The province and the states, a history of the province of Louisiana under France and Spain, and of the territories and states of the United States formed therefrom, Vol. II, Part 16

Author: Goodspeed, Weston Arthur, 1852-1926, ed
Publication date: 1904
Publisher: Madison, Wis. : The Weston Historical Association
Number of Pages: 976


USA > Louisiana > The province and the states, a history of the province of Louisiana under France and Spain, and of the territories and states of the United States formed therefrom, Vol. II > Part 16


Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).


Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48


THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.


be but once settled along our southern border and they will have the whole of your Southern States at their mercy."


Mr. Wright of Maryland delivered a speech of unusual posa in support of the administration's policy of negotiation bei-te resorting to war measures. Ile did not deny the flagrancy c: the act of the intendant, but upheld the policy of peaceful nego- tiation already in progress under the direction of President Jei. ferson. There could be no two ways about it; redress should be sought first and now through peaceful measures. That wa. the custom of all nations, and had been adopted thus far by the United States, particularly by General Washington, to whom the opposition took such pains to refer. He denied the figures of Mr. Dayton, and declared that the total exports for the year 1802 were only one million ninety-five thousand four hundred twelve dollars instead of four millions .*


On the same day, Mr. Morris of Pennsylvania said: "It behooves us, however, to consider well the spirit of the French government, which in all its changes has never lost sight of this object. The French minister, M. de Luzerne, when congress was deliberating on the ultimata for peace (in 1783), obtained a resolution that our ministers should, as to our western bound- ary, treat under the direction of France.f Our ministers dis- Their manly con- dained the condition and refused to obey. duct obtained for you the countries whose fate is now suspended in your deliberations. Never, no never, has - France lost sight of Louisiana. Never for a moment has she been blind to its importance. Those who, driven from her bosom into exile. wandered about among us, have gathered and communities the fullest information. While they enjoyed year hospitality, they probed your weakness, and meditated the means of con- troling your conduct. .


. Had this transaction ( the secret treaty of San Ildefonso) been intended fairly, it would have been told frankly. But it was secret because it was hostile. The First Consul, in the moment of terminating his differences with you, sought the means of future influence and control. He found and secured a pivot for that immense lever, by which with potent arm he means to subvert your civil and political institutions. What followed? An open and direct violation of the treaty by a public officer of the Spanish government.#


. Mr. Wright was evidently wrong, because the official records show the exports to have aggregated about the sum mentioned by Mr. Daston.


1 Diplomatic Correspondence, secret. 1 Annals of Congress.


163


THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS.


·


Bonaparte has placed himself at the head of the French republic by deeds which cast a lustre on his name. In his splendid career he must proceed. When he ceases to act he will cease to reign. Whenever in any plan he fails, that moment he falls. Ile is condemned to magnificence."


In his concluding argument Mr. Ross said: "The Spaniards delayed and evaded the execution (of the treaty of 1795) in a very unjustifiable manner. But the administration of that day did not rely upon negotiation alone; they ordered troops to the Ohio, and had the Spaniards persisted in their refusal, those troops would have acted decisively without any new application to the court of Spain They saw the approaching storm; they entered upon the execution of the treaty by running the line and giving up the posts; and if the war office be examined, gentlemen will find that our troops were then so disposed as to fall down the river Mississippi and act with effect at any moment. It was well known to us that Spain did not act in that business from the mere impulse of her own interests or wishes. She was then and is still under the irresistible influ- ence of a powerful neighbor, with whom we at that time had serious differences; she was urged and pushed forward by France ;* for Spain until she became thus dependent upon France has ranked high for her good faith, and in my opinion deserv- edly higher than any other court in Europe. . . We come now to consider the resolution offered as a substitute. It is highly gratifying to find that gentlemen are at last inclined to act-to do something like defending the rights of our country. Is there any new shape given to this business to the proposed substitute? We propose fifty thousand militia ; dlay substitute eighty thousand. To do what? Will gentlemen tell us the dif- ference. It is said ours are absolutely imperative; if so, alter them and give an unqualified discretion. We will agree to it. My own opinion is, that they should be immediately acted upon. If the majority wish for a bare discretionary power, I assent to it. There is no difference except that one set of resolutions puts greater power in the hands of the President than the other. Are gentlemen on the other side afraid to trust the President? Do they think he will abuse this power? Will it hurt the nego- tiation ? Instead of hurting it, our minister ought to carry this act to Europe with him. He would then have more means, and more forcible arguments to urge in his negotiation."


