USA > Vermont > Vermont in quandary, 1763-1825 > Part 17
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29
Hamilton, too, perceived the political significance of the proxi- mity of Vermont to Quebec. Before the Revolution he had known that a trade in staves had been carried on between the Champlain Valley and Quebec. After the Revolution he knew that com-
23. N.Y.P.L., Emmett Collection.
175
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
mercial connections between Vermonters and the British in Canada had been resumed. Hamilton had more than sufficient evidence to prove that the commercial interests of this section of Vermont were responsible for its aloofness to the other American states. His apprehension became so great that in March, 1787, he under- took to secure New York's recognition of Vermont's independence, preparatory to winning its adherence to the dying confederation. To accomplish his purpose, Hamilton introduced on March 15 a bill in the New York Assembly in which New York recognized Vermont's independence. His speech in support of his bill be- trayed his fear for the political future of Vermont. Is it not natural to suppose, he said, that the Vermonters will "provide for their own safety, by seeking connections elsewhere?" Did not the strongest evidence point to the fact that "these connections have already been formed with the British in Canada?" We have, he said, "the strongest evidence that negotiations have been carried on between that government and the leaders of the people of Ver- mont." 24
On the twenty-eighth, Richard Harrison, a spokesman for Yorker claimants to Vermont lands, opposed Hamilton's bill in a speech which proved unconvincing to the Assembly. It is alleged, said Harrison, that Vermonters "are forming improper connexions with the British in Canada, which at some future period may be destructive to America." He denied that any evidence existed for this suspicion "except in the lively imaginations of persons" who "for particular purposes" wish to arouse alarms. He ridiculed the idea that Great Britain would form an alliance with a state which it had already recognized by the Treaty of 1783 as lying within American territory. Above all, he said, Great Britain would have little reason for forming "an indirect connexion with what is a comparatively small and insignificant corner of a single state." In conclusion, he said that "the proposed connexion between Ver- mont and the British government was a phantom raised for the sake of Political prejudices, but which when carefully examined will prove to be a mere phantom only." 25
24. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, III, 423-424. 25. Ibid., III, 424-430.
176
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
On the same day Hamilton replied to Harrison's speech in a persuasive and convincing manner. He buttressed his contention that Vermont leaders had been and still were negotiating with Quebec by referring to the Haldimand Negotiations and their aftermath as conclusive evidence that Harrison was wrong. Since the peace, he continued, British officials had granted commercial concessions to Vermonters in the Canadian market. He refuted Harrison's statement that Britain had little reason to be interested in the future of Vermont by declaring that Britain's policy was to weaken still more the already enfeebled American states and, by establishing Vermont as a friendly buffer, to occupy the western posts permanently. Vermont, in its present state, he said, looked to Great Britain for support against the American States because its inhabitants were well aware of the "relative situation of Canada and Vermont."26 So convincing were Hamilton's arguments that, on April 11, the Assembly passed his bill. It was rejected, how- ever, by the Senate.
Meanwhile, the opponents of the Allens in Vermont had not been idle. They soon made it clear that they were responding to the change of sentiment being wrought in New York by Hamil- ton. In July, 1788, Chipman met with Lewis R. Morris and other opponents of the Allens in Tinmouth to establish a private cab- inet of their own to offset the influence of the Allen-Chittenden cabinet. The object was to forestall an alliance between the Allens and Great Britain and to explore the possibilities of their state's joining the other American states upon terms favorable to the Ver- monters whom they represented. After consultation, they agreed to make overtures to Hamilton. On the fifteenth they dispatched a letter to him. In it they stated that Vermont would ratify the Constitution if its citizens were not afraid that doing so would result in the Federal Courts' invalidating the New Hampshire titles. Vermonters, they said in no uncertain terms, would never join the other American states if, by so doing, their titles would be jeopardized.27
Although Hamilton was busily engaged in efforts to secure Now 26. Ibid., III, 460-438.
