USA > Louisiana > The province and the states, a history of the province of Louisiana under France and Spain, and of the territories and states of the United States formed therefrom, Vol. II > Part 17
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In his letter of April is, 1803, to Messrs. Livingston and Monroe, Mr. Madison said: "Our latest authentic information from New Orleans is of the 25th February. At that date the port had been opened for provisions carried down the Missis- sippi, subject to a duty of six per cent if consumed in the prov- ince and an additional duty if exported, with a restriction in the latter case to Spanish bottoms and to the external ports per- mitted by Spain to her colonial trade (see infra). A second letter written by the Spanish minister here has been received
. American State Papers.
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by the Intendant but without effect. On the 10th of March his interposition was repeated in a form which you will find, by his translated communication to the department of state in one of the enclosed papers, was meant to be absolutely effectual. You will find in the same paper the translation of a letter from the French charge d'affairs here to the Governor of Louisiana written with a co-operating view. A provisional letter to any French agents who might have arrived had been previously written by him, in consequence of a note from this department, founded on a document published at New Orleans, showing that orders had been given by the Spanish Government for the sur- render of the province to France; and he has of late addressed a third letter on the subject to hte Prefect said to have arrived at New Orleans. It does not appear, however, from any accounts received, that louisiana has yet changed hands. What the result of the several measures taken for restoring the right of deposit will be remains to be seen. 'The silence of the French Government to Mr. Livingston's representation is a very unfavorable indication. The letter from the Marquis de Yrujo, of which you will find a translated copy in the enclosed newspaper of this date, was received yesterday. The letters to which it refers, as containing orders for the re-es- tablishment of our deposit at New Orleans, were immediately forwarded. They will arrive in time, we hope, to mitigate con- siderably the losses from the misconduct of the Spanish Intend- ant; and they are the more acceptable as they are an evidence of the respect in the government of Spain to our rights and our friendship. From the allusion in this communication from the Spanish minister to a future agreement between the two Gov- ernments on the subject of an equivalent deposit, it would seem that the Spanish Government regards the cession to France as either no longer in force or not soon to be carried into execu- tion. However this may be, it will not be allowed, any more than the result of our remonstrance to Spain on the violation of our rights, to slacken the negotiations for the greater secu- rity and the enlargement of these rights. Whether the French or the Spaniards or both are to be our neighbors, the consider- ations which led to the measures, taken with respect to these important objects, still require that they should be pursued into all the success that may be attainable."*
It seems that Mr. Madison had been misinformed, for on
* American State Papers.
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May 25 he wrote: "You were informed in my letters of the 18th and 20th of April that orders had been transmitted by the Spanish Government for restoring the deposits. The answers from New Orleans to the Spanish and French ministers here show that their successive interpositions, including the peremp- tory one from the Marquis de Yrujo of the 11th of March, were all unavailing. The orders of the King of Spain will no doubt be obeyed if they arrive before possession be given to the French authority; nor is it presumable that in that event they would be disregarded. Still it is possible that the French agents may choose to wait for the French construction of the treaty before they relinquish the ground taken by the Intendant; and the more possible as the orders to the Intendant may contain no disavowal of his construction of it. Under these circumstances it will be incumbent on the French Government to hasten the orders neces- sary to guard against a prolongation of the evil and the very serious consequences incident to it."
