USA > Vermont > Vermont in quandary, 1763-1825 > Part 11
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The soundness of Beadle's interpretation is suggested by Ira's activities after his return from Philadelphia to Vermont. In Sep- tember, he was closeted once more with Sherwood. On orders from Haldimand, Sherwood applied unprecedented pressure on
44. Ibid., CXLVII, 334-335.
45. Ibid., CLXXVI, 207-208.
16. Ibid., CXLXXVII, 228-229.
17. V. H. S., Collections, 11, 167.
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Ira to secure Vermont's acceptance of Haldimand's proposals on pain of disrupting the truce. This threat produced the anticipated results. Despite the fact that in May, 1781, Ira had said that Ver- mont would not rejoin the empire until Parliament had acted, he now proposed that Haldimand draft a Proclamation, that it be sealed and sent to the Vermont Assembly where it would be opened, read and acted upon in October. These instructions pro- vided the utmost protection for himself. The dispatch of the Pro- clamation sealed would enable Ira to claim that the British, rather than he, had taken the initiative in sending the Proclamation and that he did not have any prior knowledge concerning its contents. The selection of October as the time for forwarding the Proclama- tion provided Ira additional time to await the outcome of Corn- wallis' campaign in Virginia. As an added precaution, Ira advised that the British forward the Proclamation only as a last resort, and, if sent, that the British dispatch a force capable of support- ing him against his patriot opponents in Vermont.48
After receiving the reports of these negotiations, Haldimand whose suspicions had been almost if not entirely allayed, began to draft the Proclamation. It offered Vermonters every preroga- tive of the former colony of Connecticut, except the election of the governor, promised free trade with the Province of Quebec and the confirmation of the New Hampshire titles. Ostensibly, the British promised to guarantee all the fruits of the Vermont Revolution against the Yorkers and themselves between 1777 and 1781. Actually, Haldimand included in his Proclamation the very significant statement that the terms were dependent upon "His Majesty's Pleasure" or "upon authority from one of the King's Commissioners.".49
Haldimand had conscientiously exercised the greatest care to stay within his powers by making the terms conditional. It was indeed fortunate that he had done so because Sir Henry Clinton, one of His Majesty's Commissioners, had already concluded that they must be so. On November 12, Clinton had written Haldimand that the terms requested by the Vermonters were so detailed and
48. Wilbur, op. cit., I, 304-311.
49. B, CLXXIX, 135-138.
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all-inclusive that it would be necessary for the British government to secure an act of Parliament because the Commissioners' powers extended only to the granting of pardons to individuals and to the restoration of rebel provinces to the British Empire, and not to settling land title disputes.50
Clinton's letter was in conformity with the oft-expressed views of William Smith, Chief Justice of the Royal Province of New York, counsellor to Clinton and possibly the best-informed person in New York on Vermont affairs. Smith stoutly maintained that the North program for conciliation provided for pardons but not for the settlement of land title disputes.51 If this were true, neither Clinton nor Haldimand had the legal power to promise the Ver- monters an unconditional confirmation of their New Hampshire titles. Because Smith admitted that Vermont would not be so weak "as to be satisfied with Jurisdiction and Restraints upon the Power to extinguish the New York titles," he unwittingly or not jeopardized, by his advice to Clinton, the success of the British in their negotiations with the Vermonters.52
Smith's advice was probably prompted by his desire to save the lands in Vermont which he held under New York title. He was far from pleased at the prospect of Vermonters' rejoining the em- pire upon terms unfavorable to holders of New York titles and consequently he encouraged the efforts of Yorker loyalists in Ver- mont to reunite Vermont with New York and both to Great Britain. If this project were successful, his Yorker allies would destroy the New Hampshire titles, the political influence of the Allens and, perhaps, win to the loyalist cause rebel Yorkers holding Vermont lands under New York title.
