USA > Louisiana > The province and the states, a history of the province of Louisiana under France and Spain, and of the territories and states of the United States formed therefrom, Vol. II > Part 4
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In answer to Mr. Izard's letter Mr. Lee wrote, "The fifth arti- de stood originally thus: 'Si les Etats-unis jugent à propos de tenter la conquête de la Canada, de la Nouvelle-Écosse, de Terre- nueve St. Jean, et des Bermudas, ces conquêtes encas de succes appartiendront aux dits ftats-Unis.' Even this did not appear to me adequate to the intentions of congress; I therefore pro- posed that it should be so extensive and explicit as was marked out to us in the eighth article of the plan proposed by congress. My colleagues did not agree with me, and I remember perfectly Doctor Franklin's answer was that congress had receded from those claims since by the concessions directed to be made to Spain. I submitted mine to the opinion of my colleagues. I have already asked the commands of congress relative to conceding anything to Spain agrecably to the instructions of the 30th of December, 1776, which you mention, and you may be assured that I will never sub cribe the cession of one inch of what congress has claimed in the eighth article of their plan without their express orders. I shall make no observations respecting the degree of
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gratitude to which Spain may be entitled, but the leaving of arti- cles so loose as to occasion disputes, or making cessions which may plant a thorn in the side of any of the United States, is not the mamier I should choose of showing it. How the fifth article came changed so much from what it was at first I never could learn." It would seem from the above that when the treaty was made, Doctor Franklin was under the impression that congress had receded from the instructions given in the act of congress of December 30, 1776. His course in disregarding the criticism of Mr. Lee of the fifth article of the treaty can be explained upon no other ground, unless upon the one previously given of his willingness to accept an imperfect or objectionable treaty rather 'han none at all.
On July 22, 1778, Doctor Franklin wrote, "The Spanish gal- leons, which have been impatiently expected, are at length hap- pily arrived. The fleet and army returning from Brazil is still out, but supposed to be on her way homeward. When that and the South Sea ships are arrived it will appear whether Spain's accession to the treaty has been delayed for the reasons given, or whether the reasons were only given to excuse the delay."* On August 31, Mr. Lee wrote to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, "It has been hinted to me that there will be two important sub- jects of negotiation with the Spanish court, upon which I beg to have the orders of congress: Providing the Spanish navy with masts at a stipulated and as reasonable price as possible ; and the cession of Florida, should it be conquered, to them. For this they would stipulate, who never peace is concluded to furnish the funds for redeeming all or a great part of the paper." Mr. Izard wrote on September 12, "The letters which Mr. Ice has lately received from Spain leave not the least room to doubt what the expectations of that comt are respecting the Floridas. For my own part, no such additional proof was necessary after having compared the fifth article of the treaty of alliance with the eighth article of the original treaty transmitted by congress. The con- duct of Spain has been full of ambiguity. She has been arming with all possible diligence ; and at the same time sent an ambas- sador to london, who has hitherto made use of no other language but that of peace and mediation. Should Spain be suf- fered to get possession of the Floridas, perpetual causes of quar- rel may be expected ; and therefore I hope the wisdom of congress will guard against this evil." Mr. Lee wrote to the Committee
* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.
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of Foreign Affairs on October 19, "No movements yet on the part of Spain. I have consulted Count de Vergennes on the propriety of my taking any measures to bring that court to a decision. Ilis advice is in these words, 'My opinion is that you will act pri- dently to suspend the advances which you desire to make to that court with the view of ascertaining its principles and resolutions with regard to America.' "
For some reason Spain diligently sought to bring the war between Great Britain and the United States to an end. There was a steady communion between the leaders of those two conn- tries during the early stages of the war. It is not at all improb- able that Spain may have intimated at one time to the British ministry that the relinquishment of the Floridas to the Spanish government would effect an alliance between Spain and Great Britain. But if so, such an intimation was disregarded by the British, because they did not expect to lose the Floridas even though they lost the colonies .*
In accordance with his instructions, M. Gerard, soon after his arrival in Philadelphia, began to consider the welfare of Spain in all negotiations in which the Floridas or the Mississippi ques- tion figured. In the instructions prepared in October, 1778, by order of congress, for Doctor Franklin at Paris, much was omitted that Mr. Morris (who wrote the instructions) had intended should be inserted. It was omitted pursuant to opinions expressed by M. Gerard, who gave congress to understand that France did not care to encourage the conquest of Canada by the United States. He also informed congress that "France would be obliged to discountenance any agressions by the United States upon Spain." Mr. Sparks gave the following summary of a dis- patch to M. Gerard to Count de Vergennes October 20, 1778: + "It seemed to him (Gerard) important for the United States to give some surety to that Power ( Spain) by fixing certain limits which should not be passed. In answer to Mr. Morris' ques- tion as to the nature and extent of this surety, Mr. Gerard said that the renunciation of any design upon Pensacola,. Mobile and St. Augustine, and even of the navigation of the Mississippi, would perhaps be necessary to accomplish an object so important to both parties and insure the confidence and friendship of Spain. Mr. Morris replied that many of his colleagues thought it was time to pass a law de coercendo imperio; that to extend the terri-
* Namiative and Critical History of America: Winsor.
