Bi-centennial history of Albany. History of the county of Albany, N. Y., from 1609 to 1886. With portraits, biographies and illustrations, Part 48

Author: Howell, George Rogers, 1833-1899; Tenney, Jonathan, 1817-1888
Publication date: 1886
Publisher: New York, W. W. Munsell & Co.
Number of Pages: 1452


USA > New York > Albany County > Albany > Bi-centennial history of Albany. History of the county of Albany, N. Y., from 1609 to 1886. With portraits, biographies and illustrations > Part 48


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His written opinions have the impress of reflection and learning, always interlarded with sufficient pre- cedent to sustain his conclusions; but they were never loaded down with pedantic quotations. From his written opinions we have room to refer to only two. Although very brief, they are very important, and give the reader a very adequate knowledge of the character and style of his judicial mind and method.


The first of these cases is that of The People vs. John Harrington and George Messer, Jr., in the Albany County Sessions. The defendants, at the


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June term in 1883, Judge Van Alstyne presiding, pleaded guilty to an indictment for burglary in the second degree. Their sentence was suspended and they were discharged from custody. In November, 1884, they were committed to jail by one of the police justices, charged with another crime ; whereupon the District Attorney, on December 5, 1884, caused them to be brought into that court, Judge Nott presiding, and moved that each be sentenced under his plea of guilty, entered at the June term of 1883. Their counsel objected to the sentence, under which a very interesting law point was raised and elaborately argued, touching the rights of the court to suspend the sentence of convicted criminals and discharge them indefinitely, and the right of a court to inflict a sentence at any subsequent time on motion of the District At- torney.


At the time the plea of guilty was entered both defendants were under sixteen years of age. When brought up for sentence, Harrington yet was under sixteen, but Messer was over that age.


" In the case of the People vs. Monisette (20 Howard Pr., 118)," says Judge Nott in his opinion, " the Court of Oyer and Terminer refused to suspend sentence, holding that no suspension of sentence or stay is authorized, except upon a certiorari or writ of error, on application in arrest of judg- ment, or for a new trial; but this ruling is contrary to the current of cases in this country, and the precise point has been recently determined in the Fourth Department of the Supreme Court in the People vs. Graves. Says Hardin, J .: ' We regard the essential question in this case so firmly re- solved against the appellant by the authorities that we do not deem it useful to open the question for fresh investigation and adjudication (2 N. Y. Crim. Rep., 227). It is just and proper that the power to suspend sentence should exist in the Superior Criminal Courts. Great harm might flow to society in the destruction of the means of those charged with the administration of criminal justice, to expose through this aid dangerous conspiracies to person and property.' 'It would seem,' says Dixon, J., ' that it is stating the matter too broadly to assert that it is always the imperative duty of a court to render judgment on a conviction of crime, unless some legal proceedings for review be interposed; considera- tions of public policy may induce the court to stay its hand (State vs. Addy, 14 Vroom, 113-39, Am. Rep., 546).' In the case of Harrington, the clemency of this court seems to have had no salutary effect upon him. We find him again in the custody of the law, charged with crime, and our duty is to impose sentence upon him, which is that he be con- fined in the House of Refuge during the pleasure of the managers (Park vs. People, I Lansing, 263). In Messer's case a different question is presented. In his case, at the time of his plea of guilty, he was one of that class of crim- inals recognized as juvenile delinquents, and the sentence of the court might and probably would have been to the House of Refuge, where his mind would have been properly trained and means taken to reform and educate him, and although but for the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (sec. 832), he would be disqualified as a witness (People vs. Park, 41 N. Y., 21), yet his right to vote at any election when arriving of age would not be taken away (Penal Code, 711). He is now over the age of sixteen years, and if sentenced he must be imprisoned in a State prison for not more than ten years nor less than five years (Penal Code, 507), or to the Elmira Reformatory, wherefrom he may be trans- ferred to a State prison.