27. Ibid., III, 441.
------
177
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
York's ratification of the Constitution by the Poughkeepsie Con- vention, he replied immediately to Chipman's letter. He stated that no time was to be lost in securing Vermont's admission to the United States, and he described the legal procedure to be fol- lowed. Ratification, he said, must be by a convention rather than by an act of the Assembly because it was "the policy of the system to lay its foundations on the immediate consent of the people."28 During the following winter, Hamilton conferred with Chipman in Albany. Together they agreed upon the means of settling the land title dispute. The holders of New York titles to Vermont lands were to be compensated by a cash appropriation of $30,000 by the state of Vermont.29
This agreement was followed by the presentation on February 13, 1789, of a petition to the New York Assembly asking for the passage of an act to appoint commissioners with power to treat with commissioners from Vermont to settle the land title dispute. This petition was stoutly resisted by George Clinton who, aston- ishingly enough, had not lost all his lands under New York title in Cavendish, Newbury and Hillsborough. Possibly these lands were protected by his friend, Jacob Bayley, or possibly Vermont did not wish to enrage His Excellency further by confiscating all his lands in the state.3º Despite Clinton's opposition, the bill was passed on July 14. New York had now reversed its attitude towards Vermont.
Its complement would be a change in the attitude of Vermont towards New York and the other American states. So long as the Allens and Chittenden were in substantial control of the govern- ment of their state this change was not to be expected. When in October, 178S, the Vermont Assembly passed a bill to send three commissioners to the Congress, Ira, who had been appointed one of them, demonstrated that he was still hostile to the American States by refusing to serve and going instead to confer with Dor- chester in Quebec on the grand plan. A change in Vermont's
28. Ibid., 446.
29. Chipman, op. cit., 81.
30. V.H.S., Newbury Manuscripts, John Mckesson to Jacob Bayley, Oct. 20, 1790; N.Y.S.L., George Clinton Papers, Account Book, 44. Vermont pursued Clinton to the grave. Hle was ultimately buried beneath a tombstone purchased in Vermont. See George Clinton Papers, George Blagden to M. B. Tallmadge, July 12, 1814.
1
178
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
attitude towards New York might not have been so soon forth- coming if it had not been for a major scandal involving Chittenden and Ira Allen which broke out in 1789.
Two years before, Jonathan Hunt, once accused of loyalism, had petitioned for a town which he called Woodbridge, now known as Highgate. Before the Assembly had had an opportunity to act on Hunt's petition, Ira startled the Assembly by declaring that Woodbridge had already been granted to him. An examina- tion of the Charter Book showed that Ira owned the town but that he had secured it by illegal methods. The astonished Assem- bly forthwith appointed a committee of investigation. Ira at- tempted to justify his actions, but he was not given the oppor- tunity, for, as he reported, Stephen R. Bradley, a member of the Committee and formerly one of his supporters, said testily that "neither the Committee or the Assembly wanted any information from me respecting the matter."31 The committee closely ques- tioned Governor Chittenden instead. The Governor, according to a newspaper account, confessed that without securing the con- sent of the whole Council he had granted on his own responsi- bility a charter to these lands to Ira. Thereupon the committee reported that in its opinion the Governor had violated the trust placed in him and had "converted it to private and sinister views." Chittenden made matters worse by declaring before the Assem- bly that he had granted the lands to Ira, fearing that this might be his last opportunity to "comply with Ira Allen's wishes."32
These disclosures caused the Assembly to order Ira to relin- quish the charter. He hastened to pacify the Assembly by saying that he would guarantee that the records of the charter in the Surveyor-General's office would be erased and destroyed and that his conduct would not cause further trouble to the Assembly.33 Even before the Woodbridge scandal, the opinion of many Ver- monters had been expressed by Jacob Bayley when he declared that the Allens were "unjustly making their fortunes out of the whole state." 34
31. N.Y.S.L., Ira Allen Papers, 1774-1789, July 20, 1789.
32. Vermont Journal, Aug. 19. 1789.
33. Vermont State Papers, V, 407.
34. Vermont Journal, June 26, 1786.
1
179
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
So outraged was a majority of Vermonters at the public disclo- sure of this scandal that, in the October election of 1789, Chitten- den was defeated by the opposing candidate, Moses Robinson, a Southwesterner. Because his election produced a shift in the con- trol of the executive branch of the government from the Cham- plain Valley to the Southwest, it resulted almost immediately in a revolution in the official attitude of Vermont towards the other American states. On the twenty-third, the newly-elected Assembly passed a bill appointing commissioners, including Tichenor and Chipman, to meet with the commissioners who had been ap- pointed by New York.35 During the winter of 1789-1790, these commissioners met and agreed that, in return for Vermont's in- demnifying New York title-holders with $30,000, New York would consent to Vermont's admission into the Federal Union. The last obstacle to Vermont's joining the union having been removed, the Vermont Assembly voted on October 25, 1790, to call a conven- tion to ratify the Constitution of the United States.
