USA > Louisiana > The province and the states, a history of the province of Louisiana under France and Spain, and of the territories and states of the United States formed therefrom, Vol. II > Part 18
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The earliest premonitions of the important changes to come were first observed by Mr. Livingston on April 11, and presented in his letter of that date to Mr. Madison. He said, "The affair of New Orleans gave me two very important strings to touch : I endeavored to convince the government that the United States would avail themselves of the breach of the treats to possess them. selves of New Orleans and the Floridas; that Britain would never suffer Spain to grant the Floridas to France, even were she so disposed, but would immediately seize upon them as soon as the transfer was made; that without the Floridas Louisiana would be indefensible, as it possesses not one port even for frigates ; and I showed the effect of suffering that important country to fall into the hands of the British, both as it affected our country and the naval force of all Europe. These reasons, with the probability of war, have had, I trust, the desired effect. M. Talleyrand asked me this day, when pressing the subject, whether we wished to have the whole of Louisiana. I told him no; that our wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas ; that the policy of
. Meinoirs of Lord Whitworth.
1 American State Papers.
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France, however, should dictate (as I have shown in an official note) to give us the country above the river Arkansas, in order to place a barrier between them and Canada. He said that if they gave New Orleans the rest would be of little value ; and that he would wish to know 'what we would give for the whole.' I told him it was a subject I had not thought of; but that I sup- posed we should not object to twenty millions (livres), provided our citizens were paid. Ile told me that this was too low an offer, and that he would be glad if I would reflect upon it and tell him tomorrow. I told him that, as Mr. Monroe would be in town in two days, I would delay my further offer until I had the pleasure of introducing him. He said that he did not speak from author- ity, but that the idea had struck him. I have reason, however, to think that this resolution was taken in council on Saturday. On Friday I received Mr. Ross's motion (made in the United States Senate for the adoption of his resolutions: see elsewhere) : I immediately sent it to M. Talleyrand, with an informal note expressive of my fears that it would be carried into effect ; and requesting that General Bernadotte (minister to be sent to Amer- ica) might not go till something effectual was done. I also trans- lated it, and gave it to General Bernadotte, and pressed upon him the necessity of asking express instructions, in case he should find the island (of New Orleans ) in possession of the Americans. He went immediately to Joseph Bonaparte. These I believe were exciting causes to the train we are now in, and which I flatter myself we shall be able on the arrival of Mr. Monroe to pursue to effect. I think from every appearance that war is very near at hand ; and under these circumstances I have endeavoted to impress the Government that not a moment should be lost lest Britain should anticipate us. I have used every exertion with the Span- ish ambassador and Lord Whitworth to prevent the transfer of the Floridas; and wrote to Mr. Graham (at Madrid) in Mr. Pinckney's absence, to give every attention to that object, and to avail himself of the coolness which subsisted between the French ambassador and the Prince of Peace (Godoy). This has retarded the negotiation ; and unless they get Florida, I have convinced them Louisiana is worth little. I would rather have confined our views to smaller objects ; and I think that if we succeed, it would be good policy to exchange the west bank of the Mississippi with Spain for the Floridas, reserving New Orleans. Perhaps, how- ever, I am too sanguine in my expectations: we will not, there- fore, dispose of the skin till we have killed the bear."
ยท American State Papers.
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From this extract it will be seen how little Mr. Livingston com- prehended what was at that moment transpiring between the French leaders. But no one could have forecast coming events. although they cast their shadows before. He seemed in his lui- ter of April IT to think that his efforts were succeeding, and that he was instrumental in retarding the negotiations at Madrid for the cession of the Floridas to France between the French ambas- sador and Godoy. Notwithstanding that Talleyrand broached the subject of the sale of all of Louisiana, Mr. Livingston did not see, had no way of seeing, that its sale was practically tendered. He had been instructed at the outset to use every endeavor to prevent the transfer of Louisiana to France ; and after the trans- fer was known to have been made had employed all his powers to induce France to relinquish the province ; and when he found that object out of the question had sought with arguments and threats, under limited authority, to gain the recognition of substantial advantages for America. Consequently, when Talleyrand asked him if he wished the whole of Louisiana, he, nor dreaming what was coming, answered "no," because the worthlessness of Louisiana without the Floridas had been the burden of his own arguments, and it would appear like stultification to show an eagerness, under the circumstances, to possess the whole province. It is no doubt true that the resolutions of Mr. Ross in the United States senate, when presented to the French government with the views of Mr. Livingston that they were likely to be carried into effect and possession be taken of New Orleans by the Americans, had much to do in hastening the negotiations of cession.
