USA > Indiana > The Eighty-sixth regiment, Indiana volunteer infantry : a narrative of its services in the civil war of 1861-1865 > Part 18
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
hand. All to the right of General Brannan were swept from the field. The noon hour had come and the broken lines of Rosecrans' right, though routed from their positions, were neither whipped nor dismayed. Longstreet's men, flushed with their success, were pressing northward past the Broth- erton house and over the Dyer field on toward Snodgrass Hill, and Harker Hill. Men fought as they fell back. Here a noncommissioned officer or private would halt, face about and commence firing, calling on his comrades to rally and reform their lines, and from this one man the lines would build out almost like magic and a new line would be formed. A Captain or Lieutenant would give the commands to men gathered from almost every regiment on that portion of the field until he would have under his command as many men as would ordinarily compose a regiment. Colonel Morton C. Hunter, of the Eighty-second Indiana, had received the shock of the charge after Longstreet came through the lines, had recharged and broke the enemy's lines, but could not stem the oncoming tide. He then fell back fighting until he reached Snodgrass Hill and formed his line and called upon the scattered troops to form on his regiment, and that there they would hold the line. At once the fragments of the regiments that had been caught in the break caused by the moving of Woods' division troops began as quickly as possible to form, and form they did. In this line were men from every Indiana regiment, along with those from other States. It was not long until regiments and brigades were brought to the line first established by Colonel Hunter. The line extended westward over Snodgrass Hill into Dry Val- ley, and extending to the east of Colonel Hunter for a few rods, when it ran northward and eastward of the Snodgrass Hill and honse to what is now called Harker's Hill.
Until 3 o'clock the battle raged and surged about Snod- grass Hill and on to Harker's hill. The troops of Longstreet came up over the country in solid lines, and hurled themselves against these hastily formed lines, and as often as they came were they forced back, broken and shattered. Again and again, and again they came on with the rush of
19
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
the storm, and as often did they find themselves defeated and stricken down. After repeated efforts to break these lines, Longstreet, who had brought with him as they boasted, "the Invincibles," found that his troops had exhausted their strength and our lines remained as firm as the hill on which they stood. Despairing of success, General Longstreet sent a staff officer to General Bragg asking for ad- ditional troops from his right. To this request General Bragg responded that the troops of his right wing "had been so badly beaten back" that they could render him no service. The men of the Union left were now almost out of ammunition, but they could not and would not relinquish their position. Orders were given that when the last shot was fired then to fix bayonets and use the cold steel.
General Thomas was now in command of the troops on the field. General Rosecrans had started for Chattanooga to look after the location of the lines at that point. If there was need of reinforcements for Longstreet there was also dire need of reinforcements for Thomas as he alone was left to direct and save the Union army. These reinforcements came in an unexpected moment and their coming saved the field to the Union army. General Gordon Granger, on the extreme left, at Rossville gap, had heard the constant roar of the battle throughout the day, and had waited and waited for orders which had not come. He felt that his troops must be needed and without orders from any one he placed him- self at the head of his reserve corps and moved out to the sound of the battle's roar. He had with him General Stead- man's division and Colonel Dan McCook's brigade. Stead- man's division had the advance, and was composed mostly of new troops, but never was a body of men more needed than were these of Steadman. Longstreet, after failing to secure reinforcements, had reformed his lines for another assault. Longstreet then had for his new assault three full divisions and two brigades, that had been with him all day, and tak- ing part in the battle. He also had here Preston's Confederate division, two brigades of which were fresh and were then brought into action for the first time during that day Just
198
THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
as Longstreet was making his final preparations for another desperate assault Steadman's troops came up and passing by General Thomas were directed to form on the right of the troops already on Snodgrass Hill. This they did and had just moved into position when Longstreet's charge again began. Steadman's men met the charge with a counter charge so daring and so terrific in its force that it broke Longstreet's left and swept it off the side of the hills and back, and yet further back, broken and scattered, with the dead and wounded covering the ground, and yet pursuing wrenched from Longstreet's forces the hills where he had planted his artillery at Vidito's.