It was held at Bennington in the Southwest in January, 1791, and was composed of 109 delegates elected by popular vote. Prac- tically the only representatives of the old guard present were Ira Allen and Chittenden, who had been reelected Governor in 1790. The delegates were primarily the more substantial citizenry of Vermont: lawyers, land owners, merchants, office holders, ex- army officers and even two opportunistic loyalists, Simon Stevens and Benjamin Green. Yorkers in Vermont were represented by Israel Smith, opponents of universal manhood suffrage by Asaph Fletcher, lawyers by Gideon Olin and Nathaniel Chipman, and debt-collectors of the Critical Period by Isaac Tichenor.36
The absence from the Convention of radicals, including Reuben Jones and Leonard Spaulding, indicates its conservative character. Their absence was undoubtedly due to the indifference displayed by the rank and file of Vermonters to the election of delegates. The return of relatively prosperous times was the major cause for this indifference. So long as times had been hard, the populace
35. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, III, 450.
36, The names of members of the convention are given in Records III, 466-467. The social standing of the convention was found in the genealogies, local histories and manu- scripts in the Library of the Vermont Historical Society.
-------------
180
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
was a force to be reckoned with in Vermont politics, as the at- tempts to close courts had demonstrated. Prosperity had the effect of lulling humble Vermonters into political apathy. It was so great that the Vermont Journal of Windsor reported on March 22, 1791, that "at a late election of delegates to Constitutional Convention," in a town of 300 voters, "only 19 attended & formed a quorum and chose their delegate." Voters who had failed to exercise the right of suffrage, it continued, now complained against the decision of the Convention. This situation, it said, existed in other towns where the lack of interest of voters resulted in "the election of Judges, Generals, etc." The overwhelmingly conservative character of the delegates meant that they would be concerned primarily with pro- moting the sectional interests which they represented. The major interests were those of the Champlain Valley on the one hand, and the Connecticut Valley and the Southwest on the other.
The people living in the latter two sections were deeply con- cerned about their future commercial prosperity. Before the es- tablishment of the Federal Government, Vermonters had been free to trade wherever most convenient: in Montreal, Quebec, Albany, or in New England. By 1790, however, Vermonters liv- ing in the Connecticut Valley and in the Southwest were no longer certain that they would be free to trade where most convenient in the future. The Federal Government, it was rumored, might hamper the trade with the American states by laying duties upon Vermont exports. On May 4, 1789, the Vermont Gazette of Ben- ington printed a news item to this effect. "Congress," it said, "will make a question whether the inhabitants of Rhode Island, Ver- mont and North Carolina in respect to payment of import [duties] on goods are to be considered citizens of the United States-as alien friends or alien enemies." This report helped to gain addi- tional adherents to the cause for which Chipman labored.
The inhabitants of the Champlain Valley could not be so easily induced to ratify the Constitution on the grounds of commercial necessity. Unlike the inhabitants of the Connecticut Valley and the Southwest, the commercial ties of the Champlain Valley in- habitants were with the Province of Quebec. Only the building
181
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
of a canal to connect Lake Champlain with the Hudson River could quiet their genuine and legitimate fears that ratification would destroy the Quebec trade without providing an alternative outlet for their surpluses in the State of New York. Anticipating this valid economic argument against ratification, the Vermont Gazette opportunely published on September 6, 1790, a report that Yorker business men proposed to commence building a Champlain-Hudson Canal.
