USA > Louisiana > The province and the states, a history of the province of Louisiana under France and Spain, and of the territories and states of the United States formed therefrom, Vol. II > Part 19
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"I asked him, in case of a purchase, whether they would stipu- ' late that France would never possess the Floridas, and that she would aid us to procure them, and relinquish all right that she might have to them. He told me that she would go thus far. I added, that I would now say nothing more on the subject, but that I would converse with Mr. Monroe; and that I was sure to find him disposed to do everything that was reasonable or could be expected, to remove every cause of difference between the two countries. That, however, if any negotiation should go on, I would wish that the First Consul would depute somebody to treat with us, who had more leisure than the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I said this to see whether my conjectures
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relative to him were well founded. He told me that as the First Consul knew our personal friendship, he having several times had occasion to speak of me and my family, and the prin- ciples that we held, he believed that there would be no difficulty, when this negotiation was somewhat advanced, to have the man- agement of it put into his hands. Hle earnestly pressed me to make some proposition that was so near the First Consul's as to admit his mentioning it to him. I told him that I would consult Mr. Monroe, but that neither he nor I could accede to his ideas on the subject. "
"Paris, April 17, 1803.
"On the 14th I called upon Mr. Monroe, to present him to the minister, who had, upon my application, fixed three o'clock that day for his reception.
"On waiting upon the minister, we found M. Marbois there, who told me that he had come to communicate to the minister what had passed between us, and that he greatly regretted the not being able to bring us to such an offer as he might men- tion to the First Consul. I told him that it was unnecessary to repeat what would compel us to limit our offers to a much more moderate sum, as I had already detailed them at large; and he knew they exceeded our means. We were very gra- ciously received by the minister, whom I pressed to obtain as early a day as possible for the reception of Mr. Monroe, as time pressed, and we were anxious to conclude our business, for rea- sons arising out of the present disturbed state of America. He told me he would speak to the First Consul that night on the subject ; and that he hoped some person would be appointed to treat with us, even before Mr. Monroe was presented. After a little general conversation, he took leave, in expectation that Mr. Monroe would be presented this day (Sunday), being a day of reception for the civil officers of the Government. The next day, Mr. Monroe and myself, after spending some time in consultation, determined to offer fifty millions, including our debts; we presumed it would be best only to mention forty in the first instance. This I accordingly did, in a conference I had on the 15th with M. Marbois. He expressed great sorrow that we could not go beyond that sum, because he was sure that it would not be accepted, and that perhaps the whole business would be defeatcd, which he the more feared, as he had just received a note from the minister, indicative of the Consul's not being quite pleased that he had so greatly lowered his original propo-
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sition. Ile said that he saw our situation, and he knew that there was a point beyond which we could not go with safety to ourselves or the President; but he wished us to advance to that point. He said that he would, if I wished, go that very day to St. Cloud, and let me know the result. I reminded him of the Consul's promise to pay the debt. I placed in the strong- est light his personal obligation on this subject; and desired him to urge it as an additional reason to conclude an agreement which would facilitate the means of doing it. The morn- ing, which was yesterday, I again called to see him. He told me that he had been to St. Cloud; that the Consul received his proposition very coldly ; and that I might consider the husi- ness as no longer in his hands, since he had given him no further powers; that he had urged the Consul's promise relative to the debt, which he admitted; but said, at the same time, he did not think it had exceeded three millions, though my letter expressly mentioned twenty. He expressed great sorrow upon the occasion ; and advised me to press M. Talleyrand to pre- sent Mr. Monroe the next day ( that is, this day) ; that he hoped that, if the Consul saw me, as he had a very particular esteem for me, he would renew the subject with me himself.
