USA > Vermont > Vermont in quandary, 1763-1825 > Part 9
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Both proposals were obviously dangerous to the Allens. Neither materialized because Ethan and Ira, mustering all their political power and mobilizing all their political talents, brought about the specific ejection by the Assembly of the New Hampshire towns from Vermont on February 12, 1779. "The union," wrote Ethan, "which Impolitically was for a time adhered to by a majority of
36. Ibid., 416.
37. Ibid., I, 422-423.
38. N. H. Provincial and State Papers, X, 325-326.
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this State," was "in the fullest and most explicit manner dis- solved."39 The Allens had warded off a threat to their political power and to the sovereignty of the state itself. The ejection of the New Hampshire towns is fairly conclusive proof that the Allens espoused the cause of backcountry inhabitants against the seaboard only in so far as the backcountry could be utilized to their own advantage.
Another proof is afforded by their attitude towards Yorkers living in south-eastern Vermont towns who opposed them, but supported the American Revolution. These were strong enough to cause the Allens a great deal of trouble. Governor Clinton of New York, who gave aid and even more comfort to them, con- tinued to act as if the new state did not exist. He made appoint- ments to military positions and civil offices and in other ways in- dulged the hope of reuniting the Grants to New York by measures short of outright and violent conquest. His Yorker supporters in Vermont declared that public sentiment favored New York and that it was the opinion of most property owners that Vermont had a "great scarcity of men properly qualified to make and put into execution a wise system of laws."40 In May, 1779, the Yorkers in the Connecticut Valley openly rebelled. Ethan hastened south- ward to secure the arrest of thirty of the ringleaders of the dis- affected and he had them brought to trial at Westminster. Among them were Elkanah Day who had attended the Westminster Con- vention of October, 1777, and Noah Sabin who had so vigorously denounced the radical excesses at Westminster in 1775. These men were brought before Judge Moses Robinson, a Southwesterner. Although he found it necessary to rebuke Ethan for his harangue to the court, he found the men guilty.41 This decision caused a great stir in New York. Governor Clinton exploded, and attempted, unsuccessfully, to involve the Continental Congress in the dispute.
By May of 1779, the Allens had overcome all the opposition to them within Vermont, had liquidated Yorker and loyalist property, had contributed to the Revolutionary cause against Burgoyne and Quebec and had exercised personal power which they had not
39. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 431.
40. Hall, History of Eastern Vermont, I, 313.
41. Ibid., 339-343.
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dreamed of when they assumed the leadership of the unorganized forces hostile to New York and Great Britain. First, the Allens had bought land, secondly, they had established a political device to secure it-the State of Vermont. As late as the spring of 1779 the Allens had succeeded in maintaining their grip upon the Vermont government. Still to be vanquished, however, were the Continen- tal Congress and the Province of Quebec. These enemies proved more formidable than the Connecticut Valley leaders, the loyalists and the Yorkers.
After 1779, the Revolution no longer provided an almost per- fect foil for their ambitions. In that year, a change occurred in the fortunes of the Allens which made them despair of securing recognition of Vermont by the Continental Congress. The wooing of the Congress had begun in the spring of 1776. It had failed to respond. It once more poured cold water on the Allens' efforts to erect a new state out of part of New York by asserting, on June 26, 1778, that the Grants could not derive any justification from the Declaration of Independence, or from any other act of the Congress for declaring their own independence. The Declaration of Independence, it said, stated a new relation between the col- onies and Great Britain, and was not to be deemed an invitation for dissident groups within the colonies to partition any of the existing colonies.42
The Congress had moved circumspectly, fearful, no doubt, of alienating the strategic and powerful state of New York. The initi- ative was, therefore, left to the Allens and New York. In February of 1778, Governor Clinton presented to the New York Assembly a series of resolutions which would have met some of the griev- ances of Vermonters. He appears, however, to have misunder- stood the complexity and variety of the causes for the Grants' secession and to have refused to draw a distinction between the grievances of settler and speculator. Moreover, he continued to aid the more conservative Yorkers in the Grants. It is a commen- tary on the leader of the small farmers of New York that his policies all too often took the appearance of hostility to the Ver- mont counterpart of his New York supporters. He appears to have