Such undoubtedly had been Smith's reasons for writing Tryon, as early as 1778, that leaving the settlement of Vermont's boun- daries and land titles to peace commissioners would enable the government to satisfy the rank and file of the holders of New Hampshire titles, while at the same time doing justice to the hold- ers of New York titles. He reminded Tryon that he had discussed
50. Clinton Papers, Clinton to Haldimand, Nov. 12, 1781.
51. W. L. Clements Library, Germain Papers, undated letter; Clinton Papers, Smith to Clinton, Nov. 8, 1781.
52. Smith Diary, May 13, 1781.
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this solution with him before and requested him to secure the necessary power from the British government. "Not a syllable as to the Remedy I proposed to you has been allowed on this side of the water. ... You can't forget what multitudes in this and the eastern provinces became adventurers under the New Hampshire Grants." If the authority is forthcoming, he continued, "we shall know how to confound the Councils of the Eastern Usurpers." 33
While Smith refused to renounce his Vermont lands as the price of gaining Vermont to the British, James Robertson, another Yorker loyalist, was willing to forego his lands in Vermont if that were necessary. He maintained "there is no sacrifice this province could make that I should not think overpay'd by making it the interest of Vermont" to reunite with Great Britain.34 In Quebec, Haldimand leaned towards the views of Robertson, rather than towards those of Smith. "If by sacrifying [sic] a part of one," wrote Haldimand, "to the interest of the other, a Reunion of the most valuable, with the Mother Country can be Affected, I think it my Duty to make the attempt." 55
The responsibility for making the decision to secure additional . power in Great Britain rested upon Clinton's shoulders. His deci- sion, as has been demonstrated, had already been made. He sup- ported the views of Smith rather than those of Robertson and Haldimand. He concluded his instructions in his dispatch of No- vember 12 by saying that until authority arrived from Britain to enable him to settle Vermont's boundaries and the land title dis- pute, he trusted that Haldimand would not have any difficulty in continuing his negotiations with the Vermonters.
A month before Haldimand received Clinton's dispatch of November 12, 1781, he had completed all preparations to forward his Proclamation which contained the conditional promise to con- firm the New Hampshire titles. If incomplete records are to be trusted, the Allens might have walked into the trap prepared for them by the Yorker loyalist, William Smith, by accepting the Proclamation under circumstances and conditions potentially dan-
53. Germain Papers, Smith to Tryon, April 30, 1781.
54. B, LXXIV, 129.
55. Ibid., CXLVII, 374-377.
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gerous to their landed interest. This danger, however, did not materialize. The Proclamation was never forwarded nor were troops ever sent to the support of the Allens. Nevertheless, Haldi- mand almost did both of these. On October 3, he wrote Sir Henry Clinton that he found it necessary to issue the Proclamation and that until he heard to the contrary he would consider the East and West Unions as belonging to Vermont. He warned Clinton that he found it necessary to make good his promises.
Despite the rumors of the impending British disaster at York- town, Virginia, Sherwood was ready to forward the Proclamation and seemed confident that the Vermonters would accept it. His disappointment must have been keen when he received a letter from Ira on October twentieth which very earnestly requested that the Proclamation be withheld in view of the British surrender. Ira must have breathed more easily when Haldimand generously complied with his wishes. His delaying tactics had been bril- liantly vindicated; his caution amply justified.
Soon afterwards, Haldimand wrote Germain that the Allens did not believe that any terms would be acceptable to their fellow- Vermonters who were now "Rioting in Excesses of Licentious Exultation."56 Sherwood was likewise despondent. He declared that further negotiations with the Vermonters would be fruitless unless British fortunes took a different turn in the South. British military reverses alone, he was fairly convinced, made the Ver- monters hesitate to rejoin the Empire.57
56. Ibid., LV, 139-140.
57. Ibid., CLXXVI, 307-308, 355-356.
CHAPTER EIGHT
The Haldimand Negotiations: Second Phase-
The surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown was bound to affect the course of the negotiations. A Vermonter named Reed reported "that one of the Council told him it was lucky they heard of Lord C's defeat in Vermont .... otherwise they would in a few days [have] put their acts in force, in favour of a reunion which would have ruined them."1 The Vermonters, if Reed's statement is to be believed, had narrowly avoided declaring for a cause which now appeared to be lost.
If Haldimand had sent his army into Vermont, a civil war might have resulted because the negotiations were arousing strong and widespread opposition among the inhabitants of the Connecticut Valley and the Southwest. By 1781 the opponents of the negotia -. tions had produced leaders the most capable of whom had settled in Vermont since the outbreak of the Revolution. Notable among them were the Southwesterners, Isaac Tichenor and Nathaniel Chipman.
