USA > Indiana > The Eighty-sixth regiment, Indiana volunteer infantry : a narrative of its services in the civil war of 1861-1865 > Part 15
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At 5 o'clock next morning I was ordered forward to rejoin the divis- ion, which order I complied with, arriving at division headquarters, five miles from Ringgold, Georgia, at about 7 a. m., when I reported to Brigadier-General VanCleve. At 9 a. m. I moved with the division in the direction of Ringgold. Marching with the division, I went with it into camp on Dogwood creek, two and a half miles south of Ringgold on the Dalton road."
The march from the time this brigade left McMinnville until it rejoined the division near Ringgold, as shown by the above itinerary and Colonel Dick's report, was a forced march all the way for eight days. The men
of the regiment were in excellent spirits; they had had a rest of two months, during which time they had had an opportunity to procure fruit and fresh vegetables, and the health of the men had been restored, and never in all its history had the regiment been in better con- dition physically. The road over which they came was dry and dusty, much of the route was through one of the most delightful portions of Tennessee, and the sun was hot during the day, but it was a "forward movement, " and couriers that were met enroute gave most encouraging reports of the ad- vance of the main army. Thus was the weariness of the
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTHI REGIMENT,
march, the heat and the dust, offset by the cheering news, and no complaints of hardships were heard. When the brig- ade crossed the river at Bridgeport on September 7, it was believed by all that an engagement was imminent and the sound of battle was expected. On the 9th, however, news of the evacuation of Chattanooga was received, and it was then believed by most of the command that a halt would be made at Chattanooga, as it was generally understood that that city was the objective point, and that now being in the hands of General Rosecrans, therefore the campaign would be ended. This delusion was soon dispelled when the orders were re- ceived to press on and join the remainder of the command then in pursuit of Bragg's army. The march in pursuit of Bragg was entered upon with hearty good will, and as the Eighty-sixth moved over the railroad around the point of old Lookont and caught sight of the stars and stripes floating over the captured city of Chattanooga a shout went up from the men that was taken up and echoed from Lookout to Missionary Ridge. Catching just a glimpse of the city as the head of the column crossed the creek at the foot of the mountain, the brigade hastened on up Lookout Valley to the southward toward Rossville, the men little dreaming of the terrible ordeal through which they were destined to pass within the following ten days.
Having now united the Eighty-sixth Indiana and the brigade to which it was attached with the division, it is im- portant as a matter of history to be preserved by the regi- ment and its friends, that the immediate organization of the Twenty-first army corps should here be given. This corps, because of its magnificent record at Chickamauga, has won a place in the hearts of all those who were connected with the Army of the Cumberland. Whether fighting as a complete corps, or taken by detachments and sent to the support of other portions of the army, the officers and men who com- posed it showed that gallantry and those soldierly qualities that make the American citizen soldier superior to any other soldier of the world. The following roster of the Twenty- first army corps at Chickamauga will doubtless bring to
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mind many incidents and scenes which have been covered up in the minds of the comrades by the dust of years that have passed, or been driven from memory, or pushed into the background by the press of business and the struggle to "get on in the world, " since the soldier of 1861-1865 has be- come again the citizen:
TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS AT CHICKAMAUGA. Major General Thomas L. Crittenden, Commanding.
FIRST DIVISION.
Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, Commanding. First Brigade. Colonel George P. Buell, Commanding.
One Hundreth Illinois. Thirteenth Michigan. Fifty-eighth Indiana. Twenty-sixth Ohio. Eighth Indiana Battery. Second Brigade. Brigadier General George D. Wagner, Commanding. Stationed at Chattanooga and not engaged at Chickamauga.
Third Kentucky. Sixty-fourth Ohio.
Third Brigade. Colonel Charles G. Harker, Commanding. Sixty-fifth Ohio. One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio. Sixth Ohio Battery. SECOND DIVISION.
Major General John M. Palmer, Commanding.
First Brigade. Brigadier General Charles Cruft, Commanding.
Thirty-first Indiana.
First Kentucky.
Second Kentucky. Ninetieth Ohio. First Ohio Light, Battery B. Second Brigade.
Brigadier General William B. Hazen, Commanding. Ninth Indiana. Sixth Kentucky.
Forty-first Ohio. One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio. First Ohio Light, Battery F.
Third Brigade. Colonel William Grose, Commanding. Eighty-fourth Illinois.