42. V. H. S., Manuscript Acts, Conventions and State Papers, 1775-1791, 2.
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all too easily dismissed the Vermont affair as the result wholly of land speculation which must be solved on a business basis, satis- factory in the main to Yorkers holding Vermont lands, of which he was one. As a result, his proposals of February, 1779, were ac- ceptable only to Yorkers. He offered to confirm New Hampshire Grants, if actually cultivated and if made prior to the time when New York commenced to make grants. 43 His proposals were totally unacceptable to Vermont speculators and settlers, because they would have jeopardized the titles to their lands. Ethan Allen dis- missed them with the statement that they were "calculated to de- ceive woods people." 44
The failure of New York to make proposals satisfactory to Ver- mont forced the Continental Congress, once more, to focus atten- tion on the dispute. On June 1, 1779, the Congress voted to send delegates to Vermont to discover at first hand its attitude towards New York. On the twenty-fourth, John Witherspoon and Samuel Attlee, the congressional delegates, interviewed Chittenden. "If the Property of your Lands were perfectly secured to you," one of them asked the Governor, "would you be willing to return to the Jurisdiction of New York?" Chittenden's answer indicated how deep-seated was popular hostility to New York. "We are in the fullest sense as unwilling to be under the Jurisdiction of New York," he said "as we can conceive America would be to revert back under the Power of Great Britain .. . and we should consider our Liberties and Privileges (both civil and religious ) equally ex- posed in future Invasions."45 Even so, the land title dispute was the major stumbling-block to friendly relations with New York. When Chittenden declared that he was willing to submit the land controversy to arbitration by the Congress, the reservations which he made subverted the principle of arbitration. He insisted on "reserving to themselves in the Trial all rights, Privileges, Immun- ities and advantages which they had or might have by any former Grants, Jurisdiction, Powers, and Privileges on account of any Province or State heretofore had, notwithstanding any subsequent Transaction." 46
43. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of New York, I, 449-452. 44. Ibid., 454. 45. Ibid., I, 520, 524. 46. Ibid., I, 525.
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In response to renewed pressure from New York, the Continen- tal Congress stepped boldly into the quarrel. On September 24, 1779, it passed a resolution recommending that New Hampshire, New York and Massachusetts (which now revived an old claim to Vermont lands ) empower the Congress to settle all boundary and land disputes. Behind the Congressional scenes, the major oppon- ents of Vermont were New York and New Hampshire. The danger arose in the winter of 1779-1780 that these two states would per- suade the Congress to partition Vermont along the spine of the Green Mountains by turning over the western part to New York, the eastern part to New Hampshire.47
These new threats delivered a severe jolt to the Allens. The Council appointed Ethan Allen and Reuben Jones as a committee to propose measures for the defense of Vermont. On February 1, 1780, the Council empowered Moses Robinson, Jonas Fay and Stephen R. Bradley to present Vermont's case to the Continental Congress. The Congress listened attentively to their arguments, now worn thin by repetition. Yet it did not move to recognize Vermont's independence or otherwise settle the dispute. Never- theless, the three delegates pledged Vermont's adherence to the American cause. "We are assured," they wrote, "that nothing on our part will deter us, from spiritedly opposing the Savages of the Wilderness or the power of G. Britain. And have full confidence that neither States or individuals, that are attached to the Ameri- can cause, can wish to divert us from our fixed purpose." 48
One aspect of this fixed purpose was undoubtedly that of driv- ing the British from the valley of the St. Lawrence River. The Grants folk had already participated in two unsuccessful assaults upon the Province of Quebec. In tackling the British province, the Vermonters had tackled an enemy far more formidable than New York. Vermonters, therefore, took an interest in the news that the Continental Congress proposed once more to launch an invasion of Quebec. In February, 1778, the Council of Safety busied itself with plans to aid this invasion. The Council ordered that a call be issued for three hundred volunteers, that provisions for their sup-
47. V. H. S., Collections, II, 25-30.
48. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, II, 243.