Isaac Tichenor was born in New Jersey and attended the col- lege at Princeton. During the Revolution, he was attached to the Quartermaster's Department of the Continental Army and lived in Bennington where he had purchased land under New Hamp- shire title. Nevertheless, he was a strong friend of Yorkers within and without Vermont, and he was firmly attached to the objec- tives of the Revolution. Indeed, Tichenor's immediate superior in the Quartermaster's Department, Jacob Cuyler of Albany, trusted that he would obey Washington's order of 1780 that no more Con- tinental Army supplies were to be given to Governor Chittenden. In November, 1780, Cuyler requested Tichenor to discover "who [had] carried flag to the British." 2
1. B, CLXXVII, pt. 2, 45.
2. Stevens Miscellaneous, Cuyler to Tichenor, Feb. 14, 1780; Nov. 7, 1780.
ISAAC TICHENOR
GEORGE CLINTON First Governor of Revolutionary New York
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The other Southwestern leader was Nathaniel Chipman, a major figure in Vermont history. Born in Salisbury, Connecticut, Chip- man attended Yale College. When the Revolution began he en- listed in the Continental Army and served for eighteen months as an officer. He resigned his commission in 1778, apparently dis- heartened if not disillusioned by the progress and the conduct of the war, and went in 1779 to Vermont where he settled in the town of Tinmouth. His apparent disgust with the Revolution caused him at first to view the Haldimand Negotiations with some favor. By 1781, however, he no longer supported them. Hence- forth, he emerged as the major opponent of the Allens. In 1783, Chipman joined Tichenor to urge the Vermont Assembly to de- clare war on the British.3
Across the mountains in the Coos Country, Jacob Bayley led another faction bitterly opposed to the Allens. Bayley was angry because the Allens had so cravenly abandoned hope of conquer- ing Quebec. His solution of Canadian problems lay in conquest rather than in neutrality. In this he agreed with General James Sullivan of New Hampshire who hoped at this time to unite all factions behind a new assault on Quebec. Bayley's hostility to the Allens rested, in part, on personal pique. He complained in 1802 to George Clinton of their hostility to him. "I was so much in favor of, your state," he said, "when our state granted lands I re- ceived none whereas if I had joined them I could have had as much as I please .... "4 In the spring of 1782 Sherwood, who had determined to take a stand against obstructionists in Vermont, sent a party to seize Bayley. He narrowly averted capture by escaping into the woods, thanks to a warning given by Thomas Johnson, a rebel among rebels, a loyalist among loyalists.
Equally unfavorable to the negotiations was a number of in- habitants living on the east bank of the Connecticut River who had opposed the second East Union of 1781. The inhabitants of Cheshire County in "An Address to the People of New Hamp- shire and of the Other United States," protested against the Machiavellian methods used by the leaders who had formed this
3. R. CLXXVI, 122.
4. N. Y. S. L., Miscellancous Manuscripts, no. 7070.
جم
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union. According to this address, the second East Union had been effected by an unholy alliance of Yorkers, loyalists and political opportunists who "Without professing a change of sentiment with regard to the common cause avow that the cause is not good" and who privately declared that a desire to avoid paying taxes was their principal reason for supporting the union. The address con- tinued, "the common enemy have by policy effected more in this quarter than they have been able to do by force anywhere else." It concluded with an appeal to New Hampshire for aid, inasmuch as "we mean no more to be to Vermont in present circumstances than Canada as we view them to be the same." 5
Jonathan Clark of Exeter, New Hampshire, confirmed these grave charges, declaring that the political difficulties of the inhabitants of Cheshire and Grafton counties arose from the intrigues of tories who had been joined "by those [Eleazer Whee- lock and others] who have ye conducting of the Indian School at Hanover."6 The New Hampshire Gazette of Portsmouth made identical accusations. On November 17, 1781, it published pro- posals intended to quiet the animosities of the inhabitants of the New Hampshire backcountry by moving the state capital inland, by meeting the demands of the backcountry for more equitable representation and by establishing a less burdensome tax system.
The charges made by the New Hampshire people against Ver- mont and its leaders were eagerly seized upon by Yorkers in Ver- mont who were loyal to the Revolution. Yorkers in Brattleborough, Guilford and Halifax charged in February of 1782 that the leaders of Vermont, without the consent of the people or that of the Assembly, had entered into a treaty with the British. When ques- tioned in the Assembly, these leaders had emphatically denied this accusation.