"I went to Mr. Monroe, and carried him to the minister, who had not returned from St. Cloud; and afterward went again, but could not see him. I dined with the Second Consul yes- terday; and in the evening M. Marbois came in. I took him aside, and asked him if any thing further had passed ; he said not ; but, that as he was to go to St. Cloud the next day, it was possible that the Consul might touch upon the subject again ; and that, if he did not, I might consider the plan as relinquished ; and that, if I had any further proposition to make, it would be well to state it. I then told him, that on further conversa- tion with Mr. Monroe, we had resolved to go to the greatest possible length, and that we would give fifty millions. He said he had very little hopes that any thing short of his propositions would succeed; but that he would make the best use of the arguments I had furnished him with, if an opportunity was offered; and if nothing was done the next day, I might con- clude that the Consul had changed his sentiments; that, hav- ing given the kingdom of Etruria, whose revenues were twenty- five millions, in exchange for this country, it was natural that the First Consul shouldl estimate it beyond its real value."*
'American State Papers.
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As is stated in the Memoirs of Lucien Bonaparte, Napoleon had made up his mind as early as the 6th of April, 1803, to sell louisiana to the United States .* It is related there that having told his brother Joseph of his intention, the latter vigor- ously opposed it and a quarrel resulted between the brothers. Joseph immediately went to Lucien and told him of the inten- tion of Napoleon, the following being the language: "The General means to give up Louisiana." To which Lucien replied, "Bah, who'll buy it 'of him?" Joseph answered, "The Ameri- cans." Whereupon Lucien declared that the chambers would not give their consent. Joseph replied that Napoleon intended to get along without the consent of the chambers -- meant to carry it through regardless of the chambers. The two brothers, Joseph and Lucien, talked the matter over several hours, and determined to oppose the sale of "Beautiful Louisiana." The next morning, April 7th, by agreement Lucien called upon Napo- leon at the Tuileries, and found him engaged in taking his morn- ing bath. A little later Joseph called, and thus the three brothers met in the bathroom, with Napoleon in the tub appar- ently greatly enjoying himself. Lucien had thought that Napo- leon would not dare to sell Louisiana without parliamentary authority; and Joseph had thought he would dare to do so, but would desist when told of the disasters sure to result to the Bonaparte family from such a transaction. Neither of the broth- crs was wholly right. Joseph and lucien hesitated for some time to mention the proposed sale of Louisiana, but finally dial and were met with the announcement that such was the mich- tion. Both declared their opposition to the sale. One complaint led to another until the interview resulted in a violent quarrel, in which the elder brother, Joseph, and Napoleon were the chief actors. Complaints led to recriminations until the brothers seemed on the point of a personal encounter. Finally Joseph made some extremely exasperating charge against Napoleon, whereupon the latter drenched him with water dashed from the bathtub, which proceeding ended their dispute for the time. In fact, as far as those two were concerned, the question was settled. The province would be sokl. In subsequent interviews, Lucien could not prevail upon Napoleon not to sell Louisiana. But it must be observed that neither of the two brothers fully under- stood Napoleon's reason for selling. The Lucien memoirs show that they did not consider the absolute necessity of selling before
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. Mem ' 1.ucjen Bonaparte: Harvard College Library.
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the province should be captured either by the English or by the Americans. In regard to results, they either did not under- stand the situation of France and Louisiana at the time, or were kept in the dark: on this particular point by Napoleon for pur- poses of his own. What the English might do or what the Americans might do seemingly had not entered their heads ; but Napoelon knew the inevitable results; and history has since shown that had he not taken the course he did and sold Louisiana it would have been been taken possession of by the United States at the first movement of the English to send a fleet across the ocean for its conquest.
