USA > Vermont > Vermont in quandary, 1763-1825 > Part 8
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Such severe treatment was not always dealt to the opponents of the dominant factions in Vermont. The Vermonters were often quite lenient to loyalists and particularly so to their families. In one instance, the Council ordered the effects of John Munro seized, leaving to his family, however, "Two cows and such other effects as were wanted for the Support of said Munro's fam- ily. ... "14 The wife of Dr. Adams, old foe of the Allens, was allowed to take out of the state "two feather beds and beddings suitable therefor, six Pewter Plates, two Platters, two basons, one quart Pot, one Teakettle, Wearing Apparel for herself and Chil-
11. N. Y. S. L., Miscellaneous Manuscripts, no. 3608.
12. Vermont, Office of the Secretary of State, Stevens Transcripts, Ethan to Elisha Payne, July 11, 1778.
13. Public Papers of George Clinton ( Albany, 1899-1914), 10 vols., III, 552-553.
14. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 151.
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dren, one Frying Pan, one Candle Stick, knives and forks." 15 The wife of the loyalist, James Rogers, secured what must have seemed to less fortunate loyalists preferential treatment. A committee of the Assembly reported in 1779 in favor of allowing Mrs. Rogers to have the proceeds from her husband's estate out of which "the Sd Mrs. Rogers and family ought to be maintained in a handsome manner." The Assembly, balking at this proposal, gave to Mrs. Rogers, instead, one hundred fifty acres and a house.16
Popular hostility was, however, another story. An act passed on February 24, 1779, complained that some loyalists who had been banished by the state had not left and that others had boldly re- turned. It prescribed punishment of forty lashes once a week until they would voluntarily leave Vermont.17
The number of loyalist estates confiscated by April 23, 1778, was only one hundred and fifty eight.18 In proportion to the total population of Vermont, the number of estates confiscated is small. One reason for the relatively few loyalists lies in the backcountry radicalism of the Vermonters. Not everywhere, of course, did the backcountry rally to the Revolution. In North Carolina, as well as in certain parts of the Hudson Valley, a large proportion of backcountry people became loyalists when the seaboard joined the Revolution.
In Vermont, however, the hostility of the backcountry to the seaboard had not as yet reached a state, of disillusionment with the complex alignment of forces for and against independence. The successful revolutionary leadership which was provided for the common folk and the continued success of that leadership undoubtedly prevented, at this time, a Vermont counterpart of the Regulators' War and its aftermath in North Carolina, during which many backcountry inhabitants joined Great Britain against their own seaboard. Moreover, the stereotyped Tory, then and now, had vanished from Vermont. The aristocratic loyalist gentle- men had disappeared from the Grants before the outbreak of the
15. Ibid., 226.
16. Nye, Mary G. (ed.), Sequestration, Confiscation and Sales of Estates (1941), 67, 69. 17. Vermont, Office of the Secretary of State, Manuscript Assembly Journals, 1778- 1781, 93. 18. Nye. op. cit., 15-17.
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American Revolution in 1776. Vermont, by beginning its revolu- tion prior to 1776, had forced the early departure of the most vehement supporters of New York and its speculators. Among these were many of the wealthy conservatives and landed gentry who tended to remain loyal to the British government which had protected their interests.
Whatever the reasons for loyalism, Vermont proceeded to con- fiscate loyalist property. As early as the summer of 1777, com- missioners were appointed with power to designate three persons to assess the value of goods and chattels seized from the loyalists and lease them for a period of two years.19
At the sales of personal property an enormous amount of live- stock and goods was sold. Cattle, sheep, plows, hemp, bed steads, frying pans, traps, powder horns, lumber, tubs, chests, scythes, kettles, sleighs, axes, shovels, augers, whippletrees, pinchers and leather breeches were bought by rebel Vermonters. A few loyal- ists were able to save some of their personal property by deeding it to friends or relatives. The commissioners were conscientious, however, and, on at least one occasion, prevented such a loss to the state. The patriot, Leonard Spaulding, prevented Oliver, Elijah and John Lovell from holding title to personal effects of the loyalist, Timothy Lovell.20 Another commissioner complained that Vermonters appropriated loyalist property for their own use. The commissioners were busy, at times, scouring the countryside for horses and other confiscated property which had been seized without due process of the laws of Vermont. One commissioner declared, "Coll. Williams can Enform Whare a Number of horses is Gone that are cared by Certain Persons who think tis No Harm to Stele from a State because a Tory once owned them. . . . "21 The funds derived from these sales of personal property were substantial. After the Revolution, Ira admitted two motives for confiscation: one to finance Vermont's war effort, the other to avoid levying taxes which would be unpopular.
