USA > Louisiana > The province and the states, a history of the province of Louisiana under France and Spain, and of the territories and states of the United States formed therefrom, Vol. II > Part 13
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The propositions to which he referred in this communication were as follows:
"I. The United States will purchase the possessions of his Catholic Majesty on the east side of the river Mississippi, for which they will pay - dollars .*
"2. They will purchase these possessions, for which they will pay -- dollars; and, moreover, guaranty to his Majesty and his successors his possessions beyond the Mississippi.
"3. They will purchase the country between the rivers Mis- sissippi and Mobile, belonging to his Majesty, and, also, places of deposite near the mouths of the other rivers passing from their territory into that of his Catholic Majesty, for which they will pay - -- dollars, or enter into other obligations, which may be thought equivalent to the acquirement.
"4. If none of these propositions can be acceded to, they will then purchase certain tracts of country on the banks of the Mis- sissippi and the other rivers passing from their territory into that of his Catholic Majesty, for which they will pay -- dollars, or enter into other obligations which may be thought equivalent to the acquirement."t
It is not improbable that, had not the government of France at that very date and for many years before been making every effort to secure the cession of the Floridas and been employ- ing much stronger inducements and making much more allur- ing offers, the king of Spain would have been pleased to grant to the United States, in accordance with this plea, a sufficient
. This sum was a maximum of $10,000,000.
t American State Papers.
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concession to have satisfied them. While it was known to the American minister that France desired the Floridas, he knew little of the intense pressure directed at the court of Spain by the first consul and designed to accomplish that object. But the offer of France was so much better than that of the United States, and the enmity of France was so much more to be dreaded by Spain, that the propositions of Mr. Pinckney, indefinite as they necessarily had to be, possessed no special nor superior attractions and were accordingly rejected. The following was the reply of Don Pedro Cervallos, secretary of state of Spain, April 7, 1802, to the above propositions of Mr. Pinckney :
"Sir :- I have communicated to his Majesty the propositions which your excellency made in the name of your government, in your official letter of the 24th of March last, respecting the cession of the two Floridas to the United States of America, by sale. His Majesty having been made well acquainted with everything advanced by your excellency in support of that idea, has commanded me to inform you, in reply, that his Majesty rejoices in every opportunity of strengthening the bonds of friendship with the United States of America, but that the sub- ject in question being one of the utmost weight and importance, merits great circumspection before it can be determined. With regard to the request made by you in the same official letter that a mercantile agent of the United States should be permitted to reside at New Orleans, his Majesty does not accede to it, as it is prohibited by our laws of the Indies; and from the just consideration that, by making one example of that kind, the door would be opened for like demands on the part of other nattens.".
This letter was regarded by Mr. Pinckney as a diplomatic rejection of his propositions; but as a matter of fact it may not have been so intended by the government of Spain. It seems more like a postponement of the American propositions. Spain was between two fires -- those of France and the United States. The possession of Louisiana by France meant the termination in that province of her colonial policy of exclusion, and hence the idea of retaining the Floridas lost much of its glitter. Should she for any reason not cede them to France, there was noth- ing to prevent her from transferring them to the United States for a satisfactory consideration. She therefore temporized with the American propositions until the demands of France had been disposed of.
· Diplomatic Correspondence.
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In a communication dated March 2, 1803, the American sec- retary of state submitted a plan to the special envoys of the United States at Paris, Messrs. Livingston and Monroe, for the adjustment of the difficulties between the two countries. The following was the plan in full :*
"Article I. France cedes to the United States forever the ter- ritory east of the river Mississippi, comprehending the two Flor- idas, the island of New Orleans, and the islands lying to the north and east of that channel of the said river which is com- monly called the South Pass, together with all such other islands as appertain to either West or Fast Florida; France reserving to herself all her territory on the west side of the Mississippi.
"Article 11. The boundary between the territory ceded and reserved by France, shall be a continuation of that already defined above the thirty-first degree of north latitude, viz: the middle of the channel or bed of the river through the said South Pass to the sea. The navigation of the river Mississippi in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean, and in all its passages to and from the same shall be equally free and common to citizens of the United States and of the French republic.
"Article III. The vessels and citizens of the French repub- lic may exercise commerce to and at such places on their respect- ive shores below the said thirty-first degree of north latitude as may be allowed for that use by the parties to their respective citizens and vessels. And it is agreed that no other nation shall be allowed to exercise commerce to or at the same or any other place on either shore below the said thirty-first degree of latitude. For the term of ten years, to be computed from the exchange of the ratifications hereof, the citizens, vessels and merchandise of the United States and of France shall be sub- ject to no other duties on their respective shores below the said thirty-first degree of latitude, than are imposed on their own citizens, vessels, and merchandises. No duty whatever shall, after the expiration of ten years, be laid on articles the growth or manufacture of the United States, or of the ceded territory, exported through the Mississippi in French vessels; so long as such articles so exported in vessels of the United States shall be exempt from duty; nor shall French vessels exporting such articles even afterward be subject to pay a higher duty than vessels of the United States.
