USA > Louisiana > The province and the states, a history of the province of Louisiana under France and Spain, and of the territories and states of the United States formed therefrom, Vol. II > Part 20
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· American State Papers.
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lution, and which he spoke of as vast and fertile. When I.e made up his mind to offer the cession of it to the United States, it was contemplated to ask for it one hundred millions, exchisis. of the debts they owed to our citizens, which they propor! we should pay, with a perpetual exemption from foreign duties on the manufactures, productions and vessels of France and Spain in the ports of the ceded territory. From that demand, however, he receded under the deliberations of his own cabinet ; for the first proposition which M. Marbois made to us . was that we should pay eighty millions, sixty of which in cash, the balance to our citizens, the whole in one year in Paris, with a perpetual exemption from foreign duties as above. The modi fication in the mode of payment, that is, by stock (for from the quantum he never would depart ) and the limitation of the term of the duties to twelve years, with the proviso annexed to it, which was introduced into the treaty with every other change from his project, was the effect of negotiation and accom- modation, in which we experienced on his part and on that of his government a promptitude and candor which were highly grateful to us. Permit us to express an earnest wish that the President and Senate may decide with the least pos- sible delay on the treaty and conventions which we have con- cluded and have the pleasure to transmit you. If it is the sense of our Government to ratify them, the sooner that fact is known to this Government the better its effect will be."
Just before the news of the cession of Louisiana to the United States reached the president, the attitude of Great Britain con- corning that province and the Florida, because a rettet of with solicitude to the American authentics. The president had been informed that in case of a war between France and Great Brit- ain the latter would endeavor to take possession of New Orleans. In such an event the question arose, How would such possession affect the rights of the United States in that quar- ter? It was intimated by the British minister that the United States might expect in that event better terms than they had expected from either France or Spain. This intimation may have been made in good faith, but it was also made no doubt to gain the good will of the United States. It was intimated also that the United States should make as little concession to France as possible "on points disagreeable to Great Britain." Mr. Madison instructed the American envoys to France that should the question arise "how far in a state of war one of the parties can of right convey territory to a neutral Power, and
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thereby deprive its enemy of the chance of conquest incident to war, especially when the conquest may have been actually projected, it is thoughit proper to observe to you, first, That in the present case the project of peaceable acquisition by the United States originated prior to the war, and consequently before a project of conquest could have existed; second, that the right of a neutral to procure for itself by a bona fide trans- action property of any sort from a belligerent Power, ought not to be frustrated by the chance that a rightful conquest thereof might thereby be precluded."#
As soon as possible after the conclusion of the cession of Loui- siana to the United States, Messrs. Livingston and Monroe lost no time in acquainting the president with all that had trans- pired. They likewise promptly informed Mr. King, the Ameri- can minister to Great Britain, of the cession, in order that the latter might check any intended expedition of the British against New Orleans. On May 7, Mr. King had written from London that "in case of war (between France and England) it is the purpose of this Government to send an expedition "to occupy New Orleans. If it be ceded to us ( the United States) would it not be expedient openly or confidentially to communicate the fact here? I have reason to be satisfied that it would prevent the projected expedition."; This letter occasioned the prompt action of Messrs. Livingston and Monroe. They further told Mr. King that he might inform the English government that in framing the cession treaty care had been taken not to infringe any of the rights of Great Britain to the navigation of the Mis- sissippi. On May 15, this information was composed In M. King to the British mmistry, who a hutle later told him that if met the approbation of the king.
In a communication to Charles Pinckney dated, Aranjuez, May 4, 1803, Mr. Cervallos, Spanish minister of state, said : "The system adopted by His Majesty not to disposses himself of any portion of his States, deprives him of the pleasure of assenting to the cessions which the United States wish to obtain by purchase, as I have intimated for their information to the Marquis of Casa Yrujo. By the retrocession made to France of Louisiana, this Power regains the said province with the lin- its it had, and saving the rights acquired by other Powers. The United States can address themselves to the French Gov-
' American State Papery.
t Diplomatic Correspondence.
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ernment to negotiate the acquisition of territories which may suit their interest."* This was the first definite information which Mr. Pinckney received from Spain to show that his efforts to secure concessions on the Mississippi from that government were wholly wasted; for here was an absolute acknowledgement that the province had passed to France, and here was the singu- lar observation that the United States must go to Paris to secure the concessions desired on the Mississippi. The above state- ment of Mr. Cervallos, without straining the natural meaning of the language, may be construed to embrace the admission that West Florida was included in the retrocession of Louisiana to France, because Mr. Pinckney had asked only for West Florida -- that for many months had been the sole and announced object of his mission-and was now told, in answer to his importuni- ties, to go to France, to whom Louisiana had been retroceded. Why go to France after West Florida if the latter was not included in the Louisiana retroceded? Was this not an inad- vertent admission by the Spanish minister that West Florida had passed to France with the retrocession of Louisiana?