Twenty-third Kentucky.
Thirty-sixth Indiana. Twenty-fourth Ohio.
Fourth United States Artillery, Battery H.
Fourth United States Artillery, Battery M.
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THIE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
THIRD DIVISION.
Brigadier General Horatio P. VanCleve, Commanding. First Brigade. Brigadier General Samuel Beatty, Commanding.
Seventy-ninth Indiana.
Seventeenth Kentucky. Nineteenth Ohio.
Ninth Kentucky.
Seventh Indiana Battery. Second Brigade. Colonel George F. Dick, Commanding.
Forty-fourth Indiana.
Thirteenth Ohio.
Eighty-sixth Indiana.
Fifty-ninth Ohio.
Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Battery.
Third Brigade. Colonel Sidney M. Barnes, Commanding.
Thirth-fifth Indiana.
Twenty-first Kentucky.
Eighth Kentucky.
Fifty-first Ohio.
Ninty-ninth Ohio. Third Wisconsin Battery.
The entire movements of General Bragg after leaving Chattanooga and his designs were shrouded in mystery in so far as General Rosecrans was able to discover. Of course it was all made manifest later on, and the rebel army was found to have been posted as stated in the foregoing portion of this chapter. After the division of General VanCleve was united then was begun the same tactics that had been pursued by the Twenty-first army corps in the valley opposite Chatta- nooga before Bragg evacuated the place. It was to be a sys- tem of strategy for the purpose of deceiving and misleading General Bragg, if possible, as to the situation and condition of the Army of the Cumberland. It was now a matter of vital importance to General Rosecrans that no general en- gagement should be brought on until his army could be again united. Although the pursuit of the Confederate army was entered upon by the troops of the Twenty-first corps with a most commendable degree of enthusiasm, no one, not even the commanding general, realized the perilous situation in which it was being placed. The true condition of affairs was, how- ever, soon made manifest to General Rosecrans and at least to all of the general officers, whether it was to the rank and file or not.
On September 12, the Twenty-first corps marched from
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
Ringgold and bivouacked near to and about Lee & Gordon's Mills. On the night of September 9, General Bragg had ordered General Hindman, then at Lee & Gordon's Mills, to march to Davis' cross roads, and there to make a junction with General Cleburne's forces, and both were to attack Neg- ley's division of General Thomas' corps then advancing from Stevens' Gap toward LaFayette, where, it was afterward learned, General Bragg had concentrated his army, and where he was then receiving large reinforcements from Virginia and Mississippi. These orders were not obeyed, but had they been executed promptly, Negley's division, isolated as it was, would have been, in all probability, utterly destroyed. General Hill, who should have had the immediate command of the two divisions that were to have attacked General Neg- ley, reported to General Bragg that the mountain gaps through which he would have to pass were so obstructed with felled timber that he could not get through in less than twenty-four hours. By the time the twenty-four hours had passed, General Baird, commanding the First division of Thomas' corps, had joined General Negley, and thus Negley was placed on nearer an equal footing with the col- umn that was to have made the attack. Again on September 10, General Bragg issued the order to make the attack, send- ing forward two additional divisions of the Confederate army as reinforcements. Again there was the delay of a day in the execution of General Bragg's orders, and in that time the other two divisions of General Thomas' corps had joined Negley and Baird, and with them General Thomas in person, and the center of our army was secure for the time being. These events now bring the reader to the day on which Crit- tenden's corps, falling back from Ringgold, had concentrated at Lee & Gordon's Mills. Thomas, with the Fourteenth corps, and McCook, with the Twentieth corps, were from twenty to forty miles away, with mountain ranges and al- most impassable roads separating them from Crittenden's corps. The Twenty-first corps, Crittenden's, was then en- tirely isolated from all support and absolutely powerless to withstand a combined attack from General Bragg's army, if
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THIE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
that officer should determine to concentrate his forces and make the attack. And this was exactly the movement that was then contemplated by General Bragg.
On September 12, General Bragg with his headquarters at LaFayette, Georgia, at 6 p. m., issued the following order to Lieutenant General Polk:
GENERAL :- I enclose you a dispatch from General Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed and the others are yours. We can then turn again on the force in the Cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.
On that evening, however, after receiving the orders General Polk notified General Bragg that additional troops should be sent to him. He said:
"I am clearly of the opinion that you should send me additional forces, so as to make failure impossible, and great success here would be of incalculable benefit to our cause."
