USA > Louisiana > The province and the states, a history of the province of Louisiana under France and Spain, and of the territories and states of the United States formed therefrom, Vol. II > Part 12
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have every reason to believe that the Floridas are not included. 'They will for the present at least remain in the hands of Spain. There never was a government in which less could be done by negotiation than here. There is no people, no legis- lature, no counsellors. One man is everything. He seldom asks advice and never hears it unasked. Ilis ministers are mere clerks, and his legislature and counsellors parade officers. Though the sense of every reflecting man is against this wild expedition no one dares to tell him so. Were it not for the uneasiness it excites at home, it would give me none ; for I am persuaded that the whole will end in a relinquishment of the country ( West Florida) and transfer of the capital ( New Orleans) to the United States. Their islands call for much more than france can ever furnish." }
Diplomatie Correspondente.
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On October 28, Mr. Livingston wrote that the army destined for Louisiana had met with a check, but that he could not learn the reason, unless it was the partial non-fulfillment by France of the considerations mentioned in the treaty of cession. He gave an interesting account of his interviews with Joseph Bona- parte, saying among other things: "He told me that he would receive with pleasure any communication I could make; but as he would not wish to appear to interfere with the minister, he begged that my communication might be informal and unsigned-exactly what I wished, because I should act with less danger of committing myself and of course with more free- dom. He added, "You must not, however, suppose my power to serve you greater than it actually is; my brother is his own counsellor but we are good brothers; he hears me with pleas- ure, and as I have access to him at all times, I have an oppor- tunity of turning his attention to a particular subject that might otherwise be passed over.' I then asked him whether he ( Napo- leon) had read my notes on Louisiana. He told me he had, and that he had conversed upon the subject with the first con- sul who, he found, had read them with attention, and that his brother had told him that he had nothing more at heart than to be upon the best terms with the United States. I told him that the only cause of difference that might arise between us being the debt and Louisiana, I conceived that both might be happily and easily removed by making an exchange with Spain, returning them Louisiana, retaining New Orleans and giving the latter and the Floridas for our debt. He asked me whether we should prefer the Floridas to Louisiana .* I told him that there was no comparison in their value, but that we had no wish to extend our boundary across the Mississippi, or give color to the doubts that had been entertained of the mod- eration of our views, and that all we sought was security and not extension of territory. He replied that he believed any new cession on the part of Spain would be extremely difficult, inas. much as Spain had parted with Trinidad and Louisiana with great reluctance."
On November 11, Mr. Livingston wrote that the difficulty over the consideration for Louisiana had been settled, and that orders
* In asking this question, Joseph Bonaparte could not have meant by "Louisi- ana" the island of New Orleans only. He unquestionably meant the province, or all of the country west of the Mississippi. Attention is called to the fact that this was the bed direct mention from any some of the transfer of the entire province to the United States. As Joseph reflected the views of Napoleon, it seems clear that the latter had already considered the possible cession of all of Louisiana to the United States.
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had been issued for the expedition destined for Louisiana to embark-two demi-brigades. He did not know that the reason for the detention of the French fleet was the refusal of the king of Spain to ratify the cession of Louisiana to France. Ile further stated that the French government "will say nothing on the question of our limits, or our right under the Spanish treaty. When asked what they meant to do as to our right of entrepot, General Victor (the commander of the expe- (lition ) spoke of the treaty (between the United States and Spain in 1795) as waste paper. The sum voted for this service is two million and a half of francs; as to the rest they expect to compel the people to support the expenses of the gov- ernment, which will be very heavy, as the number of the ofi- cers is great, so that the first act of the new gov- emment will be the oppression of their people and of our commerce. I believe you may add to this an early attempt to corrupt our western people, and an early attempt upon the Natchez, which they consider as the rival of New Orleans." On the same date, Mr. Livingston insisted on an answer to his notes concerning Louisiana and was told by the French minister "that he was expressly instructed by the First Consul to give me the most positive assurances that the treaties we had entered into with Spain or them relative to Louisiana should be strictly observed." President Jefferson, in his message to congress December 15, 1802, said: "The cession of the Spanish prov- ince of Louisiana to France, which took place in the course of the later war, will, it carried into effect, make a change in the aspect of our foreign relations, which will doubtless have just weight in any deliberations of the legislature connected with that subject."*
The treaty retroceding Louisiana to France was signed Octo- ber 1, 1800; but it was not ratified by the king of Spain until October 15, 1802. Immediately after the latter date, the French armament was fully organized and equipped. On October 16, 1802, the interdiction was promulgated at New Orleans, and two months later the inhabitants were forbidden to trade in any manner whatever with the Americans on the Mississippi. There was nothing left to the latter but the fruitless right of sailing up and down the river. When the king of Spain finally rati- fied the cession treaty, he exacted, at the suggestion of Godoy,
. Messages and Papers of the Presidents.