These rumors provided the immediate background for the de- bate over ratification in the Convention. On January 6, Chipman commenced the debate by making a notable address. In describing the disadvantages of continuing independent, he declared that Vermont was weak in comparison with the United States, that in the disputes which were bound to arise between Vermont and the other American States, it required very little knowledge of politics to predict that every sacrifice would have to be made by Vermont. He then described how in time of war the little state would be overrun either by British or by American armies and would be "equally misused, equally despised, and equally insulted and plundered by both." Furthermore, what he called ties of "blood and kindred affection" forbade an alliance with Great Britain. Thus, Chipman claimed the only feasible alternative was to unite with the United States, which would make Vermonters fellow- citizens of more than three millions of Americans. If Vermonters chose to remain independent, he concluded, "we must ever remain little, and I might say, contemptible ;- but united, we become great, from the reflected greatness of the empire with which we unite." 37
The other notable address was that of Benjamin Green which supplemented Chipman's because he based his arguments on eco- nomics. He observed that the United States now surrounded Ver- mont on three sides. If Vermont refused to join it, "where should we carry our produce? Perhaps some say to Canada, but Canada it is well known is a poor market, and soon overstocked. And in- deed from the part of the state he represented [the Connecticut
37. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, III, 468-472.
182
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
Valley], it would never answer. . .. The American Congress," warned Green, "can compel us to join the union, on their own terms, without having recourse to arms; Let them prohibit ex- portation to or importation from Vermont, and we must sink or comply." 38
The opponents of ratification ignored the arguments of Chip- man and Green. They argued that the hard-won liberties of Ver- monters would be infringed by the new colossus, the Federal Gov -. ernment, and that the New Hampshire titles would be invalidated by the Federal Courts. These objections were overborne, and on January 10, the Convention, with only four dissenting votes, rati- fied the Constitution. Ira Allen, bowing to the inevitable, voted in favor of ratification. On February 18, 1791, the Congress of the United States admitted Vermont into the union.39
Meanwhile, Levi Allen, now in Liverpool and unaware of the political changes in Vermont, prepared to sail with a cargo of goods which he said was worth 2500 £.40 But, as he wrote, "many unavoidable procrastinations took place in the course of Charter- ing and loading the ship, amongst which the Obstruction thrown in my way by the Merchants of this Country who supply Canada was not the least .... " Then the crew of the vessel upon which he planned to sail was pressed into the British Navy at the height of the Nootka Sound crisis.41 After these obstacles had been over- come, he left for Vermont. Sir Henry Clinton wrote on October 18, 1790, "Allen, I hope, by this time has safely arrived at Quebec & it is possible he may be in time to influence the Vermont elec- tions." 42 Levi, however, did not reach Vermont on this voyage be- cause his ship was blown by contrary winds to Georgia. From there he sailed back to London, instead of to Quebec, where he arrived some time in July, 1791.
In Levi's absence Ira wrote him two letters describing the changes made and impending in Vermont. In the first he told Levi that Chittenden had been defeated in the election of 1789.
38. Ibid., 477.
39. Ibid., 480, 486.
40. Ira Allen Papers, 1774-1793, Levi to Ira, July 22, 1790.
41. Q, LIV, pt. 2, 69S.
42. Clements Library, Clinton Pupers, 1790-1792.
. . .
183
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
Soon afterwards he dispatched a second letter advising Levi to limit his activities to securing direct trading connections between Great Britain and Vermont, "where Lumber can be sold to Best Advantage & goods obtained on equally good Terms." This pro- ject was the only feasible one, he declared, because of the "con- siderable revolution" caused by Robinson's election as governor. "For me to attempt to convince people of the South end of the State with their prejudices is not worth the attempt." Ira charged that members of the Assembly were blindly prejudiced against him and his policies because he had become such a great land-owner.43
These letters informed Levi that the ultimate purpose of his mission to Britain had been frustrated by Nathaniel Chipman. Nevertheless, soon after his return to London from Georgia he conferred with Simcoe who informed Henry Dundas, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, of the political changes which had occurred in Vermont. On August 2, 1791, he provided Dun- das with his evaluation of Vermont sectionalism. He divided Ver- mont into two sections, assigning to each a dominant commercial interest. The section bordering on the Hudson River, he said, quite naturally desired a connection with New York; and its leader was Moses Robinson. The other, "by far the larger Divi- sion, & what is of more importance, unlimited in its Lands . . . from the circumstances of their waters flowing into the St. Lawrence is naturally disposed to a connection with Canada of this party are the Allens and Chittenden .... " Simcoe declared that had the British government extended Levi credit, he might have arrived in the Champlain Valley in time to prevent Vermont's ratification of the Constitution. Levi, he explained, had wished to be in Ver- mont before the October, 1790, session of the Assembly in order "by a cargo directly imported from this Country to exemplify the advantages of a Commercial Intercourse" with Britain. He begged Dundas not to refuse Levi a loan solely because of his unculti- vated backwoods appearance.44
Despite Simcoe's intervention, Levi never obtained a loan and he was forced to sail from Liverpool on September 11, 1791, with-