After the organization of the state government in March of 1778, two courts of confiscation were established, one east and
19. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 136.
20. Nye, op. cit., 59.
21. Ibid., 264.
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one west of the mountains. Bayley and ex-Yorkers dominated the former, the Allen and Bennington factions the latter. Not until the establishment of these two courts was any attempt made to dis- pose of the real estate as distinct from the personal property of loyalists.
This delay was occasioned by the fact that New Hampshire and New York had made land grants which conflicted. Many Ver- monters foresaw that the sale of loyalist lands held under New York title but also claimed under New Hampshire title would liquidate the land-holdings of claimants under the latter title. Only lands held by loyalists for which there were no conflicting claims could be sold without fear of injuring claimants under New Hampshire whose lands had been re-granted by New York.
Such complications arising from the confiscation of loyalists' lands prompted Chittenden's order of April 30, 1780. This order directed: "if the title derived from New Hampshire warrant pur- chaser the New Hampshire title, if forfeiture had only York title, where there is hampshire grant, for the same lands, you will sell the Possessions and improvements only. If the forfeiture has York title and no other to land, you will warrant the premise from all . claims."22 Thus, the effect of the Vermont revolution on che for- tunes of loyalists in Vermont and outside of the state as well was to liquidate their holdings of Vermont lands. All lands held by Yorkers and all lands held by loyalists under any title whatsoever were forfeited. The Vermonters benefited, therefore, by two revo- lutions, the one against New York invalidating New York titles and the one against Great Britain invalidating all landholdings of loyalists.
The number of acres confiscated which belonged to non-resident loyalists holding title under either New York or New Hampshire was considerable, far greater than the acreage which was con- fiscated from Grants settlers. The heirs of Crean Brush lost 29,000 acres, Samuel Peters of Hebron, Connecticut, 56,000 acres (so he claimed), and William Smith approximately 26,000 £ invested in Vermont lands.23
22. V. H. S., Miscellaneous Manuscripts.
23. N. Y. P. L., Transcripts of Loyalist Claims, XLVI, 383-384; XLIV, 397; II, 266- 267; XI, 250-252; XLIV, 607-631.
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These acreages and sums far exceed the amounts confiscated from loyalists who had actually resided in the Grants. Most of these loyalists who were later to seek compensation from the British government put in claims for modest sums. Only a few could claim compensation for such large acreages as Justus Sher- wood who had owned 13,000 acres situated in New Haven, Bur- lington, Tinmouth, New Huntington, Middlebury and Sunder- land,24 or for 47,000 acres as did James Rogers.25 Some of the funds realized from the sale of confiscated lands undoubtedly were used by the Treasurer, Ira Allen, to meet public expendi- tures.
Some of these lands were sold at very low prices to attract settlers to Vermont. Eliakim Spooner, a prominent Vermonter, was, as he later wrote, persuaded to come in 1779 to Vermont from Massachusetts to invest in confiscated estates. He bought valuable lots in Westminster, but was "exceedingly injured by sundry unjust reports, which have been put & kept in circulation during the said 18 years, respecting the value of the consideration- money which he paid the state for the lands, insinuating that it was of small value. . . . "26
Some of the land was purchased by persons high in Vermont political circles. Ethan invested in them and so did Ira. One loyal- ist, John Mebus, who joined the British in 1779, reported to the Commissioners on Loyalist Claims that "Claimants title being under a New York Patent was reckoned bad. ... Col. Allen has got the land." 27
Lastly, some of the land was probably sold to outsiders who were influential in state or congressional politics. Ira Allen did not hesitate to distribute land in such a way as to increase the number of Vermont supporters in other states. The list of influential men who at one time or another held title to Vermont lands is fairly large, among them, John Paul Jones, President John Witherspoon of Princeton, John and Abigail Adams, Oliver Wolcott and Gen- eral James Sullivan. Available records do not show how many of
24. Ibid., XXI, 53-54, 57.
25. Ibid., XX, 511.
26. Vermont, Office of the Secretary of State, Manuscript State Papers, XLVI, 233.
27. N. Y. P. L., Transcripts of Loyalist Claims, XXVII, 386-387.
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these sales or gifts were of estates which had been confiscated.