" A sentence now under the plea of guilty would be add- ing an additional penalty to that which might and probably would have been suffered if sentenced at the time he entered his plea, that of disfranchisement. It is an exem- plary rule that any law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed is void (Calder vs. Bull., 3 Dall., 386-390), and the rule is the same when the law is changed


after conviction (Hartung vs. People, 22 N. Y., 95). The humanity of our law and the genius of our Constitution require that no severer penalty should be imposed on a criminal than that which existed when the offense was com- mitted or a conviction had. In State vs. Addy (43 New Jersey Law Reports, 113), it was held on a conviction of maintaining a nuisance, the court having suspended sentence on payment of costs, so long as the defendant should abate the nuisance, that a sentence of imprisonment at a sub- sequent time was void.


" The charity of a court should not be allowed to work an injustice to a defendant. Independent of the question of disfranchisement, there is such a marked difference between the methods and prison discipline of the House of Refuge and a State prison that it is apparent that a sentence now of Messer to a State prison would be harder and more severe than if sentenced over a year ago, when the plea was entered ! Entertaining these views, the court declines to sentence Messer on his plea of guilty, and remands him into the custody of the Sheriff, under the later criminal charge, upon which he was committed to jail, to he proceeded against as the law directs."


This decision, it will be seen, is sustained by acute reasoning, strongly fortified by legal author- ities and common sense suggestions, and exhibits an able, fearless and humane judicial officer.


The other case to which we alluded is that of Heenan vs. The West Shore Railroad. It is of great importance, as it settles the jurisdiction of the County Court over the person in regard to the ser- vice of processes from it, and what constitutes the legal residence of domestic corporations.


Heenan brought an action against the West Shore R. R., in the County Court of Albany County, to recover damages for injury to personal property, caused in defendant's negligence in operat- ing its railroads through the village of West Troy, in Albany County.


The complaint alleges that the defendant is a domestic corporation, engaged in the carrying of freight and passengers for hire in various parts of the State, including the County of Albany; that a part of its line of road is located in this county.


The answer of the defendant admits that it is a domestic corporation, and avers that its principal place of business is, and was at and long before the commencement of this action, established by its articles of association and actually located in the City of New York; that its principal place of bus- iness never was established or located in the County of Albany, and that the summons was served upon the defendant in the City of New York. The answer also puts in issue the various allegations in the complaint.


On the trial it was established that the defendant, being a railroad corporation, operated its road through various counties of the State, including Albany County; that by the articles of association and in fact its principal place of business is and was located in the City of New York; that the summons in the action was served upon one of the officers of the defendant in the City of New York.


The plaintiff had a verdict, whereupon the de- fendant moved for a new trial and a dismissal of the complaint.


" Two questions," said Judge Nott, " are presented for the consideration of the court: first, has the court such juris- diction as to entertain the action ? second, if it has not, has the defendant waived, or is he precluded from raising, the


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point, he having appeared and answered ? The Code of Civil Procedure provides that for the purpose of determin- ing the jurisdiction of the County Court a domestic corpora- tion or joint stock association, whose principal place of bus- iness is established by or pursuant to a statute or by its articles of association, or is actually located within the county, is deemed a resident of the county, and personal service of a summons made within the county, as prescribed by the Code, is sufficient (sec. 541). Our jurisdiction, there- fore, by this provision, in the case of a domestic corpora- tion, depends, first, upon the location within our county of its principal place of business, whether by force of a special statute or its articles of association, or its actual location ; and secondly, personal service of the summons within the county upon one of those of its officers who may be served under the Code of Civil Procedure with a summons in an action against it.


"The provisions of the Constitution in reference to the County Court (art. 6, sec. 15) are broad enough to permit the Legislature to confer this power upon the County Court, and that it is so eminently proper to cover cases where large business enterprises are carried on within the county, and some of its chief officers within the county di- recting its principal offices, although the principal office may be located in another county (Gemp vs. Pratt, 7 Daly, 197, distinguishing Landers vs. The S. I. R. Co., 53 N. Y., 450)."


The conclusions the Court arrives at are as fol- lows :


" Here the principal place of business of the defendant, by its articles of association, and in fact, is located within one county, and the summons was not served in this county. The conclusion reached is, that this Court has not jurisdiction over the defendant. This brings us to the conclusion of the second question: Has the defendant waived, or is it precluded from raising the objection. The plaintiff insists that, the defendant having answered and ap- peared generally in the action, although by its answer it raised the issue of its residence, it cannot now say it is a non-resident of the county, as the Court could acquire juris- diction of the defendant by the service of the summons upon a proper officer of the company within the county, which could not be done in the case of an individual.