On the 10th of April. 1803, Easter Sunday, Napoleon called Barbé Marbois and Alexandre Berthier in Tor a private consulta- tion regarding Louisiana. Both of these gentlemen were famil- iar with Louisiana and the United States, and he desired their views concerning the alienation of the province. Mr. Marbois favored the sale to the United States and stated his reasons there- for at great length, Napoleon listening attentively to all that he said, and asking an occasional question. Mr. Berthier opposed the sale and likewise presented his reasons at great length, to all of which Napoleon listened just as intently. Before they had made their statements he said: "I know the full value of Louisiana, and I have been desirous of repairing the fault of the French negotiator who abandoned it in 1763. A few lines of a treaty have restored it to me, and I have scarcely received it when I must expect to lose it. But if it escapes from me, it shall one day cost dearer to those who . lige me to strip myself of it than to those to whom I wish to deliver it. The English have successively taken from France Canada, Cape Breton, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and the richest por- tions of Asia. They are engaged in exciting troubles in St. Domingo. They shall not have the Mississippi which they covet. Louisiana is nothing in comparison with their conquests in other parts of the globe, and yet the jealousy they feel at the restoration of this colony to the sovereignty of France, acquaints ine with their wish to take possession of it, and it is thus that they will begin the war. They have twenty ships of war in the Gulf of Mexico; they sail over those seas as sover- eigns, whilst our affairs in St. Domingo have been growing worse every day since the death of Leclerc. The conquest of Louisiana would be easy, if they only took the trouble to make the descent there. I have not a moment to lose in putting it out of their reach. I know not whether they are not already
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there. It is their usual course, and if I had been in their place. I would not have waited. I wish, if there is still time, to tale from them any idea that they may have of ever possessing that colony. I think of ceding it to the United States. I can scarcely say I cede it to them, for it is not yet in our posses. sion. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall only transmit an empty title to those republicans, whose friend- ship I seek. They only ask of me one town in Louisiana, but I already consider the colony as entirely lost, and it appears to me that in the hands of this growing power, it will be more useful to the policy and even to the commerce of France than if I should attempt to keep it."*
The discussion was continued far into the night, and termi- nated without other statement from Napoleon than the above. At daybreak the next morning Napoleon summoned Mr. Marbois, who had favored the sale of Louisiana, and asked him to read aloud the dispatches which had just been received from London. The information they contained showed that in all England naval and military preparations of every description were in progress "with extraordinary rapidity." Napoleon was intensely moved by the dispatches. He said: "The English ask of me Lampedonso, which does not belong to me, and at the same time wish to keep Malta for ten years. This island, where military genius has exhausted all the means of defensive fortification to an extent of which no one without seeing it can form an idea, would he to them another Gibraltar. To leave it to the English would be to give up to them the couverte of the Levant, and to job my southern provinces of it. They wish to keep this possession and have me immediately vacate Holland. Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana. . It is not only New Orleans that I will cede; it is the whole colony without any reservation. I know the price of what I abandon, and I have sufficiently proved the importance that I attach to this province, since my first diplo- matic act with Spain had for its object the recovery of it. I renounce it with the greatest regret. To attempt obstinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiate this affair with the envoys of the United States. Do not even await the arrival of Mr. Monroe; have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston; but I require a great deal of money for this war, and I would not like to commence it with new contributions.
' History of Louisiana: Barbe Matbois.
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For a hundred years France and Spain have been incurring expenses for improvements in Louisiana, for which its trade has never indemnified them. Large sums which will never be returned to the treasury, have been lent to companies and agri- culturalists. The price of all these things is justly due to us. If I should regulate my terms according to the value of these vast regions to the United States, the indemnity would have 110 limits. I will be moderate in consideration of the necessity in which JI am of making a sale. But keep this to yourself. I want fifty millions (of livres), and for less than that sum I will not treat. I would rather make a desperate attempt to keep these fine countries. Tomorrow you shall have your full powers."*
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At this point of the interview Mr. Marbois interposed some observations in regard to whether the souls of the people in Louisiana could be made the subject of contract and sale, where- upon he was interrupted by Napoleon, who said: "You are giving me in all its perfection the ideology of the law of nature and of nations. But I require money to make war on the rich- est nation of the world. Send your maxims to London. I am sure they will be greatly admired there, and yet no great atten- tion is paid to them when the question is the occupation of the finest regions of Asia." Continuing, he said: "Mr. Monroe is on the point of arriving. To this minister going two thousand leagues from his constituents, the President must have given, after defining the object of his mission, secret instructions more extensive than the ostensible authorization of Congress, for the stipulation of the payments to be made. Neither this minister nor his colleague is prepared for a decision which goes infinitely beyond anything that they are about to ask of us. Begin by making them the overture without any subterfuge. You will acquaint me, day by day, hour by hour, of your progress. The cabinet of London is informed of the measures adopted at Wash- ington, but it can have no suspicion of those of which I am now making. Observe the greatest secrecy, and recommend it to the American ministers; they have not a less interest than yourself in conforming to this counsel. You will correspond with M. de Talleyrand who alone knows my intentions. If I attended to his advice France would confine her ambition to the left bank of the Rhine, and would only make war to protect our weak states and to prevent any dismemberment of her posses- sions. But he also admits that the cession of Louisiana is not
. History of Louisiana: Barbe Maibois.
