USA > Montana > Yellowstone County > An illustrated history of the Yellowstone Valley : embracing the counties of Park, Sweet Grass, Carbon, Yellowstone, Rosebud, Custer and Dawson, state of Montana > Part 7
USA > Montana > Park County > An illustrated history of the Yellowstone Valley : embracing the counties of Park, Sweet Grass, Carbon, Yellowstone, Rosebud, Custer and Dawson, state of Montana > Part 7
USA > Montana > Dawson County > An illustrated history of the Yellowstone Valley : embracing the counties of Park, Sweet Grass, Carbon, Yellowstone, Rosebud, Custer and Dawson, state of Montana > Part 7
USA > Montana > Rosebud County > An illustrated history of the Yellowstone Valley : embracing the counties of Park, Sweet Grass, Carbon, Yellowstone, Rosebud, Custer and Dawson, state of Montana > Part 7
USA > Montana > Custer County > An illustrated history of the Yellowstone Valley : embracing the counties of Park, Sweet Grass, Carbon, Yellowstone, Rosebud, Custer and Dawson, state of Montana > Part 7
USA > Montana > Sweet Grass County > An illustrated history of the Yellowstone Valley : embracing the counties of Park, Sweet Grass, Carbon, Yellowstone, Rosebud, Custer and Dawson, state of Montana > Part 7
USA > Montana > Carbon County > An illustrated history of the Yellowstone Valley : embracing the counties of Park, Sweet Grass, Carbon, Yellowstone, Rosebud, Custer and Dawson, state of Montana > Part 7
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In the meantime the same tactics were being pur-
sued and executed around Custer hill. The warriors under the leadership of Crow-King, Crazy Horse, White Bull, Hump, and others, moved up the ravine west of Custer hill. and concentrated under the shelter of the ridge on the right flank and back of his posi- tion. Gall's bloody work was finished before the anni- hilation of Custer was accomplished, and his victorious warriors hurried forward to the hot encounter then go- ing on, and the frightful massacre was completed.
Smith's men had disappeared from the ridge, but not without leaving enough dead bodies to mark their line. About 28 bodies of men belonging to the troops and other organizations were found in one ravine near the river. Many corpses were found scattered over the field between Custer's line of defense, the river, and the direction of Reno's hill. These, doubtless, were of men who had attempted to escape; some of them may have been sent as couriers by Custer. One of the first bodies I recognized and one of the nearest to the ford was that of Sergeant Butler, of Tom Custer's troop. Sergeant Butler was a soldier of many years' experience and of known courage. The indications were that he had lost his life dearly for near and under him were found many empty cartridge shells.
All the Indian accounts that I know of, agree that there was no organized close-quarters fighting, except on the two flanks; that with the annihilation at Cus- ter's hill the battle was virtually over. It does not appear that the Indians made any advance to the at- tack from the direction of the river; they did have a definite force along the river, and in the ravines which destroyed those who left Custer's line.
Two Moon, a chief of the Cheyennes, in de- scribing the battle, states that they surrounded Custer from all sides and kept "swirling and swirling around the soldiers." "Once in a while," he says, "a soldier would break out and run toward the river, but never would reach it. At last about a hundred men and five horsemen stood on the hill and bunched to- gether. All along the bugler kept blowing his commands * * * Then a chief was killed. I heard it was Long Hair (Custer), and then the five horsemen and the bunch of men, maybe some forty, started toward the river. All the soldiers were killed and stripped." He states that they counted the dead and they numbered 388, and that 39 Sioux and 7 Cheyennes were killed and about 100 wounded. From the best authority we are acquainted with Custer's abil- ity. He had served in the war of the rebellion
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with destinction and honor, and had taken part in many engagements with the Indians. No one who is at all familiar with his career doubted his ability. General Terry had no ex- perience in Indian warfare. Then, would it not be natural that he should leave Custer to his own judgment as far as possible under the circumstances? The following written instruc- tions were given Custer on the 22nd :
Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River. Montana Territory, JUNE, 22, 1876. 1
Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, 7th Cavalry,
Colonel :- The Brigadier-General commanding di- rects that as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pur- suit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Ma- jor Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so, the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, how- ever, indicate to you his own views of what your actions should be, and he desires that you should con- form to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that yon should pro- ceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail ahove spoken of leads. Should it be found to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, per- haps as far as the head waters of the Tongue, then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling, however, con- stantly to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing along your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up as far as least as the forks of the Little and Big Horns. Of course its fu- ture movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians. if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly encircled by the two columns that the escape will be impossible. The De- partment Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's creek, and that you should endeavor to sent a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column, with information of the results of your examination. The lower part of the creek will be examined by a detach- ment from Colonel Gibbon's command.