In a communication dated May 12, 1803, Mr. Livingston expressed the opinion that, at the time Napoleon had read with much attention his memorials sent to him through the favor of his brother Joseph, "they had determined to let ns have New Orleans and the territory above the Arkansas in exchange for certain commercial advantages, and that if they could have con- cluded with Spain, we shoukl also have had West Florida."t This may have been true, because about the same time the inter- diction at New Orleans was ordered revoked, and Mr. Livingston was accorded far better treatment by the French minister and the first consul. As early as the first of February, 1803, something had occurred to change the attitude of the French leaders toward the Americans. Mr. Livingston was shown high privileges and distinguished personal considerations. He was led to believe that his efforts would prove successful to a reasonable degree in case the Floridas could be secured from Spain by France. He soon became aware of the fact that the first consul "had conceived an idea that by taking possession of the country ( Louisiana ) he could more advantageously treat with our Government;" and that "Mr. Talleyrand accordingly told me several times, in general terms, that everything would
* This statement should be borne in mind.
t This is further proof that the interdiction was upon the order of France.
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be arranged, but that they must first take possession." Mr. livingston further said : "What I believe principally drove them to this measure was the promise which the First Consul had hastily made me to pay our debt fully and promptly, and which he found himself in no situation to fulfill and yet knew not how to elude, as I pressed it at every turn." The attitude of con- gress and the threatened rupture with Great Britain, Mr. Liv- ingston stated, contributed to the conclusions of the first consul to sell Louisiana.
It was stated by Mr. Livingston on June 3, "that since the ratification (of the cession treaty) we have had a great deal of trouble with it, an opinion prevailing that we have made too favorable a bargain. ... I must eamestly press you, if you think the object important, to get the ratification as soon as possible and to do all that on our part remains to be done. During this transaction I have thought it improper to press any other business that might excite the smallest irritation. How happy, my dear sir, are we to have concluded a treaty which will forever exclude us from the politics of this stormy quarter of the globe. I hope that you will not let it totally pass through your hands."
The importance of speedy action on the treaty was again called to the attention of the president by Messrs. Livingston and Monroe in a letter dated June 7. In order to prevent any pos- sible accident and to insure the prompt arrival of the treaty papers in Washington, the American envoys sent the originals and two copies by three different messenger : On Job 1 ;. 19. one sent by Mr. Hughes was placed in the hands of Preside! ! Jefferson. Some misgivings having arisen in the minds of the French authorities concerning the security of France as to the payments to be made for Louisiana and the transfer of the prov- ince to the United States, efforts were made by M. Marbois, at the instigation of the first consul, to correct any possible misunderstanding. The American envoys were given to under- stand that the first consul considered the province worth from three to four hundred millions of livres .* In other ways it was intimated to them that they had made a splendid bargain for themselves and that many Frenchmen were sorry of the ces- sion and would be pleased to learn that the treaty had not been ratified by the United States. This alarmed the American envoys, who in all of their letters of that date, urged congress and the
* American State Papers.
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president to ratify the treaty and do it quickly. They wie: June 7: "We thought we could discern some symptoms of ... content in the Government (of France) with the bargain it l ... ! made. The letter from M. Marbois left no doubt on that hea : We are convinced that if the transaction was not complete, c: was within the reach of the Government, it would not take place eyen on terms very different from those stipulated. There i, much reason to believe that this letter was written not solely for the purpose of manifesting a sentiment of regret at what had been done but to create difficulties and embarrass the transaction in the execution of it. * * We learned from the minister of foreign affairs that the first consul considered the ratification as under his control till the exchange took place, and that he might annex to it such conditions as appeared to him to be proper ; that he claimed every act stipulated on the part of the United States to be performed strictly within the terms specified, or on failure that the parties be restored to the state they were in if the treaties were never made. We asked him what had created any doubt on that point ; he said that the clause in the article of the convention respecting the payment of sixty millions of francs to France, which was made dependent on the delivery of possession of the country to our commissary, might by accident or other causes become nugatory ; the Spaniards might not surrender it at once, the British might take it, etc. We told him that these things were contemplated by the parties when the treaties were made and provided for; that we could not add a new article to the treaty or explain any one in it, since it must be explained by itself only; that delays which proceeded from bad faith were those only for which our Government was responsible; that such as were unavoidable attached to them no blame and could not affect the treaty. He replied that after the example of our Gov- ernment in the last treaty, the Consul might nevertheless annex a condition to the ratification explanatory of his sense of it, whichi he would do if we did not satisfy him either with respect to the prompt manner in which the treaty would be executed by our Government, or agree to expunge the terms in that convention which respected taking possession of the territory. We did not fail to remark that the treaty must stand as it was to be adopted, rejected or modified by the parties having the right to do the same and not by us."