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that Louisiana should never be alienated,* but should be returned to Spain in case the king of Etruria lost the power granted to him by Napoleon for Louisiana. The projects of the first consul for the colonization of Louisiana were not matured until late in the year 1801, when the peace with Great Britain, which arrived some months before the treaty, presented the opportunity of strengthening his domains, preparatory for another possible war. He at first demanded the entire Gulf coast from St. Marys on the Atlantic to the mouth of the Rio Grande, and would prob- ably have obtained it all had it not been for Godoy, who was known as the Prince of Peace.
Mr. Jefferson had favored the revolution in France, admired the revolutionary leaders, particularly Napoleon, and accord- ingly did not readily suspect the designs of that conqueror upon Louisiana and Florida. His party had blamed the Federalists for the troubles with France in 1797-98; and so amid the clamor he chose a neutral course until the truth could no longer be denied. He then informed Napoleon that if France persisted in taking possession of Louisiana, it would cost her a war that would sweep her navy from the oceans. * * This threat was well sustained, as before stated, by what he wrote about the same time to Mr. Livingston at Paris : "From the moment that France takes New Orleans, we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." The imminency of the. danger to be apprehended from the French occupation of Louisiana was realized by both parties in America, but each had a different remedy for the dis- order. The course pursued by Mr. Jefferies was eminently wise and statesmanlike, as subsequent events abundantly provol.
The American ministers to France and Spain, under the stim- ulus of the excitement at home, redoubled their efforts to effect a satisfactory settlement of the Louisiana problems. Mr. Liv- ingston continued, through the kindness of Joseph Bonaparte, to reach the cars of Napoleon with his elaborate and convincing memorials. In December, 1802, he suggested in one of these memorials the cession of West Florida, the island of New Orleans, and all of Louisiana above the mouth of the river Arkan- sas to the United States; but the first consul seemed as immov- able as ever in his views regarding Louisiana. Mr. Talleyrand said of him that he was entete (obstinate) with the project.
. This was a secret agreement, the article concerning which seems never to hav been made public.
" Writings of Thomas Jefferson; Ford.
t For the full text of these memorials, see American State Papers.
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The French expedition to Louisiana was still delayed, upon what grounds it was wholly a matter of conjecture, The interdic- tion at New Orleans was not removed, the shipments of the people of the western country, many of whom were not apprised of the interdiction, were practically confiscated, and again the forcible possession of New Orleans and the enforcement of the right to navigate the Mississippi were openly and seriously threatened. In February, 1803, Mr. Livingston wrote that the Louisiana expedition was "ice-bound." At this time Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney were instructed, in case a cession should be obtained from Spain, to secure "an enlargement of our right of deposit at New Orleans, the establishment of suitable deposits at the mouths of the rivers passing from the United States through the Floridas, as well as the free navigation of those rivers by citizens of the United States."