The evidence at hand tends to support the view that the Revo- lution within Vermont did little to sweep aside the speculative holdings of any but those of rebel and loyalist Yorkers and that, although much land passed from the hands of local small land- owners who became loyalists, to local small land-owners who were patriots, the net effect of the revolution in land ownership was to establish the supremacy of the Allens and their supporters and to substitute for Yorker absentee owners a new group of absentee owners, chiefly Yankee.
The sale of loyalist estates was responsible, in part, for a re- bellion in Vermont against the Allen leadership. The fundamental cause for this rebellion was, however, the undue influence of the Allens in the government of the new state. Vermonters had not anticipated this situation. Their constitution expressly declared that government did not exist for "the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family or set of men who are a part only of ... [the] community." Events subsequent to independ- ence demonstrated that the machinery of government could be manipulated all too easily in the interest of the landed, com- mercial and political ambitions of the Allens. Despite the demo- cratic constitution, Vermonters only partially benefited by its pro- visions. The structure of government was democratic; but the structure was controlled substantially by what the Allens and other Vermonters later referred to as the "private cabinet" of Ver- mont.
This private cabinet centered in and around the Governor's Council which was composed of twelve persons elected by popu- lar vote. The titular head of the council was Vermont's first Gov- ernor, Thomas Chittenden. Until Vermont's declaration of inde- pendence, Chittenden had not played a decisive role in politics. Yet his early inactivity in Vermont affairs proved to be his chief political asset. After 1777, he emerged as the prime political sym- bol, uniting in precarious alliance the different factions, some of the members of which were envious of the Allens. Chittenden's subsequent career demonstrated that his sense of loyalty to his political mentors was often greater than his loyalty to the con-
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stitution, or his responsibility to the Assembly. He was soon com- mitted, by and large, to underwriting the Allens' policies. Ira ap- pears even to have written many of his state papers.
That the government was dominated by the Allens and their associates was not due to the fixity of their aims nor to their use of unscrupulous means. The government was easily manipulated partly because the members of the private cabinet, unlike the members of the Assembly, were in consultation almost daily. The Assembly, on the other hand, met only for brief periods in each year. For example, during the year 1778, it met three times: March 13 to March 26, June 4 to June 24 and October 9 to Novem- ber 24.25 Between the meetings of the Assembly, decisions had to be made. In emergencies, the Allens could find plausible excuses for violating express provisions of the constitution which vested policy-making powers in the Assembly.
Yet when the Assembly was in session, it invariably acquiesced in faits accomplis of the private cabinet. This is not surprising be- cause many Vermonters showed their gratitude to the Allens for refusing to levy taxes, for confiscating loyalist estates and for con- tinuing to defy New York successfully, by electing Assemblymen who would support them. Still other factors which explain the great power of the executive branch of the government were the crushing of the Yorker opposition in the Grants and the war- induced emphasis upon centralized authority. Furthermore, the isolation of the Vermont towns from each other by mountains and very poor roads made it difficult for their inhabitants to become acquainted with what transpired in the towns which served at different times as the capital of the state. Lastly, the provision of the constitution granting two representatives only to towns of more than eighty inhabitants had the effect of over-representing the less populous towns in the Champlain Valley where the Allens were so very influential, and under-representing the more popu- lous towns in the Connecticut Valley. A constitution which granted one representative to towns of less than eighty inhabitants and only two representatives to towns of eighty or more inhabitants did not meet the popular demand for representation in legisla-
28. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 243-282.
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tures based solely upon population. As a result of the operation of all of these factors, the provisions of the constitution strictly subordinating the executive to the legislative branch could not for many years curb a cabal composed of the Allens and Chittenden.
To overthrow this cabal or to reduce its influence became the great ambition of Jacob Bayley. He had supported independence as a last resort and as the lesser of the evils confronting him. No love was lost between him and his supporters, and the Allens and theirs. Bayley appears to have proposed to wrest state leadership from the Allens by cooperating with all Assemblymen elected by the inhabitants of the Connecticut Valley who were opposed to the Allens. These out-numbered the Assemblymen elected by the inhabitants of the towns in the more sparsely populated Cham- plain Valley and Southwest. But the popular appeal and political talents of the Allens enabled them to hold firm the reins of gov- ernment after the first Assembly met on March 13, 1778. Yet the Allens' opponents elsewhere in Vermont trusted that they could in time wrest leadership from them by annexing to Vermont the New Hampshire towns situated on the east bank of the Connecti- cut River. The Assemblymen elected by these towns, in conjunc- tion with those elected by the towns on the west bank of the river, could effect what Bayley had desired to do.