It should be borne in mind that in suppressing the deposits at New Orleans, Spain, when held to blame, claimed the right to do so .* She insisted that the privilege was a pure gratuity revocable at her pleasure; that the right by the United States to navigate the Mississippi had not been interfered with; that it was for the United States and not Spain to procure another place of deposit when New Orleans was refused them; that the inconsiderable losses to American citizens, by being . forced through their own want of foresight in not procuring another place of deposit to load and unload in the middle of the river. could not justly be attributed to Spain, who had done only what she had a right to do, because the three years stipulated in the treaty of 1795 had expired before the promulgation of the inter- diction; and that the injury to the royal revenue was ample justification for the revocation of the deposits at New Orleans. Why, it was asked in substance by the Spanish minister, did not the United States ask for another "equivalent establishment" on the Mississippi when the three years had expired, instead of depending upon the sufferance of Spain in permitting greatly to her loss the continuance of the deposits at New Orleans? It
. If the interdiction was pursuant to the order of France, Spain would have taken precisely the course she did, but would have taken an altogether different course had she been acting of her own volition. France desired the abrogation of the provisions concerning the deposits and the navigation of the Missuppi embraced in the Spanish treaty of 1, 2); Spain did not, because she had willingly granted them and had enjoyed them ever since; and besides, was wholly unconcerned. because she was about to surrender the province to France.
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was for the United States and not for Spain to take the initia- tive in securing another establishment. Why should the negli- gence of the United States, which brought them loss, be made to react upon Spain, who had committed no offense? At the expiration of the three years it was the duty of the United States, . in order to avoid precarious emergencies, to have sought for a new stipulation that would have secured their deposits some- where. Had they done so they no doubt would have been accom- modated; but instead of seeking an "equivalent establishment" they demanded the restoration of the deposits in New Orleans, a demand to which they had no right. Under the treaty stipu- lations the "equivalent establishment" must be convenient to the United States, and therefore had to be selected by them, but with the co-operative assent of Spain. This assent had never been refused by Spain ; she had only refused the privilege in New Orleans. Had Spain, then, the right to suspend the deposits in New Orleans before agreeing with the United States on another "equivalent establishment?" Must Spain submit to the loss and inconvenience of the deposits after the three years, because the United States had neglected to provide an "equivalent establish- ment?" Or must Spain submit to the inconvenience after the expiration of the three years until a convention could be called to select an "equivalent establishment?" Or should the United States suffer the inconvenience after the three years until another place of deposit had been selected? This was the manner in which the situation was presented by the Spanish ministry .* It was then asked, why should Spain be held accountable for the American losses from the suppression of the deposits: to say the least, the United States had contributed to those losses by taking no steps to procure "an equivalent establishment."
The fact that the orders of high Spanish officials for the revo- cation of the interdiction were wholly disregarded by the intend- ant, is conclusive proof that he considered himself beyond the reach of the lash that invariably fell upon the backs of all subordinates guilty of disobedience to the imperial mandates of Spain. When to this observation is added the further fact that Spain, which was on the eve of surrendering the province to France, could have had no object of her own in prohibiting the deposits, the responsibility of the French republice for the inter- · diction cannot well be denied. It should be noted, also, that the
. It is not illogical not untensonable to suppose that these views of Spain were offered to carry into effect the wishes of France. See Diplomatic Correspondence.
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first steps taken by the intendant to modify the severity of the act, were succeeding the reception by him of the order to that effect from the French charge d'affairs at Philadelphia. Here, then, the intendant had the orders of both French and Spanish officials high in authority to revoke the interdiction, but refused fully to obey either, surely because he must have had in his pos- session an order from a much higher tribunal to justify a refusal against such preponderating odds.
It was beyond the power of the government of Spain to order the revocation of the interdiction at New Orleans, because she had retroceded Louisiana to France. This was known to the inhabitants of New Orleans. They knew that France alone had the authority to order the intendant to remove that restriction. This partly explains why the orders of Spain to the intendant were not obeyed, and why the interdiction was continued until orders had been received from France to restore the privilege. The orders of Spain to the intendant to remove the interdiction were only perfunctory measures resorted to to allay the wrath of the Americans. Why were the orders of the government of Spain unavailing? If the act of the intendant. was not pursuant to the direct or indirect orders of France, why did not the latter, when she learned of the distress and indignation in America, order the removal of the interdiction? The king of Spain had ratified the treaty of St. Ildefonso in October, 1802, thus perfect- ing the ownership of the province by France; but the latter took no steps to remedy the complaint, though well knowing that upon her order alone would the intendant act. Was it not, as herein stated, because Napoleon desired to breed dissatisfaction among the people west of the Alleghanies with the view of their eventual separation from the Atlantic states and their formal coalescence with Louisiana for their own protection, prosperity and happi- ness ?