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port be collected, that twenty-five sleighs be provided and that the quartermaster would enjoin everyone's hearty cooperation in collecting hay, provisions and other articles.49 On the tenth, the Council exhorted the Grants folk to stand loyally behind the ex- pedition. "Therefore this Council flatter themselves that no further arguments [need] be used to induce every well wisher to the Free- dom & Liberty of himself & Injured Country vigorously to exert every nerve on this important Occasion."50
The disappointment of Vermonters can be imagined when, on February 25, 1778, the Council announced that the intended in- vasion of the Province of Quebec had been abandoned.51 Later, General Lafayette desired the Continental Congress to dispatch an army against Quebec but Washington opposed his plan be- cause he feared that the French, who would take part in the inva- sion, might decide to remain permanently in the province. As a result of these divided counsels, the British remained on the offen- sive in the Champlain Valley and in the summer of 1778 they sent raiding parties against Vermont towns. Settlers were forced to abandon the central portion of the Champlain Valley and to re- treat to the Connecticut Valley or to the Southwest. The raiders were dispatched by the new Governor of Quebec, Frederick Haldimand. He was born in Switzerland in 1715, had served in different European Armies including the Prussian, and in 1754 he entered the British Army. After participating in the conquest of New France, he served at various times before 1778 in Pensacola, New York and Boston. In the late spring of 1778, he arrived in Quebec as Carleton's successor.
The new Governor reported on November 21, 1778, to Lord George Germain, British Secretary of War, that his troops had destroyed the equivalent of four months' provisions sufficient for twelve thousand men and had driven the Vermonters from the Champlain Valley. "At present," he said, "there remain no more traders on either side of Lake Champlain from near Tyconderoga to Canada, and considerable settlements of them along Otter
49. Ibid., I, 217.
50. Ibid., I, 219.
51. Ibid., I, 225.
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Creek have been destroyed .... "52 These raids brought terror and misery to the Vermonters. Instead of humbling the British, they were humbled themselves.
This turning of the tables embarrassed Ira Allen who, in addi- tion to stating that the Congress would recognize Vermont's claim to independence, had also predicted that the Province of Quebec would be captured. By 1779 the hope of immediate recognition of Vermont's independence by the Congress had died, and the hope of immediate capture of Quebec had withered away. The purposes for which Vermonters had joined the Revolution had been only partially fulfilled. Vermont was a new state; but it lay exposed to the British and it was spurned by the Continental Congress. That a change was about to occur in the attitude of Vermont towards the British on the one hand, and towards the Congress on the other, was ominously indicated by Chittenden when he informed the Congress that unless Vermont's independence were recog- nized, Vermont might take such measures as self-preservation would justify.53
52. P. A. C., Haldimand Papers (B), LIV, 61-72.
53. V. H. S., Collections, II, 32.
CHAPTER SEVEN
The Haldimand Negotiations: First Phase
The supposition that the Allens might withdraw from the Revo- lution and negotiate with the British had been suggested by Wil- liam Smith as early as 1777. "May it not be supposed," he confided to his diary on May 9. of that year, "that if they are disavowed by Congress that they will suddenly turn about, look to Great Britain and join the army from Canada."1 Smith did not know that the British had attempted as early as 1776 to persuade Ethan Allen to abandon the Revolutionary cause.
After Ethan had been released by the British, he said that he had been approached in New York in December of 1776 by a man whom he did not identify and that this person offered him lands and offices if he would declare himself a loyalist; "but as to lands he was by no means satisfied, that the king would possess a suf- ficient quantity in the United States at the end of the war to re- deem any pledges on that score."2 His exchange in May, 1778, might have been more speedily arranged but for the hostility of Yorkers. Samuel Adams, who believed that they had delayed Ethan's release, deplored the prevalence of what he described as private or partial motives among them.3
In the same year that Ethan was freed, Lord North's program of conciliation was launched by the dispatch to the colonies of the Carlisle Commission. It arrived in Philadelphia in the spring of 1778. Composed of William Eden, Lord Carlisle and George John- stone, the commission was empowered by the British Parliament to treat with the Continental Congress for the return of the col- onies to the empire on the basis of the repeal of the Intolerable Acts and the renunciation by Parliament of its legal power to tax the colonies. The terms offered by the British government in 1778
