with a furious cross-fire of artillery and musketry in front and on both flanks. Wood was forced to retire, which he did deliberately, and halted upon a ridge a little in rear and on the right; Johnson connected with him, continuing the line, with the left curving backward and making a strong refused flank in the direction of the mill and the creek. This affair was a costly one, for Howard reported a total loss of about fif- teen hundred. The ground gained was nevertheless very valuable, for it enabled the whole left wing to swing forward so far as to cover and conceal the extension of Sherman's line toward the Ackworth road, and protect the Alatoona road upon which his cavalry were operating. Had John- son noticed that he was first attacked in flank by cavalry only, and pushed Scribner's brigade straight on in support of Hazen, whilst he took care of the horsemen and another brigade of his division, the determined attack of the Fourth corps men would probably have been successful. The ground, however, was a dense wood broken into ravines, where noth- ing could be seen, and where embarrassments were scarcely
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less than in a night attack. Under the circumstances the won- der is, not that the attack failed, it is rather that Howard was able to withdraw in order, carrying off his wounded; and that he did so proves the magnificent steadiness and courage of his officers and men." So writes General Jacob D. Cox, one among the bravest and best division commanders in all Sherman's grand army, and it is no mean compliment to the troops of Wood's division.
While the Eighty-sixth was not in the assault proper, perhaps no regiment in the entire division was situated in so trying a position. For it is a well known fact to all exper- ienced soldiers that to hold troops under a withering and de- structive fire, without a return of the fire or any action what- ever on their part, is of all the duties of a soldier the most trying and difficult, and is at all times the severest test of the steadiness and nerve of soldiers. That the Eighty-sixth maintained its ground in this exposed position without a quiver is sufficient to stamp it, in rank and file, as one com- posed of unflinching soldiers. Much depended upon its holding this ground, for had it given way the enemy could have turned Wood's right flank and probably cut off both Wood and Johnson from the rest of the army, and either capture or destroy them before reinforcements could have reached them through the tangled woods.
One rebel account of this battle characterizes it as "a bloody struggle between Cleburne's division and Sherman's left, the Fourth corps." Another and more extended account is as follows: "Late in the afternoon of the 27th, a bloody struggle ensued between Cleburne's division of Hardee's corps, aided by a portion of Wheeler's dismounted cavalry, and the Fourth army corps of Federals, under command of General Howard, in columns six lines deep, near Pickett's Mill and the road leading from Burnt Hickory. The latter assailed the Confederates with great courage, and pressed forward with fortitude under fire, which will ever be remem- bered with admiration by those who met them. The two lines were at one time within twenty paces of each other; but, at length, the Federals were compelled to give way
THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
before the terrific storm of bullets; and fled for refuge to a ravine near by. About 10 o'clock that night, ascertaining that many of the Federals troops were in the ravine before them. the Confederates charged and drove them out, taking some 232 prisoners. The scene of the struggle was in a dense woods, with thick undergrowth, broken by hills and ravines, where nothing could be observed at a distance, and where neither side could see what was going on, except at the immediate point of conflict. The acknowledged loss of the Federals in this combat was about 1,500 men."
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