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a dismemberment of France. Keep him informed of the pres ress of this affair."
As before stated, the overtures were made, as suggested b. Napoleon, to Mr. Livingston before the arrival of Mr. Monroe. but the latter, arriving the next day, was at once informed of the situation of affairs. Amid the surprise and confusion nece .. sarily kindled in the minds of both of the American envoys. they still instantly perceived the importance and value of the overtures and were not one whit behind in meeting them in the spirit in which they were offered. The conferences were fre- quent and the deliberations rapid. There were three points to be considered : I. The cession of the province. 2. The price to be paid for it. 3. The claimed indenmity for prizes and car- goes. It was at once revealed that the American envoys were not clothed with sufficient powers to contract for the whole of Louisiana. Such a contingency had not entered the minds of the American government. At best they had only expected to get the island of New Orleans, or West Florida, or both. But it was realized by all that it would be too late to await the arrival of sufficient instructions from Philadelphia. In this emergency, the Americans resolved to exceed their instructions, accept the cession, and take the chances of the ratifications of their actions by the president and congress. The consent of the president and the senate would be necessary for the ratification of the treaty ; but the house would have the disposal of the financial measures necessary to pay for the province. Though not with- out misgivings as to the outcome at Philadelphia, the envoys resolved to take the risk. Dels man that England would be in possession before the months should elapse. The Ameri- cans had brought with them the draft of a treaty, but as the whole aspect was changed by the French overtures, the draft proposed by the latter was used as the basis. In fact, the draft prepared by Napoleon himself, a copy of which may be found herein, was the foundation of the negotiations. The first serious obstacle encountered was in regard to the limits of Louisiana. The Americans asked for the customary guaranty of the prop- erty they were about to acquire by purchase ; but were told by the French envoy that the limits of louisiana had never been fully and wholly defined ; that they would have to take the prov- ince as France had received it from Spain in 1800. The treaty of San Ildefonso was produced and carefully gone over, the lan- guage studied, and the chances were fully weighed. The Amer- icans saw that if every allowance was made for cintailment,
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they still would receive an immense and magnificent tract of country, more than sufficient to satify all their future require- ments. The French envoy avoided committing himself on the subject of limits, merely stating that the United States would receive what had been retroceded to France .. However, in one of the conferences he made the statement that although the Bishopric of Louisiana had been extended to the Pacific ocean, the province itself, concerning the rights of property and sovereignty, had not thus been extended. In this connection M. Marbois after- ward said: "Jf in appearing to be resigned to these general terms (of the treaty of San Ildefonso) through necessity, the American plenipotentiaries considered them really preferable to more precise stipulations, it must be admitted that the event just- ified their foresight. The shores of the Western ocean were cer- tainly not included in the cession; but the United States are already established there (this statement was made about the year 1830)." Napoleon also said in this connection that "If an obscurity did not already exist, it would perhaps be good pol- icy to put one there." M. Marbois at first put the price of the cession at one hundred millions of livres; but when the Amer- icans said this price was prohibitory he dropped to eighty millions. The Americans finally yielded this figure upon the condition that twenty millions of the eighty millions should be used to liqui- date the American claims. This was agreed to by M. Marbois. It was agreed that the original drafts of the treaty should be in the French language. The originals were completed on the 30th of April, there being three of them, but as they had to be copied, the signatures were not appended until the 3d of May."
It is a noteworthy and remarkable fact that the respective envoys were greatly elated at the harmony of the proceedings and the completion of the cession. All were impressed with the momentons character of the negotiation. M. Marbois himself afterward said : "A sentiment superior even to glory seemed to animate the three ministers and never perhaps did negotiators taste a purer joy." That is extremely strong language, and betokens that they were in a state of spiritual ecstacy, so impressed were they with the extraordinary nature of the act. As soon as the treaties were signed, all spontaneously arose and shook hands with intense feeling. Mr. Livingston, who had labored so long and earnestly for the good of his country, said: "We have lived long, but this is the noblest work of our whole
. History of Louisiana: Barbe Marbois.