It was a magnificent charge and the "boys" of Stead- man's division "won their spurs" in that charge if ever knight of old by gallantry won his spurs. Our lines were now reformed and strengthened as best they could be. The ammunition in the cartridge boxes of the men who had fallen was gathered up and distributed, Steadman's men dividing their ammunition with those who had none. The ammuni- tion trains, by some officer's orders, no one knew whose, had gone on to Chattanooga. The very fact that a superior force was before them and that they had so little ammuni- tion, was sufficient of itself to strike dismay to the hearts of these Union troops on Snodgrass Hill. But not so. The Spartans of old had no more courageous troops than were these men, boys rather, who faced the foe in the closing hours of Sunday, September 20, 1863, holding the line that was to save the Army of the Cumberland, save Chatta- nooga, and wring from defeat a victory so grand, so magnifi- cont that it shall yet pass into history as even greater than Thermopylæ.
Turning for awhile from the magnificent defense of the Union right in the closing hours of the day, let the reader go once more to the left where the battle had opened in the morn- ing. Remember that in the first charge at the opening of the battle on Sunday morning that Breckenridge's troops were unable to break the Union left. Again reforming the line they moved out for the attack, and notwithstanding the severe re-
199
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
pulse they had received, they rushed forward with even more daring than in the first, but here again they were met with direct musketry in the front and were enfiladed by a battery of four guns which poured canister into their ranks, and with the musketry increasing, their men went down like grass be- fore a reaper. It was a fire in which no troops could live, and the remnant recoiled before the fearful storm. Again reforming and strengthening the lines, the shout of the charge was raised and on they came the third time with de- termined purpose to break the lines Nearer and nearer they come with shout upon shout, their lines at first closed up and unwavering, but the Union troops answered the yells with shouts of defiance, and once more broke forth the rain of lead and iron like a deluge; great breaches were torn in their lines, and officers and men went down before the pitiless storm. The men of Baird crowded behind their log breast- works until there was space for not another man, and they who could not find places loaded the guns and passed them to the men in the front line. It seemed one continuous stream of fire, one unbroken roar and rattle of artillery and musketry.
Thus it raged and stormed as if all the furies were turned loose. This charge, as the other two, failed and the rem- nant of the lines of Breckenridge fell back into their former position, while the Union line around the Kelly field still held its ground. While these charges of Breckenridge had failed to break our lines, and although their loss in officers and men had been most fearful, yet the charges had covered another purpose that was evidently had in contemplation to be consummated with the breaking of our lines, and that was to sweep around our extreme left and get onto the LaFayette road. So although they failed to break the line immediately in their front, their lines were long enough to sweep far be- yond our extreme left, and a part of Helms' and all of Stov- all's Confederate brigades fell upon General John Beatty's brigade and doubled him back and swept across the La- Fayette road at the McDaniel house. At the McDaniel house and just north of it were the Forty-second and Eighty -
200
THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
eighth Indiana, and these two regiments withstood the storm till they were absolutely crowded off the field west of the LaFayette road, when the Forty-second Indiana and the left wing of the Eighty-eighth Indiana which were taken by General Negley to McFarland's Gap, while the right wing of the Eighty-eighth Indiana found their way, following the sound of the guns, to Harker's Hill and from there to Snod- grass Hill. Thus after so long a struggle, by dint of super- ior numbers General Bragg got possession of the LaFayette road, but it availed him naught. His troops were too broken and shattered to follow up the advantage thus gained, and for the remainder of the day lay about the Kelly field and dared not make another charge, and did not venture to move his col- ums to the left to press a column toward Chattanooga. The prize for which he had fought on the Union left and for which thousands of lives had been given was now "dead sea fruit. "
Turning again to Snodgrass Hill may be seen the last desperate and unsuccessful attack of that portion of the Confederate army that was so renowned for its fighting qualities. Longstreet had been beaten back in his first assault on Snodgrass Hill. He had had almost a tri- umphal march, until he and his troops struck this hill, and there instead of finding a broken and demoralized body of troops he found a wall of human adamant. He determined about 5 p. m. to make another desperate effort to capture or destroy this body of soldiers, for they had proved themselves such. It is needless to attempt to describe this last fierce charge. The results are given and the reader can judge by its slaughter, and the experienced soldier will know full well of its terrible and horrible nature. The rebel troops came on in their charge until they had almost reached the summit, but on the sides of that hill and at its foot one brigade that entered upon the charge with 2,003 men, lost 698 killed and wounded. Another brigade out of 852 men. lost 303. Another brigade lost 504, one rebel regiment out of 239 men, lost 169. These figures form only a part of the loss that was sustained. After this charge, it then being after
201
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
dark, there was no general charge but the enemy pushed up under cover of darkness near to the brow of the hill.