"Article IV. The citizens of France may, for the term of ten
* American State Papers.
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years, deposit their effects at New Orleans and at such other places on the ceded shore of the Mississippi, as are allowed for the commerce of the United States, without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of stores.
"Article V. In the ports and commerce of West and East Florida, France shall never be on a worse footing that the most favored nation ; and for the term of ten years her vessels and merchandise shall be subject therein to no higher duties than are paid by those of the United States. Articles of the growth or manufacture of the United States and of the ceded territory, exported in French vessels from any port in the West or Fast Florida, shall be exempt from duty as long as vessels of the United States shall enjoy this exemption.
"Article VI. The United States, in consideration of the ces- sion of territory made by this treaty, shall pay to France --- millions of livres tournois, in the manner following, viz: They shall pay - millions of livres tournois immediately on the exchange of the ratifications hereof ; they shall assume in such order of priority as the Government of the United States may approve the payment of claims which have been or may be acknowledged by the French republic to be due to American citi- zens, or so much thereof as, with the payment to be made on the exchange of ratifications, will not exceed the sum of -; and in case a balance should remain due after such payment and assumption, the same shall be paid at the end of one year from the final liquidation of the claim hereby assumed, which shall be pay- able in three equal annual payments, the first of which is to take place one year after the exchange of ratificati as, or they shall bear interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date. of such intended payments until they shall be discharged. All the above mentioned payments shall be made at the treasury of the United States and at the rate of one dollar and ten cents for every six livres tournois.
"Article VII. To incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the United States on an equal footing, being a provision which cannot now be made, it is to be expected, from the character and policy of the United States, that such incorporation will take place without unnecessary delay. In the meantime they shall be secure in their persons and prop- erty and in the free enjoyment of their religion."
Subjoined to this proposition were elaborate explanatory notes, presenting the reason for every provision from the standpoint of the United States. Much was left to the judgment and
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discretion of the envoys. An interesting feature was the .... parative estimate placed upon the value of different portions o; the territory. The two Floridas were estimated at one-fourth the value of the whole island of New Orleans; and East Fl ... ida at one-half the value of West Florida. The envoys were instructed to evade, if possible, any and every stipulation con- cerning guaranties of territory to France. If the cession of the Floridas could not be obtained, they were instructed to secure. in any event, the rights of deposit and of navigation. They were also required to effect some arrangement that would in future obviate a repetition of such an unauthorized act as the interdiction of the deposits at New Orleans by a subordinate official.
On February 19, 1803, M. Talleyrand returned the following reply to the many memorials of Mr. Livingston regarding Louisiana. The pretended transfer of the whole subject to the United States was evidently a maneuver on the part of France to postpone a definite answer as long as possible: "The First Consul, always appreciating the motives which have induced you to insist on an explanation of the new relations which ought to exist between the two republics, has charged me to inforin you that, aware of the solicitude, perhaps premature, but in reality natural and plausible, which the United States have manifested in this discussion, has come to the determination to send immediately to the United States a minister plenipotentiary, who will communicate on every point the information necessary to a final decision."> One reason why Finance desired if 's was disclosed in Mr. Livingston's note of March 12, when he said : "With respect to a negotiation for Louisiana, I think nothing will be effected here. I have done everything I can through the Spanish ambassador to obstruct the bargain for the Floridas, and I have great hope that it will not be soon con- cluded. The ambassador tells me that the Consul often com- plains to him of the delay that business meets with; and while Spain keeps the Floridas, Louisiana will be considered here as an object of little moment, as they are absolutely without ports on the Gulf. Mr. Madison has never told me whether he has received two little essays, calculated the one to raise our importance in the views of this government as a naval power and the other to disgust them with Louisiana, preparatory to our future negotiations. They were both read with consider-
. Diplomatic Conespoudence.
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able attention by the First Consul, having had them translated for that purpose." It thus was known to France that the pos- session of Louisiana without the Floridas would give them a power barren of the immense results they confidently and rightly conjectured would follow their additional occupancy of the Flor- idas. This was the principal reason why they wished to delay giving a definite answer to the United States; and in the mean- time they crowded forward their negotiations with Spain for the Floridas.