As before stated, Mr. Livingston was successful, as early: as December, 1802, in securing the attentive perusal of his memo- rials by Napoleon. This unofficial course was wholly agreeable to Mr. Livingston and to the Bonapartes. It committed neither, while informing both of the views of each other. If the august first consul was so wedded to the project of possessing and colonizing Louisiana, what did he find in the memorials of Mr. Livingston to interest him? The American used every argu- ment in his power to dissuade him from taking possession of the province. He showed that Great Britain was certain to capture the country during the first war between them. He stated emphatically that the United States would maintan at any cost their rights stipulated in the treaty of 1795 to the navi- gation of the Mississippi and to a port of deposit on that stream. Every feature of the situation was critically examined and turned to the disadvantage of France, should she take posses- sion of Louisiana. He argued for the cession of all of Louisiana above the mouth of the Arkansas to the United States, and explained how such a tract would serve as a protection to the French colonies below from British attacks down the Missis- sippi from Canada, and that the cession of this tract and West Florida would gain for France perpetual freedom of commerce on the Mississippi and its tributaries and the eternal friendship of the United States.
If the project of holding Louisiana was really dear to the heart of Napoleon, it follows that he naturally would want to learn everything in favor, and everything against, such reten- tion. The arguments of Mr. Livingston against the retention
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suggested to the alert mind of Napoleon the arguments in favor of it. Mr. Livingston, in speaking of the subject, wrote on February 18, 1803: "I can have a personal conference with him when I choose, having made arrangements for that pur- pose; but I defer it for two reasons: First, I have never yet had any specific instructions from you how to act or what to offer, and to meet merely to talk of the justice of our claims would be only to say ungracious truths and render a future con- ference more difficult ; and second, because it is one of the traits of his character when he has once fully avowed a sentiment not casily to change it. I have, therefore, thought it best to address myself officially to the minister, and unofficially to the only man supposed to have any sort of influence over him. I have accord- ingly put into his hands some notes containing plain truth mixed with that species of personal attention which I know to be most pleasing."*
In his memorials, Mr. Livingston further endeavored to show that France would gain little advantage from the possession of the colony ; that a successful attack by Great Britain could read- ily be made; that the loss of Louisiana meant also the loss of the French West Indies; that this conquest by Great Britain would give her the monopoly of the Gulf commerce; and that an alliance with the United States would avert such a misfor- tune. He then proposed the relinquishment to the United States of New Orleans and West Florida as far as the river Perdido and the territory lying west of the Mississippi and north of the mouth of the Arkansas. I've this cession, I intimated that the United States were willing to pay a considerable sum of money. Ile further said: "These propositions, with certain accompaniments, were well received, and were some days under the First Consul's consideration, when it was thought a better bargain might be made on the spot (at Washington )." It seems that the first consul thought that by sending General Berna- dotte to America to treat on the subject, he might obtain a bet- ter bargain than that offered by Mr. Livingston. In fact, the latter, not having been authorized, was unable to name the spe- cific sum of money which the United States was willing to pay. As Napoleon needed money badly, the statement of the situa- tion by Mr. Livingston had produced the desired effect, and the former was in a pliant and affable mood. It is not improb- able to suppose that had Mr. livingston, at this time, been fully
* Diplomatic Conespondeuce.
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equipped with authority, he might have succeeded in securing from France and Spain respectively, New Orleans, West Flor. ida, and ali of Louisiana north of the mouth of the Arkansas. He said, "My plan is much relished by the person through, whom it was proposed."*
lle continued on the same date: "I told you that Parma would be offered for the Floridas, and that General Bournonville was sent to negotiate the business. It was never doubted a moment here that it would be effected ; this I learned from Tal- leyrand and the Spanish ambassador. "They (intimated) that the treaty would be signed the day the King returned from Barcelona ; and their information accorded with that which Jord Whitworth had received. I learn now from the Spanish ambas- sador that the thing has met with some difficulty, as he says, not because of any aversion in the court to make the cession, but of some difference between the Prince of Peace ( Godoy) and General Bournonville. I believe, however, that this is not the sole cause; but that Spain begins to see that, in receiving Parma, she will receive nothing ; as it will be rendered subser- vient to another arrangement, as I hinted in my last. France is fully impressed with the nullity of her possession in Louisiana unless she has some port in the Gulf. .