The United States, from the moment it was learned that France had secured Louisiana, was intensely opposed to the transfer, and this feeling grew in strength as time passed and the rapacity and power of Napoleon were developed. The government soon realized that war with France would almost certainly result from the transfer, owing to Napoleon's policy of hostility to every resistance to this ambition for dominion. The French govern- ment was told of this sentiment in the United States. It was also informed at divers times and in various ways that the United States would try to maintain, peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary, their rights on the Mississippi as stipulated in the Span- ish treaty of 1795. Every effort was made by Mr. Livingston to secure from the French government an acknowledgment of the rights of the United States on the Mississippi, but without avail. Any commitment on that question was rigidly avoided by France. Unquestionably, Napoleon, who expected until the last moment
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to take possession of Louisiana and make it a powerful colony, did not care to handicap his future arrangements and policy in America with any questionable or unnecessary promises to the United States. As his policy would most certainly have been to close the Mississippi against the United States, and as the United States would never have surrendered that right but "with their political existence," as Mr. Livingston informed the French min- ister of state, the result would undoubtedly have been war. Of course Napoleon realized that the United States alone would
prove no mean antagonist, and he was further well aware that in case of such a war Great Britain and the United States would join hands against him. Therefore, as he came to see that war with Great Britain was inevitable, he likewise realized that the United States would not hesitate, while all the strength of France was engaged to crush or hold in check her ancient enemy, to take possession of the mouth of the Mississippi, with force if necessary. It was not necessary to tell Napoleon that this could easily be done by the United States, although such a finality was laid before him. Owing, then, to the certainty of losing Louisiana to the United States in case of a war with Great Britain, and to the inevitableness of such a war, his only course was to get rid of Louisiana before the commencement of hostilities. He could return it to Spain, or could sell it to the United States. There would be no immediate gain by returning it to Spain ; he could secure immediately from the United States a goodly sunt. Hence his determination to sell.
The United States, not knowing of the state of the negotia- tions at Paris, instructed Messes. Livingston and Slotte On April 18, 1803, to press the French government for a settlement of rights and claims. They were instructed that "If the French Government, instead of friendly arrangements or views, should be found to meditate hostilities, or to have formed projects which will constrain the United States to resort to hostilities, such com- munications are then to be held with the British Government as will sound its dispositions and invite its concurrence in the war. Your own prudence will suggest that the communications be so made, as, on one hand, not to precipitate France into hostile operations, and, on the other, not to lead Great Britain from the supposition that war depends on the choice of the United States, and that their choice of war will depend on her participation in it. If war is to be the result, it is manifestly desirable that it he delayed until the certainty of this result can be known, and the legislative and other provisions can be made here; and also of
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great importance that the certainty should not be known to Gre; Britain, who might take advantage of the posture of thing, t press on the United States disagreeable conditions of her enteim. into the war. Notwithstanding the just repugnance ci this country to a coalition of any sort with the belligerent politic. of Europe, the advantages to be derived from the co-operation of Great Britain in a war of the United States at this period against France and her allies, are too obvious and too important to be renounced. The price which she may attach to lier co-operation cannot be foreseen, and therefore cannot be the sub- ject of full and precise instructions. It may be expected that she will insist at least on a stipulation that neither of the parties shall make peace or truce without the consent of the other ; and as sucli an article cannot be deemed unreasonable and will secure ns against the possibility of her being detached in the course of the war by seducing overtures from France, it will not be proper to raise difficulties on that account. It may be useful, however, to draw from her a definition as far as the case will admit of the objects contemplated by her that whenever with ours they may be attainable by peace, she may be duly pressed to listen to it. On another point, it may be answered at once that Great Britain shall enjoy a free trade with all the ports to be acquired by the United States on the terms allowed to the most favored nations in the ports generally of the United States. If made an essential condition, you may admit that in the ports to be acquired within the Mississippi, the trade of her subjects shall be on the same footing for a term of about ten years with that of our own citizens. The anxiety which Great Britain has shown to extend her dominion to the Mississippi, the uncertain extent of her claims from north to south beyond the western limits of the United States, and the attention she has paid to the northwest coast of America, make it probable that she will connect with a war on this occasion a pretension to the acquisition of the country on the west side of the Mississippi, understood to be ceded by Spain to France, or at least of that portion of it lying between that river and the Missouri. The evils involved in such an extension of her possessions in our neighborhood and in such a hold on the Mississippi, are obvious. The acquisition is the more objection- able as it would be extremely displeasing to our western citizens, and as its evident bearing on South America might be expected to arouse all the jealousies of France and Spain, and to prolong the war on which the event would depend. Should this preten- sion, therefore, be pressed, it must be resisted as altogether