The American envoys thereupon gave the best assurance they could of the good conduct of the United States, but at the same time urged the authorities in America to lose not a moment to
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ratify the treaty. "It is our carnest wish and advice, if the treaties are approved by the President, that he convene the Con- gress to provide the funds for an immediate compliance with them. It is best to leave nothing to hazard. The surrender of the posts ought to precede the creation of the fund; but as there will be no doubt on that point after taking the necessary meas- ures, we would consider it as done and act accordingly. If we execute our part strictly within the terms specified, the transac- tion is at an end; there will be no obstacle from this quarter.
. . We cannot too strongly impress an idea, if our conduct is approved, of the most prompt execution of the stipulations to be performed on our part and of a course of proceeding which leaves nothing to chance, by giving any cause of complaint to this Government." To protect itself the French government instructed its minister at Washington that, on exchanging the ratifications with the United States, he should declare such ratifications void, unless the funds, etc., were created by congress in the term stipulated.
In a communication dated June 25, Mr. Livingston wrote: "I hope that nothing will prevent your immediate ratification with- out altering a syllable of the terms. If you wish anything changed, ratify unconditionally and set on foot a new negotia- tion. Be persuaded that France is sick of the bargain ; that Spain is much dissatisfied, and that the slightest pretense will lose you the treaty. Nothing has raised the reputation of our country in Europe so high as the conduct of our Government upon this occasion, both at home and alford.". In answer to a complaint from Mr. Livingston that Mr. Motive had been given greater powers than he, Mr. Madison wrote on July 29: "The difference in the diplomatic titles given to Mr. Monroe from that given to you and which you understood to have ranked him above you, was the result merely of an error in the clerk who copied the document, and which escaped attention when they were signed. It was not the intention of the President that any distinction of grade should be made between you." Mr. Living- ston was instructed to investigate thoroughly the question of the boundaries of Louisiana.
The act of Messrs. Livingston and Monroe in securing the cession of Louisiana, though wholly beyond their instructions and authority, met the approval of the Jeffersonian administration and generally of the people of the United States. It cannot be
* Diplomatic Correspondence.
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said to have been the result of the good work of the envoys though the memorials of Mr. Livingston indicated to France a would-be purchaser ; nor was it brought about by the statesman. ship of Mr. Jefferson, though he possessed to an eminent degree such qualities; neither did the arrival of Mr. Monroe in Paris have anything to do with fixing in the mind of the first consul the determination to sell, because the conclusion to dispose of the whole of the province instead of a part was unalterably reached by Napoleon some days before the arrival of Mr. Mon- roe. The determination to sell resulted from the conclusion that France was certain soon to lose the province either to England or the United States. As between the two, France, of course, had but one choice, even if the conditions had been the same or similar, which they were not. It would pass to England as the result of war, to the United States for a consideration. Its value was known to Napoleon, but more was not asked, because the chances were that the American envoys would not pay more without too long a wait, and because great haste was necessary to forestall the British from taking possession of New Orleans. Thus the acquisition of Louisiana by the United States was the unexpected and extraordinary result of the international situation in Europe.
The American envoys were informed by Mr. Madison that their acts were approved by the administration. He wrote: "In concurring with the disposition of the French Government to treat for the whole of Louisiana, although the western part of it was not embraced by your powers, you were justified by the solid reasons which you give for it ; and I am changed by the I'vesi- dent to express to you his entire approbation of your so doing." This approbation is in no respect precluded by the silence of your commission and instructions. When these were made out the object of the most sanguine was limited to the establishment of the Mississippi as our boundary. It was not presumed that more could be sought by the United States, either with a chance of success or perhaps without being suspected of a greedy ambi- tion, than the island of New Orleans and the two Floridas, it being little doubted that the latter was or would be compre- hended in the cession from Spain to France. To the acquisition of New Orleans and the Floridas, the provision was therefore accommodated. Nor was it to be supposed that in case the French Government should be willing to part with more than the terri-
· American State Papers.
Ola Maps Showing the Extent of Louisiana
110°
140°
97 " 30'
102'30'
STATE
No. 7. 1775
NEW
London. Under act of Parliament Copied from Von Stacklin's. St. Petersburg. 1774. Am. Atlas Jeffery's No. 2.
Additions to the United States by the trealy and its effects.
LOUISIANA
35
CHIKA SAWS
40°
-
1
LOUISIANA.
CHACTAWS
Barbe-Marbois. Paris 1820.