. Note that the change is openly made that France was not only responsible for the interdiction, but for the refusal to surrender the posts mh 1797.


0


164


THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.


Many of the senators from whose speeches these extracts ate taken, were members of the minority party of congress-were opposed to the Jeffersonian administration, and took an ultra position to throw the responsibilities of inaction upon ti.e majority, or at least to stimulate and develop the "Mississippi policy" of Mr. Jefferson. The friends of the administration in the senate counseled conservatism and declared that the Presi- dent was doing all that should be done at that time to remove the interdiction and to secure a continuance of the rights granted by the treaty of 1795; that to descend with a force upon New Orleans would be rash and would react upon the United States; that the right to navigate the Mississippi had not been abro- gated, only the right to the deposit in New Orleans and the privilege of trading with the Spanish people had been prohib- ited; that there was no occasion for hostile proceedings, because, in any event, the worse Spain had done was to fail assigning an "equivalent establishment" for the deposits on the Missis- sippi ; and that there was nothing to show that the act of inter- diction was other than the unauthorized misapprehension of the intendant. The resolutions of Mr. Ross were rejected by a vote of fifteen to cleven-a strict party test. The resolutions of Mr. Breckenridge were then adopted without a dissenting voice. All who had favored the Ross resolutions, including Mr. Ross him- self, voted for the Breckenridge resolutions, (see supra for both resolutions ).#


At the session of the house in January, 1803, a secret commit- tee, of which Mr. Nicholson of Manshed was chairman, was appointed to investigate the Mississippi question and report tell the desirability and expediency of acquiring New Orleans and the Floridas .; The committee did not extend their investiga- tions beyond the immediate cause of complaint. Mr. Nichol- son said during the debate in October, 1803: "As one of the committee, I am free to declare that I did not at that time enter- tain the most distant idea that the almost boundless tract of country lying west of the Mississippi could be obtained by our government on any terms, much less for the comparatively incon- siderable sum which we have agreed to pay for it. Had I then offered an opinion on the subject, I should have had no hesi- tation to say that the west bank of the Mississippi was almost


. The congressional debate naturally assumed a partisan hue, the friends of the administration denying and the opposition athoming the responsibility of France of the interdiction. Of course, this was rendered possible by the lack of conclu- ive knowledge on the subject.


8 t Annals of Congress.


165


THIE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS.


incalculable in its value to the United States, if it was only for the purpose of preventing any foreign nation from coloniz- ing it. If that country were thickly settled by a foreign nation, the whole river Mississippi, from its source to the sea, must have been guarded by a strong chain of military posts ; whereas the wilderness itself will now present an almost insurmount- able barrier to any nation that may be inclined to disturb us in that quarter." The committee considered the interdiction at New Orleans with a view of having it revoked at the earliest possible moment, and recommended measures which were deemed likely to prevent a recurrence of the act in the future. Mr. Nicholson said in October: "An inquiry of this kind naturally led to a view of the situation of the western country generally, and it was readily perceived that the same inconveniences which had occurred in relation to the month of the Mississippi might at some future period perhaps not very distant embar- rass the commerce of the whole Mississippi Territory, the west- ern part of Georgia and the eastern part of Tennessee. It was seen that the produce of this valuable country must be carried to the sea by means of the great rivers which rise in the Mis- sissippi Territory, but pass through East and West Florida before they reach the Gulf of Mexico; and the committee were of opinion that these ought if possible to be secured by treaty." They therefore made recommendations in accordance with their findings. Their report, though made known to the members of congress, was not published at that time. Mr. Randolph said in October, 1803, "it had been thought inespclient to publish the report at that time," and moved that it be referred to a com. mittee to be published for the use of the members, but such action was postponed. It was taken up later and published in its proper place in the January proceedings. The committee recommended the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas, in order to get the free navigation of the southern rivers. They concluded by recommending the adoption of the following reso- lution :