Jared Spark's Manuscripts Harvard College.
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tory of the United States farther to the south and west would be rather to weaken than confirm the Union, and that the poverty and vigor of the north were the best safeguards of the Republic. He said these same persons considered it for the interest of the con- federation that the navigation of the Mississippi as high up as the month of the Ohio should appertain exclusively to his Catholic Majesty, because it would be the only means of retaining under dependence to the Republic the mass of population which would spring up between the Ohio and the lakes and in the western set- tlements of Virginia; that the inhabitants of these immense regions, whether English or Americans, having an outlet down the St. Lawrence on the one side and the Mississippi on the other, would be in a condition to domineer over the power of the United States, and even of Spam, and would in the end render them- selves independent. M. Gerard asked if this was the general sense of congress, for he knew several members who thought the navigation of the Mississippi should belong equally to the English and the Americans, Mr. Morris answered that these topics had not been agitated in such a manner as to come to any positive result, but the prevalent feeling was that it would not be expedi- ent to extend dominion to the south, and he believed the persons who wished to take possession of the Floridas had a scheme of ceding them to Spain for a pecuniary consideration ; and that some of those at least who were bent on securing the navigation of the Mississippi were interested in the new establishment in that quarter." But according to Francis Wharton "there must have been a misunderstanding as to the last point on the part of Gerard. Whatever may have been Morti ' own conviction of the impolicy of a southwestern extension of the United States, it is not likely that he would have charged those members who differed with him with being governed by interest in the new 'establishments' in the southwest."
Time continued to slip away without definite action concerning an alliance on the part of Spain. M. Gerard assumed to be the spokesman or agent for Spain, and through him communications were had with the Spanish monarch. On February 9, 1779, he informed congress that "the King of Spain, in order to put an end to the tergiversations of lingland," had made known to that power that he would undertake mediation between her and the United States and that, "the King of Spain, by taking this pro- ceeding upon himself in a friendly manner, has shown a disposi- tion most Favorable to the alliance (with the United States)." He therefore asked that congress should hasten to appoint some
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person authorized to proceed to Madrid to consider the problems likely to be presented during the negotiations. He also stated that the King of France had suggested that "at a time in which the United States are employed in fixing their political existence, it seems to belong to their foresight to consider the sentiments of the states as to the peace in relation to Spain." The committee of congress appointed to consider the terms upon which peace would be accepted, in pursuance of the mediation of Spain, pre- . pared an elaborate report which was submitted to congress on February 23, 1779, and after being read was ordered to lie on the table until the next Thursday. The report was taken from the table half a dozen times and very critically and fully considered. This seems to have been an carnest and honest attempt on the part of both France and Spain to establish peace between Great Britain and the United States upon the basis of the independence of the colonies. The delay of congress in preparing their ultimata occasioned an earnest appeal from M. Gerard on March 17, to hasten proceedings. Finally the following ultimata were agreed to March 19:
"1. That the thirteen United States are bounded north by a line to be drawn from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia along the highlands which divided those rivers which empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic ocean to the northesternmost head of Connecticut river; thence down along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude; thence due west in the latitude forty-five degrees north from the equator to the northwesternmost side of the river St. Lawrence or Cadaraqui ; thence straight to the south end of Lake Nipissing, and thence straight to the sources of the river Mississippi ; west by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river Mississippi from its source to where the said line shall intersect the latitude thirty-one degrees north. South by a line to be drawn due east from the termination of the last mentioned line in the latitude thirty-one degrees north from the equator to the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River; thence straight to the head of St. Mary's river ; thence down along the middle of St. Mary's river to the Atlantic ocean ; then east by a line to be drawn along the middle of St. John's from its source to its month in the Bay of Fundy, or by a line to be settled and adjusted between that part of the State of Massachusetts Bay; formerly called the Province of Maine, and the Colony of Nova Scotia, agreeable to their respective rights, comprehending all
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islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States and lying between lines to be drawn due cast from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part and East Florida on the other part shall, respec- tively, touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic ocean : Provided, that if the line to be drawn from the mouth of Lake Nipissing to the head of the Mississippi can not be obtained without continuing the war for that purpose, then that a line or lines may be drawn more southerly, so as not to be southward of a line in latitude forty-five degrees north.