For many years after the province had passed to the possession of the United States, the latter endeavored to obtain from the Spanish government satisfaction for the damage done by the interdiction of the deposits at New Orleans, but without suc- cess. In one way or another, Spain managed to evade any resti- tution therefor .. Why? Was it not because she knew that the order had been issued at the dictation of the French republic? If it had resulted from the order of France, it was very natural that Spain should object strenuously to payment therefor. On the contrary, inasmuch as Spain was usually prompt to pay her just
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dues, would she not have settled this claim, instead of contest it to the last, and then in the end totally avoiding payment? " item was not settled until the treaty between Spain and the Un : States in 1819, when in consideration of mutual renunciati ... . the claim was finally dropped by the United States.
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THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES.
CHAPTER V
The Cession to the United States
T IlE treaty of Amiens, concluded March 25, 1802, between France and Great Britain, was unsatisfactory to both nations ; and it was not strange, therefore, that hostilities soon again made their appearance. During the antunmn of 1802 and the succeeding winter, both nations seemed to be drifting steadily and directly into the vortex of war. The possession of Louisiana by France made its defense by that nation necessary, as it also made its conquest and acquisition an object to Great Britain. The transfer by Spain was secret, and although it soon leaked out, several months of delay were gained by France, during which time the preparations to occupy and defend it with troops were made. Neither the sentiments of Spain, nor the distress of the western settlers in the United States, figured with much importance in the calculations of either France or Great Britain. Oa August 10, 1802, Mr. Livingston wrote from Paris to the secretary of state, "There are obvious symptoms of ill humor between this country and Britain, and I think it will not be long before they assume a serious aspect. Good may arise out of this evil, if it should hap- pen." And he wrote on September 1, "The extreme hauteur of this Government to all around them will not suffer peace to be of long continuance. The French minister at Lisbon, it is said, is coming home without taking leave. England is very sour. Helvetia is still in arms." He wrote on October 28, "While the union between France and Russia subsists, the dis- contents which almost every nation in Europe feels at the extreme loftiness of the first will be suppressed. But as fear and not affection occasions the suppression, they are ready to break out on the first favorable moment. Many think that moment not very 11-12
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distant. . . Britain is seriously dissatisfied, and indu! has some reason to complain. The prospect of a ru; .. ure grows more serious. I can tell you with certainty that .. remonstrance in pretty strong terms has been presented by lier minister on the subject of the Consul's interference in the affan of Helvetia. Ilow it will be received I know not ; but think a would not have been made if it had not been the intention of Britain to seek a quarrel." Ile said on February 18, 1803. "I find that the sentiments of the two nations ( France and Great Britain), with respect to each other, have totally changed from what they were a year ago; they at present mortally hate each other, and nothing but the want of allies keeps Britain from breaking out."*
Through the friendly offices of Joseph Bonaparte, Mr. Living- ston, in one of his long memorials to the first consul about the middle of February, 1803, made the following andacions observa- tions : "It cannot be doubted that the peace between France and Britain has been too disadvantageous to the latter to be of long duration. Strong symptoms of an approaching rupture have already appeared ; and the statesmen of both countries will begin to examine the points of attack and defense, and the acquisitions that afford the most permanent advantages. The Cape, Malta and Egypt have already awakened the cupidity of Great Britain. Should she extend her views across the Atlantic (and what is to limit them?) the cession of Louisiana to France offers her the fairest pretence to invade that country either from Canada or by the Atlantic. She felt no reluctance in having them to Spain ; but she will not quietly see them in the hands of France. She will strain every nerve to acquire them. By uniting them with Canada and Nova Scotia she encircles the United States. . · If she should unite Louisiana and West Florida to her other
American possessions, no power in Europe will be able to oppose her force." On the 11th of March he said, "things every day look more towards a rupture between this country and Britain, and though the politicians think otherwise I believe a war not very distant." In his letter of March 12, he communicated the follow- ing ominous occurrence :
"I broke off this part of my letter to attend Madame Bona- parte's drawing-room, where a circumstance happened of suffi- cient importance to merit your attention. .. .