"Resolved, That the sum of two million dollars in addition to the provision heretofore made, be appropriated to defray any expenses which may be incurred in relation to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, to be paid out of any money that may be in the treasury, not otherwise appro- priated and to be applied under the direction of the President of the United States, who if necessary is hereby authorized to


.


166


THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.


borrow the whole or any part thereof, an account whereof as suas as may be shall be laid before congress."


The action on the "Mississippi question," as it was called. in the house was less protracted than in the senate, though the sentiment was fully as strong for the maintenance of treat. rights. The following resolution, introduced by Mr. Griswold of Connecticut, was rejected :*


"Resolved, That the people of the United States are entitled to the free navigation of the river Mississippi; that the naviga- tion of the river Mississippi has been obstructed by the regu- lations recently carried into effect at New Orleans; that the right of freely navigating the river Mississippi ought never to be abandoned by the United States ; that a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and, if any, what, legislative measures are necessary to secure to the people of the United States the free navigation of the river Mississippi."


The house of representatives, on January 7, passed the follow- ing act :


"Resolved, That this House receive, with great sensibility, the information of a disposition in certain officers of the Span- ish government at New Orleans to obstruct the navigation of the river Mississippi, as secured to the United States by the most solemn stipulations. That, adhering to that humane and wise policy which ought ever to characterize a free people, and by which the United States have always professed to be gov- erned ; willing, at the same time, to ascribe this breach of com- pact to the unauthorized misconduct of certain individuals. rather than to a want of good faith on the part of His Catholic Majesty; and relying with perfect confidence on the vigilance and wisdom of the Executive, they will wait the issue of such measures as that department of the government shall have pur- sued for asserting the rights and vindicating the injuries of the United States; holding it to be their duty, at the same time, to express their unalterable determination to maintain the bound- aries, and the rights of navigation and commerce through the river Mississippi, as established by existing treaties."


Taking all the data presented in the house and senate into consideration and weighing the arguments of the members, there does not seem to be a reasonable doubt that Napoleon expected to place in New Orleans a sufficient force, aided by the militia there, to hold it against any probable attack of the


· Annals of Congress.


167


THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS.


western settlers or a British armament ; to control the interdic- tion of the deposits; to obstruct the navigation of the Missis- sippi by the Americans below the thirty-first degree without the payment of a heavy duty; to detach, if possible, the Western states from the Eastern and make them a part of his Louisiana domains ; to secure the Floridas from Spain, by force if neces- sary; and to be then in a position to take Canada from Great Britain and Mexico from Spain when he should so desire, and later to conquer the Atlantic states, thus forming a magnificent empire in the New World for the glory of France. The refusal of the king of Spain, under the advice of the sagacious Godoy, to sign the treaty of cession for two years saved New Orleans from passing into the hands of France immediately after the treaty of St. Ildefonso. During that entire period Napoleon continued his demands or his entreaties, as seemed most likely to be efficacious, to secure the ratification of the king and to acquire by purchase the two Floridas as well. His threats were adroitly evaded by Godoy, until at length he began the forma- tion of the armament destined for New Orleans, intending to take possession without the ratification of the Spanish monarch, in which case he would doubtless soon have likewise occupied the Floridas, should the United States not have forestalled his intentions by a prior possession.