Very respectfully, Your obedient servant.
E. W. SMITH,
Captain 18th Infantry, Acting Assistant Adjutant-Gen.
In accordance with Terry's instructions, as given above, Custer and Gibbon were to meet on the Little Big Horn on the 26th, the pre- sumption being that the Indians were camped in this valley, that they might make a joint attack and if possible surround and capture the hostiles. We also note on previous pages that Custer did not wait until the 26th, but on 25th made attack. Was he justified in making this early attack ? Some writers say he was; others say he was not. Those who say he was, con- tend that the instructions were not binding, that it was not the intention of Terry that Custer shuld not be permitted to vary from the instructions if he thought best, and in proof of their contention they cite from the instructions given Custer the following sentences : "It is im- posible to give you definite instructions in re- gard to this movement. * * The Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy." They further infer that these instruc- tions were not definite orders, but simply a guide, and that if Custer thought best after overtaking the enemy, he was to exercise his own judgment as to what he should do under the circumstances.
The other writers contend that the instruc- tions were definite orders and, that under no circumstances should he have varied from them. They contend that a request from a mil- itary officer is a command and that Custer should under no circumstances have varied from the written instructions.
One writer says, that "Custer might have been prompted to immediate action fearing that the enemy might abandon the village after learning the position of the soldiers, and thus, in order to prevent their abandoning the vil- lage made the attack on the day previous to the appointed time of the meeting of the two forces."
Had Custer ascertained the position of the
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HISTORY OF MONTANA.
enemy, giving orders for a simultaneous attack from the right (Custer), from the left ( Ben- teen), and from the upper end of the village (Reno), the advantage would all have been in favor of the soldier. The Indians not know- ing the strength of the soldiers and being sub- jected to a cross fire from the three different columns, would no doubt have abandoned the village.
From information gathered from the chiefs who took part in the battle we must credit them with some very skillful moves. Their plan for surrounding Reno was tactful and had it been carried out Reno's forces would have been sur- rounded and met the same fate as Custer and his men.
Reno found but little interference until he reached nearly the upper end of the village. In the meantime, the Indians had circled around him to the south with the expectation of preventing his return across the same ford by which he crossed to the west side, thus sur- rounding him. They did not know that there was a ford farther north where he could retreat to the east side of the river. Their plan to sur- round him having failed, and he having gained the east side, they now planned to surround his force before it could ascend to the high bluffs. In order to do this the force of Indians south of Reno crossed the same ford where Reno crossed to the west side, and another detach- ment of the warriors was sent across at a ford farther north. The Indians arrived just a few minutes too late to accomplish their designs, and Reno was well on his way up the bluff be- fore they arrived.