1. N. Y. P. L., Smith Diary.
2. V. H. S., Collections, II, 76n.
3. N. Y. P. L., Samuel Adams Papers, Adams to Archibald Campbell, Jan. 14, 1778.
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GEN. FREDERICK HALDIMAND
Courtesy the Fleming Museum
THOMAS CHITTENDEN Silhouette by Charles Wilson Peale
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HALDIMAND NEGOTIATIONS: First Phase
might possibly have been acceptable to the colonists if they had been offered in 1776; but by 1778 they were more determined than ever to become independent. The French Alliance of that year helped to strengthen their determination.4
By July of 1778 the Commission was thoroughly disillusioned by the reception accorded its proposals in the Continental Con- gress. In despair, the Commission reported on July 7 to Lord George Germain, that its success must come either by force of arms or "by negotiating with separate Bodies of men and Indi- viduals."5 Private negotiations resulted in the treason of Benedict Arnold and started a chain of events which led to overtures to the Allens. This new technique of negotiation was employed by Sir Henry Clinton, Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in North America, who was carrying on the war from his head- quarters in the city of New York. He found time to suggest to William Eden that Ethan Allen might be induced to withdraw from the Revolution. "He may in my opinion," wrote Clinton to Eden, December 24, 1778, "be easily tempted to throw off any dependence on the Tyranny of the Congress and made useful to Government by giving him and his adherents the property of all the Lands appropriated to the Rebels and making that Country a Separate Government dependent on the Crown and the Laws of Great Britain, this would not only attach the present riotous crew but draw to them numbers from the rebels. .. . "6
Clinton watched with growing interest the unfolding quarrel between revolutionary New York and revolutionary Vermont. He confided to Germain on January 11, 1779, "that insurgents under Allen continue to give umbrage to what is called the New York Government."" Germain was greatly interested in Clinton's infor- mation. On March 3, 1779, he wrote Clinton that he hoped by "discreet management" that the Vermonters could be detached from the revolutionary cause and that he saw "no objection to your giving them reason to expect that His Majesty will erect their
4. Van Doren, Carl, Secret History of the American Revolution (New York, 1941), 59-87.
5. William L. Clements Library, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, Box for July 1-28, 1778. 6. Stevens. B. F., Facsimiles of Mss. in European Archiccs Regarding America, no. 549. 7. Clements Library, Clinton Papers, Box for January, 1779.
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country into a separate Province, and confirm every occupant that shall give proofs of his return to his duty, in the possession of the ungranted lands he occupies."8
In the summer of 1779, Clinton attempted for the first time to communicate with the Allens. A messenger, possibly the Ver- monter, Simon Stevens, was dispatched to Ethan urging him to fall back on Canada and to cooperate with General Frederick Haldimand in Quebec. Clinton wrote Eden, when he thought he had received an answer from Allen favorable to his proposal, that it would effect a revolution. Clinton's hopes, however, were pre- mature. The messenger appears never to have seen Ethan and to have made the report out of whole cloth. Undiscouraged, Clinton sent other messengers to Allen. According to Smith's diary, Clin- ton actually saw Allen in New York on July 4 or 5, 1779.9
William Smith of New York took great interest in Clinton's effort to establish contact with the Allens. He looked upon the Revolution as a mighty mistake due to the British government's inept handling of the taxation issue. His nature made him adverse to violence of any sort, except against Vermont. Seeing both sides of the quarrel between his province and Great Britain, Smith was now living in retirement near Albany, unable to decide which side to support. Lord North's program of conciliation ended his objec- tions to British imperial policy and in August, 1778, he decided to enter the British lines. He went over to the British with the best wishes of "the scourge of the Tories", his ex-student, Governor George Clinton of New York. "You may be assured, Sir," wrote Clinton, "that former friendship as well as a Desire of seeing jus- tice prevent my witholding from you any of your property or sub- jecting you to penalties ... therefore any Application you may think proper to make. from New York or elsewhere for your Effects ... shall as far as may be consistent with my duty Cheer- fully complied with .... "1º Because Smith was not attainted, his property was never confiscated.
His real property in Vermont was on a different footing. As a Yorker and as a loyalist, he had every reason to expect the seizure
8. P. A. C .. B. XLITT. 135.
9. Clinton Papers, Clinton to Eden, Aug. 21, 1779; Smith Diary, July 5, 8, 1779. 10. N. Y. S. L., George Clinton Papers, Clinton to Smith, July 26, 1778.