At 5:30 p. m. the troops in the Kelly field were with- drawn and were ordered to McFarland's Gap, enroute to Chat- tanooga. Our troops on Snodgrass Hill held their position until after 8 p. m., when the firing having ceased along the entire line, General Thomas withdrew from the field and re- joined the portion of the army that had started for Chatta- nooga. Thus closed a battle that has not its parallel in mod- ern warfare when the number of men engaged on both sides and the duration of the engagement are considered. We have said that our troops were withdrawn from Snodgrass Hill about 8 p. m. This is true as to all of the troops, except- ing the Eighty-eighth Indiana remained at Snodgrass Hill until after daylight on Monday morning, September 21, when they marched to MeFarland's Gap, and then to Ross- ville and joined the left wing of the regiment and their brig- ade, and went into position on Missonary Ridge, and on Monday night were moved to Chattanooga. Captain W. M. Thompson, of this regiment, says that when the Eighty-eighth Indiana left Snodgrass Hill on Monday morning there was not an armed Confederate in sight on the field.
In the battle of Chickamauga Rosecrans in effective force had almost 55,000 men in all branches of the service. The force which General Bragg had at his command as shown by the best and most reliable Confederate reports was 81,219. The battle was fought on ground of General Bragg's own choosing. In so far as numbers were concerned, if the dis- parity in numbers counts for aught, it would seem as if Rose- crans was so greatly outnumbered that it would have been absolutely suicidal to have attempted to withstand a force so greatly superior. It should also be taken into consideration that General Bragg had with him the very best fighters of the entire Confederate army. With all of these advantages in favor of General Bragg: first, selection of the field; second, superiority in numbers; third, the flower of the Confederate army; yet with all this for three days, for we should include September 18, General Rosecrans' army withstood the
202
THE EIGHTY-SIXTII REGIMENT,
tiercest assaults that could possibly be made upon troops. From the time the battle opened until its close it was terrific in the extreme. Men on both sides fought with desperation as is shown by the casualties. The losses of the Union army at Chickamauga on September 19th and 20th were 16,179. The loss of the Confederates on the same days was 17,804, a total by the two armies of 33,983. The per cent of loss in many of the divisions was far higher than that of any other battle of modern times. Longstreet's command lost 44 per cent, and the greater portion of their loss was on Sunday afternoon at Snodgrass Hill. Steadman's division in the charges and countercharges at Snodgrass Hill lost 49 per cent, in killed and wounded. Brannan lost 38 per cent, and take the whole of Rosecrans' army in this battle the average loss is almost 33 per cent. General Boynton, the historian for the "Chickamauga National Military Park." has care- fully compiled the per centage of losses at Chickamauga, and he reports the loss of Confederates as follows: Bushrod Johnson's division at 44 per cent, Anderson's brigade of Hindman's division at 30 per cent. Bate's brigade of Stew- art's division 52 per cent; Preston's division 33 per cent and Gracie's brigade at 35 per cent, and the losses by both of these two last were all in only a little more than an hour's time at Snodgrass Hill. Over on the left Cheatham's division ranged from 35 to 50 per cent in the brigades. The loss in Breckenridge's division was 33 per cent. Cleburne's loss
was 43 per cent. No such charges were made during the war of 1861-1865 as were made by the Confederate forces at Chickamauga. The celebrated charges in other battles of the war consisted of but one charge each, but in the battle of Chickamauga they were repeated over and over by the Con- federates, not by the same troops each time but by fresh troops brought into them with all of the strength and force of fresh soldiers. If the charges were made with courage and daring, the defense was even more heroic, for it required the highest type of bravery to resist the oncoming charge of such men as made the assaults at Chickamauga. The same troops that made the charges at Chickamauga could not
203
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
stand before the charge at Missionary Ridge made by the same troops that successfully met and repulsed the charges at Chickamauga.
Of the fighting qualities of both armies General Hind- man of the Confederate army has said:
" I have never known Federal troops to fight so well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confederate soldiers fight better."
Of one of the assaults made by the troops of Longstreet, and which was repulsed on Snodgrass Hill, General Ker- shaw said:
"This was one of the heaviest attacks of the war on a single line." General Bragg says in his report of the battle:
"The conduct of our troops was excellent throughout the entire contest. * * Our loss was in proportion to the prolonged and obstinate struggle. Two-fifths of our gallant troops had fallen, and the number of general and staff officers stricken down will best show how these troops were led."