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lives. The treaty which we have just signed has not been obtained by art or dictated by force ; equally advantageous to the two contracting parties, it will change vast solitudes into flour- ishing districts. From this day the United States take their place among the powers of the first rank; the English lose all exclusive influence in the affairs of America."
Napoleon had followed the progress of the negotiations witli all the interest and earnestness of his impetuous and decisive nature, inspired as he was with intense regret at the loss of the province and the imperative necessity of speedy action. He was greatly pleased when the negotiations were fully completed; but here the contradictory and inexplicable qualities of his nature revealed themselves. He had himself set the price of the ces- sion at the minimum of fifty millions of livres. M. Marbois afterward said of him at this point that "He learned that the eighty millions had been agreed on ; but that they were reduced to sixty millions by the deduction stipulated to be previously made for the settlement of the debt due by France to the Amer- icans. Then forgetting, or feigning to forget, the consent that he had given, he said with vivacity, 'I would that these twenty millions be paid into the treasury. Who has authorized you (Marbois) to dispose of the money of the State? The rights of the claimants cannot come before our own.' But when his attention was called to his own figures of fifty millions for the treasury and that really sixty millions were to be put there, he said : 'It is true ; the negotiation does not leave me anything to desire; sixty millions for an occupation that will not perhaps last but a day. I would that France should only this mes- pected capital, and that it nuo be employed in works beneficial to her marine.' " Later Napoleon said: "This accession of ter- ritory strengthens forever the power of the United States ; and I have just given to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride."
To show that Napoleon was right as to the imminency of war between France and England, it is only necessary to state that the respective ministers of the two countries left for home on the 17th of May, and that hostilities were begun by France on the 22d of May by the capture of some English merchantmen, and on the same day the treaty of cession was ratified by Napo- leon without waiting for the action of the United States. The transfer was made none too soon.
The American envoys formally communicated to congress on May 13 that they had conchiled with France a treaty for the
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whole of the province of Louisiana and gave their reasons to justify them in thus exceeding their instructions. They stated that the first consul at the outset had expressed the wish to cede the whole and not a part ; and that as they proceeded with the negotiation they found "that Mr. Marbois was absolutely restricted to the disposition of the whole and that he would treat for no less a portion."* This forced the Americans to con- sider the cession of the whole. They evidently were careful to view so important an acquisition from every standpoint that was likely to affect the United States, all of which was set forthi in their letter of May 13. They said: "By this acquisition, which comprises within our limits this great river and all the streams that empty into it from their sources to the ocean, the apprehension of disasters is banished for ages from the United States. We adjust by it the only remaining known canse of variance with this very powerful nation ( France) ; we antici- pate the discontent of the great rival of France, who would probably have been wounded at any stipulation of a permanent nature which favored the latter and which it would have been difficult to avoid, had she retained the right bank. We cease to have a motive of urgency at least for inclining to one Power to avert the unjust pressure of another. We separate ourselves in a great measure from the European world and its concerns, especially its wars and intrigues. We make, in fine, a great stride in real and substantial independence, the good effect whereof will we trust be felt essentially and extensively in all our foreign and domestic relations. Without exciting the appre- hensions of any Power, we take a more imposing attitude with respect to all. The bond of our Union will be strengthened and its movements become more harmonious by the increased purity of interest which it will communicate to the several parts which compose it. Louisiana was acquired of Spain by France in exchange for Tuscany, which latter is settled by treaty on the son-in-law of the King of Spain, with the title of King of Etruria, and was estimated in the exchange in con- sideration of its revenue at one himdred millions of francs. The First Consul thought he had made an advantageous bargain in that exchange, as appears by the high idea which he entertained of its value as shown on many occasions. Louisiana was the territory which he promised in his proclamation at the peace as an asylum to those who had become unfortunate by the revo-
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