But the French subterfuge to effect delay did not disconcert nor deceive Mr. Livingston, who continued his notes and memo- rials to the French minister and the first consul. He said on March 18: "You will see that, on the subject of New Orleans, the answer to my letter is very unsatisfactory. I at first intended to let the matter rest till Mr. Monroe arrived; but on reflection I dreaded the consequences of delay if France should take possession and continne the policy of Spain; and as the moment was critical and the time of Mr. Monroe's arrival uncertain, I sent in the enclosed note, and am doing all that I can to get a speedy and favorable answer." The "enclosed note" referred to was the strongest and severest ever sent in by Mr. Livingston. He had grown tired of the evasions and procras- tinations, and made up his mind to press matters to a finality, if possible, before the arrival of Mr. Monroc. He said :*
"The First Consul has done me the honor through you to inform me that he proposes to send a minister to the United States, to acquire such information as he may deem necessary previous to his taking any nka ares idative to the station in which the acquisition of Louisiana will place France with respect to the United States. If, sir, the question related to the formation of a new treaty, I should find no objection to this measure. On the contrary, I should readily acquiesce in it, as that which would be best calculated to render the treaty mutually advantageous. But, sir, it is not a new treaty for which we now press, (though one mutually advantageous might be made, ) but the recognition of an old one, by which the United States have acquired rights that no change in the circumstances of the country obliges them to relinquish, and which they never will relinquish but with their political existence. By their treaty with Spain their right to the navigation of the Missis- sippi is recognized and a right of depot granted with a provis-
*American State Papers.
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ion on the part of the King of Spain to revoke this riel : within three years he found it prejudicial to his interests. which case he is to assign another equivalent establish .. ... The King of Spain has never revoked that right; but after !.: ing made the experiment of its effects upon his interests ; . three years he has continued it. The United States have, ! this continuance, acquired a permanent and irrevocable Til. to a depot at New Orleans; nor can that right now be cali ! in question, either by Spain or by any other nation to whoc; she may transfer her title. Even the assignment of anoth : equivalent establishment cannot at this day be forced upon this United States without their consent. The time allowed to Spain has passed, and she has preferred to have the depot at New Orleans to placing it elsewhere; and I will venture to say that in so doing she has acted wisely. For New Orleans derives its whole valne from its being the market for American produce and their principal port of entry; and if this consideration' was important to Spain it is infinitely more so to France, the produce of whose agriculture and manufactures will find a ready exchange for the raw material of the United States. Under these cir- cumstances, at the very moment that Spain is about to relinquish the possession of that country to France, she violates her treaty without any apparent interest, and leaves the country with a stain upon her character."
This sententious summary was followed by a vivid picture of the situation of the western people, with the alternative before them of having their crops ant on their bank mot havet them confiscated at New Orleans. The fact was forably called to the attention of France that it was with the greatest difficulty that the western people had been restrained by the government of the United States from forcibly maintaining their rights on the Mississippi. The minister ended with a powerful appeal to the first consul for an immediate admission of the rights of the United States on the Mississippi as stipulated in the treaty of 1795. According to Mr. Livingston, the appointment of Mr. Monroe as a special envoy was employed by France as a pre- text to delay still longer a definite answer to his notes. Ile said on March 24, "The French minister told me that an answer was prepared (to Mr. Livingston's notes), and that everything should be arranged ; and I have no doubt the answer contained all those assurances which I have been so long soliciting. Unfortu- nately, dispatches arrived at that moment from Mr. Pichon, informing them that the appointment of Mr. Monroe had tran-
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quilized everything. Conceiving then that they might safely wait his arrival, they determined to see whether the storm would not blow over, in which case they will treat to more advantage. They accordingly substituted for the first note, which as the min- ister told me arranged everything, the enclosed note which con- tains nothing." He added on the same date, "Florida is not yet ceded, nor as I hope very likely to be so. The armament in Hol- land, designed for Louisiana, is stopped for the present in conse- quence of the state of things here."
Late in March and early in April Mr. Livingston sent many strong notes, essays and letters to M. Talleyrand, even at the risk of becoming importunate, urging the consideration and settlement of the Lonisiana questions ; and seemed to think, in his letter dated April 11, that he had gained ground with all except the first consul. As a matter of fact, he had, on the contrary, yet unknown to himself, gained ground with the first consul, but not with the French statesmen generally. He wrote, "I endeavored to convince the Government that the United States would avail them- selves of the breach of the treaty (of 1795) to possess themselves of New Orleans and the Floridas; that Great Britain would never suffer Spain to grant the Floridas to France, even were she so disposed, but would immediately seize upon them as soon as the transfer was made; that, without the Floridas, Louisiana would be indefensible, as it possesses not one port even for frigates ; and I showed the effect of suffering that important coun- try to fall into the hands of the British, both as it affected our country and the naval force of all Europe. These reasons, with the probability of war (between France and Great Britain), have had, I trust, the desired effect.">
During the last half of March and the first half of April, 1803, both France and Great Britain continued active preparations for war, and at the same time their respective ministers, in perfunc- tory communications, endeavored to stay the approaching storm. The means of attack and defense were closely studied, and the weaknesses of each were, so far as possible, strengthened or wholly discarded. It was manifest to Bonaparte that the unquestionable superiority of the English navy placed all of the French colonial possessions in the severest jeopardy and rendered their loss to France an almost certain result of the war. It was clear that to hold Louisiana against the prowess of the English arms, meant the despatch to New Orleans of a much larger armament than was originally intended and a corresponding weakening of the
* American State Papers. .