Again he says:
"Our troops were led with the greatest gallantry and exhibited great coolness, bravery and heroie devotion. In no instance did they fail when called on to rally and return the charge. But though invari- ably driving the enemy with slaughter at the points assailed, they were in turn compelled to yield."
Further he gives as a reason for not pursuing the Army of the Cumberland, the following:
" Any immediate pursuit by our infantry and artillery would have been fruitless, as it was not deemed practicable with our weak and ex- hausted force to assail the enemy-now more than double our numbers, behind entrenchments. Though we had defeated him and driven him from the field with heavy loss in men, arms and artillery, it had only been done by heavy sacrifices, in repeated, persistent, and most gallant charges."
General Bragg seems to have estimated the fighting qualities of the Army of the Cumberland as its true worth and strength, and it is doubtless this quality which makes him say that the Union army was "more than double our numbers."
General D. H. Hill in his report of the assaults made on the extreme left of the Union line on Sunday morning says:
"The whole corps had failed in its attack ; Breckenridge had been compelled to fall back a short distance, and Cleburne still further after a heavy repulse."
General Bushrod A. Johnson in his report refers to the
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THIE EIGHTY-SIXTHI REGIMENT,
conduct of General Granger's corps that reinforced Thomas at Snodgrass Hill:
"Our line pressed determinedly forward for some time, keeping up an incessant volley with small arms. But the enemy now evidently re- ceived reinforcements of fresh troops, which advanced with a shout that was heard along our lines, and we were driven back to our guns. It was subsequently ascertained from prisoners captured that the reinforce- ments were a part of General Granger's corps which we fought the rest of the day. Deas' brigade and the part of Manigault's next to it fell back to the foot of the hill. Anderson's fell back to its first position, and these three brigades, save two regiments of Manigault's next to John- son's brigade, did not again enter the fight. * The retreat on this hill
was precipitate, and called for all the exertions I couldl command to prevent many of the troops from ubuntoning it. The officers, however, joined with every energy and zeal in the effort to stay the retreat, and by appeals, commands, and physical efforts, all save a few who presisted in skulking behind trees or lying idly on the ground were brought up to our lines in support of the artillery. The enemy were not whipped, and the conflict still raged with varying fortune. Repeatedly our men advanced, and were in turn forced to yield a portion of the ground they had gained."
The portion here italicised are not italicised by General Johnson, but the words are those of the report. This report of General Johnson, who was one of Longstreet's division commanders, is worthy of consideration, and speaks most strongly of the bravery and fighting qualities of the small band of Union troops that so gallantly held Snodgrass Hill on Sunday afternoon "against all comers." It is related, on what authority it is not known, that as one of Longstreet's Virginia divisions was moving forward it passed through a body of Tennessee troops that had been so severely punished in one of the charges that it had been moved to the rear to gather reinforcements, and Longstreet's men as they passed through shouted, "Rise up, Tennesseeans, and see the Virginians go in." They went in, but soon came back repulsed, broken, and fleeing before the terrible storm that met them as they went "in, " and as they came flying back the Tennessee men cried, "Rise up, Tennesseans, and see the Virginiuns come out."
The foregoing quotations are sufficient to show the esti- mation in which the leading Confederate officers who were at Chickamauga placed upon the battle. The fact that Gen-
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
eral Bragg, with all of the superior numbers under his com- mand could not, and did not follow the Union army off the field is one of the highest tributes that it has been possible to pay to the gallantry and endurance of the Army of the Cum- berland. To those who may visit the battle field of Chicka- mauga now years after the memorable 19th and 20th of Sep- tember, 1863, and there fully understanding the situation of the ground, the position of the contending armies, and the actual numbers engaged on each side, the cause for wonder and astonishment is not so much that the Union army left the field in the hands of the Confederates, but the greatest surprise is that any of the Union army survived. General Alexander P. Stewart, who commanded a division of Buck- ner's corps, on Sunday, and witnessing the terrific charges that were made on the Kelly field, stood with the writer look- ing over that memorable scene of carnage. The talk was of the tempest of war that had raged on that field thirty-one years before, when the question was asked: General Stewart, when you had the Union troops so nearly surrounded in this field why did you suffer one of them to live to get away to tell of the fight? The General replied: "I have asked that question of myself many times, and I can answer it but one way, that is, the good Lord intended it just as it was." The answer of General .Stewart was made with the utmost rever- ence, for he is a true Christian gentleman. And so after a careful review of the battle of Chickamauga may each one say, in the same spirit in which he spoke it, "The good Lord intended it as it was."