The number of warriors taking part in the battle has been variously estimated, military officers placing the number at about . 2.500. General Sheridan estimates the number of hostile band at from 500 to 800. Major James McLaughlin, U. S. Indian Agent at Devils Lake, N. D., for many years, has made an esti- mate of the number engaged, in which he states that one-third of the Sioux Indians, in-
cluding the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, were present at the battle; that the entire band to- gether numbered about forty thousand, and that there must have been from twelve to fifteen thousand assembled in the valley at this time, one-fourth of which should be counted in estimating the number of warriors, which would make a fighting force of twenty-five hundred to three thousand men. Dr. Charles Alexander Eastman, a full blood Sioux, has made a very careful study of the number of warriors who were in the Little Big Horn at this time. He bases his estimate on the number of Indians in the different agencies, the number absent from the agencies, and also upon infor- mation gathered from his own people who were of the hostile tribes at this time. Below we quote from an article published in the Chautau- qua Magazine in the year 1900 by Dr. East- man. He says :
The camp was in the following order from south to north down the river: Hunkpapaws, 224 tepees; Sans Arc, 85 tepees ; Inkpadutas, 15 tepees ; Brules, 140 tepees ; Minneconjus, 190 tepees ; Ogallallas, 240 tepees ; Cheyennes, 55 tepees ; making a total of 949 tepees. If we allow five persons to the tepee. we have 4,945 In- dians, and counting one-quarter of this number war- riors (which is allowing too large an estimate), there will be 1,211 warriors. Suppose we add to this num- ber 200 warriors who may possibly have come from the various agencies in Dakota, the number of fighting men all told will be 1,411. This will bring it within the number that General Custer expected to meet. In fact, if we exclude the boys under 18 years of age, and the old men over 70 (a number of whom did not have sufficient weapons), the number of warriors would be about 800 or 900, and that was about the estimate General Sheridan made before the expedition was sent out.
After the battle of the Little Big Horn the hostiles divided into two bands, Sitting Bull's Indians remaining in the west, Crazy Horse's moving towards the east. In October Sitting Bull, having given up hopes of accomplishing anything during the winter, came to General Miles with propositions of peace. His terms of peace embodied the following clauses : He and his followers were to be left to roam and
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HISTORY OF MONTANA.
hunt over unoccupied territory; they were to live the free life of the Indian; they were not to be supplied with rations or annuities. General Miles sent them word that there was only one proposition- they must accept terms of peace and move to the agencies. Sitting Bull would not accept General Miles' terms so the hostilities con- tinued. Shortly after this Miles surprised the Indians, defeated them, and captured 400 of their lodges. Sitting Bull escaped to the north and was here joined by a few small bands. Early in December Lieutenant Baldwin at- tacked Sitting Bull, driving him across the Mis- souri. At this time Sitting Bull was reduced to 190 lodges. About the middle of the month Baldwin again surprised their camp, captured sixty horses and nearly all their food supplies. Having lost their food supplies, they were now in almost destitute circumstances.
Crazy Horse, learning of the reverses of Sitting Bull, of his defeat and of having lost his supplies, sent word to him to join his camp as he had plenty of men and provisions for the winter. General Miles, however, learned of this through his spies and kept a force between the two hostile bands, thus preventing them from uniting forces. Crazy Horse was camped on the Tongue river. On December 29th Miles started with 436 men and two cannons against Crazy Horse. The Indians, learning of his coming, abandoned their quarters. Miles fol- lowed in rapid pursuit, capturing one warrior and seven women and children. The captives were relatives of one of the Cheyenne chiefs. That evening desperate efforts were made to recover them, but not succeeding, the attempt was renewed in the morning by the full force of the warriors. They were defeated and suf- fered heavy loss. Communications were opened through the captives. On February first, Miles sent word to them that they must surrender, and if they did not he would attack with renewed force. Their strength being much reduced, being unable to unite with Sit-
ting Bull, and their supplies becoming scarce, they sent word to Miles that they would con- clude terms of surrender.
Three hundred Indians under Two Moon, Hump and other chiefs surrendered on April 22; two thousand under Crazy Horse surrend- ered at Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies in May.
Sitting Bull, finding it impossible to join forces with Crazy Horse, his force being greatly reduced, realized the uselessness of further resistance with the troops and fled into British Columbia. In British Columbia he was joined by Chief Gall. The only remaining hos- tiles now were a few of the Minneconjous, who broke off from Crazy Horse's band when he surrendered. They did not exceed in numbers fifty lodges. General Miles surprised and routed them on the Rosebud. They lost four- teen killed, all their supplies and 450 ponies. The remaining few scattered in different di- rections and finally surrendered to the various agencies.
In September, 1876, the Sioux concluded a treaty by which they surrendered the Black Hills and Powder river country. In lieu of this they were to receive rations from the gov- ernment until such time as they could become self-supporting.