Public reaction outside of Vermont to the negotiations was not wholly unfavorable. The Connecticut Courant of Hartford denied that they were in any way treasonable. "Unfortunately," it de- clared, "for those flagitious violators of the most sacred tics, the government of Vermont despised their base insidious attempts,
5. N. Y. S. L., Stevens Miscellaneous.
6. New Hampshire Historical Society, Meseach Weare Papers, X, Clark to Weare, O.t. 12, 1781.
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and sent the original letters received from General Haldimand, to the United States in Congress assembled." The presence of these Vermont commissioners at the Congress in the summer of 1781 was alone proof "how false, and absurd the British accounts are, when they have objects of consequence in view."7
The Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army did not agree with the interpretation of the Courant. Washington was incensed by the Haldimand Negotiations. Ever mindful of the strategic value of the Champlain Valley, he labored to keep Ver- mont in the Revolutionary fold. On January 1, 1782, he answered a letter from Chittenden which complained bitterly of the Con- gress' shabby treatment of Vermont, stating that it was his opinion that the Continental Congress would recognize Vermont's inde- pendence if the East and West Unions were dissolved.8
This letter had the effect Washington intended. It precipitated a grave political crisis. Vermonters, such as Isaac Tichenor, who were sincerely attached to the cause of the Revolution, proposed to act immediately upon ·Washington's opinion and advice. The Allens, who were no longer sincerely attached to the American cause, were opposed to dissolving the unions. When in February, 1782, Ira and Jonas Fay appeared in Philadelphia they truculently refused to relinquish them. Meanwhile, what they refused to do in Philadelphia was swiftly accomplished by Tichenor, who by now had great influence in the Vermont Assembly. He removed the unions as a bone of contention between Vermont and the Con- gress by prodding the Assembly to dissolve them on February 22.9 · Tichenor had inserted the first wedge designed to topple the politi- cal structure which the Allens had so skilfully erected and which was so essential to their aims.
The day after the dissolution of the unions a second wedge was inserted for the same purpose by George Clinton. On February 23, Clinton dramatically laid papers, including an item published in a Fishkill newspaper, before the New York Assembly which he claimed proved that the Vermonters had been treasonably com- municating with the enemy. Clinton added that the Assembly
7. Sept. 4. 1781.
8. V. H. S., Collections, II, 228-232.
9. Ibid., 245-249.
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would understand that the person who had given the information and the means by which it had been secured ought not to be divulged. The communications, he added, came from a person who had left New York on the twenty-third of December.10
Later on, the long finger of suspicion was pointed at William Smith as the informer. In 1790, John Graves Simcoe, who during the war served in the Queen's Rangers and who was soon to be Lieutenant-Governor of the new Province of Upper Canada, flatly quoted his friend, Sir Henry Clinton, as having said that Smith betrayed the negotiations because he was in imminent danger of losing his lands in Vermont. Simcoe related the following story:
It is apprehended there are in the Secretary of State's office more papers relative to Vermont and the report of Sir Henry Clinton that his correspondence with Vermont had been destroyed by Smith, then Chief Justice of New York, to whom it had been solely and confidentially en- trusted, and who endeavoured to reconcile Sir H. Clin- ton to the imputation by saying that he (laying his hand familiarly on his shoulder as Sir H. Clinton told me ) ... expected hourly that the Rebel Governor Clinton would make proposals and that it was impossible Sir Henry could have both Vermont and New York.11
Smith's diary, however, tells a different story. On the twenty- second of March, 1782, Smith wrote that he had been with Sir Henry Clinton for one hour. The General had told him that he guessed a Doctor Romyn had carried the intelligence which was published in the Fishkill newspaper to George Clinton. Sir Henry thereupon asked Smith if he had given him information concern- ing the Haldimand Negotiations. "I said," wrote Smith in his diary, "I thought not and did not recollect any conversation with him on the subject." He then told Clinton that George Clinton's papers could not do any harm because loyalist Vermonters would per- . ceive that the information was correct but could deny its truth when expedient. Smith added that George Clinton had done a
10. Rivington's Royal Gazette (New York), March 20, 1782; V. H. S., Collections, II, 256.
11. P. A. C., "Wolford" Simcoe Papers, Bk. I, p. S01. The material which points to Smith as the informer has been assembled by A. J. H. Richardson, "Chief Justice William Smith and the Haldimand Negotiations," Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society (N. S., IX, June, 1941), 84-114.