The entire day passed and General Polk awaited for re- inforcements, and at the close of the day the entire corps of Crittenden had united. At night, on September 12, General Bragg again writes General Polk:
" Your position seems to be a strong one for defense, but I hope will not be held unless the enemy attacks early. We must force him to fight at the earliest moment, and before his combination ean be carried out. However, to avoid all danger, I shall put Buckner in mo- tion in the morning and run the risk here. You must not delay attack for his arrival, or another golden opportunity may be lost by the with- drawal of our game. * Action, prompt and decided, is all that can save us."
On the very day that this attack was ordered to be made by General Bragg on Crittenden, September 13, General Crittenden, after placing his corps in position, ordered Gen -* eral VanCleve, with General Beatty's brigade, supported by Colonel Dick's brigade, to make a reconnoissance beyond Lee & Gordon's Mills on the Lafayette road. At the same time Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, with General Cruft's brigade as support, was ordered to reconnoitre to the left through Pea Vine valley. The same day the Fourth United States cavalry reported to General Crittenden for duty, and
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
he ordered them to reconnoitre the road toward McLemore's Cove.
General VanCleve moved out in obedience to his orders, crossing Chickamauga creek and advancing for three miles toward LaFayette. This reconnoissance developed the fact the enemy was in front in some considerable force, but from General VanCleve's report it is evident that he went back to his position at Lee & Gordon's Mills in blissful ignorance of the exact situation in his front that day. In his report to General Crittenden after the battle of Chickamauga, in de- tailing his movements for each day from the 4th to the 21st of September, he says:
"On the 13th, by your order, I made a reconnoisance with my division three miles toward LaFayette. We met the rebel cavalry immediately after passing our picket line, and with sharp skirmishing drove them back. Two privates of the Nineteenth Ohio were mortally wounded by a solid shot. Captain Drury, Chief of Artillery, and Lieutenant Clark, Company G, Seventy-ninth Indiana Volunteers, were seriously wounded. The loss of the enemy is unknown."
At the end of the three miles advance General VanCleve halted and rested his command, giving the men an oppor- tunity to eat a lunch before he started on the return. Not one of the officers or men either of Dick's brigade, or of Beatty's brigade, as they ate their hardtack that Sunday noon of September 13, 1863, imagined for one instant that only one mile farther on the greater part of Bragg's army were waiting for what they supposed Crittenden's advance to fall into their hands. Had General Polk obeyed the orders of his chief, which were to fall upon Crittenden that morning, he would have caught General VanCleve all un- prepared for the discovery of so much force, soon after he, VanCleve, had crossed the Chickamauga, and the two brig- ades would have been litterly overrun and annihilated. The same condition of affairs confronted Wilder's brigade that day. Had Wilder but pushed forward on his reconnoissance one mile further than where he halted and turned back, he would have struck the solid right wing of Bragg's army. The greater the examination of the history of the battle of Chickamauga one makes, the more it is apparent that Chicka-
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
mauga was full of blunders, and failures on the part of the Confederate army, and of escapes for the Union army. The failure of Hindman and Cleburne to strike Negley, was a blunder on their part, and an escape for Thomas' corps. The failure of Polk with his overwhelming force to strike Crittenden on the morning of September 13 with VanCleve's division on the east bank of the Chickamauga, and Wilder's brigade with their breech loading Spencer rifles out of reach on the left, with the cavalry towards MeLemore's Cove, and the remainder of the corps all unconscious of its danger, was the greatest blunder and mistake of the Confederates, and the crowning escape not only of Crittenden's corps, but in its final results, as we shall see a little further on, the almost miraculous escape of the Army of the Cumberland as well. General Polk's timidity and the lack of enforcing orders by General Bragg on Sunday, September 13, was the pivot on which absolute defeat and ruin to General Rosecrans turned to an ultimate victory in the holding of Chattanooga.