For a variety of reasons many inhabitants of the towns on the west bank of the Connecticut River wished to support this plan to humble the Allens. They were, in particular, annoyed by Ira Allen's mangagement of the confiscation and sale of loyalist estates. Ira later wrote that his opponents had declared that, in violation of instructions of the Continental Congress, Vermont had confiscated many large and extremely valuable loyalist es- tates and had "disposed of them accordingly, and the avails ap- propriated to many frivolous and unnecessary purposes without depositing any part thereof in the continental loan offices."29
The cooperation of the inhabitants living in the New Hamp- shire towns on the east bank of the Connecticut was easily secured because their grievances against New Hampshire had not been redressed. Its constitution of 1775 had not only caused many in-
29. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 435.
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habitants of the New Hampshire Grants to abandon all thought of joining New Hampshire, but also angered and alienated the inhabitants of many towns in its own backcountry. The New Hampshire people east of the Connecticut River were represented in political affairs by Eleazer Wheelock, founder of Dartmouth College; Elisha Paine, lawyer of Lebanon and Bezaleel Wood- ward, an associate of Wheelock. They refused to participate in the "revolutionary" yet conservative government established in New Hampshire.
So substantial were their grievances that delegates from the seaboard consented to meet with representatives of the back- country at Lebanon on February 13, 1777, to investigate their complaints. The disaffected claimed "that no one of us is as yet in any degree convinced of the Justice or Equity of said plan [ of representation]," and "have as much ground for uneasiness as be- fore." The failure of the seaboard delegates on their return to im- press the Governor and Assembly of New Hampshire with the seriousness of the situation caused the backcountry settlers to call a second convention at Hanover on June 11, 1776. The grievances against seaboard New Hampshire were restated. It declared that the inhabitants had been invited to send representatives to the New Hampshire Provincial Congress in May of 1775, but that "said Congress near the close of the sessions (without any par- ticular authority vested in them for that purpose by their Con- stituents ) did undertake to adopt a Plan of Representation where- by we apprehend they abridged the liberties of the people," by depriving a number of backcountry towns of representation in the legislature. Rer.onstrances against the plan of representation had been made, notwithstanding which, the Convention con- tinued, "the same oppressive mode of Representation still con- tinues as appears by Writs of election issued last year." 30
The people of Chesterfield were so angered that they claimed that coastal New Hampshire was "influenced by iniquitous in- trigues and secret designations of persons unfriendly, to settle down upon the dregs of Monarchical and Aristocratical tyranny
30. The proceedings of these conventions are printed in New Hampshire Provincial and State Papers, XIII, 760-764.
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in imitation of their late British oppressors."31 To remedy what they deemed a violation of the principle of no taxation without representation, these settlers demanded that each town of one hundred or more inhabitants be permitted to send one represen- tative to the legislature and that every town of less than one hundred inhabitants be permitted to unite with another town to send one representative to the legislature.
This backcountry discontent was heightened by disappointment over the establishment of the Vermont-New Hampshire boundary along the west bank of the Connecticut River. The people on both banks constantly crossed and recrossed the river to transact busi- ness or visit friends and relatives. As a result, they did not view the river as the natural boundary between New Hampshire and Vermont. Bezaleel Woodward declared that it was inconvenient that the river should form the boundary between the two states. "Mountains and heights of land seemed designed by nature as the proper boundary of States, because the Communication is small . on account of the difficulty of passing them." 32
Thus, the local geographic situation caused inhabitants of back- country New Hampshire towns to consider the possibility of seced- ing from New Hampshire and joining Vermont. The New Hamp- shire representative to the Continental Congress, William Whip- ple, was aware of this alarming state of disaffection. He wrote Meseach Weare, Governor of New Hampshire, in the winter of 1778, that the territorial integrity of their state would be en- dangered if the Congress recognized the independence of Ver- mont. "Should the last take place, I am very apprehensive that many towns on the Eastern side of the River will be fond of join- ing them, by which New Hampshire will be embroiled in a very disagreeable contention or subscribed to a very small com- pass .... " "'33
The delegate had correctly predicted what was about to hap- pen. The inhabitants of the west bank and the inhabitants of the east bank were about to unite, the former to destroy the political
31. Ibid., VIII, 423.
32. N. Y. S. I .. , Avery Papers, Bezaleel Woodward to Benjamin Bellows, Nov. 23, 1778. 33. Burnett, E. C. (ed.), Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress ( Wash- ington, D. C., 1921-1936), 8 vols., III, 423.