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favor for the British by informing the world of Vermont's defec- tion which would lead loyalists to flock to Vermont.12 Smith de- clared in his diary that Sir Henry Clinton had neglected to send Haldimand's dispatches to England, which, if true, might explain the delay in Great Britain to attend to Vermont's wishes and the miscarriage of the negotiations. If this were true, Clinton must bear some of the responsibility for British failure to secure Ver- mont before it was too late. "Sir Henry's Negligence of the Papers proper for Gen'l Haldimand ever since 29 March . . . put [s] his character and conduct in a disadvantageous Light as a Man of Business."13
Sherwood took a different view than did Smith of the con- sequences of the divulgence of the negotiations. He wrote that the news in the Fishkill paper "proves that our Confidence has been somewhere betrayed, and God knows what bad effects it may have in that affair, particularly if Allen and Fay have been sincere." 14
The disclosure of the negotiations must have been sorely vex- ing and embarrassing to the Allens. The Congress had been allowed to know that the British were attempting to seduce Ver- monters from their allegiance to the Revolutionary cause, but not to know that they had discussed the terms upon which Vermont might rejoin the empire. Nevertheless, the information published in the Fishkill newspaper provided Vermonters loyal to the Revolu- tionary cause with an opportunity to use Clinton's message as a weapon for securing recognition by a frightened Continental Con- gress.They hoped that it would now recognize Vermont's in- dependence in order to forstall its joining the British. Such appears to have been the purpose of the presence in Philadelphia in April, 1782, of Isaac Tichenor and Jonas Fay (the latter secretly supporting the negotiations).
The Congress did not act. It was deadlocked over the issue of Vermont's independence.15 Not only were the delegates to the Congress from the powerful state of New York opposed to recog-
12. Smith Diary, March 22, 1782.
13. Ibid., May 7, 1781.
14. B. CXLVIII, 24-29.
15. V. H. S., Collections, II, 259-262.
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izing Vermont's independence, but also other delegates were per- sonally involved in the dispute because some of them owned land under Vermont or New Hampshire titles. At least one dele- gate, Elias Boudinot, was in the unenviable position of owning lands in Vermont, some under New Hampshire, some under New York titles. Pierce Butler of South Carolina flatly declared that corrupt influences were at work in the Congress. "This Vermont business is a shameful and scandalous affair .... I believe it is be- yond a doubt that Witherspoon and some others have received large grants of land from the Vermonters to support their claim in Congress."16
Moreover, Southern delegates opposed Vermont's admission because they feared that it would increase the strength of the New England bloc in the Congress. The land title dispute and sec- tional animosities were largely responsible for the subsequent failure of the Congress to act upon Vermont's claims. Ezra L'Hommedieu wrote George Clinton on November 2, 1782, that only three or four states would vote to admit Vermont and that seven votes could not be marshalled to condemn it. The upshot was that Congress took no further action during its existence upon this perplexing and embarrassing question.17
Congressional inaction brought the Allens to the final parting of the ways from the American cause. After his rebuff of February, 1782, Ira never again returned to Philadelphia. Henceforth, the British were in a position to renew the Haldimand Negotiations with greater prospects of success, despite Cornwallis' surrender. The negotiations were resumed in the spring of 1782 upon specific instructions from Germain. He wrote Haldimand on January 2, 1782, that he was pleased to know that they were going so smoothly and that a force was gathered at Sorel to protect the Vermonters from Congress should they declare for Great Britain. Not as yet informed of the public disclosure of the negotiations, Germain was solely worried by the effect of Cornwallis' surrender upon Vermonters. "Lord Cornwallis' misfortune will I fear deter them from taking that step at present, but I trust they will not be 16. Burnett. E. C., Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress ( Washington, D. C., 1921-1936), 8 vols., VI, 327n. 17. Ibid., VI, 531.
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intimidated into a submission to Congress but that you will find means to encourage them to persevere in their former purpose .... " He concluded by stating that to secure Vermont's adherence to the British was Haldimand's primary duty and that the govern- ment would not begrudge whatever expenses it might entail.18
In Quebec, Haldimand and Sherwood were sunk in pessimism at this time. The latter suspected that the political ideas of Ver- monters were subject to change without notice. They would, he feared, "continue as changeable as the wind" until they were wel- comed and supported by either the British or the Americans.19 On the same day, he penned his reactions to a letter received from the loyalists, Samuel Wells and Luke Knoulton. "From this letter," Sherwood said, "I am fully satisfied that nothing is to be expected from Vermont but cursed hypocrisy and deceit, I hope a speedy vengeance may overtake them before they are aware of it."20
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