After the First Consul had gone the circuit of one room, he turned to me
· Americau State Papers.
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and made some of the common inquiries usual on these occasions. He afterwards returned and entered into further conversation. When he quitted me, he passed most of the other ministers merely with a bow, went up to Lord Whitworth ( the English minister), and after the first civilities said: 'I find, my lord, your nation want war again.' L. W .: 'No, sir, we are very desirous of peace.' First Consul : 'You have just finished a war of fifteen years.' L. W .: 'It is true, sir, and that war was fifteen years too long.' Consul : 'But you want another war of fifteen years.' L. W .: 'Pardon me, sir, we are very desirous of peace.' Consul : 'I must either have Malta or war.' L. W .: 'I am not prepared, sir, to speak on that subject ; and I can only assure you, citizen First Consul, that we wish for peace.' The prefect of the palace then came up to the Consul and informed him that there were ladies in the next room and asked him to go in. He made no reply, but bowing hastily to the company retired immediately to his cabinet without entering the other room. Lord Whitworth came up to me and repeated the conversation as I now give you. I asked Lord Whitworth whether there were any pending nego- tiations relative to Malta. He told me that there were; that the conduct of France having convinced them that they still had views upon Egypt, and the guaranties to which they were entitled with respect to Malta not having been executed, they thought they could not surrender it with safety. But what brought on the business today was a message from the King of Great Britain to the Parliament on the 1st which has just been received here, speaking with distrust of the armaments in the french ports, and in fact preparing them for war. It is then highly probable that a new rupture will take place, since it is hardly possible that the First Consul would commit himself so publicly unless his determi- nation had been taken."*
The American minister to England, Rufus King, wrote to the secretary of state on March 17, that "war seems more and more probable; indeed it, appears to me inevitable. Holland will be involved, and Spain and Portugal must obey the commands of .France." He announced that the day after the king's message to parliament was communicated to the French government, Bonaparte delivered to Lord Whitworth a paper practically amounting to a declaration of war; and that the greatest activity prevailed in the British military and naval departments. The "paper" referred to was the ultimatum of France, from which she
· American State Papers.
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could not retreat, and to which Great Britain could not accede with honor. Thus, as early as the middle of March, war wa: rendered absolutely inevitable. As this culmination of the jeal- ousies and hostilities through many months had a direct bearing upon the fate of Louisiana, it has here been given considerable space.
Previous to this time, say the middle of March, 1803, there is not a line to show that Bonaparte intended otherwise than to take possession of Louisiana with the armament still assembled in Holland. Indeed, in his "paper" to Lord Whitworth he said, "The expedition preparing in the Dutch ports was, as all the world knew, destined for America ; but in consequence of the mes- sage (of the King of England to Parliament), it had been recalled and would not proceed. If the armament announced in the mes- sage be not satisfactorily explained, or if it take place France would march twenty thousand men into Holland. The forces debarked in the ports of Holland would be reinforced and assembled on the coast of Flanders. The French army will be immediately put on a war establishment. England must not expect, under the cover of an armament, to avoid the execution of the treaty of Amiens."* As Great Britain did not retreat from the declarations of the king's message, nor explain the meaning of her armament, an immediate and radical change occurred in all the involved policies of France.