BISCAY
Gulf of Mexico
NEW LEON
No. VI
97'30'
102' 30'
He negotiated treaty of cession in 1803. His History of Louisiana Con Library. 300
NO· No.IX.
till of Mexico
Pacific
MEXICO
40'
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tory on our side of the Mississippi, an arrangement with Spain for restoring to her the territory on the other side, would not be preferred to a sale of it to the United States. The effect of such considerations was diminished by no information or just pre- sumptions whatever. In truth the communications in general between Mr. Livingston and the French Goverment, both of prior and subsequent date, manifested a repugnance to our views of purchase, which left no expectation of any arrange- ment with France, by which an extensive acquisition was to be made, unless in a favorable crisis, of which advantage should be taken. Such was thought to be the crisis which gave birth to the extraordinary commission in which you are joined. It consisted of the state of things produced by the breach of our deposits at New Orleans; the situation of the French islands, particularly the important island of St. Domingo; the distress of the French finances ; the unsettled posture of Europe; the increasing jealousy between Great Britain and France; and the known aversion of the former to see the mouth of the Mississippi in the hands of the latter. These considerations, it was hoped, might so far open the eyes of France to her real interest, and her ears to the moni- tory truths which were conveyed to her through different chan- nels, as to reconcile her to the establishment of the Mississippi as a natural boundary to the United States; or at least to some con- cession which would justify our patiently waiting for a fuller accomplishment of our wishes under auspicious events. The crisis relied on has derived peculiar force from the rapidity with which the complaints and questions Loween France and Great Britain ripened toward a rupture ; and it i just go amd fo; contual and general felicitation that it has issued under your zealous exertions in the extensive acquisition beyond the Mississippi."
The following interesting letter was written by President Jef- ferson to John C. Breckenridge under date of August 12, 1803 :* "The boundaries, which I deem not admitting question, are the highlands on the western side of the Mississippi enclosing all its waters, the Missouri of course, and terminating in the line drawn from the northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods to the nearest source of the Mississippi as lately settled between Great Britain and the United States. We have some claims to extend on the seacoast westwardly to the Rio Norte or Bravo, and better to go eastwardly to the Rio Perdido between Mobile and Pensa-
. Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Ford.
11-14
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cola, the ancient boundary of Louisiana. These claims will be a subject of negotiation with Spain and if, as soon as she is at war, we push them strongly with one hand, holding out a price in the other, we shall certainly obtain the Floridas and all in good time. In the meanwhile, without waiting for permission, we shall enter into the exercise of the natural right we have always insisted on with Spain, to-wit: That of a nation holding the upper part of streams having a right of innocent passage through them to the ocean. We shall prepare her to see us practice and she will not oppose it by force. Objections are raised to the eastward (in the New England States probably) against the vast extent of our boundaries, and propositions are made to exchange Louisiana or a part of it for the Floridas. But as I have said we shall get the Floridas without, and I would not give one inch of the waters of the Mississippi to any nation, because I see in a light very impor- tant to our peace the exclusive right to its navigation and the admission of no nation into it, but as into the Potomac or Dela- ware with our consent and under our police. These Federalists see in this acquisition the formation of a new confederacy, embracing all the waters of the Mississippi on both sides of it, and a separation of its eastern waters from us. These combina- tions depend on so many circumstances which we cannot forsee, that I place little reliance on them. We have seldom seen neigh- borhood produce affection among nations. The reverse is almost the universal truth. Besides, if it should became the great inter- est of those nations to separate from this, if their happiness should depend on it so strongly as to induce than to go through that convulsion, why should the Atlantic States diead it? But especially why should we, their present inhabitants, take side in such a question? When I view the Atlantic States, procuring for those on the eastern waters of the Mississippi friendly instead of hostile neighbors on its western waters, I do not view it as an Englishman would the procuring future blessings for the French nation with whom he has no relations of blood or affection. The future inhabitants of the Atlantic and Mississippi States will be our sons. We leave them in distinct but bordering establish- ments. We think we see their happiness in their union and we wish it. Events may prove it otherwise; and if they see their interest in separation, why should we take side without Atlantic rather than our Mississippi descendants? It is the elder and the younger son differing. God bless them both and keep them in union, if it be for their good, but separate them if it be better." It was at this time that Mr. Jefferson and other American states-
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men prepared drafts of an amendment to the constitution pro- viding for the admission of new states into the Union.
As soon as it became known to Spain that Napoleon had ceded Louisiana to the United States, the French authorities encountered serions remonstrances from the Spanish government. They declared that the cession was a breach of faith; that France had solemnly agreed not to alienate the province (which was true) ; and that they ( Spain) would use every endeavor in their power to obstruct the transfer. The Spanish minister at Paris was instructed to prevent, if possible, the cession from being carried into execution and was authorized to us "pecuniary arguments" if they were likely to succeed .* The following communication was sent to the American minister to Spain by the Spanish gov- ernment :
"Palace, July 19, 1803.
"To the Minister of the United States of America :
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