"2. That every port and place within the United States, and every island, harbor and road to them or any of them belonging, be absolutely evacuated by the land and sea forces of his Britan- nic Majesty and yieldled to the powers of the states to which they respectively belong."#
On the 22d of March, a third resolution relative to the. New- foundland fisheries was adopted; and two days later the fourth resolution was rejected by a vote of 28 to 8, the latter being as follows : "That the navigation of the river Mississippi be acknowl- edged and ratified absolutely free to the subjects of the United States." The reason why so many voted against this resolution was doubtless because they deemed it impolitic, in view of the known attitude of both France and Spain against such claim, to adopt in so formal a manner a resolution so broad, emphatic and decisive. This action be congress was due to the solicitations of the French minister, who desired to lay before Spain in definite form the demands of the United States. Whether Spain would form an alliance with the United States against Great Britain, depended wholly on the concord likely to be reached between Spain and the United States on the questions of boundaries and the navigation of the Mississippi.
Late in 1778 and early in 1779, M. Gerard, the French minister to Philadelphia, endeavored to induce congress to agree to the conditions required by the king of Spain, in order to secure his active services as an ally against Great Britain. He assured the Committee of Foreign Affairs of congress "that his King would not prolong the war for a single day to secure to the United States the possessions which they coveted."f At this time congress did not ask for more than an extension of their western limits to the Mississippi and the permanent right to navigate that river from
. Diplomatie Correspondente, secret.
+ Spark's Manuscript: Harvard College.
EARLY N.IFIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 49
its source to the sea. But M. Gerard informed them that in his opinion the United States already had more territory than they could easily administer, and expressed a hope that there would never be more than thirteen states unless Canada became the fourteenth. In order to assist Spain, France, at the commence- ment of the Revolution, had asked her to recognize the inde- pendence of the United States, that she might have a basis for the negotiations which should result from the war; but instead of doing so she reserved such right in a special article attached to the treaty between France and the United States. Spain sought for the possession of the river and the port of Mobile, the acqui- sition of Pensacola, and all of the coast of Florida along the Bahama channel. In order to favor Spain and curb the preten- sions of the United States the French minister supported the demands of the former and was curt and severe in the endeavor to effect his objects. In a formal interview with congress . on February 15, 1779, he announced that Spain put the price of declaring war against Great Britain and of joining France and the United States in the struggle at the possession of Pensacola and the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, and declared that if these conditions were not agreed to she might join England instead of the United States. As it was vastly to the interests of France to have Spain join against Great Britain, the course of the French minister becomes clear in trying to satisfy Spain at the expense of the United States. But the importance of navigating the Mississippi was fully recognized this early by the members of congress, and they did not readily agree to its relinquishment.
In a letter dated May 27, 1779. M. Gerard urged congress to hasten action anew in regard to the concessions to Spain. "It is only by enabling the court of Spain to bring its mediation to its critical and decisive point that it can be hoped that this power, convinced of the injustice of the views and of the ambition of England, will join the alliance, acknowledge the independence of the United States, and take an active part in the war. On the contrary, by delaying, without communicating to the parties interested the motives which induce them to it, the states will be in danger of fatiguing this power, which keeps on foot the forces of the whole monarchy, principally with a view to give respecta bility to a mediation which appears to be neglected ; they incur the risk of cooling the good will of his Catholic Majesty, and per - haps of alienating him as much by delays as if resolutions con- trary to the system which he has appeared disposed to favor by his mediation should give him lawful reasons for changing his 11-4
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conduct. The alliance will dans be deprived of a decisive sup. port, which the goodness of its cause, the wisdom of its conduct and the close union subsisting between France and Spain seemed to promise it. . The season is already so far advanced that this same uncertainty, by destroying the hope of seeing Spain declare herself during the course of the present campaign, leaves France' alone exposed to the efforts of the principal body of the enemy's forces. The wisdom of congress and the faithful attach- ment which they show on every occasion is as conspicnons as it is satisfactory to the alliance, and the respect which they have always expressed for Spain, do not permit a doubt as to the atten- tion which they will be pleased to give to considerations of such importance."
This was an elaborate and round-about effort of the French minister to secure the passage of strong resolutions of congress in favor of Spain in order to win the immediate alliance of the lat- ter and thus engage her assistance to repel the early-expected attack of a fresh and threatened expedition of the British. Of course congress was aware that M. Gerard expected them to make large concessions to Spain at this critical juncture, as much to save the armies of France as those of the United States. On the other hand, it was not deemed wise to concede immensely valuable rights to Spain, when, with the assistance of France, congress felt able to crush the British armies and the British fleets. They did not, therefore, surrender everything Spain desired in order to gain her active co-oeration in the war. In the fall of 1979. M. Gerard was superceded by Chevalier de la Luzeme, who continued the policy of the former. On June 21 Mr. Lee wrote, "I have the honor to inform congress that Spain has declared against Great Britain and that their respective ambassadors are recalled. A part of the Spanish fleet has joined that of France, which makes it outnumber that of England."*
Spain saw that, owing to the demands of the United States, there was certain to be contentions between the two countries, should the latter gain their independence. It was therefore out of the question for her to form an alliance with the revolting col- onies, unless they should recode from their demands on the Mis- sissippi. But if she remained silent, the States would, with the assistance of France, win their independence, and at the same time probably secure by conquest the Floridas and in consequence the permanent and free navigation of the Mississippi. This would
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. prolence, secret.