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French continental battalions. While the relinquishment of Louisiana was to be sincerely regretted, no other reasonable cour.c seemed open to France. If the province were returned to Spain little or no ready money would be realized. Its retention by France meant its almost certain reduction and conquest by Great Britain. There was no other course: It must be sold at once to the United States for as high a price as possible. This was unquestionably the conclusion of Bonaparte and the logic of the intricate and perilous situation. It is reasonable to conclude therefore, that, if the prospect of inevitable war with England was the cause of Bonaparte's decision to sell Louisiana to the United States, the arguments and importunities of Mr. Livingston disclosed the opportunity of disposing of it, before it was too late, to the pecuniary advantage of France at a time when money was of the first importance and delay was extremely dangerous.
It was seen by Bonaparte that when the war should once begin, the United States, unless their claims under the treaty of 1795 were acknowledged by France, would no doubt take advantage of the opportunity to occupy New Orleans and the Floridas. The western people, in fact, were on the point of taking such a course at that moment regardless of the probable European war or the protests of their goverment. Many of them thought that the occupancy by France meant the extinguishment of their rights on the Mississippi, and would be ouly too glad of the chance to take the country at small cost while France was engaged elsewhere. Unless the claims of the United States were speedily aclnow !- edged, war with Great Britain meant was also with the United States, and therefore the certain loss of Louisiana, probably to the latter. But the acknowledgment of the claims of the United States, and the failure to secure the Floridas from Spain, would render the possession of Louisiana by France barren of the important and immensely valuable results expected in the future. Spain would not willingly surrender the Floridas; the United States would in any event fight for their rights of navigation and deposit. The only reasonable course left to France therefore was to sell Louisiana to the United States.
But Bonaparte did not sell Louisiana until after all hope of peace with Great Britain had been abandoned. It is doubtful whether he came to the undeviating conclusion to sell it much before the date of actual sale. Prizing it as he did and build- ing high and gilded hopes on it for the future, he delayed enter- taining the thought of sale until circumstances indicated the wisdom, if not the necessity, of its immediate relinquishment. Ile
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then met with a storm of protest from nearly all around him, even from his two brothers, Joseph and Lucien. But when once his course was clear and his mind made up, he brooked no inter- ference and listened patiently to no remonstrance even from his brothers. It is idle to invest him, as some writers do, with super- natural qualities. He was an ambitious, selfish, egotistical, dom- inant, alert and brilliant man, broad of comprehension, unerring in the power to blend forces for the accomplishment of an object, and endowed with a will and personality that commanded obedi- ence, if not homage. He made up his mind only upon strong evidences, and tenaciously clung to his conclusions, knowing their accuracy and their cost in mental acumen. But when a conclu- sion was proved to be wrong, or for any sufficient reason unten- able, the mental penetration that enabled him to see his error, also pointed out to his judgment the means for its correction. It was thus that, although Louisiana was dear to his heart, he made up his mind to abandon it at the moment he saw the unwisdom of its retention. That moment arrived when he abandoned the last
hope of peace. The transfer was made so speedily that the American envoys were still dazed and astonished for days after the treaty was signed. It was Napoleon's way-a profound yet impetuous decisiveness that won him all his battles and his conse- quent imperishable fame.
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CHAPTER IV
The Interdiction of the Deposits, 1802
A FTER the danger of war with Spain in 1797 had blown over, and the Spanish troops had evacuated Chickasaw Bluffs, Walnut Hills and Natchez, and the survey of the thirty-first parallel had settled all trouble in that quarter, the intercourse between the French and Spanish inhabitant of Louisiana and West Florida and the Americans from "up the river" grew pleasant, great in extent and mutually profitable. The liberal stipulations contained in the treaty of 1795, granting the United States a place of deposit for produce and goods in New Orleans, were faithfully carried out by the Spanish authorities. Under this desirable order of affairs, the trade of New Orleans grew to an enormous extent considering the sparcity of inhabitants, and the Ohio valley quadrupled in population and prosperity. Flow, non products, grain, pork, beef, tobacco, cotton, etc., found tengo raty logement in New Orleans before being sent to every quarter of the globe. The enterprising Anglo-Saxon from "up the river" so conducted his commercial transactions that he soon managed practically to command the entire trade of that already famous port. What he of the river did not succeed in securing, was largely monopolized by the American vessels passing between New Orleans and the cities of the Atlantic coast-Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, etc.
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