Instinctively, the people of the United States associated the cession of Louisiana to France and the interdiction of the depos- its. The latter seemed to them the beginning of troubles that were sure to result from the former. The declaration of the governor of Louisiana that the act was disapproved by ham was not believed, particularly, as he did nothing to remove the interdiction. The ministers to France and Spain were instructed to inform the authorities of those countries that the interdic- tion must be removed and the rights of the United States under the treaty of 1795 be fully recognized. As Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Livingston under date of January 18, ISO3: "Such, indeed, has been the impulse given to the public mind by these events, that every branch of the government has felt the obli- gation of taking the measures most likely, not only to re-estab- lish our present rights, but to promote arrangements by which they may be enlarged and more effectually secured." In order the more surely to effect this result, the government sent James Monroe on a mission extraordinary to assist Mr. Livingston at Paris and Mr. Pinckney at Madrid to effect treaties with the object of securing "a cession of New Orleans and the Floridas


168


THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.


to the United States, and consequently the establishment of ti;c Mississippi as the boundary between the United States and Louisiana. In order to draw the French government into the measure, a sum of money will mark part of our proposition, to which will be added such regulations of the commerce of that river, and of the others entering the Gulf of Mexico, as ought to be satisfactory to France."*


An important statement made by Mr. Livingston concerning the act of the intendant at New Orleans in interdicting the depos- its should be borne in mind: "I have examined the treaty; there is no pretence for this construction of it; and as the right has been regularly exercised till now, it will be generally believed in the United States that this construction could only have been suggested by a wish on the part of France to get rid of the provisions of the treaty before she took possession."} When all the circumstances are taken into consideration :- that Spain by the treaty of 1795 had not only recognized the right of the United States to the free navigation of the Mississippi, but had granted the perpetual privilege of deposit, either at New Orleans or some other "equivalent establishment" on the bank of the Mississippi; that this privilege had been continued without inter- ruption, to the advantage of Spain, from 1797 to 1802; that the Spanish governor at New Orleans denied having given the order of interdiction ; that the Spanish ambassador at Washing- ton repudiated all knowledge of such an order; that the Span- ish minister of state at Madrid stated that neither the king nor the ministry had directed any euch action to be taken ; that the interdiction had not been ordered until France was on the point of sending out an armament to take possession; that no satisfaction to the urgent requests of the American ambassa- dor as to the attitude of France on the Louisiana questions was rendered; that the French ministry stated that the cession of the country asked for "was out of the question ;" that the project of colonizing and strengthening Louisiana was "dear to the heart of Napoleon;" that it was well known in New Orleans that the province had been retroceded to France and would be soon formally ttirned over to her; that the mere request of the first consul was sufficient to cause the intendant to issue the order; and that France was anxious to know what the United States would do in case the stipulations of the treaty of 1795


. American State Papers.


t Thus even Mr. Livingston entertained the opinion that France was responsible for the interdiction.


169


THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS.


concerning the navigation of the Mississippi and the privilege of deposit were abrogated-it is not necessary to go beyond the consular government of France to learn where the order of interdiction originated.


The authorities of the Spanish government at New Orleans had little conception of the aggressive commercial spirit of the Americans. And the government of Spain was even farther removed from comprehending the resolution that would take forcible possession of the mouth of the Mississippi for the sole purpose of gaining a market. Barbe Marbois said: "Spain thought that circumstances only required from her an easy sac- rifice. She consented in 1788 to cede the free navigation of the Mississippi to the States, founded on the left bank of that river. But she so little understood the spirit of those Republicans that she had no hesitation in proposing as a condition of this grant that it should only take effect in case they determined to form an empire distinct from that of the Atlantic States." The threats which preceded the Spanish refusal to permit the Amer- icans to navigate the Mississippi, did not betoken a spirit that would either yield to the refusal or surrender allegiance to the United States. The overtures of the Spanish authorities, which had for their object the intention of dividing the Union, were never seriously taken into consideration. The efforts which were put forth were occasioned by malcontents, law-break- ers, and the uninformed. The threats themselves meant noth- ing more than to hasten the government of the United States into some action that would afford effectual minutes of felici.