I pre- sume that she will, ultimately, find some way to cut the gor- dian knot; and I cannot but sincerely wish that you may have availed yourselves of the pretence Spain has given you to take possession. It will be best to treat with the subject in our hands ; but, at all events, tell me wie to do if they st and go ian the hands of France." He also stated that the armament destined for Louisiana would be detained in Holland until the last of March, and therefore could not reach New Orleans until June, and added, "a precious interval, of which you may think it pru- dent to avail yourselves."t
On this date, February 2S. Mr. Livingston wrote that he had represented to the French minister of state the determination of the United States never to suffer their rights on the Missis- sippi to be impeded; but the minister had answered that the United States must consider the purchase of the country as out of the question, intimating that a sale was beneath the dignity of France.
When once Mr. Livingston had secured the attention of Bona-
. The person to whom he refers was undoubtedly Joseph Bonaparte.
t Diplomatic Correspondence.
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parte and his ministers, he argued that France, by ceding the territory asked for, would not only pay the debt due the United States, but would place the colony of Louisiana, should she con- clude to retain it, in a much better situation than it would other- wise be. He said : "The United States have at present but two possible causes of difference with France-the debt due to her citizens and the possession of Louisiana." If France could pos- sess Pensacola and the other ports to the east, she would com- mand the Gulf. If in addition she possessed the free naviga- tion of the Mississippi and the territory west of that river and south of the mouth of the Arkansas, she would have as large a colony as she would ever need for her surplus products and population. "Louisiana within these limits can support a popu- lation of fifteen millions of people." The United States spe- cially desired West Florida in order to gain the mouths of the rivers running through the southern part of their territory. The situation of New Orleans was very inferior; a much bet- ter one for a large city was on the opposite side of the river at Fort Leon ; the impending rupture between France and Great Britain would give the latter the occasion and the opportunity ' of attacking Louisiana; the possession of West Florida and of Louisiana above the Arkansas by the United States would place a barrier between Canada and Louisana and would take the edge off the British desire to wrest Louisana from France; the silence of the French government concerning the rights of the United States to the Mississippi and to an entrepot at New Orleans was causing intense uneasiness among the citizens of the United States; the act of the intendant at New Orleans was not justi- fied by any reasonable construction of the treaty of 1795; "the United States will rather hazard their very existence than suf- fer the Mississippi to be shut against them; when the United States made their first treaty with Great Britain in 1783, their ministers were instructed, anxious as all were for peace on alnost any terms, to sign no treaty without securing the free naviga- tion of the Mississippi."
In a letter dated February 27, 1803, Mr. Livingston made a direct and open appeal to the first consul. Ile reviewed all the existing differences between France and the United States, and disclosed the fact that "a spirit of resentment has been mani- fested from one end of the Union to the other, and nothing but the interposition of the Spanish minister, the disavowal of the act (of interdiction) by the governor of New Orleans, and the extreme solicitude of the United States to avoid everything
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that might have a tendency to interrupt the existing harmony could have prevented an immediate recurrence to arms." He said that "if nothing should be done before the season of American shipment of produce down the Mississippi arrived, "the government will be compelled to follow the impulse of the people. And added, "should the agents of France, who are to take possession of the colony, continue the regulations, in the face of the treaty, which they may find established b; the Spanish Intendant, a fatal blow will be struck at the future peace and harmony in both countries .. . As the moments are precious, and the United States will suffer extremely in their commerce, if the officers of France, who are directed to take possession, should not be explicitly instructed to respect the right of navigation and depot claimed by the United States, I must camestly solicit some treaty, explanatory of the terms on which France has received the cession of Louisiana from Spain and recognizing the rights of the United States."