Sitting Bull and his followers soon become tired of living under Canadian rule. Under this government they did not receive rations; the hunting was not the best, and they were kept under a strict watch. Protection was all that was assured them, and if they expected protection they were obliged to remain peace- able, not only in Canada, but also on this side of the line. Tiring of this method of living, small bands would leave, cross to this side and surrender to the agencies. After nearly all his followers had deserted him, Sitting Bull, realizing the uselessness of further resistance, surrendered to the authorities at the Standing Rock agency.
Sitting Bull, the acknowledged leader of
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HISTORY OF MONTANA.
the Indians in the Custer fight, met his death sixteen years later. After that fight he conduc- ted himself in a very peaceable manner until the summer of 1890, when the Indians at the agency were becoming imbued with the "Mes- siah Craze." Possessed of a personality re- markably striking, he had a powerful influence over his people, and in this craze they were easily influenced by the teachings of Sitting Bull, who now called himself the High Priest. He promised them that the white race would be exterminated, that the white man's gun would be no longer a deadly weapon, but that the ball would drop from it harmlessly, that their ancestors would return to the earth, that their hunting grounds would again be re- stored, that the former wild life of the Indians would be enjoyed by all Indians in the future, and that, should any be killed in obeying this call of the Messiah, they would immediately join their ancestors, who at this time had been restored to some distant part of the country. Fearing the outcome of Sitting Bull's teachings, Major James McLaughlin, the Indian agent, notified the Indian department of Sitting Bull's conduct and asked what should be done under the circumstances. In response to the above message from Major Mclaughlin the follow- ing telegram was sent to the commanding of- ficer at Fort Yates, the nearest fort to this agency :
The division commander has directed that you make it your special duty to receive the person of Sit- ting Bull. Call on the Indian agent to co-operate and render such assistance as will best promote the pur- pose in view. By command of General Ruger.
(Signed) M. BARBER, Ass't. Adjutant-General.
Troops were sent from the fort to the agency to quell any disturbance. In order that the Indians might not know of their coming, they kept well back of the hills from the village. At the same time a number of police, most of them Indians, were sent to Sitting Bull's cabin to arrest him. Early in the morning the police
entered the house and made the arrest. The chief accepted the arrest quietly, but his son, Crowfoot, commenced upbraiding him for go- ing with the police, upon which Sitting Bull became obstinate and refused to go. He was removed from the house, and no sooner were they outside that they were surrounded by the ghost dancers, frenzied with rage. Sitting Bull called on the Indians to release him. The po- lice kept the Indians driven back, and had it not been for Sitting Bull's appeal to them. there might not have been any trouble. But his fol- lower believing in his teachings, thought no harm could come to them by resisting and that they must obey the command of Sitting Bull, According they opened fire on the police, kill- ing and wording several. Bull Head, an Indian policeman, was severely wounded by the first fire. No sooner was he wounded than he shot Sitting Bull. The fight now became general. The police gained the house and sta- ble from which they fired, driving the ghost dancers to the timber. The troops, who were stationed some distance away, approached and opened fire on the Indians. Soon everything was quiet. Sitting Bull now being killed, the Indians, having no leader, returned to their homes and no further disturbance was created.
One of the most remarkable campaigns ever carried on by an Indian against United States troups was that of Joseph, in the Nez Perce war of 1877. For months that astute chieftain waged war-and all but a successful one-against a larger force of United States troops. The war started in Idaho and ended in Montana, Joseph having retreated several hundred miles, carrying with him all his tribe and belongings.
In speaking of the Upper and Lower Nez Perce we do not refer to distinction of tribe, but to destinction of land, of territory. The Lower Nez Perce, under the chieftainship of Joseph, were considered to own the country south and east of the Blue Mountains, and west of the Snake River south of Powder River, a
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HISTORY OF MONTANA.
tributary of the Snake. The Upper Nez Perce were extended the privilege of hunting on this territory, but were not supposed to have any control over it.