The interdiction of the deposits was severely felt i Now Orleans, and roused even there storms of protest. The city was soon in sore straits for provisions, in particular flour, and the complaint became so great that the intendant himself was obliged to modify his interdiction to the extent of admitting a few of the staple necessities. As a matter of fact the procla- mation of interdiction only served to make clear that all exclu- sive and arbitrary barriers over commerce must give way to human necessities. But this point should be noted : If the inter- diction was the act solely of the intendant, why did he not revoke it when it was seen to be such a burden even to the inhabitants themselves ?* llis proclamation of February 5, 1803, gave to the people the relief demanded. But this was merely a slight infraction of the edict, and not its revocation. In view of the


. Everything indicates that the Intendant was acting under the orders of a power he dared not disobey.


.


:


1


170


THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.


hostility of the inhabitants themselves, occasioned by the har'. ships thus thrust upon them, it seems reasonable that the inte: . ant must have been the instrument of some higher power.


After the lapse of the three years stipulated in the treas . the right of deposit in New Orleans was continued by facit agree ment until its revocation by the interdiction in October, 1802. The report was promptly circulated throughout the western country that the right to navigate the Mississippi had been pro · hibited, but this was not the fact. Spain had the right to pro- hibit the deposits in New Orleans and the right to forbid her subjects to have any business dealings with the Americans. It is true that she did not assign an "equivalent establishment" on the Mississippi, but neither did the United States press for such a place, because the Americans did not want another deposit ; they wanted New Orleans. It was easy for the Amer- icans to use their wants as the basis of an incontestible. right. They therefore claimed about every right pertaining to the river ; and they longed for a rupture that would give them all they desired, knowing full well that the feeble Spaniards would prove no barrier to the sweep they should make were they to deter- mine to come down the river for the purpose of capturing New Orleans. At one time steps were taken to make Natchez the "equivalent establishment," but this was given up finally as impracticable. It was thought by many of the settlers that the French government was back of the interdiction. Had not this been thought to be the probability and had not the settlers thought that to take louisiana from France was an att gether different step than to take it from Spain, the chances are that they would have taken possession of New Orleans early in ISO3.


Mr. Martin, the historian, writes: "On the first of March (1803), the King (of Spain) disapproved of the order of Mo- rales (the Intendant), prohibiting the introduction of deposit of goods, wares and merchandise from the United States in the port of New Orleans; and ordered that the United States should continue to enjoy their right of deposit in New Orleans, with- out prejudice of his to substitute some other spot on the banks of the Mississippi." Late in May, 1803, the intendant revoked the interdiction which he had ordered in the previous October. It should be noted that this revocation was pronounced nearly two months after Napoleon had made up his mind to sell the province to the United States. Is it not reasonable to conclude that as soon as he became satisfied the sale would be effected, he sent an order across the Atlantic to the intendant to remove


171


THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS.


the interdiction in order to quiet the Americans? The order of the king of Spain to the intendant was wholly perfunctory, because he had issued a decree on the 15th of the previous October directing the governor of Louisiana to turn the prov- ince over to France and was aware that his authority had prac- tically ceased in Louisiana. It must have been upon the order of the French republic that the interdiction was removed.


That the intendant at New Orleans was acting under the express request or direction of the French government, is proved by the fact that, although the Spanish minister at Washington and the Spanish secretary of state at Madrid, under the direc- tion of the king of Spain, had ordered the removal of the inter- diction, it was continued in force without interruption and with increased exactions and severity. Mr. Madison, secretary of state, wrote to Mr. Pinckney under date of March 2, 1803, that "our latest authentic information from New Orleans is of Janu- ary 20. At that date the edict of the Intendant against our right of deposit had not been revoked, although the letters to him and the Governor from the Spanish minister here had been previously received. And it appears that the first outrage had been followed by orders of the most rigid tenor against every hospitable intercourse between our citizens navigating the river and the Spanish inhabitants. This continuation of the obstruc- tion to our trade and the approach of the season for carrying down the Mississippi the exports of the western country have had the natural effect of increasing the western irritation and emboldened the advocates for an innmediate to hess be falls. Should the deposit not be restored in time to the arrival of the Spring craft, a new crisis will occur, which it is presumed that the Spanish government will have stimulated to prevent by the very heavy claims of indemnification to which it would be otherwise fairly subjected."*




Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.