The reports made by General Rosecrans and the Gen- erals of his army all bear abundant testimony to the fact of the wonderful bravery of the men and officers of the Army ' of the Cumberland at Chickamauga, and it is not necessary that their reports should here be reproduced. The reports of those who were of the other army, or enemies then, bear tes- timony not to be controverted.
What of the troops that held the lines against such great odds, and, in the face of all that pointed to complete disaster and overthrow, WON? Yes, the Army of the Cumberland
1
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
com and held all that it was ordered to take-CHATTANOOGA! The battle-field was left for the hands of the enemy. Yes, 'tis 1rue. But it was a battle-field to be held, if it was held, with- out a victory being won. They who claim to have held the field, were so broken and shattered that they could not and dared not pursue. Bragg fought the battle of Chicka- manga, not for Chickamauga, but his purpose, his plan, and this battle in which he says he lost 18,000 of the best troops of the South was to regain Chattanooga. It was to regain Chattanooga that Longstreet was brought from the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, the army of Rob- ert E. Lee. It was for the same purpose that Buckner's corps was brought from East Tennessee. It was to wrench the "Key to the South," Chattanooga, from the hand of Rosecrans that all the troops of Johnston joined Bragg's army. Rosecrans fought the battle of Chickamanga not for Chickamauga, but to hold Chattanooga, and Chatta- nooga he held. Again the question, what of the troops that won? From whence came they?
The roster of Rosecrans' army answers the question, and every State represented is worthy of mention. The troops of each one did all that troops could do. Read the list:
STATES.
INFANTRY REG'MENTS REG'MENTS
MOUNTED ARTILL'RY INFANTRY BATTER'ES O'G'NI'T'NS TOTAL
Indiana
26
3
3
8
40
Illinois
28
3
5
36
Kansas
1
1
Kentneky
13
17
Michigan
4
2
8
Minnesota
1
1
2
Ohio
42
10
55
Pennsylvania
1
6
Tennessee .
2
Wisconsin
1
3
9
Missouri
1
3
U. S. Army (Regulars.)
4
1
4
9
Total
129
18
6
35
1SS
CAVALRY
Against these 188 organizations, the Confederates had 259 organizations. Indiana, as appears from the foregoing,
207
INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
was fully represented in the battle of Chickamauga as she was in all of the battles of the war. It is no disparagement to the troops of the other States from which came the Union army to say that the troops of Indiana did their full share of duty at Chickamauga, and that the gallantry of her sons was not surpassed by that of any other State there represented, regardless of whether the troops were from the North or the South, Union or Confederate. Indiana was the first, with her Seventeenth and Seventy-Second regiments and Eigh- teenth battery, to oppose the crossing of Bragg's troops over the Chickamauga creek on Friday, September 18. Indiana troops, the Tenth and Seventy-fourth regiments, were the first troops of Rosecrans' army to open the battle on the morning of September 19. In the corps of Granger that met the charge of Bushrod R. Johnson, with a counter charge, and broke his line and hurled them back was the Eighty-fourth Indiana; the last volley fired on Snodgrass Hill was fired by the Ninth Indiana regiment, and the last Union regiment to leave the battle-field was the Eighty-eighth regiment, which marched away on Monday morning, Sep- tember 20, from Snodgrass Hill. Indiana's "Roll of Honor" was written on the field of Chickamauga, at Reed's Bridge, at Viniard's, at Brotherton's, at Poe's, at Kelly's, at Mc- Daniel's, in the Brock field, at Harker's Hill, on Snod- grass Hill, everywhere on Chickamauga, where the bat- tle raged the fiercest, and the storm was most deadly. By Chickamanga's muddy waters, in the glades, under the pines, in the open fields, on the highlands, and around the fire begirt hills, over three thousand of Indiana's sons gave their blood and lives in the de- fense of the Flag and for the preservation of the Republic. Eleven States of the Union and the regular army of the United States were represented in the battle of Chicka- mauga, and one-fifth of the loss in killed and wounded in that battle were from Indiana's regiments and batteries. The reports on file at the War Department show that during the war of the rebellion, from the opening in April, 1861, to the close of the war in 1865, Indiana lost 24,000 men. If
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