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repugnant to the sentiments and to the sound policy of the United States. . A separate letter to you is enclosed, authoriz- ing you to enter into such communications and conferences with British ministers as may possibly be required by the conduct of France. The letter is made a separate one, that it may be used with the effect but without the formality of a commission. It is hoped that sound calculations of interest as well as a sense of right in the French Government, will prevent the necessity of using the authority expressed in this letter. . If France sltonld . avow or evince a determination to deny to the United States the free navigation of the Mississippi, your consultations with Great- Britam may be held on the ground that war is inevitable. Should the navigation not be disputed and the deposits alone be denied, it will be prudent to adapt your consultations to the possibility that congress may distinguish between the two cases and make a question how far the latter right may call for an instant resort to arms, or how far a procrastination of that remedy may be sug- gested and justified by the prospect of a more favorable con- juncture. These instructions have thus far supposed that Great Britain and France are at peace and that neither of them intend at present to interrupt it."*
Thus it will be seen that the United States, whether they were joined by Great Britain or not, intended to conduct war if neces- sary against France, to gain the rights claimed on the Mississippi. Of course, an active alliance with Great Britain, if it could be secured without too severe a sacrifice, was a result earnestly to be desired. Should war commence between France and England, the United States could no doubt either jeeen an active ambiance with the latter or secure valuable concessions on the Mississippi, upon liberal terms, from the former. War between France and England, it was seen, could not result otherwise than to the vasi advantage of the United States. But the international compli- cations which had been heating with such intensity for so many months, were now almost ready to boil over. The crisis was reached, as is shown by the following letters to the state depart- ment from Mr. Livingston :
"Paris, April 13, 1803. midnight.
"I have just come from the Minister of the Treasury. Our conversation was so important, that I think it necessary to write it, while the impressions are strong upon my mind ; and the rather,
* American State Papers.
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as I fear that I shall not have the time to copy and send this k :. ter, if I defer it till morning.
"By my letter of yesterday, you learned that the minister ask. I me whether I would agree to purchase Louisiana, &c. ; on the 12d .. I called upon him to press this matter further. He then thougi .: proper to declare that his proposition was only personal, but st ... requested me to make an offer ; and, upon my declining to do so. as I expected Mr. Monroe the next day, he shrugged up hi- shoulders, and changed the conversation. Not willing, however. to lose sight of it, I told him I had been long endeavoring to bring him to some point; but, unfortunately, without effect: that ] wished merely to have the negotiation opened by any proposition on his part; and, with that view, had written him a note which contained that request, grounded upon my apprehension of the consequence of sending out General Bernadotte without enabling him to say a treaty was begun. He told me he would answer my note, but that he must do it evasively, because Louisiana wa's not theirs. I smiled at this assertion, and told him that I had seen the treaty recognizing it; that I knew the Consul had appointed officers to govern the country ; and that he had himself told me that General Victor was to take possession ; that, in a note written by the express order of the First Consul, he had told me that General Bernadotte was to treat relative to it in the United States, &c. He still persisted that they had it in contemplation to obtain it, but had it not. I told him that I was very well pleased to understand this from him, because, if so, we should not commit ourselves with them in taking it from Spain, to whom. by his account, is still belonged ; and thea, as we had just cause of com- 'plaint against her, if Mr. Monroe concurred in opinion with me, we should negotiate no further on the subject, but advise our Government to take possession. He seemed alarmed at the bold- ness of the measure, and told me he would answer my note, but that it would be evasively. I told him I should receive with pleasure any communication from him, but that we were not dis- posed to trifle ; that the times were critical, and though I did not know what instructions Mr. Monroe might bring, I was perfectly satisfied that they would require a precise and prompt notice; that I was very fearful, from the little progress I had made, that my Government would consider me as a very indolent negotiator. He laughed, and told me that he would give me a certificate that I was the most importimate he had yet met with.