Bragg after the failure of Polk on Sunday, resolved upon another line of action differing only in the manner of its exe- cution, from the one he had mapped out in his orders to Gen- eral Polk when he ordered him to fall upon Crittenden's corps. His new plan was fully developed in his orders which were issued to his army a few days later. In this new plan he proposed to move down on the east side of the Chickamauga and cross the stream between Chattanooga and Lee & Gordon's Mills, destroy General Crittenden's corps, then to follow up his victory and attack General Thomas and destroy or scatter his command in the mountains, thus leav- ing General MeCook with his corps, utterly powerless, away from supplies, away from all hope of assistance and at the mercy of the Confederate army, with Chattanooga again in his grasp whenever at his leisure he might see fit to take it, and with the way once more open for a triumphant march northward. The plan was an excellent one, and it does seem now in the light of all the facts, as if there was no pos- sible hindrance to its successful accomplishment. By inter- posing his army between Chattanooga and Crittenden's left,
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
Bragg would be in no danger of being caught between the Twenty-first corps and the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps, which might come up before the Twenty-first was disposed of. But here again came another blunder of General Bragg. He was too slow, and allowed four days to pass before he issued his final orders for the advance of his army. Gen- eral Rosecrans, in the meantime, had gained information that Bragg was in receipt of a large reinforcement, and that General Longstreet, with his famous corps of the Army of Northern Virginia was enroute also to further strengthen General Bragg. General Rosecrans also had received such information as led him to believe that General Bragg was concentrating towards the Union left. At once he, Rose- crans, undertook to concentrate the Army of the Cumber- land on Crittenden's corps. General Rosecrans in his re- port covering the date of September 12, says:
"Thus it was ascertained that the enemy was concentrating all his forces, both infantry and cavalry, behind Pigeon Mountain, in the vicin- ity of LaFayette, while the corps of this army were at Gordon's Mills, Bailey's cross-roads, at the foot of Stevens' Gap, and at Alpine, a dis- tance of forty miles from flank to flank, by the nearest practical roads, and fifty-seven miles by the route subsequently taken by the Twentieth army corps. It had already been ascertained that the main body of Johnston's army had joined Bragg, and accumulation of evidence showed that the troops from Virginia had reached Atlanta on the first of the month, and that reinforcements were expected to arrive soon from that quarter. It was now a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of the army."
The plan adopted by General Rosecrans for the concen- tration of his army was for General McCook with his corps to join General Thomas at McLemore's Cove, then to move General Thomas to the left permitting General McCook to take the place of General Thomas, and then by forced marches to move both of their corps to the rear of and to the left of General Crittenden's corps. Thus in the formation as was then contemplated and as was afterward carried out leaving General Crittenden's corps so that it would become the right wing of the army instead of the left. While these preparations for consolidating the army were in progress, the troops of Crittenden's corps were kept busy in making
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THE EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT,
reconnoissances, and by moving about were making a show of strength. On the night of September 12, at midnight, General McCook received his order to join General Thomas at Mclemore's Cove, and he at once commenced a move- ment which required him five days to execute, reaching his position with General Thomas on the 17th. Five long, anx- ious and dangerous days for the small body of the army along Chickamauga creek. Five days in which at any time Bragg might have destroyed Crittenden and have thrown his whole force against Thomas and destroyed him before McCook could get up. As soon as McCook had joined Thomas the movement to the left began and on the night of the 17th these two corps had pushed well on toward Crit- tenden.
On the night of the 17th, General Bragg issued his orders for the movement of his corps and for the opening of the battle, and it was intended that the movements named in the order should all be made so that Bragg should open the battle by 6 o'clock on the morning of the 18th. The orders as issued by General Bragg, dated at Leet's Tan Yard, September 18, 1863, read as follows :
1. Johnson's column, (Hood's), on crossing at or near Reed's bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee & Gordon's Mills.
2. Walker, crossing at Alexander bridge, will unite in this move- and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.
3. Buckner, crossing at Thedford's ford, will join in the movement to the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee & Gordon's Mills.
4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee & Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross, will hear to the right and cross at Dalton's ford, or at Thedford's, as may be necessary, and join in the attack wherever the enemy may be.
5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the Cove, and by pressing the cavalry in his front, ascertain if the en- emy is reinforcing at Lee & Gordon's Mills, in which event he will at- tack them in flank.
6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain and cover our rear and left, and bring up stragglers.
7. All teams, etc., not with troops, shall go toward Ringgold and
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
Dalton, beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking shall be done at the trains. Rations when cooked will be forwarded to the troops.