" I am of opinion that the allegations of the complaint as to residence were sufficient, and as the defect of which the defendant complains did not appear on the face of the com- plaint, he could not demur (Code, sec. 488). The objec- tion to the jurisdiction was, therefore, properly taken by answer (Code, sec. 498) ; Holbrook vs. Baker, 16 Hun, 176; Mayhew vs. Robinson, 10 How, 162-5), and was not waived by appearance in the action, and an answer therein setting up the objection (Sullivan vs. Frazer, 4 Robt., 620; Wheelock vs. Lee, 74 N. Y., 497-8). In opposition to the rule at common law, under the Code, a defendant may plead as many defenses as he has, wheth- er, as formerly denominated, to the jurisdiction in abate ment or in bar (Code, sec. 507 ; Sweet vs. Tuttle, 16 N. Y., 465). It follows, therefore, that the general appearance of the defendant, distinctly by its pleading giving notice of its intention to raise the question of jurisdiction, is no waiver, nor does it preclude the defendant from insisting on the want of jurisdiction of this Court (Landers vs. The S. I. R. Co., 53 N. Y., 450; Davidsburgh vs. The K. L. Ins. Co., 90 N. Y., 526). The cases cited by the plaintiff's counsel (Paulding vs. Hurd Man. Co., E. D. Smith, 38; Ballard vs. Burrows, 2 Robt., 206; Olcott vs. McLean, 73 N. Y., 223) do not apply to this case. An order must be entered granting the motion of the defendant and awarding a new trial, and the complaint should be dismissed."


This case was appealed to the General Term, and the opinion of Judge Nott was there cited, with approval, and unanimously confirmed.


Judge Nott takes much interest in secret benev- olent organizations, known as Masonery, Knights of Pythias, Independent Order of Odd Fellows and the Order of United Friends, to all of which he has belonged for several years, and is held in


high estimation by his brethren of these orders. He finds great pleasure in advancing their interests, and his influence is recognized as salutary and advantageous. . In 1879 he was elected Grand Chancellor of the Knights of Pythias, and in 1881 he represented the Grand Lodge in the Supreme Lodge. In December, 1881, on the organization of the Order of United Friends, he was elected Imperial Chancellor for the term of two years. The benefits of his administration among the be- nevolent orders of the United States are generally and warmly acknowledged.


In politics Judge Nott is a Democrat. To this party he gave his adherence early in life, under the conscientious conviction in the rectitude of its principles, though he is willing to acknowledge all real merit in- opposing parties and political oppo- nents, recognizing the necessity of political parties in a government organized like our own. While he is strong in his political predilections, he is in no sense a political bigot. In the discharge of his judicial duties he forgets politics, partisans, and political distinctions, deciding whatever mat- ters come before him from the stand-point of strict impartiality.


Judge Nott carries into social life the amenities of a gentleman by intuition and association. What- ever sternness there is in his nature is exhibited only on the bench, and there only as occasion requires. In his social relations he is genial, easy of ap- proach, attached to his friends, and attaches them to himself in those reciprocal relations, always agreeable in private life. Judge Nott has been, and still is, attached to the cause of education, and in this respect is also a very useful member of so- ciety. Such are the characteristics and such the career, down to this writing, of Judge John C. Nott, stated without embellishment or amplifica- tion. Readers of all classes will concede that an honorable place in the history of Albany County justly belongs to him.


EDWARD J. MEEGAN.


Mr. MEEGAN possesses endowments that natur- ally qualify him for attaining success in his profes- sion. Bold, ardent, self-reliant, clear in his con- ceptions, with an extensive knowledge of books. To these qualities may be added much ingenuity and a quick and ready use of his learning in the trial and conduct of causes, united with the ability to protect himself against the coup d'état of the most learned and experienced opponent, and in his turn is formidable in the attack, quick in detecting the errors and omissions of others.