As early as December 20, 1802, Lord Whitworth, the British ambassador to France, wrote to his government that, "The First Consul is determined to exert his numost efforts, por only to sub- due St. Domingo, but to strengthen himself in Jumstana and the Floridas; and so pressing are his insistances with the Court of Spain for the possession of those two provinces that they will inevitably be ceded to him in the course of the month of Jan- uary."; He wrote on February 7, 1803, that if St. Domingo should be lost to France, Napoleon would no doubt turn his whole attention to Louisiana and the Floridas. On February 28 he wrote, "In the next place, the conduct of America, from whose President everything subservient was expected, and by whom it is now foreseen that every opposition will be made to the projects of the French Government in that part of the world and that so far from being able to gain quiet possession of the Floridas, the settlement even of Louisiana may be considered as doubtful."
· American State Papers.
t Foreign Correspondence of England.
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And again on March 17 he wrote, "The Americans, whose fears never suffered them to doubt the professed destination of the armaments in the Dutch ports, are now delivered from their appre- hensions. They are sanguine enough to hope that they shall hear no more of the threatened exchange of the Floridas, or even of the projects on Louisiana. It is certain that M. de Talleyrand has given the American Minister ( Mr. Livingston) reason to suppose that these projects will be deferred, and he trusts to the chapter of accidents for the rest." From the statement above, it will be seen that the British minister did not believe that the French armament was destined for Louisiana. As shown in the king's message to parliament, it was not doubted that the French force in the Dutch ports was intended to be used against Eng- land.
The account of his famous interview with Napoleon is given by Iord Whitworth as follows: "He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters from Your Lordship ( the English Prime Minister) two days ago. Hle immediately said, 'So you are determined to go to war.' 'No, Premier Consul,' I replied, 'we are too sensible of the advantages of peace.' 'Nous avons,' said he, 'déjà fait la guerre, pendant quinze ans.' As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only, 'C'en est déjà trop.' 'Mais,' said he, 'vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m'y forcez.' I told him that was very far from His Majesty's intentions. He then proceeded to Connt Marcoff and the Chevalier Azzara, who were standing together at a little distance from me, and said to them 'les Anglais veulent la guerre, mans s'ils sont les premiers i fier l'épée, je serai le dernier à la remettre. Ils ne respectent pas les traités. Il faut dorénavant les couvrir de crêpe noir.' I suppose he meant the treaties. Ile then went his round, and was thought by all those to whom he addressed himself to betray great signs of irritation. In a few minutes he came back to me, to my great annoyance, and resumed the conversation, if such it can be called, by something personally civil to me. He then began again : 'Pour quoi des armements? centre qui des measures de precau- tion? Je n'ai pas un seul vaisseau de ligne dans les ports de France, mais si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi ; se vous voulez vous battre, je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peut-être tuer la France, mais jemais l'intimider.' 'On ne vondroit,' said I. 'ni l'un ni l'autre. On vondroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle.' 'Il faut donc respecter les traites,' replied he ; 'malheur a ceux qui ne respectent pas les traites. Ils en serout responsibles
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a toute l'Europe.' He was too agitated to make it advisable : prolong the conversation. I therefore made no answer, and ! - retired to his apartments repeating the last phrase. It is to 1. remarked that all this passed loud enough to be overheard by ti hundred people who were present. I was fortunate enough 1; to be betrayed into anything imprudent, or which could be n .;. construed. I am persuaded that there was not a single per? ?? who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and il.c total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occasion." .
On the 18th of March Mr. Livingston wrote, "We are here (at Paris) all in a bustle, not knowing whether we are to have war or peace. In England they expect war certainly. Here they are very anxious to avoid it. Peace will in no event last long. I frankly confess that though I believe a war would be extremely dangerous for Great Britain, yet I think her ruin inevitable if France continues ten years at peace." In his letter of March 24th he said, "The question of war yet remains unde- termined. Here there is an carnest and sincere desire to avoid it, as well in the government as the people." But Mr. Livingston evidently did not take into consideration the views or ambitions of the first consul, although he had written on September 1, 1802, "one man is everything."t
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