8. The above movements wil be executed with the utmost prompt- ness, vigor and persistence.
Between General Bragg and General Crittenden run the deep and muddy waters of the Chickamauga, with banks that were steep, and the crossings, difficult for artillery and ammu- nition trains, were narrow and poor. To make these crossings the more difficult, each one was guarded by a strong detach- ment from Wilder's mounted infantry and Minty's cavalry, each detachment being supported or assisted with artillery. This was a force not counted upon by General Hood in his calculation. Beside this his command did not get under way early in the morning, and it was after noon of that day be- fore the advance of the different corps approached their points of crossing, and when these were reached they found a sufficient force to dispute their passage and the crossing was not effected until late in the evening, too late to carry out the plans as laid down in General Bragg's order. Only a part of Bragg's army got across that evening and the Union troops were constantly on the guard.
CHAPTER XV.
THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.
The Opening Ball-The Eighty-sixth in at the Beginning-Dick's Brigade in Sup- port of Wilder-Important Points on the Field Described-Position of Rose- frans' Troops-Waiting in Suspense-The Orders Arrive-The Regiment goes in-A Vivid Portrayal of the First Day's Contest-The Lines Reformed for the Second Day-The Bloody Contest Rages With Unabated Fury-The Va- rions Movements of the Regiment, Brigade and Division-The Charges at the Kelly and Poe Fields-The Break in the Lines-Longstreet in the Charge- On Snodgrass Hill and Harker Hill-Steadman's Troops Come Up-Confed- erates Gain Possession of the LaFayette Road on the Left-Final Repulse of Longstreet at Snodgrass Hill-Withdrawal of Union Troops-Strength of the Armies and Losses at Chickamauga-Estimates of the Battle by Confederate Officers- Indiana at Chickamauga.
On September 18, Dick's brigade lay during the forenoon at Crawfish Springs, two miles west and south, by the wagon road, from Lee & Gordon's Mills. The horses stood hitched to the artillery for any emergency. The troops had just finished their noon meal and were sitting about waiting for the next move, when from the north came the report of ar- tillery announcing the opening of the battle at Alexander's bridge and Reed's bridge. The troops were now fully aroused as they began to thoroughly realize that the battle was opening. For several days it had been expected, but no one realized the severity with which the contest was to rage for the next two days after these opening shots. The brigade did not have long for speculation or conjecture upon the opening of the engagement, before there came an order to Colonel Dick to push forward his brigade as rapidly as possible to the support of General Thomas J. Wood, who was then threatened by General Polk's advance at Lee & Gordon's Mills. There was no delay in getting off after the order was received, and the Eighty-sixth Indiana with the other regiments of the brigade, reached the position on the
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INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.
left of Wood in time to see the first of the wounded cavalry and mounted infantry coming in from Wilder and Minty's command. Until the sun went down on the afternoon of the 18th of September, the fight was between the cavalry and mounted infantry of Rosecrans, and the head of the columns of Bragg. The day, however, was practically lost to Bragg, in so far as the speedy and successful execution of his plans were concerned.
The soldiers who took part in the battle of Chickamauga and who have not visited Chickamauga since the battle, may have forgotten to a certain extent the roads and locations that were prominent in that battle, and the reader of this sketch who has not been on the battle-field should know of the different positions as they are named as important points in the battle.
The Chattanooga & LaFayette road, spoken of during the battle as the LaFayette road, is a wagon road leading a little east of south from Chattanooga to Rossville, a distance of four miles, where it passes through Missionary Ridge by what is known as Rossville Gap. Near Rossville and a very little to the north, is the boundary line between Tenn- essee and Georgia. The LaFayette road, after passing through Rossville Gap runs southeast for near two miles, and then runs due south through or near the center of the battle-field to Lee & Gordon's Mills, eight miles and a half from Rossville and twelve and a half miles from Chattanooga, and thirteen miles yet further south of Lee & Gordon's Mills is LaFayette. Along the line of this LaFayette road are for the most part the important positions where the battle raged on September 19th and 20th. As the battle opened our right lay at Lee & Gordon's Mills, and to the east side of the LaFay- ette road, faced east, and as all of the movements of the bat- tle were to our left, or northward, the points will be named beginning at Lee & Gordon's Mills and going to our left, north toward Chattanooga on this road. First is Viniard's, one mile and a half north of the mill, Brotherton's, a mile and a small fraction north of Viniard's; Poe's, a quarter of a mile north of Brotherton's; Kelly's, three-fourths of a mile
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