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of his lands to the last acre. Although Smith had always deplored the Vermont embroglio, as much indeed as the American Revolu- tion, he never admitted that his participation in the illegal and collusive granting of lands in the Royal Province of New York had contributed to the partition of New York and, indirectly, to the separation of the colonies from the British Empire. As a Yorker he had resisted the claims of the New Hampshire grantees be- fore the Revolution. After he became a loyalist in 1778, he was sorely troubled by the conflict between his sense of duty that he should do nothing to prevent Vermont's rejoining.the empire and his personal interest in seeing justice done to loyalist Yorkers hold- ing lands in Vermont under New York title.
On December 19, 1778, soon after Smith arrived in New York, he wrote Lord Carlisle a long letter in which he outlined his views of the Grants disputes and the possibilities of an impartial solu- tion by the British of the Yorker-Yankee conflict, now transformed into a conflict between loyalist Yorkers and potentially loyalist Vermonters. The British, he said, cannot flatter themselves "with the Hope of winning over the Vermonters to the Crown side, by any Project for an impartial adjudication of the Question of Prop- erty .... If they acquire the whole Legislative and Executive, the Rights under New York will be totally extinguished and thousands of loyal as well as disloyal subjects in various Parts of the King's Dominions will be ruined." Smith recalled his and Tryon's plan to confirm settlers' land titles with certain reservations and, he said, "if members had favored it, rebellion of Grants would have ended." He did not wholly despair of the eventual success of this plan, "for your Lordship is not to conceive, that the whole People of this District are of one Mind." "The King," Smith continued, "has loyal subjects in it" who have deliberately aggravated the situation in order to "embarrass and overthrow Congressional power." To tackle this dual problem of bringing Vermont over to the British under the guarantee that the land title dispute would be compromised, Smith recommended to Carlisle that Parliament set up a council or commission to settle all such disputes. "Such a Council," said Smith, "will know how to manage not only Ver-
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mont, but work upon hopes and interests and fears of many thou- sands in other places."11
Smith was obviously worried by information of one Samuel Stevens that the Vermonters would join the British only if their New Hampshire titles were confirmed. In February of 1779, Smith was even more worried by information that Vermont had rejected George Clinton's proposals that all grants by New Hampshire not covered by New York grants be confirmed and that conflicting grants be arbitrated. "I advised Mr. Tryon to cause this Publica- [tion] to be reprinted to show as it does that the Vermont Revolt mean to annihilate all titles under New York. There are many loyal as well as Disloyal Subjects interested against this Design both here and in England, and in and out of the King's Army."12
The apprehensions of Smith appear to have been transmitted to Sir Henry Clinton. In the Clinton Papers in the Clements Library in Ann Arbor is an undated memorandum in Clinton's hand which touches upon this delicate question. In it he stated that the Con- tinental Congress had avoided a decision in the dispute favorable either to New York or Vermont because either decision would destroy the property rights of many revolutionary leaders. "If Ver- mont chooses to join Great Britain," he continued, "her friends will be left out .... Query, is object of joining Vermont equal to the expense of indemnifying friends of Government, who would lose lands in Vermont?" Clinton had two proposals in mind. One was, if Vermont abandoned the Revolution, that the British might indemnify Yorker loyalists, "mentioning the limits and granting all the lands now possesst, to the possessors, and the remainder to be granted under certain restrictions." If this were not feasible, Clinton suggested that the lands under New York and New Hamp- shire title which had been granted first be confirmed and that grantees losing land by the application of this rule be indemnified with ungranted land. The remainder of Vermont lands could be granted to Vermonters and others who declared for Great Britain.13
Clinton's recognition of the complications involved in offering
11. Stevens, Facsimiles, no. 108.
12. Smith Diary, Feb. 9, 1779.
13. Clinton Papers, Box for 1780.
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"GREATER" VERMONT:
1781
Cartography by Earle Newton. Base map: section from Conder's 1777 map.
- Most westerly claim Most easterly claim (Graf-
ton and Cheshire Counties, N. H.)
. N. H. towns admitted Apr. 5, 1781
+ Vermont towns voting for admission
· Vermont towns voting against admission
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HALDIMAND NEGOTIATIONS: First Phase
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