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power of the Allens, and the latter to redress their political grievances by seceding from New Hampshire and joining Ver- mont.
When the rebellion against the Allens began, they had them- selves partly to blame. At the time of the writing of the constitu- tion, Ira appears to have given assurance to the west bank in- habitants that the east bank inhabitants would be welcome to join Vermont sometime after the constitution had gone into operation. He does not seem to have had any intention of acting upon his promise. In order to mislead the inhabitants of the west bank of the Connecticut and to nip in the bud a coalition potentially hos- tile to him, Ira delayed as long as possible printing and distrib- uting the constitution, which failed to contain any provision ad- mitting towns that did not lie within the New Hampshire Grants. This deception is undoubtedly the explanation for Ira's otherwise puzzling statement that the constitution would have been rejected if it had been submitted to popular ratification.34
After the elections of March 13, 1778, the Assemblymen rep- resenting the Connecticut Valley took the offensive against the Allens. They introduced a bill to unite the towns east of the river to Vermont. This bill immediately caused a deadlock between the Assemblymen representing the eastern and the two western sections of the state. To break the deadlock, the proposal was re- ferred to the towns which were asked to decide the issue by vote. Unfortunately for the Allens, the majority of the towns voted in favor of the union. Before the Allens could catch their breath, the Assembly voted on June 11, 1778, to admit sixteen New Hamp- shire towns.35
How they wriggled loose from this embarrassing commitment deserves telling. Ethan hastened to the Continental Congress to inquire whether it favored the dismemberment of New Hamp- shire. After the Congress told him that it was shocked by this aggression against New Hampshire, he returned to Vermont, and, speaking wholly out of previous character, told the silent Assem- bly that "except the state recede from such union, immediately,
34. Public Papers of George Clinton, IV, 397.
35. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 424.
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Courtesy Baker Library
REV. ELEAZAR WHEELOCK Educator and Politician
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THE NEW HAMPSHIRE GRANTS: 1777-1778 Cartography by Earle Newton. Base Map: section of T. Conder's 1777 Map. "Vermont" Towns 4 Towns adopting The Declaration of Independence Jan. 7, 1777 "Yorker" Towns .
"Valley" Towns
o Towns adopting the Constitution. July 8, 1777
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the whole power of the confederacy of the United States of America will join to annihilate the State of Vermont .... "36 Ira, like his brother, adopted a new tone of respect for the Continental Congress. He deplored the breaking of the proposed Articles of Confederation by which the States resolved to respect the terri- torial integrity of each other. Obviously the Allens were momen- tarily thrown off balance by the coup of the easterners.
Shortly thereafter, they regained their composure and by slow and sure steps recovered the ground lost to their rivals. On Octo- ber 21, 1778, the Allens succeeded in ramming through the Assem- bly a resolution which by implication excluded the sixteen towns from Vermont. In protest, the Lieutenant-Governor, two mem- bers of the Governor's Council and approximately twenty-four members of the Assembly resigned.37 They gathered soon after at Cornish, New Hampshire, to find a way out of the dilemna in which they were placed by this resolution. Spurned by the Allens, rebuffed in their efforts to reform New Hampshire, the Valley folk sought to recover the initiative by making a series of amaz- ing proposals to New Hampshire. The Convention proposed either to erect a new state composed of both banks of the upper Con- necticut, or to unite with New Hampshire if that state would lay claim to all Vermont.38 The purpose of the first proposal was to establish a state independent of its enemies in western Vermont and in seaboard New Hampshire. If the second proposal had been adopted, the inhabitants of the Connecticut Valley would have found themselves in a position to exercise a rough sort of balance of power between the Champlain Valley and seaboard New Hampshire in a greatly enlarged state of New Hampshire.
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