It was evident that, at this time, France was jealous of the amity existing between Great Britain and the Atlantic states; and that she entertained the belief that the possession of Louisi- ana and the control of the Mississippi were the keys by which the attachment of the western people to France might be secured and their separation from the states to the cast might in the end be effected. Could the western people be drawn from the Union to the side and assistance of France, the trade of the Nhs- sissippi and hence the commercial supremacy of the Gulf, the great desideratum, would be the undoubted result of such a coalition. It was, therefore, the policy of France to develop this sentiment in the western people with the hope and possi- bly the expectation, that such a proposition, after her armament had arrived in New Orleans and taken possession, would tempt the western people to effect such a separation from the Atlantic states and such a union with French Louisiana.
The arguments and the diplomacy of Mr. Livingston did not blind Napoleon as to the true value of Louisiana to the grow- ing and ambitious French republic. He knew that the posses- sion of Louisiana and the Floridas, could they be held against other nations generally and Great Britain in particular, meant the absolute control of the commerce of the Mississippi and of the Gulf. Pamphlets were circulated in France declaring the province of Louisiana to be almost a paradise .* The possibili-
. The arguments of Mr Livingston against the value of Louisiana, could not have had much weight with Napoleon.
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ties of immense future advantage to France by holding the Louisiana country were freely discussed throughout the repub- lic, and found no lack of expounders and supporters among that imaginative people. But Napoleon realized that without the Floridas, the navigation of the Mississippi could not be controlled by France. For this reason the consular government struggled to add them to the French possessions. . Every inducement within the power of France was held attractively before the eyes of Spain ; and there can be no doubt that, in the end, their pos- session would have passed to the French republic. The order of interdiction at New Orleans was made at the instigation of France, and was intended to test the temper of the western people. A large force of French troops at New Orleans, it was thought, would prevent any serious movement to open forcibly the Mississippi to western trade, wouldl check the threatened advance of Great Britain upon New Orleans, and would result in great advantage to French commerce and prestige.
In all of this maneuvering for power, the wants, wishes and welfare of Spain were apparently wholly disregarded by the French republic. Louisiana, "agrecably to promise," was relin- quished upon the mere asking. There was no doubt in the mind of Napoleon that the two Floridas would be secured by pur- chase. But the United States, unaware of the exact relations which chained Spain to France, instructed Mr. Pinckney to pur- chase the two Floridas from the former. In accordance with these instructions, Mr. Pinckney wrote as follows to the Spanish minister of state:
"I had the honor yesterday, to state to your excellency the anxiety of our government on the subject of possessing the ter- ritory on the east side of the Mississippi. The importance of this acquisition to them, for the purpose of securing to the citi- zens of one half of the United States the certain means of exporting their products has been so fully explained to your excellency in my letter written in March last and in subsequent conversations, that I need not at this time go again into the subject. Referring your excellency to them, .I have now to say that the government of the United States, from many circum- stances, as well as from the conduct of the intendant, feel them- selves every day more convinced of the necessity of their hav- ing a permanent establishment on the Mississippi, convenient for the purposes of navigation and belonging solely to them. To obtain this they have authorized me to say that, should his Majesty be now inclined to sell to the United States his pos-
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sessions on the east side of the Mississippi, or between that as I the river Mobile, agreeably to the propositions enclosed, i. United States will make to his Majesty, and I do now in the.r nanie make, the important offer of guarantying to him and 1 ... successors his dominions beyond the Mississippi. It is with 1 .: Majesty and his ministers to consider, for the reasons 1 ha i the honor to state in our conversation of the last evening. ille immense importance of this offer to the Spanish crown, and to reflect how far it may be in the power of any other nation to make an offer so truly valuable and precious as this is to Spain --.. one that the United States would never have made, but from a conviction of the indispensable necessity of their possessing a suitable establishment on this river and which this territory can alone furnish."
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