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be their undoubted right could they accomplish it. To prevent this result, Spain was forced to declare war against Great Britain. She rightly concluded that while England was engaged with the rebellious colonies, she could make a conquest of the Floridas and thus be in possession of them and therefore the mouth of the Mississippi upon the conchision of peace. She would thus be in a much better situation than if she joined the colonies. She therefore declared war against England and concluded a secret treaty April 12, 1779, with France, but did not secure by the lat- ter any advantages over the United States.
After a discussion lasting more than six months, congress finally, on September 17, 1779, adopted the following resolution :+
"Whereas, By the treaties subsisting between his Most Christian Majesty (of France ) and the United States of America, a power is reserved to his Catholic Majesty (of Spain) 'to accede to said treaties and to participate in their stipulations at such times as he shall judge proper,'" etc.
"And whereas, Should his Catholic Majesty accede to the said treaties without any alteration, he must be under the necessity of renouncing forever all claims to the possession of the Floridas, of the utmost consequence to his kingdom, and more particularly to his American dominions. In order, therefore, that nothing may by wanting on the part of these States to further a treaty of alliance and of amity and commerce with his Catholic Majesty, consistent with the engagements of the said States and agreeable to his most Christian Majesty, their ally,
"Resolved, That if his Catholic Majesty shall accede to the said treaties, and in concurrence with France and the United States of America, continue the present war with Great Britain for the pur- pose expressed in the treaties aforesaid, he shall not thereby be precluded from seenring to himself the Floridas. On the con- trary, if he shall obtain the Floridas from Great Britain, these United States will guaranty the same to his Catholic Majesty : provided always that the United States shall enjoy the free navi- gation of the river Mississippi into and from the sea.
"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to prepare instruc- tions conformable to the foregoing resolutions."
It will be noted in these resolutions how alluringly the bait of the Floridas was presented, and how it was made to appear that their acquisition by Spain depended on an alliance with the United States. There can be no doubt that the reason why Spain did not
· Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.
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concluide such a treaty with the colonies at the outset, as France did, was because she was differently situated than France, and her interests were likely to suffer by such an alliance. Accord- ingly, at the commencement of the Revolution, Spain only favored a redress of grievances for the colonies. Her statesmen saw that the proximity of the United States to Louisiana and the Spanish West Indies, was a menace to the Spanish American possessions. Spain had nothing to gain by an alliance with the United States, unless the latter should renounce to her the Floridas which she coveted ; but she expected to gain them without such an alliance while lingland was busy with her rebellious colonies. She wisely concluded that, in any event, it was necessary for her to move with extreme prudence and cantion. She disliked Eng .. land, was the firm friend of France, and wished to gain the friend- ship of the United States. She likewise thought that, should the colonies fail to gain their independence, it would be to her advan- tage to remain in the good graces of England, her nearest neigh- bor in America. The people of New Orleans and of all the other Louisiana colonies feared the encroachments of the Americans, who had begun already to push their settlements into the valley of the Ohio and to send their produce down the Mississippi to New Orleans. This fear is all the more noteworthy by reason of the exclusive policy of Spain in regard to the trade of her col- ony of Louisiana. As the war progressed it was developed that her ambition was to gain the Floridas with a boundary as far north as possible and the exclusive navigation of the river Mis- sissipi and that of the Gulf of Mexico. It was clearly developed that the apprehensions of the Spanish sovereign of future dis- sensions, and perhaps wars, with the United States, the differ- ences in regard to American colonial boundaries, and the dis- agreement over the right to navigate the Mississippi river, were the principal obstacles during the Revolution to a treaty between Spain and the United States.
But the colonies, in their struggle, needed assistance -- money, soldiers, ships, munitions and accordingly, in September, 1779, appointed John Jay minister plenipotentiary to the court at Mad- rid, with powers of concluding a treaty with Spain similar to the one concluded with France in 1778, or if that could not be accom- plished, to secure such assistance as was possible. He was spe- cially instructed with the above resolutions of congress of Sep- tember 17, 1770, and was further instructed September 25 as follows: "You are particularly to endeavor to obtain some coll- venient port or ports below the thirty-first degree of north lati.
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