The treaty of 1855 set aside for these peo- ple a large reservation in western Idaho and eastern Oregon, and declared that, "no white man shall be permitted to reside on said reser- vation without permission of the tribe and the superintendent and agent." The Nez Perce were peaceable, and settlers came in and took up land in the valleys granted them by the treaty. Their policy was peace and confidence in the Great Father that he would see that their lands would not be taken away from them. The whites came in and took up land in nearly all the fertile valleys. What must be done? Another treaty was decided upon. In 1863 the chiefs were called together. The Upper Nez Perce accepted the present reservation of Lap- wai, in western Idaho, the Lower Nez Perce refusing to join in the treaty. A peculiar pro- cess of reasoning, the one adapted, by which the non-treaty Indians were to be removed to the Lapwai reservation. In the treaty of 1855 Joseph joined in the sale of part of their lands, thereby recognizing himself and his followers as part of the tribal organization, and now, the majority of the chiefs having joined in the sale, they sold Joseph's land with the land of the Upper Nez Perce.
Joseph died in 1871, and his son, Young Joseph, commonly known as Chief Joseph, be- came leader of the Lower Nez Perce. His dy- ing words were: "Always remember that your father never sold his country. A few years more and the white man will be all around you. They have their eyes on this land. My son; never forget my dying words. This country holds your father's body. Never sell the bones of your father and mother."
These were peaceable people; they were never known to shed white man's blood; they refused aid to hostile tribes; they kept at peace with those who encroached upon their grounds ;
they cared for the horses of the Lewis and Clark expedition during the winter, and when they returned in the spring they refused to take pay; they called for missionaries; they raised great herds of cattle; they committed no crimes ; they loved the land of their fathers. they loved the beautiful Wallowa Valley in northeastern Oregon, the valley of their homes ; but the government demanded their removal to the Lapwai reservation. They pleaded; they counseled, but all in vain. All their efforts to retain their native home having failed, they, true to their principles of peace, made ready to depart for the reservation, and on the date of departure, after everything had been packed and ready and the little band was on the way, trouble arose between a division of the band and the settlers in which several of the settlers were killed.
The commission that met from day to day to treat with the Indians found many objec- tions to meet. Joseph argued at length and met the various reasons advanced by the com- mission for their removal to the reservation. After all efforts on the part of the commission had failed Joseph was told that there was but one course to pursue, and that, that they must abandon the valley. They were given thirty days after May 14th to gather their stock to- gether and vacate the land. Joseph's advice to his people was to leave peaceably. They went out to the range to gather in their cattle and horses and found many of them missing. They could not be found. Learning this the hot headed among the Indians became desper- ate; Joseph counselled peace, but was unable to overcome the infuriated warriors.
The thirty days passed; the soldiers had not come. The loss of their stock bore heavily on their minds, and then the Indians, hereto- fore unknown to have taken white man's blood. turned from their pathway of peace. On Salmon river an old hermit by the name of Divine was killed. This deed was committed on the 13th of June, the day, according to the
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command of the commission, on which the Indians were to remove to the Lapwai reserva- tion. On the 14th they killed four more. Their savage nature which had been pacified these many years burst forth at the sight of human blood. Mounting the horses of their victims they hastily rode to Camas Prairie where the greater portion of the Indians were camped. Riding through the camp they displayed the spoils of their deeds, and called upon all who were present in the camp to assist, and at the same time asserting their determination to re- turn and kill the other settlers in that locality. Seventeen warriors joined them and eight more settlers lost their lives.
Chief Joseph was not in the camp at the time these deeds were being planned. His wife was sick and he had moved her to a tepee some distance away, that she would not be disturbed by noise and conversation of those who might be angered because they were forced to leave their homes.
Colonel Perry, who was stationed at Lap- wai, hurried down with ninety men. Ten set- tlers joined them, making in all one hundred men. In order to intercept the retreat of the Indians and prevent their crossing the river, Colonel Perry marched to the White Bird can- yon, and thence up it, reaching the head of the canyon by daylight of the 17th. They ex- pected to give the Indians a surprise, but Joseph had learned of their coming and was waiting for them. The attack was a signal failure, and 35 of the hundred men were killed. Joseph pursued them for 12 miles, then con- tinued his retreat. This was Joseph's first battle, and being a complete victory gave his men courage.
General Howard with a batallion of 400 men, was crossing over the country to en- counter the Indians. Not until the IIth of July did he come in sight of Joseph. On the above date Joseph was camped on the Clear- water, and was waiting for Howard to come up. In number of fighting men Joseph was
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