Thus equipped, though quite young, he has reached the head of the junior, if not the senior, Bar of his native city. His singular success in the management of important causes in all of the State Courts is proverbial. Some of these causes have passed into history, made interesting to the student and practitioner by the new and original points which determine cases in his favor. As is natural with one of his ambition, he has found in politics a sphere congenial to his tastes, in which he has gained a position of such eminence and influence


Edward Jellegany


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that he has become a power and a leader in the Democratic party, to which he gave his early alle- giance, as we shall more fully see in tracing his life and career.


He was born at Albany, N. Y., September 28, 1846. His parents were Thomas and Sarah Mee- gan, natives of the County of Tyrone, Ireland, from whence they came to this country in 1824, and became residents of Boston, Mass. In 1826 they removed to Albany, where they were highly re- spected, and there resided until their death.


Young Meegan developed a love of learning, his amusement being found in books and the practical reading of works apparently beyond his comprehension. As the means of his parents were limited, he was compelled to rely much upon his own resources in attaining his education ; thus his capacity was not obscured nor his mental growth retarded by pampered indulgence or the want of strong incentive to action. Accustomed to early self-reliance, he entered the battle of life to become a victor.


At an early age he was placed at St. Joseph's Parish School, Albany, where he was carefully and profitably educated. It was in this institution that he gave indubitable evidence that his future life would be devoted to one of the learned professions. Indeed, one of the dreams of his early ambition was the hope of becoming a lawyer, and it is pleas- ant to record the nianner in which those pleasing dreams became reality.


At the early age of thirteen these dreams began to take the form of reality and action. Young in years but precocious in intellect, he entered the law office of Edwards & Sturtevant, a highly respecta- ble firm at Albany. He at once entered upon the practicable duties of a legal clerkship, learning that detail of a lawyer's life by witnessing and, in a measure, participating in the most important part of a lawyer's life and duties in the law office ; and thus we may say that Mr. Meegan was, in the fullest sense, bred to the law.


He continued with this firm and with Isaac Ed- wards, Esq., distinguished as the author of " Ed- wards on Bills and Notes," and a highly approved work on Bailments, etc., until his admission to the Bar. This event took place in 1867, as soon as he reached the constitutional age of twenty-one years. He opened an office at Albany, surrounded by the highest legal talent and experience, and entered ardently and self-reliant into the practice of his profession.


He had passed with great credit through the teachings of his profession; his studentship was full and unconditional. He gave to the office in which he studied his entire time and attention -- much more time than the law requires to fit a student for examination. He read with ambitious fidelity to his calling, and conducted with his own hands many hundred cases through all the intricacies of the Code; so that when he began practice for him- self, young as he was, he was a trained and experi- enced lawyer. With these advantages, and unflag- ging energies, quickened by ambition, it is not strange that signal success at once attended him.


In May, 1869, he was elected by the Common Council of Albany Corporation Counsel, having then been only two years at the Bar. Perhaps no higher compliment could be paid to the talents of the young lawyer than this. The duties of the office demanded high abilities, learning and pru- dence. Happily, both for the city and him, he brought to it all these endowments.


When he commenced his official duties there were many unfinished suits, and he was confronted by an accumulation of official work that would have been almost appalling even to an older and much more experienced lawyer. But he entered ardently and sagaciously into the work before him. By his executive ability, professional skill and vigi- lance he saved the city over half a million of dol- lars. This was recognized by the city authorities, eliciting thanks from Mayor Thacher. Mr. Mee- gan continued to discharge the duties of Corpora- tion Counsel until April, 1874. In the meantime his other legal business continued to increase until few, if any, lawyers in the city commanded a larger or more profitable clientage.


He adopted no specialty in his profession, for he had prepared himself for a general law practice. He devoted himself mostly to what is known as civil cases, but he found in the criminal law a field of usefulness and profit. The success which has attended his career at the Bar is the best demon- stration of his character and capacity as a lawyer.