"There was something so extraordinary in all this, that I did not detail it to you till I found some clue to the labyrinth, which
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I have done, as you will find before I finish this letter; and the rather, as I was almost certain that I could rely upon the intelli- gence I had received of the resolution to dispose of this country. "This day Mr. Monroe passed with me in examining my papers ; and while he and several others were at dinner with me, I observed the Minister of the Treasury ( Marbois) walking in my garden. I sent out Colonel Livingston to him ; he told him he would return when we had dined. While we were taking coffee he came in ; and, after being some time in the room, we strolled into the next room, when he told me he heard that I had been at his house two days before, when he was at St. Cloud ; that he thought I might have something particular to say to him, and had taken the first opportunity to call on me. I saw that this was meant as an open- ing to one of those free conversations which I had frequently had with him. I accordingly began on the subject of the debt, and related to him the extraordinary conduct of the minister, &c. He told me that this led to something important, that had been curi- ously mentioned to him at St. Cloud ; but, as my house was full of company, he thought I had better call upon him any time before eleven that night. He went away, and a little after, when Mr. Monroe took leave, I followed him. He told me that he wished me to repeat what I had said relative to M. Talleyrand's request- ing a proposition from me as to the purchase of Louisiana. ] did so; and concluded with the extreme absurdity of his evasions of that day, and stated the consequence of any delay on this sub- ject, as it would enable Britain to take possession, who would readily relinquish it to us. He said that this proceeded upon a supposition of her making so successind a war as to be qualled to retain her conquests. I told him that it was probable that the same idea might suggest itself to the United States; in which case, it would be their interest to contribute to render her successful; and I asked whether it was prudent to throw us into her scale? This led to long discussions of no moment to repeat. We re- turned to the point : he said, that what I had told him led him to think that what the Consul had said to him on Sunday, at St. Cloud, (the day on which, as I told him, the determination had been taken to sell,) had more of earnest than he thought at the time; that the Consul had asked him what news from England? As he knew he read the papers attentively, he told him that he had seen in the London papers the proposition for raising fifty thou- sand men to tale New Orleans. The. Consul said he had seen it too, and had also seen that something was said about two millions of dollars being disposed among the people about him, to bribe
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them, &c. ; and then left him. That afterwards, when walking in the garden, the Consul came again to him, and spoke to him abusi the troubles that were excited in America, and inquired how far I was satisfied with his last note. Here some civil things were introduced, for which I presume I am more indebted to the min- ister's politeness than to his veracity; so let them sleep. He ( Marbois) then took occasion to mention his sorrow that any cause of difference should exist between our countries. The Con- sul told him, in reply, "Well, you have the charge of the Treasury : let them give you one hundred millions of Francs, and pay their own claims, and take the whole country.' Seeing, by my looks, that I was surprised at so extravagant a demand, he added that he considered the demand as exorbitant, and had told the First Consul that the thing was impossible ; that we had not the means of raising that. The Consul told him we might borrow it. I now plainly saw the whole business : first, the Consul was disposed to sell; next, he distrusted Talleyrand, on account of the business of the supposed intention to bribe, and meant to put the negotia- tion into the hands of Marbois, whose character for integrity is established. I told him that the United States were anxious to preserve peace with France ; that, for that reason, they wished to remove them to the west side of the Mississippi ; that we would be perfectly satisfied with. New Orleans and the Floridas, and had no disposition to extend across the river; that, of course, we would not give any great sum for the purchase ; that he was right in his idea of the extreme exorbitancy of the demand, which would not fall short of war hundred and twenty five mellom ; that, however, we would be ready to purchase, provided the sum was reduced to reasonable limits. He then pressed me to name the sum. I told him that this was not worth while, because, as he only treated the inquiry as a matter of curiosity, any dec- larations of mine would have no effect. If a negotiation was to be opened, we should (Mr. Monroe and myself) make the offer after mature reflection. This compelled him to declare, that, though he was not authorized expressly to make the inquiry from me, yet, that, if I could mention any sum that came near the mark, that could be accepted, he would communicate it to the First Consul. I told him that we had no sort of authority to a sum that bore any proportion to what he mentioned ; but that, as he himself considered the demand as too high, he would oblige me by telling me what he thought would be reasonable. He replied that, if we would name sixty millions, and take upon us the American claims, to the amount of twenty more, he would
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try how far this would be accepted. I told him that it was vain to ask anything that was so greatly beyond our means; that true policy would dictate to the First Consul not to press such a demand; that he must know that it would render the pres- ent Government unpopular, and have a tendency, at the next election, to throw the power into the hands of men who were most hostile to a connection with France; and that this would probably happen in the midst of a war. I asked him whether the few millions acquired at this expense would not be too dearly bought. He frankly confessed that he was of my sentiments; but that he feared the Consul would not relax. I asked him to press this argument upon him, together with the danger of seeing the country pass into the hands of Britain. I told him that he had seen the ardor of the Americans to take it by force, and the difficulty with which they were restrained by the prudence of the president ; that he must easily see how much the hands of the war party would be strengthened, when they learned that France was upon the eve of a rupture with Eng- land. He admitted the weight of all this: 'But,' says he, 'you know the temper of a youthful conqueror; everything he does is rapid as lightning ; we have only to speak to him as an opportunity presents itself, perhaps in a crowd, when he bears no contradiction. When I am alone with him, I can speak more freely, and he attends; but this opportunity seldom hap- pens, and is always accidental. Try, then, if you cannot come up to my mark. Consider the extent of the country, the exclu- sive navigation of the river, and the importance of having no neighbors to dispute you, no war to dread.' I toll him that I considered all these as important considerations, but there was a point beyond which we could not go, and that iell far short of the sum he mentioned.
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