43. N.Y.S.L., Levi Allen Papers, Ira to Levi, Feb. 7, 1790.
4. Report of the Public Archives of Canada for 1889, 53.
184
THE FOURTEENTH STATE
out a cargo. He arrived in Windsor, Vermont, on October 27. To his great chagrin he learned that Vermont had ratified the Con- stitution. On November 27, he wrote Dundas that he was greatly mortified by the decision of the Convention, that he could truth- fully state that if he had sailed up the St. Lawrence the previous year with a carefully chosen cargo of goods, Vermont would not have ratified the Constitution. Members of the Governor's Coun- cil and of the Assembly, he said, "now confess they are sorry, and feel themselves much hurt on hearing many advantages that would have accrued to Vermont if they had remained indepen- dent." 45
Levi blamed not only the British government for Vermont's joining the states but also Chittenden and his brother. He declared that Chittenden was privately opposed to joining the United States. He accused Ira of voting at the Convention in favor of ratification because his "cursed lucrative ideas" had allowed a dispute between himself and Henry Caldwell of Quebec over the boundary be- tween Ira's town of Alburg and Caldwell's Manor to prejudice him against the British.46 Adam Mabane, a leading political figure in Quebec, declared that other difficulties between Vermonters and Canadians arose from the hostility of William Smith to Ver- mont after his arrival in the province in 1786 as the chief adviser to Dorchester. Mabane claimed that Smith's hostility had helped to create sentiment in Vermont favorable to its joining the United States.47 Similar charges against Smith were made by Simcoe, Clin- ton and Samuel Peters. The latter, writing under the nom de plume of Evan Paul, excoriated Smith as a "loyal, royal, republican judge." Nevertheless, the charge of Levi, Mabane and others, which placed the blame upon the shoulders of Ira, Chittenden and Smith, show that they were not aware of the real reason for Ver- mont's ratifying the Federal Constitution.
45. Ibid., 56.
46. Ibid.
47. B, LXVII, 113-114.
48. Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society ( n.s. I, no. 3, 1930), 18-19.
CHAPTER TWELVE
The Aftermath of Union
The "considerable revolution" mentioned by Ira did not end with Vermont's becoming a part of the United States because the opposition to the Allens used its political influence to carry on this revolution further. It sponsored measures to amend the Ver- mont Constitution of 1777 to make it conservative; it rewarded its friends in New York with land grants; it decided in favor of the legality of the confirmatory patents issued by New York prior to the American Revolution; and lastly, it attempted to connect Lake Champlain with the Hudson River by building a barge canal.
Political conservatism was an outstanding characteristic of the opponents of the Allens and Chittenden. The Vermont Constitu- tion was in few, if any, particulars expressive of the conservative point of view of the proper relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. Furthermore, the concession of universal manhood suffrage in the Constitution was contrary to the Federalist thesis that in politics property should have as much, if not more weight than numbers. Possibly, Chip- man, Tichenor and Morris considered that New York's Constitu- tion of 1777 more adequately embodied their political theories. At all events, the difficulties which lawyers, merchants and creditors experienced during the post-war depression caused a conservative as early as 1785 to propose further checks in the Constitution on what he called "hasty measures." The passage of hasty measures, including a paper currency bill, had been defeated, as we have seen, with great effort by the conservatives.
Soon after Vermont joined the union, Asaph Fletcher, a conser- vative, wrote his friend Tichenor a letter in which he discussed what he thought was the greatest defect in the Vermont Consti- tution. He recommended that his letter be placed before the Council of Censors and suggested that it might be in the interest
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.