Mr. Meegan, having relinquished the office of Corporation Counsel, continued his practice with a useful experience in the management of city cases, particularly actions to vacate assessments for irregu- larity, etc. He was retained in a very large num- ber of these cases, and was successful in every one .. The best evidence of a lawyer's career is what he does and the results ; we, therefore, select a few from the many cases conducted by Mr. Meegan as interesting matter, not only to the profession, but the general reader. Some of these cases are largely connected with the history of the City and County of Albany, and are, therefore, appropriate matter for this work. From our limited space, however, we can only give a sufficient abstract of these cases to put the reader in possession of the questions in- volved in them, and a knowledge of the manner in which they were conducted.


Perhaps one of the most important and interest- ing cases conducted by Mr. Meegan was that of Wm. H. Keeler, Sheriff of the County of Albany, in which the attempt was made to take from the sheriff the essential powers of his office ; in other words, to denude the office.


On May 31, 1882, an act was passed by the Legislature directing the Sheriff of Albany County to remove all the prisoners from the Albany County Jail to the Albany County Penitentiary, designating that institution as the County Jail - of Albany County, making the keeper of the said penitentiary the jailer of the said county. He was to be ap- pointed by the joint board of the Supervisors of the county and the Mayor and Recorder of the City of Albany. The said Superintendent was to have the custody and control of all persons confined in the


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penitentiary, the same as the sheriff of the county would have were the law not enacted, and no jailer could, therefore, be appointed by the sheriff.


This act was a strange innovation upon the rights and powers of the sheriff, inasmuch as the control and charge of the prisoners in the county have been for centuries the prerogative of the sheriff.


Wm. H. Keeler was elected in November, 1882, and entered upon the duties of his office January 1, 1883, restricted by the act to which we have alluded.


The act had been pronounced constitutional by many leading members of the Bar, but Mr. Keeler decided to test the matter thoroughly. Accord- ingly, on January 1, 1883, he addressed Mr. Mee- gan a letter, requesting him to give him his written opinion as to the validity of the act. Mr. Meegan prepared an opinion, in which he elaborately re- viewed the law touching the case, coming to the decision that the act was unconstitutional. This opinion was generally acknowledged by the Bar to be singularly learned and exhaustive, and added largely to the reputation of its author as a learned and critical lawyer. As a legal document it is prolific in thought, strong in argument-a condensation of a vast number of authorities to a single focal point, and that the evident unconstitutionality of the act. Strengthened by this opinion, Mr. Keeler invoked the aid of the courts. Litigation followed, result- ing in a decision declaring the law unconstitutional and void.


It was a signal triumph both for the sheriff and his counsel. The case created intense interest, and Mr. Meegan undertook it with the prevailing opinion of the Bar against him. It is a case of historic interest, reported as The People ex rel. Mc- Ewen vs. Keeler, 29 Hun's Reports, 175.


Another case of equal interest and importance was that of The People vs. James M. Dempsey et al., involving the constitutionality of chapter 532 of the Laws of 1881, amending the Code of Civil Pro- cedure in regard to the method of selecting Grand Jurors in Albany County.


Grand jurors were annually selected by the Su- pervisors of Counties under the Revised Statutes (3d R. S., 6th ed., 1015; 3d R. S., 7th ed., 2558).


The amendment of the Code to which we have referred changed the method of selecting grand jurors in Albany County, providing that the Re- corder of the City of Albany perform the duties imposed upon the Town Clerk, Supervisor and Assessor of Towns in regard to the drawing of grand jurors, instead of drawing the said jurors under the provisions of the Revised Statutes. The change was sweeping, completely revolutionizing the grand jury system, so far as Albany County was concerned.


It provides that the grand jurors in Albany County shall be drawn from the petit jurors' box, and that the names of the proposed petit jurors are se- lected, not, as heretofore, by the seventeen Super- visors, but by the Recorder of the City of Albany. The grand jury, as organized under this act, found an indictment against James M. Dempsey et al.


for an alleged violation of the Election laws. Mr. Meegan was retained to defend. This, like the Keeler case, created great interest. It involved an elaborate study of a large number of authorities. Meegan took the ground that the Code, as amended by chapter 532 of the Laws of 1881, so far as it affected the City and County of Albany, is in con- flict with the Constitution, as amended November 3, 1874. Article 3 of section 18 of the Constitu- tion provides that "the Legislature shall not pass a private or local bill in any of the following cases : * *




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